Salaam v. Morgan

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJanuary 24, 2020
Docket1:19-cv-11121
StatusUnknown

This text of Salaam v. Morgan (Salaam v. Morgan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Salaam v. Morgan, (S.D.N.Y. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK AZIZ SALAAM, Plaintiff, -against- 19-CV-11121 (CM) TIMOTHY MORGAN, G.I.T.S., Corcraft Industries Fishkill Correctional Facility; ORDER TO AMEND MAURICE PEIRSMA, I.T.S., Corcraft Industries Fishkill Correctional Facility, Defendants. COLLEEN McMAHON, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, appearing pro se, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated his federal constitutional rights.1 By order dated December 19, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (“IFP”). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

1 Plaintiff currently resides in Jamaica, New York, but brings this action in regard to events that occurred while he was incarcerated at Fishkill Correctional Facility. While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits –

to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals

of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Aziz Salaam brings this action regarding events that occurred when he was incarcerated at the Fishkill Correctional Facility. While incarcerated, Plaintiff worked at the Corcraft Metal Fabrication Industry, a division of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”) that employs inmates in the state’s correctional facilities. He sues Timothy Morgan and Maurice Peirsma, both Civilian Corcraft Industries Training Supervisors at Fishkill’s Metal Fabrication Industry. The following allegations are taken from the complaint: Plaintiff was prescribed psychotropic mental health medications that occasionally caused him to “nod off” when sitting down. (ECF No. 2, at 4.) In June 2019, while at work, Plaintiff went to use the bathroom and fell

asleep while sitting in a bathroom stall. He does not know how long he had been sleeping on the toilet. When he awoke, Timothy Morgan’s face was “under the bathroom stall door” and Morgan was demanding to see what was in Plaintiff’s hand. (Id.) Plaintiff was “shocked and appalled and afraid to move.” (Id.) Later that day, Plaintiff was “summoned to the Corcraft civilian office and [was] told to sign a paper or be written up for sleeping on the toilet.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that the paper he signed, referred to as a Counsel and Reprimand form, was written by Maurice Peirsma “under the instructions of Timothy Morgan.” (Id. at 4-5.) The form was placed in Plaintiff’s Corcraft work file.

For months after that incident, Morgan repeatedly made comments that Plaintiff was “probably on the toilet sleeping again.” (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff asserts that, as a result, he became “fearful of [his] safety to complain.” (Id.) Plaintiff also discontinued the psychotropic medication he was talking for a mental health condition because he was afraid that he might fall asleep on the toilet again “and feared having the repeat offense happen again.” (Id. at 5-6.) He alleges that “[e]veryone knew” that he took mental health medication that made him drowsy at work, but “no one ever spoke to [him] or made any corrective suggestions to help [him] remedy this matter.” (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff seeks declarative and injunctive relief, as well as money damages. DISCUSSION The Court construes the complaint as asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person

acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). A. Sexual Harassment and Abuse Verbal abuse, threats, and intimidation standing alone, without injury or damage, do not amount to a constitutional deprivation. See Purcell v. Coughlin, 790 F.2d 263, 265 (2d Cir. 1986) (name-calling without “any appreciable injury” is not a constitutional violation); Jones v. Harris, 665 F. Supp. 2d 384, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“It is well-settled that verbal harassment by a corrections officer, inexcusable though it be, does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.”); Shabazz v. Pico, 994 F. Supp. 460, 474 (S.D.N.Y.

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Bluebook (online)
Salaam v. Morgan, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/salaam-v-morgan-nysd-2020.