1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 SATWANT S. SAHOTA, an No. 2:24-cv-136 WBS AC individual, and JASDEE SHAKER, 13 an individual, 14 Plaintiffs, ORDER RE: PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES 15 v. 16 MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC, a Delaware limited liability 17 company, and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, 18 Defendants. 19 20 ----oo0oo---- 21 22 The parties settled this vehicular warranty action 23 arising under the Song-Beverly Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1794, 24 without resolving “the issue of attorneys’ fees and costs.” 25 (Docket No. 17 at 2.) Plaintiffs Satwant S. Sahota and Jasdee 26 Shaker (collectively, “plaintiffs”) now move for $101,149.61 in 27 attorneys’ fees and costs. (Docket No. 33 at 2, 8, 13, 25.) 28 Defendant Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (“defendant”) opposes on the 1 ground that plaintiffs are entitled to “no more than $16,830.00” 2 in attorneys’ fees and costs. (Docket No. 22 at 11.) The 3 parties appear to agree that plaintiffs may recover some 4 reasonable “attorneys’ fees and costs.” (Docket No. 17 at 2 5 (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(d)).) 6 The applicable fee-shifting statute provides that a 7 prevailing buyer may recover “a sum equal to the aggregate amount 8 of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual 9 time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably 10 incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and 11 prosecution of such action.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(d). “State 12 law governs attorney’s fees awards based on state fee-shifting 13 laws,” such as the Song-Beverly Act. Graham-Sult v. Clainos, 756 14 F.3d 724, 751 (9th Cir. 2014). “The fee setting inquiry in 15 California ordinarily begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the 16 number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable 17 hourly rate.” PLCM Grp. v. Drexler, 22 Cal. 4th 1084, 1095-96 18 (2000) (capitalization altered). The lodestar may then by 19 adjusted upward or downward by the court based on relevant 20 factors. See Ketchum v. Moses, 24 Cal. 4th 1122, 1131-32 (2001). 21 “A ‘reasonable’ number of hours equals ‘the number of 22 hours which could reasonably have been billed to a private 23 client.’” Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1202-03 24 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation modified) (quoting Moreno v. City of 25 Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1111-12 (9th Cir. 2008)). “The 26 reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for 27 similar work.” PLCM Grp., 22 Cal. 4th at 1095. “Generally, when 28 determining a reasonable hourly rate, the relevant community is 1 the forum in which the district court sits.” Camacho v. 2 Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 979 (9th Cir. 2008). The 3 court may only use “rates from outside the forum . . . ‘if local 4 counsel was unavailable.’” Owen v. Hyundai Motor Am., No. 2:22- 5 cv-882 KJM CKD, 2024 WL 3967691, at *3-4 & nn.4-6 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 6 28, 2024) (quoting Barjon v. Dalton, 132 F.3d 496, 500 (9th Cir. 7 1997)). 8 Local Rule 293(c) provides the following non-exhaustive 9 list of factors that may guide the court’s award of attorneys’ 10 fees: (1) the time and labor required of the attorney(s), (2) the 11 novelty and difficulty of the questions presented, (3) the skill 12 required to perform the legal service properly, (4) the 13 preclusion of other employment by the attorney(s) because of the 14 acceptance of the action, (5) the customary fee charged in 15 matters of the type involved, (6) whether the fee contracted 16 between the attorney and the client is fixed or contingent, (7) 17 any time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances, 18 (8) the amount of money, or the value of the rights involved, and 19 the results obtained, (9) the experience, reputation, and ability 20 of the attorney(s), (10) the “undesirability” of the action, (11) 21 the nature and length of the professional relationship between 22 the attorney and the client, (12) awards in similar actions, and 23 (13) such other matters as the Court may deem appropriate under 24 the circumstances. L.R. 293(c); accord Kerr v. Screen Extras 25 Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975) (identifying the 26 same factors as relevant), abrogated on other grounds by City of 27 Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 561-67 (1992). 28 Plaintiffs propose a lodestar figure of $63,302.50, 1 based on 113.8 hours billed by seven attorneys (five associates 2 and two partners), at hourly rates ranging from $550.00 to 3 $700.00. (See Decl. of Sepehr Daghighian (“Daghighian Decl.”) 4 Ex. A at 9-10 (Docket Nos. 21-1, 21-2)). Plaintiffs provide 5 itemized billing of the work performed on the matter, broken down 6 by each attorney. (Id. at 1-9.) 7 After reviewing plaintiffs’ legal bills, the court 8 finds no issue with their counsel’s individual time entries. 9 See Shepard v. Miler, No. 2:10-cv-1863 WBS JFM, 2011 WL 1740603, 10 at *3-6 (E.D. Cal. May 5, 2011). Defendant opposes the instant 11 motion on the ground that plaintiffs’ counsel used “improper 12 block-billing” but cites no case law from this court reducing an 13 award of attorneys’ fees for that reason. (See Docket No. 22 at 14 7-8.) Likewise, the court finds no evidence that plaintiffs’ 15 counsel exaggerated their time billed. (Id. at 8-9.) The 16 challenged entries appear recoverable in nature and reasonable in 17 amount. See Reade v. N.Y. Times Co., No. 2:22-cv-543 WBS KJN, 18 2023 WL 2602296, at *2-3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2023). Thus, the 19 court declines to modify the amount of fees awarded for that 20 reason. 21 Sacramento, or the Eastern District of California more 22 broadly, is the “relevant community” for purposes of using an 23 hourly rate to calculate a lodestar. See Camacho, 523 F.3d at 24 979. Some of the rates sought exceed what is typically awarded 25 here in this district. See Owen, 2024 WL 3967691, at *3-4 & 26 nn.4-6 (collecting cases). Even though plaintiffs’ counsel has a 27 local office in Sacramento, it appears that each attorney who 28 worked on this case is instead based in the Central District of 1 California. (See Daghighian Decl. ¶¶ 16-25.) The Central 2 District, encompassing Los Angeles and surrounding communities, 3 typically awards higher fees than the Eastern District does. 4 See Reade, 2023 WL 2602296, at *1-2. Indeed, the rates sought 5 appear more consistent with rates that have been approved in the 6 districts in which the attorneys’ offices are located. 7 Michael A. Brim, with twenty years of experience 8 practicing law, billed 56.2 hours in this matter at an hourly 9 rate of $550.00. (Daghighian Decl. ¶ 12.) Miguel A. Ortiz, with 10 nineteen years of experience, billed 22.6 hours here at a rate of 11 $525.00. (Id. ¶ 13.) Alastair F. Hamblin, who has practiced law 12 for thirteen years, billed 19.4 hours in the case at an hourly 13 rate of $550.00. (Id. ¶ 11.) Brian T. Shippen-Murray, who has 14 thirteen years of experience, billed 1.3 hours here at a rate of 15 $550.00. (Id.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 SATWANT S. SAHOTA, an No. 2:24-cv-136 WBS AC individual, and JASDEE SHAKER, 13 an individual, 14 Plaintiffs, ORDER RE: PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES 15 v. 16 MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC, a Delaware limited liability 17 company, and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, 18 Defendants. 19 20 ----oo0oo---- 21 22 The parties settled this vehicular warranty action 23 arising under the Song-Beverly Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1794, 24 without resolving “the issue of attorneys’ fees and costs.” 25 (Docket No. 17 at 2.) Plaintiffs Satwant S. Sahota and Jasdee 26 Shaker (collectively, “plaintiffs”) now move for $101,149.61 in 27 attorneys’ fees and costs. (Docket No. 33 at 2, 8, 13, 25.) 28 Defendant Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (“defendant”) opposes on the 1 ground that plaintiffs are entitled to “no more than $16,830.00” 2 in attorneys’ fees and costs. (Docket No. 22 at 11.) The 3 parties appear to agree that plaintiffs may recover some 4 reasonable “attorneys’ fees and costs.” (Docket No. 17 at 2 5 (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(d)).) 6 The applicable fee-shifting statute provides that a 7 prevailing buyer may recover “a sum equal to the aggregate amount 8 of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual 9 time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably 10 incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and 11 prosecution of such action.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(d). “State 12 law governs attorney’s fees awards based on state fee-shifting 13 laws,” such as the Song-Beverly Act. Graham-Sult v. Clainos, 756 14 F.3d 724, 751 (9th Cir. 2014). “The fee setting inquiry in 15 California ordinarily begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the 16 number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable 17 hourly rate.” PLCM Grp. v. Drexler, 22 Cal. 4th 1084, 1095-96 18 (2000) (capitalization altered). The lodestar may then by 19 adjusted upward or downward by the court based on relevant 20 factors. See Ketchum v. Moses, 24 Cal. 4th 1122, 1131-32 (2001). 21 “A ‘reasonable’ number of hours equals ‘the number of 22 hours which could reasonably have been billed to a private 23 client.’” Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1202-03 24 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation modified) (quoting Moreno v. City of 25 Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1111-12 (9th Cir. 2008)). “The 26 reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for 27 similar work.” PLCM Grp., 22 Cal. 4th at 1095. “Generally, when 28 determining a reasonable hourly rate, the relevant community is 1 the forum in which the district court sits.” Camacho v. 2 Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 979 (9th Cir. 2008). The 3 court may only use “rates from outside the forum . . . ‘if local 4 counsel was unavailable.’” Owen v. Hyundai Motor Am., No. 2:22- 5 cv-882 KJM CKD, 2024 WL 3967691, at *3-4 & nn.4-6 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 6 28, 2024) (quoting Barjon v. Dalton, 132 F.3d 496, 500 (9th Cir. 7 1997)). 8 Local Rule 293(c) provides the following non-exhaustive 9 list of factors that may guide the court’s award of attorneys’ 10 fees: (1) the time and labor required of the attorney(s), (2) the 11 novelty and difficulty of the questions presented, (3) the skill 12 required to perform the legal service properly, (4) the 13 preclusion of other employment by the attorney(s) because of the 14 acceptance of the action, (5) the customary fee charged in 15 matters of the type involved, (6) whether the fee contracted 16 between the attorney and the client is fixed or contingent, (7) 17 any time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances, 18 (8) the amount of money, or the value of the rights involved, and 19 the results obtained, (9) the experience, reputation, and ability 20 of the attorney(s), (10) the “undesirability” of the action, (11) 21 the nature and length of the professional relationship between 22 the attorney and the client, (12) awards in similar actions, and 23 (13) such other matters as the Court may deem appropriate under 24 the circumstances. L.R. 293(c); accord Kerr v. Screen Extras 25 Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975) (identifying the 26 same factors as relevant), abrogated on other grounds by City of 27 Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 561-67 (1992). 28 Plaintiffs propose a lodestar figure of $63,302.50, 1 based on 113.8 hours billed by seven attorneys (five associates 2 and two partners), at hourly rates ranging from $550.00 to 3 $700.00. (See Decl. of Sepehr Daghighian (“Daghighian Decl.”) 4 Ex. A at 9-10 (Docket Nos. 21-1, 21-2)). Plaintiffs provide 5 itemized billing of the work performed on the matter, broken down 6 by each attorney. (Id. at 1-9.) 7 After reviewing plaintiffs’ legal bills, the court 8 finds no issue with their counsel’s individual time entries. 9 See Shepard v. Miler, No. 2:10-cv-1863 WBS JFM, 2011 WL 1740603, 10 at *3-6 (E.D. Cal. May 5, 2011). Defendant opposes the instant 11 motion on the ground that plaintiffs’ counsel used “improper 12 block-billing” but cites no case law from this court reducing an 13 award of attorneys’ fees for that reason. (See Docket No. 22 at 14 7-8.) Likewise, the court finds no evidence that plaintiffs’ 15 counsel exaggerated their time billed. (Id. at 8-9.) The 16 challenged entries appear recoverable in nature and reasonable in 17 amount. See Reade v. N.Y. Times Co., No. 2:22-cv-543 WBS KJN, 18 2023 WL 2602296, at *2-3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2023). Thus, the 19 court declines to modify the amount of fees awarded for that 20 reason. 21 Sacramento, or the Eastern District of California more 22 broadly, is the “relevant community” for purposes of using an 23 hourly rate to calculate a lodestar. See Camacho, 523 F.3d at 24 979. Some of the rates sought exceed what is typically awarded 25 here in this district. See Owen, 2024 WL 3967691, at *3-4 & 26 nn.4-6 (collecting cases). Even though plaintiffs’ counsel has a 27 local office in Sacramento, it appears that each attorney who 28 worked on this case is instead based in the Central District of 1 California. (See Daghighian Decl. ¶¶ 16-25.) The Central 2 District, encompassing Los Angeles and surrounding communities, 3 typically awards higher fees than the Eastern District does. 4 See Reade, 2023 WL 2602296, at *1-2. Indeed, the rates sought 5 appear more consistent with rates that have been approved in the 6 districts in which the attorneys’ offices are located. 7 Michael A. Brim, with twenty years of experience 8 practicing law, billed 56.2 hours in this matter at an hourly 9 rate of $550.00. (Daghighian Decl. ¶ 12.) Miguel A. Ortiz, with 10 nineteen years of experience, billed 22.6 hours here at a rate of 11 $525.00. (Id. ¶ 13.) Alastair F. Hamblin, who has practiced law 12 for thirteen years, billed 19.4 hours in the case at an hourly 13 rate of $550.00. (Id. ¶ 11.) Brian T. Shippen-Murray, who has 14 thirteen years of experience, billed 1.3 hours here at a rate of 15 $550.00. (Id. ¶ 9.) Sepehr Daghighian, one of the two partners 16 who worked on the matter, has twenty years of experience 17 practicing law and billed 11.1 hours in the matter at an hourly 18 rate of $625.00. (Id. ¶¶ 1-7.)1 19 Last year, this court found that the appropriate hourly 20 rates for attorneys with 21-23 years of experience was $500.00. 21 See Owen, 2024 WL 3967691, at *3-5 & nn.4-6. It also concluded 22 that the work of an attorney who had 14 years of experience was 23 1 The other associate, Michael W. Oppenheim, has a 24 billing rate of $350.00 with five years of experience practicing law. (See Daghighian Decl. ¶ 10.) The second partner Michael H. 25 Rosenstein has practiced law for 32 years and billed 3.1 hours in this case at a rate of $700.00. (Id. ¶ 8.) Because their hourly 26 rates better match their experience, and the two lawyers only 27 billed for 3.2 hours between the two of them, the court declines to reduce what these two attorneys have billed. See Owen, 2024 28 WL 3967691, at *3-4 & nn.4-6. 1 compensable at an hourly rate of $375.00. Id. 2 Accordingly, the court adjusts the associates’ hourly 3 rates as follows: Brim from $550.00 to $500.00, Ortiz from 4 $525.00 to $500.00, Hamblin from $550.00 to $375.00, and Shippen- 5 Murray from $550.00 to $375.00. Id. Similarly, for Daghighian, 6 the court adjusts his hourly rate from $625.00 to $500.00. The 7 difference between what plaintiffs’ counsel billed and what they 8 should have billed for work in the Eastern District’s community 9 is $8,385.00. Accordingly, the court reduces the suggested 10 lodestar amount from $63,302.50 to $54,917.50.2 11 Plaintiffs contend that the court should further 12 multiply the lodestar amount by 150% based on numerous factors, 13 including the novelty of the legal issues, the high skill level 14 of the attorneys that worked on the matter, and the results 15 obtained. (See Docket No. 21 at 20-23.) The court disagrees. 16 Notwithstanding counsel’s self-serving assertions that his firm 17 is far superior to the other law firms routinely handling Song- 18 Beverly Act cases, the court finds nothing unusually complex 19 about the facts or law in this case, counsel’s qualifications, or 20 the result obtained that would warrant a departure from the 21 lodestar amount. 22 The court has rarely if ever increased attorneys’ fees 23 2 At oral argument on June 9, 2025, plaintiffs’ counsel 24 repeatedly cited Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc., 35 Cal. App. 4th 112, 137-38 (3d Dist. 1995), for the proposition that 25 the court should use hourly rates billed by attorneys in Los Angeles. This case was not only overruled in part by the 26 California Supreme Court, see Rodriguez v. FCA US LLC, 17 Cal. 27 5th 189, 204-06 (2024), but also has nothing at all to do with attorneys’ fees, instead addressing “expert witness fees.” 28 See Jensen, 35 Cal. App. 4th at 137-38. 1 by a multiplier in analogous cases involving the same or peer 2 defendants and similar causes of action. See, e.g., Davis v. 3 Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No. 2:21-cv-174 KJM KJN, 2022 WL 4 16529527, at *3-4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2022) (“No multiplier is 5 warranted here.”); Cianchetta v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, No. 2:20-cv- 6 241 KJM JDP, 2022 WL 2160556, at *6-7 (E.D. Cal. June 15, 2022) 7 (same); Nagesh v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, No. 2:18-cv-829 KJM JDP, 8 2021 WL 1060357, at *4-5 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2021) (“No 9 enhancement to the lodestar award is appropriate in this case, 10 which involved no novel or difficult issues, no unusually skilled 11 work by counsel, and no other employment precluded.”); Seebach v. 12 BMW of N. Am., LLC, No. 2:18-cv-109 KJM AC, 2020 WL 4923664, at 13 *6-7 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2020) (same); see also Owen, 2024 WL 14 3967691, at *8-9 (reducing award of attorneys’ fees by a 15 multiplier instead). 16 Therefore, the court will not multiply the lodestar 17 amount because it “represents the fair market value of this 18 particular action.” Siafarikas v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 19 No. 2:20-cv-1784 JAM AC, 2022 WL 16926265, at *3-4 (E.D. Cal. 20 Nov. 14, 2022). 21 Because the court finds plaintiffs’ modified award of 22 attorneys’ fee reasonable under Local Rule 293(c), the court 23 finds plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys’ fees as a prevailing 24 party and shall be awarded the same.3
25 3 Pursuant to counsel’s agreement at oral argument on June 9, 2025, the court will DENY plaintiffs’ request for costs 26 and expenses without prejudice subject to plaintiffs filing a 27 properly formatted bill of costs after the court enters judgment pursuant to Local Rule 292. In addition to complying with the 28 Local Rule, plaintiffs’ counsel is advised to provide supporting —_—_—Ne mI EEE INI NOOR DE IIE IIE ES IIE ENED IEEE EE EEO IEE IGE GOS IED OE OE
1 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion for 2 attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses (Docket No. 21) be, and the 3 same hereby is, GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Plaintiffs 4 are hereby awarded $54,917.50 in attorneys’ fees.’ 5 | Dated: June 10, 2025 bet ak. 1d 6 WILLIAM B. SHUBB 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 documentation for each item on the bill of costs. 22 4 Under separate cover, plaintiffs objected to a declaration defense counsel filed in opposition to their motion. 23 (See Docket Nos. 22-1, 24.) “The general practice of objecting to evidence during motion practice is unproductive and 24 unnecessary.” Shepard, 2011 WL 1740603, at *5-6 (capitalization 5 altered) (citing Burch v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 433 F. > Supp. 2d 1110, 1118-20 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (Shubb, J.)). The court 26 OVERRULES their “boilerplate evidentiary objections.” See Siafarikas, 2022 WL 16926265, at *1 n.2; see also Davis, 2022 27 WL 16529527, at *1 n.1 (“To the extent this court’s analysis implicates any declaration to which there was an objection, such 28 | objection is overruled.”).