1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SAID ASKAROV, Case No.: 26-cv-1806-JES-DDL
12 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITION 13 v. FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
14 CHRISTOPHER LAROSE, warden of Otay Mesa Detention Center DANIEL A. [ECF No. 1] 15 BRIGHTMAN, San Diego Field Office 16 Director, Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Removal Operations 17 (“ICE/ERO”); TODD LYONS, Acting 18 Director of Immigration Customs Enforcement (“ICE”); KRISTI NOEM, 19 Secretary of the Department of Homeland 20 Security (“DHS”); PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General of the United States, 21 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 22 SECURITY; and U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, 23 Respondents. 24 Before the Court is Petitioner Said Askarov’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 25 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”), filed on March 22, 2026. ECF No. 1. Pursuant 26 to the Court’s order to show cause, Respondents filed a return to the petition. ECF No. 4 27 28 1 (“Return”). Petitioner filed an optional Traverse. ECF No. 5 (“Traverse”). For the reasons 2 set forth below, the Court GRANTS the petition. 3 I. BACKGROUND 4 Petitioner, a citizen of Kyrgyzstan, entered the United States on March 9, 2023, 5 fleeing persecution and discrimination in his home county. Pet. ¶¶ 1, 2. He was granted 6 humanitarian parole the same day. Id. ¶ 2. Petitioner since received work authorization, 7 found housing, and has integrated himself into the local community. Id. ¶ 3. In 2024, 8 Petitioner filed an application for asylum. Id. Petitioner states that he has met all conditions 9 of his parole. Id. ¶ 42. 10 Petitioner was re-detained on February 19, 2026, while driving for Uber. Id. ¶ 4. He 11 picked up an Uber client at Los Angeles International Airport and drove him to Camp 12 Pendleton Marine Base. Id. The guard at the entry gate asked for identification, asked if 13 Petitioner had a green card, and then ordered him to pull to the side and wait. Id. After 14 about two hours, military police ordered Petitioner out of his car and handcuffed him 15 without warrant or explanation. Id. The military police officers then delivered Petitioner to 16 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) officers, who drove Petitioner to Otay 17 Mesa Detention Center where he is currently still detained. Id. 18 Petitioner states that he was never given notice that his parole was being termination, 19 a particularized reason for his re-detention, or any opportunity to be heard. Id. ¶¶ 46, 47. 20 II. LEGAL STANDARD 21 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 22 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). 23 “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that 24 custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal 25 custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A court may grant a writ of 26 habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates to be in custody in violation of the 27 Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Traditionally, “the writ of habeas 28 corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in 1 that context that its protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 2 (2001). Accordingly, challenges to immigration-related detention are within the purview 3 of a district court's habeas jurisdiction. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see 4 also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003). 5 III. DISCUSSION 6 In his petition, Petitioner argues that his re-detention violated the Administrative 7 Procedure Act and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because Respondents 8 revoked his release on supervision on the basis of his 2003 conviction, which predated his 9 release, without providing any process regarding his re-detention. Pet. ¶ 44. Respondents 10 argue only that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), but 11 correctly concede that courts have consistently held otherwise. See generally, Return. The 12 Court does not find that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 13 1225(b) for the reasons set forth in Martinez Lopez v. LaRose, No. 25- cv-2717-JES-AHG, 14 2025 WL 3030457 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2025). The Court analyzes Petitioner’s Due Process 15 claim below. 16 “The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the Government from 17 depriving individuals of their life, liberty, or property, without due process of 18 law.” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 990 (9th Cir. 2017). “[T]he Due Process Clause 19 applies to all persons within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence is 20 lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 679. “Freedom from 21 imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint— 22 lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.” Id. at 690. A person at risk of suffering 23 a serious loss being given notice and an opportunity to be heard, in a meaningful manner 24 and at a meaningful time, is the essence of procedural due process. Mathews v. Eldridge, 25 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 26 Courts have identified various ways that a petitioner may be granted some form of 27 release. The choice is “discretionary and is made on a case-by-case basis.” J.S.H.M v. 28 Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01309 JLT SKO, 2025 WL 2938808, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 1 2025). Parole can be made for humanitarian reasons or for it providing a significant public 2 benefit under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), or it can be for conditional parole under 8 U.S.C. 3 § 1226(a). Id. Courts have recognized that typically, the term “released on their own 4 recognizance” refers to conditional parole. Id.; see also Ortega-Cervantes v. Gonzales, 501 5 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2007) (“It is apparent that the INS used the phrase ‘released on 6 recognizance’ as another name for ‘conditional parole’ under § 1226(a)”); Castellon, 2025 7 WL 2373425, at *4; Faizyan v. Casey, No. 3:25-CV-0884-RBM-JLB, 2025 WL 3208844, 8 at *1 n.2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2025). 9 While courts have recognized these as distinct procedures, they have consistently 10 applied the same procedural due process analysis to petitioners under these forms of parole. 11 In the context of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), courts have held that such parole status entitles 12 the petitioner to certain due process rights under both procedural due process and the 13 Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). See Y-Z-L-H v. Bostock, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 14 1146 (D. Or.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SAID ASKAROV, Case No.: 26-cv-1806-JES-DDL
12 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITION 13 v. FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
14 CHRISTOPHER LAROSE, warden of Otay Mesa Detention Center DANIEL A. [ECF No. 1] 15 BRIGHTMAN, San Diego Field Office 16 Director, Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Removal Operations 17 (“ICE/ERO”); TODD LYONS, Acting 18 Director of Immigration Customs Enforcement (“ICE”); KRISTI NOEM, 19 Secretary of the Department of Homeland 20 Security (“DHS”); PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General of the United States, 21 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 22 SECURITY; and U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, 23 Respondents. 24 Before the Court is Petitioner Said Askarov’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 25 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”), filed on March 22, 2026. ECF No. 1. Pursuant 26 to the Court’s order to show cause, Respondents filed a return to the petition. ECF No. 4 27 28 1 (“Return”). Petitioner filed an optional Traverse. ECF No. 5 (“Traverse”). For the reasons 2 set forth below, the Court GRANTS the petition. 3 I. BACKGROUND 4 Petitioner, a citizen of Kyrgyzstan, entered the United States on March 9, 2023, 5 fleeing persecution and discrimination in his home county. Pet. ¶¶ 1, 2. He was granted 6 humanitarian parole the same day. Id. ¶ 2. Petitioner since received work authorization, 7 found housing, and has integrated himself into the local community. Id. ¶ 3. In 2024, 8 Petitioner filed an application for asylum. Id. Petitioner states that he has met all conditions 9 of his parole. Id. ¶ 42. 10 Petitioner was re-detained on February 19, 2026, while driving for Uber. Id. ¶ 4. He 11 picked up an Uber client at Los Angeles International Airport and drove him to Camp 12 Pendleton Marine Base. Id. The guard at the entry gate asked for identification, asked if 13 Petitioner had a green card, and then ordered him to pull to the side and wait. Id. After 14 about two hours, military police ordered Petitioner out of his car and handcuffed him 15 without warrant or explanation. Id. The military police officers then delivered Petitioner to 16 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) officers, who drove Petitioner to Otay 17 Mesa Detention Center where he is currently still detained. Id. 18 Petitioner states that he was never given notice that his parole was being termination, 19 a particularized reason for his re-detention, or any opportunity to be heard. Id. ¶¶ 46, 47. 20 II. LEGAL STANDARD 21 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 22 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). 23 “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that 24 custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal 25 custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A court may grant a writ of 26 habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates to be in custody in violation of the 27 Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Traditionally, “the writ of habeas 28 corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in 1 that context that its protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 2 (2001). Accordingly, challenges to immigration-related detention are within the purview 3 of a district court's habeas jurisdiction. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see 4 also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003). 5 III. DISCUSSION 6 In his petition, Petitioner argues that his re-detention violated the Administrative 7 Procedure Act and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because Respondents 8 revoked his release on supervision on the basis of his 2003 conviction, which predated his 9 release, without providing any process regarding his re-detention. Pet. ¶ 44. Respondents 10 argue only that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), but 11 correctly concede that courts have consistently held otherwise. See generally, Return. The 12 Court does not find that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 13 1225(b) for the reasons set forth in Martinez Lopez v. LaRose, No. 25- cv-2717-JES-AHG, 14 2025 WL 3030457 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2025). The Court analyzes Petitioner’s Due Process 15 claim below. 16 “The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the Government from 17 depriving individuals of their life, liberty, or property, without due process of 18 law.” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 990 (9th Cir. 2017). “[T]he Due Process Clause 19 applies to all persons within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence is 20 lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 679. “Freedom from 21 imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint— 22 lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.” Id. at 690. A person at risk of suffering 23 a serious loss being given notice and an opportunity to be heard, in a meaningful manner 24 and at a meaningful time, is the essence of procedural due process. Mathews v. Eldridge, 25 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 26 Courts have identified various ways that a petitioner may be granted some form of 27 release. The choice is “discretionary and is made on a case-by-case basis.” J.S.H.M v. 28 Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01309 JLT SKO, 2025 WL 2938808, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 1 2025). Parole can be made for humanitarian reasons or for it providing a significant public 2 benefit under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), or it can be for conditional parole under 8 U.S.C. 3 § 1226(a). Id. Courts have recognized that typically, the term “released on their own 4 recognizance” refers to conditional parole. Id.; see also Ortega-Cervantes v. Gonzales, 501 5 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2007) (“It is apparent that the INS used the phrase ‘released on 6 recognizance’ as another name for ‘conditional parole’ under § 1226(a)”); Castellon, 2025 7 WL 2373425, at *4; Faizyan v. Casey, No. 3:25-CV-0884-RBM-JLB, 2025 WL 3208844, 8 at *1 n.2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2025). 9 While courts have recognized these as distinct procedures, they have consistently 10 applied the same procedural due process analysis to petitioners under these forms of parole. 11 In the context of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), courts have held that such parole status entitles 12 the petitioner to certain due process rights under both procedural due process and the 13 Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). See Y-Z-L-H v. Bostock, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 14 1146 (D. Or. 2025) (finding violation under APA); Mata Velasquez v. Kurzdorfer, 794 F. 15 Supp. 3d 128, 154 (W.D.N.Y. 2025) (finding violation under procedural due process). 16 Similarly, for conditional release under § 1226(a), the court in Pinchi explained similar 17 procedural due process rights: 18 [Petitioner’s] release from ICE custody after her initial apprehension reflected a determination by the government that she was neither a flight risk nor a 19 danger to the community, and [Petitioner] has a strong interest in remaining 20 at liberty unless she no longer meets those criteria. The regulations authorizing ICE to release a noncitizen from custody require that the 21 noncitizen “demonstrate to the satisfaction of the officer that such release 22 would not pose a danger to property or persons” and that the noncitizen is “likely to appear for any future proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8). “Release 23 [therefore] reflects a determination by the government that the noncitizen is 24 not a danger to the community or a flight risk.” Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2017), aff'd sub nom. Saravia for A.H. v. 25 Sessions, 905 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2018). [Petitioner] was apprehended by ICE 26 officers when she crossed the border into the United States . . . ICE then released her on her own recognizance. As ICE was not authorized to release 27 [Petitioner] if she was a danger to the community or a flight risk, the Court 28 must infer from [the] release that ICE determined she was neither. 1 [Petitioner’s] release from ICE custody constituted an “implied promise” that her liberty would not be revoked unless she “failed to live up to the conditions 2 of her release.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972). The 3 regulatory framework makes clear that those conditions were that she remain neither a danger to the community nor a flight risk. . . . Accordingly, 4 [Petitioner’s] private interest in retaining her liberty is significant. 5 Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1034-35 (N.D. Cal. 2025). Several district courts 6 have followed suit and found due process violations where the petitioners in the cases were 7 specifically identified to be released under Order of Release on Recognizance with an 8 accompanying I-220 form. See C.A.R.V. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01395 JLT SKO, 2025 9 WL 3059549, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2025) (finding due process violation where 10 petitioner was originally released on OREC); Leiva Flores, 2025 WL 3228306, at *5 11 (similarly finding procedural due process violation for petitioner released on OREC and 12 requiring hearing before detention); Faizyan, 2025 WL 3208844, at *7 (same). 13 The Court agrees with all the foregoing courts and similarly holds that Respondents 14 created a liberty interest in Petitioner when they issued his parole. See Pet. ¶ 39. As this 15 Court explained in Sanchez v. LaRose, due process requires not only notice and opportunity 16 to be heard regarding the revocation of such an interest, but also that the notice and 17 opportunity be meaningful. No. 25-CV-2396-JES-MMP, 2025 WL 2770629 at *3 (S.D. 18 Cal. Sept. 26, 2025). Petitioner alleges that he has not been provided any notice or 19 opportunity to be heard regarding the revocation of his parole. Pet. ¶¶ 46, 47. In their 20 briefing, Respondents provide no evidence that Petitioner was afforded any notice or 21 opportunity to be heard regarding the revocation of his parole. See generally ECF No. 4. 22 Further, without changed circumstances or another factor justifying re-detention, any 23 notice and opportunity to be heard that did occur could not have been meaningful. See Rios 24 v. Noem, No. 25-CV-2866-JES-VET, 2025 WL 3141207, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2025) 25 (“An alien's opportunity to be heard regarding a change in his status is only meaningful if 26 the government comports with its own internal standards regarding parole revocation. DHS 27 has the authority to revoke an alien's supervised release ‘at any time’ on a discretionary, 28 1 || but not unlimited, basis.”). Petitioner alleges, and Respondents do not contest, that there 2 || were no changed circumstances or individualized findings in Petitioner’s case justifying 3 ||his re-detention. /d. 4 6. The manner in which Petitioner was re-detained reflects this, 4 because Petitioner was taken to immigration detention after driving an Uber passenger 5 || from the airport to Camp Pendleton and being asked about his legal status by a guard. /d. 6 Accordingly, the Court finds that Respondents violated Petitioner’s due process rights 7 || when they re-detained him on February 19, 2026. 8 IV. CONCLUSION 9 For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s writ of habeas 10 ||corpus, and does not reach the remainder of Petitioner’s claims as the requested relief is 11 || granted. Because the Court grants the petition on the Due Process ground and concludes 12 ||that Respondents’ revocation of Petitioner’s supervised release violates procedural due 13 process, Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from custody, 14 ||subject to any conditions of his preexisting release that existed at the time he was re- 15 detained. The Parties are ORDERED to file a Joint Status Report by March 31, 2026, 16 || confirming that Petitioner has been released. 17 IT ISSO ORDERED. 18 || Dated: March 30, 2026 19 Aa Sin, 20 Honorable James E. Sunmons Jr. 1 United States District Judge 22 23 24 25 26 27 28