Saidwal v. Flagship

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: March 19, 2026
• Docket: 24-6573
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 19 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BIBI NOHIA SAIDWAL, No. 24-6573 D.C. No. 4:19-cv-08211-JSW Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. MEMORANDUM*

FLAGSHIP,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Jeffrey S. White, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 16, 2026**

Before: SILVERMAN, NGUYEN, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

Bibi Nohia Saidwal appeals pro se from the district court’s order confirming

an arbitration award in favor of defendant under the Federal Arbitration Act. We

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Johnson v. Gruma

Corp., 614 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2010) (confirmation of arbitration award);

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Collins v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 505 F.3d 874, 879 (9th Cir. 2007) (denial of motion to

vacate arbitration award). We affirm.

The district court properly confirmed the arbitration award because Saidwal

failed to establish any of the limited grounds on which an arbitration award may be

vacated. See 9 U.S.C. § 9 (“[T]he court must [confirm an arbitration award] unless

the award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of

this title.”); Collins, 505 F.3d at 879 (setting forth the limited grounds on which

courts may vacate an arbitration award); see also U.S. Life Ins. Co. v. Superior

Nat’l Ins. Co., 591 F.3d 1167, 1175 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Arbitrators enjoy wide

discretion to require the exchange of evidence, and to admit or exclude evidence,

how and when they see fit.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying further leave to

amend because amendment would have been futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide

Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of

review and explaining that leave to amend may be denied when amendment would

be futile); Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 1072 (9th

Cir. 2008) (explaining that “the district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is

particularly broad where plaintiff has previously amended the complaint” (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted)).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

2 24-6573 in the opening brief, or arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett

v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

3 24-6573