F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 15 2000 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
LORENZO SALAZAAR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. Nos. 99-2248 & 99-2260 (D.C. No. CIV-97-503-LH) JEFF ENCINIAS, City of Raton Police (D. N.M.) Officer, and CITY OF RATON,
Defendant-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY , PORFILIO , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
these appeals. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cases are
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. This appeal and cross-appeal arise from plaintiff’s action, brought pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in which he alleged that defendants violated his Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures when Officer Encinias
used excessive force in arresting him and caused plaintiff to suffer a subdural
hematoma. 1 The appeal is from the district court’s grant of summary judgment
in favor of defendant on causation: it ruled that plaintiff would not be permitted
to present evidence of his subdural hematoma at trial because he had not
presented sufficient evidence that Officer Encinias’ actions were the proximate
cause of the injury.
The cross-appeal is from the district court’s action in amending the
judgment to award nominal damages. Plaintiff’s excessive force and battery
claims proceeded to trial. The jury found that Officer Encinias did not batter
plaintiff, but it did find that he used excessive force in arresting him. The jury
further found that plaintiff did not prove that he was damaged, so it awarded no
damages. Plaintiff made post-trial motions in which he argued that, because the
jury found liability under § 1983, the court must amend the judgment to award
nominal damages. The district court granted the motion and amended the
judgment to reflect an award of one dollar in nominal damages. On cross-appeal,
1 Plaintiff also claimed that his arrest was without probable cause, but he has not appealed the district court’s judgment on that claim.
-2- defendant maintains that it was improper for the district court to amend the
judgment to award nominal damages.
No. 99-2248
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo ,
construing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff. Kaul v. Stephan ,
83 F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th Cir. 1996). Applying this standard, we conclude that
the district court was correct in granting partial summary judgment and in
precluding plaintiff from presenting evidence of his subdural hematoma.
Plaintiff’s summary judgment evidence established that his injury could
have been cause by “any one” of the blows plaintiff suffered that day: either
Officers Encinias’ excessive force or the attack by plaintiff’s neighbor. Affidavit
of Andrea Halliday, M.D., Appellant’s App. at 52. In other words, the evidence
established that this was a situation involving alternative liability. See Menne v.
Celotex Corp., 861 F.2d 1453, 1465-66 (10th Cir. 1988); Northington v. Marin ,
102 F.3d 1564, 1568 (10th Cir. 1996) (discussing alternative and concurrent
liability in concluding that case was one of concurrent liability). Citing
Northington , plaintiff argues that the burden should be shifted to the defendant to
prove he did not cause the harm. The burden-shifting portion of the Northington
holding is not applicable in this case, however, because plaintiff’s own summary
judgment evidence establishes that this is a case of alternative, not concurrent,
-3- liability. See id. at 1568 (holding that “the burden of proof shifts to the defendant
in the case of concurrent causes,” regardless whether all wrongdoers are before
the court). Unlike a concurrent liability situation, the burden in an alternative
liability case shifts to the defendant only when all wrongdoers are before the
court. See Menne , 861 F.2d at 1466; Northington , 102 F.3d at 1568 (citing
Menne ). This is an alternative liability case, and, because plaintiff did not join
both of the parties who could have caused his injury, he is not entitled to shift the
burden to require that Officer Encinias prove that he did not cause the injury.
Consequently, the district court was correct in ruling that plaintiff did not present
sufficient evidence of causation to submit the issue to the jury.
No. 99-2260
In his cross-appeal, defendant argues that it was at plaintiff’s own hand that
the jury was not instructed on nominal damages, and, thus, plaintiff should not
have been heard to argue that he must be awarded nominal damages in light of the
jury’s finding of liability. Alternatively, defendant also argues that the district
court’s amended judgment, awarding one dollar in nominal damages on the jury’s
liability finding, was an improper additur. We conclude that the district court
erred in amending the judgment to award nominal damages because plaintiff
waived any right to nominal damages.
Defendant’s proposed jury instruction number 13 instructed that:
-4- IF YOU RETURN A VERDICT FOR THE PLAINTIFF, BUT FIND THAT PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO PROVE BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE THAT HE SUFFERED ANY ACTUAL DAMAGES, THEN YOU MUST RETURN AN AWARD OF DAMAGES IN SOME NOMINAL OR TOKEN AMOUNT NOT TO EXCEED THE SUM OF ONE DOLLAR. NOMINAL DAMAGES MUST BE AWARDED WHEN THE PLAINTIFF HAS BEEN DEPRIVED BY DEFENDANT OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT BUT HAS SUFFERED NO ACTUAL DAMAGE AS A NATURAL CONSEQUENCE OF THAT DEPRIVATION. THE MERE FACT THAT A CONSTITUTIONAL DEPRIVATION OCCURRED IS AN INJURY TO THE PERSON ENTITLED TO ENJOY THAT RIGHT, EVEN WHEN NO ACTUAL DAMAGES FLOW FROM THE DEPRIVATION. THEREFORE, IF YOU FIND THAT PLAINTIFF HAS SUFFERED NO INJURY AS A RESULT OF THE DEFENDANT’S CONDUCT OTHER THAN THE FACT OF A CONSTITUTIONAL DEPRIVATION, YOU MUST AWARD NOMINAL DAMAGES NOT TO EXCEED ONE DOLLAR.
Appellee/Cross-Appellant’s App. at 32. Plaintiff objected to this instruction, both
in open court and in a letter generally objecting to all of defendant’s proposed
instructions. Id. at 36 (District Court Order), 33. 2 Consequently, “[c]onsistent
with Plaintiff’s objections the jury was instructed that it could award
compensatory damages, but no instruction was given on nominal damages.”
Id. at 36 (District Court Order).
2 The transcript of the open-court objections to the jury instructions is not in the record, but plaintiff does not dispute the accuracy of this statement, made in the district court’s order and in defendant’s briefs before the district court and on appeal.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 15 2000 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
LORENZO SALAZAAR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. Nos. 99-2248 & 99-2260 (D.C. No. CIV-97-503-LH) JEFF ENCINIAS, City of Raton Police (D. N.M.) Officer, and CITY OF RATON,
Defendant-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY , PORFILIO , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
these appeals. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cases are
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. This appeal and cross-appeal arise from plaintiff’s action, brought pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in which he alleged that defendants violated his Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures when Officer Encinias
used excessive force in arresting him and caused plaintiff to suffer a subdural
hematoma. 1 The appeal is from the district court’s grant of summary judgment
in favor of defendant on causation: it ruled that plaintiff would not be permitted
to present evidence of his subdural hematoma at trial because he had not
presented sufficient evidence that Officer Encinias’ actions were the proximate
cause of the injury.
The cross-appeal is from the district court’s action in amending the
judgment to award nominal damages. Plaintiff’s excessive force and battery
claims proceeded to trial. The jury found that Officer Encinias did not batter
plaintiff, but it did find that he used excessive force in arresting him. The jury
further found that plaintiff did not prove that he was damaged, so it awarded no
damages. Plaintiff made post-trial motions in which he argued that, because the
jury found liability under § 1983, the court must amend the judgment to award
nominal damages. The district court granted the motion and amended the
judgment to reflect an award of one dollar in nominal damages. On cross-appeal,
1 Plaintiff also claimed that his arrest was without probable cause, but he has not appealed the district court’s judgment on that claim.
-2- defendant maintains that it was improper for the district court to amend the
judgment to award nominal damages.
No. 99-2248
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo ,
construing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff. Kaul v. Stephan ,
83 F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th Cir. 1996). Applying this standard, we conclude that
the district court was correct in granting partial summary judgment and in
precluding plaintiff from presenting evidence of his subdural hematoma.
Plaintiff’s summary judgment evidence established that his injury could
have been cause by “any one” of the blows plaintiff suffered that day: either
Officers Encinias’ excessive force or the attack by plaintiff’s neighbor. Affidavit
of Andrea Halliday, M.D., Appellant’s App. at 52. In other words, the evidence
established that this was a situation involving alternative liability. See Menne v.
Celotex Corp., 861 F.2d 1453, 1465-66 (10th Cir. 1988); Northington v. Marin ,
102 F.3d 1564, 1568 (10th Cir. 1996) (discussing alternative and concurrent
liability in concluding that case was one of concurrent liability). Citing
Northington , plaintiff argues that the burden should be shifted to the defendant to
prove he did not cause the harm. The burden-shifting portion of the Northington
holding is not applicable in this case, however, because plaintiff’s own summary
judgment evidence establishes that this is a case of alternative, not concurrent,
-3- liability. See id. at 1568 (holding that “the burden of proof shifts to the defendant
in the case of concurrent causes,” regardless whether all wrongdoers are before
the court). Unlike a concurrent liability situation, the burden in an alternative
liability case shifts to the defendant only when all wrongdoers are before the
court. See Menne , 861 F.2d at 1466; Northington , 102 F.3d at 1568 (citing
Menne ). This is an alternative liability case, and, because plaintiff did not join
both of the parties who could have caused his injury, he is not entitled to shift the
burden to require that Officer Encinias prove that he did not cause the injury.
Consequently, the district court was correct in ruling that plaintiff did not present
sufficient evidence of causation to submit the issue to the jury.
No. 99-2260
In his cross-appeal, defendant argues that it was at plaintiff’s own hand that
the jury was not instructed on nominal damages, and, thus, plaintiff should not
have been heard to argue that he must be awarded nominal damages in light of the
jury’s finding of liability. Alternatively, defendant also argues that the district
court’s amended judgment, awarding one dollar in nominal damages on the jury’s
liability finding, was an improper additur. We conclude that the district court
erred in amending the judgment to award nominal damages because plaintiff
waived any right to nominal damages.
Defendant’s proposed jury instruction number 13 instructed that:
-4- IF YOU RETURN A VERDICT FOR THE PLAINTIFF, BUT FIND THAT PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO PROVE BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE THAT HE SUFFERED ANY ACTUAL DAMAGES, THEN YOU MUST RETURN AN AWARD OF DAMAGES IN SOME NOMINAL OR TOKEN AMOUNT NOT TO EXCEED THE SUM OF ONE DOLLAR. NOMINAL DAMAGES MUST BE AWARDED WHEN THE PLAINTIFF HAS BEEN DEPRIVED BY DEFENDANT OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT BUT HAS SUFFERED NO ACTUAL DAMAGE AS A NATURAL CONSEQUENCE OF THAT DEPRIVATION. THE MERE FACT THAT A CONSTITUTIONAL DEPRIVATION OCCURRED IS AN INJURY TO THE PERSON ENTITLED TO ENJOY THAT RIGHT, EVEN WHEN NO ACTUAL DAMAGES FLOW FROM THE DEPRIVATION. THEREFORE, IF YOU FIND THAT PLAINTIFF HAS SUFFERED NO INJURY AS A RESULT OF THE DEFENDANT’S CONDUCT OTHER THAN THE FACT OF A CONSTITUTIONAL DEPRIVATION, YOU MUST AWARD NOMINAL DAMAGES NOT TO EXCEED ONE DOLLAR.
Appellee/Cross-Appellant’s App. at 32. Plaintiff objected to this instruction, both
in open court and in a letter generally objecting to all of defendant’s proposed
instructions. Id. at 36 (District Court Order), 33. 2 Consequently, “[c]onsistent
with Plaintiff’s objections the jury was instructed that it could award
compensatory damages, but no instruction was given on nominal damages.”
Id. at 36 (District Court Order).
2 The transcript of the open-court objections to the jury instructions is not in the record, but plaintiff does not dispute the accuracy of this statement, made in the district court’s order and in defendant’s briefs before the district court and on appeal.
-5- By objecting to the very instruction he now seeks to benefit from, plaintiff
waived any right he had to a nominal damage award. See United States v.
Hardwell , 80 F.3d 1471, 1487 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating that defendant may not
invite a ruling and then seek to have it set aside on appeal); see also Alexander v.
Riga , 208 F.3d 419, 429 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that entitlement to nominal
damages is not automatic: plaintiff must make a timely request for nominal
damages), petition for cert. filed , (U.S. July 18, 2000) (No. 00-195); Warren v.
Fanning , 950 F.2d 1370, 1374 (8th Cir. 1991) (affirming trial court’s denial of
motion to amend judgment to include nominal damages where, not only did
plaintiff fail to object to instruction making nominal damage award discretionary,
but plaintiff actually proposed instruction); Sims v. Mulcahy , 902 F.2d 524,
533-34 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that plaintiff waived claim that jury was legally
required to award nominal damages where plaintiff not only failed to object to
jury instruction making nominal damages discretionary, but agreed with court that
there was no required minimum amount of nominal or compensatory damages).
The invited-error doctrine “prevents a party who induces an erroneous ruling from
being able to have it set aside on appeal,” United States v. Burson , 952 F.2d 1196,
1203 (10th Cir. 1991), and the same logic should apply to having the erroneous
ruling set aside in a post-judgment motion. Having made the strategic choice to
present the jury with an “all or nothing” option, plaintiff should not have been
-6- heard to complain about the lack of nominal damages after the jury chose
“nothing.” Because plaintiff waived entitlement to any legal rule that he must
be awarded at least nominal damages, deviation from the rule was not error.
See United States v. Olano , 507 U.S. 725, 732-33 (1993). Consequently, there
was no need for the district court to amend the judgment.
Conclusion
We AFFIRM the district court’s grant of partial summary judgment in
No. 99-2248. We REVERSE the district court’s ruling on the post-judgment
motion in No. 99-2260, and we REMAND to the district court with instructions
to vacate its amended judgment and reinstate the original judgment.
Entered for the Court
John C. Porfilio Circuit Judge
-7-