1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SAGAR SAGAR, No. 1:26-cv-0843 DC CSK 12 Petitioner, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS GRANTING PETITIONER’S WRIT OF 13 v. HABEAS CORPUS 14 CHRISTOPHER CHESTNUT, Warden of the California City Detention Facility, et 15 al., 16 Respondents. 17 18 Petitioner Sagar Sagar, who fled India, and entered the United States on December 18, 19 2024, has filed a verified petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.1 20 Petitioner was initially detained by Customs and Border Protection inside the U.S. and released 21 on December 27, 2024 on his own recognizance pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(B)(2). On 22 January 12, 2026, petitioner was re-arrested and re-detained, despite no change in circumstances, 23 and without a pre-deprivation hearing. Petitioner has been in continuous detention since January 24 12, 2026. This habeas action concerns petitioner’s re-detention. For the reasons that follow, the 25 Court recommends granting the petition for a writ of habeas corpus and ordering petitioner’s 26 immediate release. 27 1 This matter proceeds before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, 28 and Local Rule 302(c)(17). 1 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND2 2 Petitioner is a 19-year old citizen and native of India. (ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 11, 50.) On 3 December 18, 2024,3 petitioner entered the United States without inspection and was detained by 4 U.S. Customs and Border Protection. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 3.) On December 27, 2024, petitioner was 5 released on his own recognizance under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(B)(2) (Section 236 of the 6 Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”)). (Id. at ¶¶ 4, 54.) Petitioner was not paroled from 7 custody pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). (Id. at ¶ 55.) No credible fear or other interview as to 8 admissibility occurred during initial arrest. (Id. at ¶ 56.) Petitioner was issued a Notice to Appear 9 in Section 1229a removal proceedings, which are standard removal proceedings.4 (Id. at ¶ 57.) 10 In addition, the Notice to Appear does not allege petitioner is an “arriving alien,” though the 11 Notice does include a place to designate this information. (Id. at ¶ 63.) Thereafter, petitioner 12 filed an application for asylum with the immigration court. (Id. at ¶ 58.) Petitioner applied for 13 temporary work authorization and his application was approved. (Id. at ¶ 59.) 14 Petitioner has never been arrested, or missed any appointments with U.S. Immigration and 15 Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) or any other agency, and has complied with all terms of his 16 conditional parole. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 64.) Petitioner has fully complied with all requirements to 17 apply for asylum protection and to appear at immigration appointments. (Id. at ¶ 72.) 18 On or about January 12, 2026, respondents rearrested petitioner despite no material 19 change in circumstances. (Id. at ¶ 60.) Petitioner was not provided a pre-deprivation hearing or 20 notice of the basis for his detention. (Id. at ¶ 61.) Petitioner was not deemed to be a flight risk or 21 2 Petitioner filed a verified habeas petition. (ECF No. 1 at 17-18.) A court “may treat the 22 allegations of a verified . . . petition [for writ of habeas corpus] as an affidavit.” L. v. Lamarque, 23 351 F.3d 919, 924 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 197-98 (9th Cir. 1987)). Respondents do not contest petitioner’s factual allegations. (See ECF No. 8.) 24 3 The petition appears to have a typographical error for the year of petitioner’s entry into the United States in paragraph 51 of the petition (listed as December 18, “2026”). This typographical 25 error does not affect the Court’s analysis where the year is listed correctly as 2024 in paragraph 3 of the petition. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 3 (December 18, 2024 entry date); see also id. at ¶ 54 (December 26 27, 2024 release date.) 27 4 Removal proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (INA § 240) are standard removal proceedings, which are different from expedited removal proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 28 § 1225(b)(1) (INA § 235(b)(1)). 1 a danger to the community. (Id. at ¶ 62.) Petitioner has been in continuous detention since 2 January 12, 2026. (Id. at ¶ 65.) 3 II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 4 On February 1, 2026, petitioner filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus. (ECF No. 1.) 5 On February 12, 2026, respondents timely filed a motion to dismiss the petition, and on February 6 18, 2026, petitioner timely filed a traverse and reply to the motion to dismiss. (ECF Nos. 8, 9.) 7 Respondents did not file a reply. Briefing is now complete. 8 III. LEGAL STANDARD 9 The Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas corpus “to every individual 10 detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., 11 Art I, § 9, cl. 2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality 12 of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” 13 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas corpus may be granted to a 14 petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 15 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing 16 the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.” 17 I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). A district court’s habeas jurisdiction includes challenges 18 to immigration detention. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). 19 IV. DISCUSSION 20 Generally, noncitizens are subject to civil immigration detention only if the noncitizen 21 presents a risk of flight or danger to the community. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (holding that 22 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) does not authorize indefinite detention). Petitioner challenges his 23 continued detention based on the violation of the following: (1) the Fifth Amendment substantive 24 due process clause; (2) the Fifth Amendment procedural due process clause; and (3) violation of 25 the Immigration and Nationality Act. (ECF No. 1 at 15-17.) Respondents do not argue that 26 petitioner is a flight risk or a danger to the community and instead argue that petitioner’s 27 detention is mandatory under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), and he is ineligible for a bond hearing. 28 (ECF No. 8 at 1-2.) Respondents cite Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 2026 WL 323330 (5th Cir. 1 Feb. 6, 2026), in support of their position that § 1225(b)(2)(A) is applicable here. (Id. at 1.) 2 Respondents also argue that petitioner does not possess a right to freedom from immigration 3 detention in any form other than the form provided by Congress. (Id. at 2.) In the alternative, 4 respondents request that the Court stay this matter pending resolution of Rodriguez v. Bostock, 5 No. 25-6842 (9th Cir.). (Id.) 6 A. Statutory Claim (Petitioner’s Third Claim) 7 The first issue here is whether petitioner, who has no criminal record and has lived in the 8 United States since December 2024, is subject to discretionary release as first ordered by 9 immigration officials under § 1226(a) as petitioner contends, or whether, petitioner is now subject 10 to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A), as respondents argue. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) 11 mandates detention during removal proceedings for applicants “seeking admission” and does not 12 provide for a bond hearing. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) “provides the general process for arresting and 13 detaining [noncitizens] who are present in the United States and eligible for removal.” Rodriguez 14 Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2022). Under Section 1226(a), the Government 15 has broad discretion whether to release or detain the individual. See id. Section 1226(a) provides 16 several layers of review for an initial custody determination and it confers “an initial bond hearing 17 before a neutral decisionmaker, the opportunity to be represented by counsel and to present 18 evidence, the right to appeal, and the right to seek a new hearing when circumstances materially 19 change.” Id. at 1202. Respondents contend § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies because petitioner is an 20 “applicant for admission” and therefore subject to mandatory detention. (ECF No. 8 at 1-2.) 21 The Court concludes that § 1226 applies to petitioner. First, immigration authorities 22 released petitioner on his own recognizance pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(B)(2) on December 23 27, 2024. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 54.) Respondents do not dispute this fact. (See ECF No. 8.) 24 Second, this Court agrees with and joins the majority of courts nationwide, including the 25 Eastern District of California, in rejecting respondent’s new interpretation5 of Sections 1225 and 26
27 5 Until DHS changed its policy in July 2025, the Government consistently applied Section 1226(a), not Section 1225(b)(2), to noncitizens residing in the United States who were detained 28 by immigration authorities and subject to removal. See Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1196. 1 1226. See Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock, 2025 WL 2782499, at *1, 21-22 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 2 30, 2025) (concluding, after a thorough analysis, that “the government’s [interpretation of § 1225] 3 belies the statutory text of the [Immigration and Nationality Act], canons of statutory 4 interpretation, legislative history, and longstanding agency practice”); J.Y.L.C. v. Bostock, 2025 5 WL 3169865, at *2 (D. Or. Nov. 12, 2025) (collecting more than thirty cases rejecting the 6 government’s assertion that § 1225 empowers DHS to arrest and hold a noncitizen present 7 without legal status who has spent years in the U.S.); Cardona-Lozano v Noem, 2025 WL 8 3218244, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2025) (“Repeatedly, [district courts across the country] have 9 found that DHS and the [Board of Immigration Appeals’] construction of the [Immigration and 10 Nationality Act] is incorrect and that petitioners who have long resided in the United States but 11 are being held under § 1225 are entitled to relief.”) (collecting cases)); Faizyan v. Casey, 2025 12 WL 3208844, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2025) (holding that § 1226 applies to a petitioner who 13 “DHS has consistently treated” as subject to discretionary detention and “who has been residing 14 in the United States for two years” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Josue I.C.A. 15 v. Lyons, 2025 WL 3496432, at 3 n.6 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2025) (collecting cases); Morales-Flores 16 v. Lyons, 2025 WL 3552841, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2025) (collecting cases) (“Courts 17 nationwide, including this one, have overwhelmingly rejected respondents’ arguments and found 18 DHS’s new policy unlawful.”). 19 “These courts examined the text, structure, agency application, and legislative history of 20 1225(b)(2) and concluded that it applies only to noncitizens ‘seeking admission,’ a category that 21 does not include noncitizens like [petitioner], living in the interior of the country.” Salcedo 22 Aceros v. Kaiser, 2025 WL 2637503, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2025) (collecting cases). By 23 contrast, “[t]he government’s proposed reading of the statute (1) disregards the plain meaning of 24 section 1225(b)(2)(A); (2) disregards the relationship between sections 1225 and 1226; (3) would 25 render a recent amendment to section 1226(c) superfluous; and (4) is inconsistent with decades of 26 prior statutory interpretation and practice.” Guerro Lepe v. Andrews, 2025 WL 2716910, at *4 27 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2025) (collecting cases). This Court incorporates and adopts the thorough 28 and persuasive reasoning of the district court in Lepe, 2025 WL 2716910, at *3-9. 1 Further, respondents’ reliance on Buenrostro-Mendez, 2026 WL 323330, is unavailing. In 2 Buenrostro-Mendez, the Fifth Circuit recently agreed with respondents’ interpretation of 3 § 1225(b)(2). This Court agrees with the district court in Gurvinder Singh v. Chestnut, 2026 WL 4 413839 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2026): 5 Two courts of appeal have addressed whether 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to noncitizens who have lived in the United 6 States for years without having been admitted. See Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048, 1060-62 (7th Cir. 7 2025) (concluding that government was not likely to prevail on the merits that petitioner was subject to mandatory detention under 8 § 1225(b)(2)(A)); Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, --- F.4th ---, Nos. 25-20496, 25-40701, 2026 WL 323330 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026) 9 (finding petitioners were subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A)). Respondents cite to the Buenrostro-Mendez 10 decision. Doc. 9 at 1. The Court finds the analysis in Castañon-Nava and in the dissent in Buenrostro-Mendez to be more persuasive on 11 the statutory interpretation issue. In any event, the Buenrostro- Mendez decision did not address the due process claim at issue in the 12 present case.” 13 Gurvinder Singh, 2026 WL 413839, at *1 n.1. This Court does not find Buenrostro-Mendez to be 14 persuasive for the reasons provided above. See also Singh v. Baltazar, 2026 WL 352870, at *3-6 15 (D. Colo. Feb. 9, 2026) (rejecting the Buenrostro majority in its interpretation of § 1225 as 16 nonbinding and highlighting the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ disagreement with the 17 Buenrostro majority) (citing Castanon-Nava v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048, 18 1052 (7th Cir. 2025)); Tomas Nicolas v. Warden, 2026 WL 364399, at *3 n.3 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 10, 19 2026) (disagreeing with Buenrostro majority and declining to follow); Chachipanta Cando v. 20 Bondi, 2026 WL 357551, at *5 n.6 (D. Neb. Feb. 9, 2026) (same); Aroca v. Mason, 2026 WL 21 357872, at *15 n.40 (S.D. W.Va. Feb. 9, 2026) (same). In addition, as in Gurvinder Singh, 22 petitioner raises a due process claim, which the court in Buenrostro-Mendez did not address, and 23 which the Court turns to next. 24 Following the majority of courts, this Court also rejects the government’s new 25 interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and their contention that petitioner is an “applicant for 26 admission” subject to § 1225(b)(2). This Court finds that petitioner is detained under 8 U.S.C. 27 § 1226(a) and its implementing regulations because petitioner was expressly released on his own 28 recognizance pursuant to § 1226, he has resided in this country for over a year since his release in 1 December 2024, and petitioner’s January 2026 re-arrest and re-detention were not upon his 2 arrival to the United States. As such, petitioner should have been provided a bond hearing before 3 his re-detention. 4 B. Due Process Claims (Petitioner’s First and Second Claims) 5 Petitioner also argues he has a fundamental liberty interest in freedom from imprisonment 6 pursuant to the Fifth Amendment, and has a liberty interest in not being incarcerated after prior 7 release without pre-custodial hearing or notice. (ECF No. 1 at 16.) Respondents argue 8 petitioner’s due process claims fail because petitioner does not possess a right to freedom from 9 immigration detention in any form other than the form provided by Congress. (ECF No. 8 at 2.) 10 Respondents’ asserted compliance with § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not demonstrate the government 11 has satisfied the requirements of the Due Process Clause, “which of course constitute[s] the 12 supreme law of the land[.]” Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 472 (1943) (Black, J., 13 concurring). 14 The Due Process Clause protects persons in the United States from being deprived of life, 15 liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. “It is clear that 16 commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due 17 process protection.” Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992). “[T]he Due Process Clause 18 applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is 19 lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693. “The Due Process 20 clause applies to noncitizens in this country in connection with removal proceedings, even if their 21 presence is unlawful or temporary.” Tinoco v. Noem, 2025 WL 3567862, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 22 14, 2025) (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690). 23 The Supreme Court has found that a protected liberty interest may arise from a conditional 24 release from physical restraint. Young v. Harper, 520 U.S. 143, 147-49 (1997). Even when a 25 statute allows the government to arrest and detain an individual, a protected liberty interest under 26 the Due Process Clause may entitle the individual to procedural protections not found in the 27 statute. See id. (finding due process requires pre-deprivation hearing before revocation of 28 preparole); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) (same, in probation context); 1 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) (same, in parole context). To determine whether 2 a specific conditional release rises to the level of a protected liberty interest, “[c]ourts have 3 resolved the issue by comparing the specific conditional release in the case before them with the 4 liberty interest in parole as characterized by Morrissey.” Gonzalez-Fuentes v. Molina, 607 F.3d 5 864, 887 (1st Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 6 In Morrissey, the Supreme Court explained that parole “enables [the parolee] to do a wide 7 range of things open to persons” who have never been in custody or convicted of any crime, 8 including to live at home, work, and “be with family and friends and to form the other enduring 9 attachments of normal life.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. “Though the [government] properly 10 subjects [the parolee] to many restrictions not applicable to other citizens,” such as monitoring, 11 his “condition is very different from that of confinement in a prison.” Id. “The parolee has relied 12 on at least an implicit promise that parole will be revoked only if he fails to live up to the parole 13 conditions.” Id. The revocation of parole undoubtedly “inflicts a grievous loss on the parolee.” 14 Id. (quotations omitted). Therefore, a parolee possesses a protected interest in his “continued 15 liberty.” Id. at 481-84. 16 Here, petitioner’s initial detention and subsequent release on his own recognizance 17 pursuant to § 1226 in December 2024 are similar because it allowed petitioner to live in the 18 United States, subject to immigration supervision, but free of custody for over a year. Such time 19 allowed petitioner to form “enduring attachments of normal life.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. 20 This Court finds that petitioner’s original release and time out of custody gave rise to a 21 constitutionally protected liberty interest. 22 Petitioner’s release pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) was premised upon a finding that, at 23 the time of petitioner’s release, he was not dangerous nor a flight risk. See 8 C.F.R. 24 § 1236.1(c)(8) (“Any officer authorized to issue a warrant of arrest may, in the officer's 25 discretion, release an alien not described in [8 U.S.C. § 1226](c)(1), under the conditions at 26 section [8 U.S.C. § 1226](a)(2) and (3) of the Act; provided that the alien must demonstrate to the 27 satisfaction of the officer that such release would not pose a danger to property or persons, and 28 that the alien is likely to appear for any future proceeding.”); Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1 1168, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2017), aff'd sub nom. Saravia for A.H. v. Sessions, 905 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2 2018); F.M.V. v. Wofford, 2025 WL 3083934, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2025). In light of all of 3 the forgoing, the Court finds that petitioner’s prior release pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) created 4 a reasonable expectation that he would be entitled to retain his liberty as long as he was not a 5 flight risk and did not pose a danger to the community. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 6 601-03 (1972) (finding reliance on governmental representations may establish a legitimate claim 7 of entitlement to a constitutionally-protected interest); F.M.V., 2025 WL 3083934 at *4. This 8 Court concludes that petitioner has a protected liberty interest in his release. See Guillermo M. R. 9 v. Kaiser, 2025 WL 1983677, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2025) (recognizing that “the liberty 10 interest that arises upon release [from immigration detention] is inherent in the Due Process 11 Clause”); Ortega v. Kaiser, 2025 WL 1771438, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2025) (collecting cases 12 finding that noncitizens who have been released have a strong liberty interest); F.M.V., 2025 WL 13 3083934 at *4-5. 14 Next, the Court turns to what procedures are necessary to ensure that the deprivation of 15 that protected liberty interest meets the demands of the Constitution. The Ninth Circuit has 16 “regularly applied Mathews [v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)], to due process challenges to 17 removal proceedings.” Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1206 (9th Cir. 2022); see also 18 Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 993 (9th Cir. 2017) (applying Mathews factors in 19 immigration detention context). In applying the Mathews test to a procedural due process claim 20 to a detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226, the Ninth Circuit explained that “Mathews remains a 21 flexible test that can and must account for the heightened governmental interest in the 22 immigration detention context.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F. 4th at 1206-07 (citations omitted). Under 23 Mathews, the Court considers three factors: (1) the private interest affected; (2) the risk of an 24 erroneous deprivation; and (3) the government’s interest. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 25 First, petitioner has a clear interest in remaining free from detention. “Freedom from 26 imprisonment -- from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint -- lies at 27 the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (citing 28 Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80 (“Freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the liberty 1 protected by the Due Process Clause.); Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 981 (“[T]he government’s 2 discretion to incarcerate non-citizens is always constrained by the requirements of due process.”). 3 For over a year, petitioner was free from custody before his re-detention. Petitioner also 4 possessed a temporary work authorization, but is now unable to work due to the detention. (ECF 5 No. 1 at ¶¶ 59, 79.) The duration of his conditional release elevates and underscores his interest 6 in liberty. See Pinchi v. Noem, 2025 WL 2084921, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2025) (in the past 7 five years, petitioner developed “extensive relations of support and interdependence” that 8 “underscore the high stakes of [his] liberty.”); Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 963 (N.D. 9 Cal. 2019) (holding that petitioner had a substantial liberty interest where he had been released 10 from custody for 18 months and was living with his wife, spending time with his mother and 11 other family members, working as a bicycle mechanic, and developing friendships in his 12 community). 13 The second Mathews factor also weighs in petitioner’s favor. “The risk of an erroneous 14 deprivation [of liberty] is high” when “[the petitioner] has not received any bond or custody 15 redetermination hearing.” See A.E. v. Andrews, 2025 WL 1424382, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 16 2025). Again, civil immigration detention, which is “nonpunitive in purpose and effect[,]” is 17 typically justified under the Due Process Clause only when a noncitizen presents a risk of flight 18 or danger to the community. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; Padilla v. ICE, 704 F. Supp. 3d 19 1163, 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2023). Respondents do not contend that petitioner is or was a flight risk 20 or a danger to the community. (See generally ECF No. 8.) In addition, respondents do not 21 contend that petitioner has a criminal record. (Id.) 22 Here, petitioner has been detained since January 12, 2026, without being given an 23 individualized bond hearing to evaluate whether petitioner is a flight risk or a danger to the 24 community. No neutral arbiter under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 has determined whether petitioner is a 25 flight risk or a danger to the community. Respondents must demonstrate that petitioner’s re- 26 detention is reasonably related to a valid government purpose. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; 27 see, e.g., Rodriguez Diaz v. Kaiser, 2025 WL 3011852, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2025) (“If 28 respondents wish to establish that re-detention is warranted by raising the effect of . . . 1 [petitioner’s] six alleged bond violations, a hearing before a neutral adjudicator provides a forum 2 to do so.”); see also Cajina v. Wofford, 2025 WL 3251083, at *1, 6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2025) 3 (ordering petitioner’s immediate release and enjoining and restraining respondents from re- 4 detaining petitioner absent a pre-detention hearing, despite petitioner being charged with driving 5 under the influence). 6 As to the third Mathews factor, this Court recognizes that the government has an interest 7 in enforcing immigration laws, but respondents’ interest in detaining petitioner without a hearing 8 is “low.” Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 970; Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1094 9 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2025). Detention hearings in immigration courts are routine, and impose a 10 “minimal cost.” Doe, 787 F. Supp. 3d at 1094. In addition, here, the government’s interest is 11 even lower because petitioner was previously released on his own recognizance pursuant to 12 § 1226 after immigration officials determined he was not a flight risk or danger to the community, 13 he lived in the country for over a year on release, and he has no criminal record. See Pinchi, 2025 14 WL 1853763, at *2. 15 Overall, balancing these factors, the Court finds that the Mathews factors weigh in favor 16 of finding petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing, and petitioner should have been provided such a 17 hearing before he was detained. “An essential principle of due process is that a deprivation of 18 life, liberty, or property be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the 19 nature of the case.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (internal 20 quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis added). In criminal cases, parolees released on 21 parole, which does not provide “absolute liberty,” but rather “conditional liberty properly 22 dependent on observance of special parole restrictions,” are also entitled to due process, including 23 a predeprivation hearing before their parole can be revoked. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480-86. 24 “Numerous district courts have held that these principles extend to the context of immigration 25 detention.” F.M.V., 2025 WL 3083934 at *6 (collecting cases). Respondents point to no reasons 26 a pre-deprivation hearing could not be held, and provided no evidence of “urgent concerns,” thus, 27 “a pre-deprivation hearing is required to satisfy due process.” Guillermo M. R. v. Kaiser, 791 F. 28 Supp. 3d at 1036. Accordingly, the Court finds that petitioner is also entitled to relief on his due 1 process claims. 2 V. RESPONDENTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS 3 For the reasons set forth above, respondents’ motion to dismiss should be denied. In 4 addition, respondents’ alternative request that this matter be stayed pending a ruling by the Ninth 5 Circuit should also be denied. 6 VI. CONCLUSION 7 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 8 1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) be GRANTED. 9 2. Respondents’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 8) and request to stay this matter be denied. 10 3. Respondents be ordered to IMMEDIATELY release petitioner Sagar Sagar and be 11 ordered to provide petitioner with a copy of the release order at or near the time of 12 release. If respondents have custody of petitioner’s documents (e.g., identification, 13 passport, work permit, Social Security card, etc.), respondents shall return those to 14 petitioner at the time of release. 15 4. Respondents be ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED from re-detaining petitioner unless 16 the government demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence at a pre-deprivation 17 bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, that petitioner is a flight risk or danger to 18 the community such that his physical custody is legally justified. 19 5. The parties be directed to file, within seven days of the adoption of these findings and 20 recommendations, a joint status report addressing petitioner’s status. 21 6. The Clerk of the Court be directed to enter judgment in favor of petitioner and close 22 this case. 23 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 24 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within seven days of 25 the date of these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the 26 court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to 27 Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the objections shall be 28 filed and served within seven days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that 1 | failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District 2 | Court’s order. See Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 3 4 || Dated: March 2, 2026 5 ( haa Spo CHI SOO KIM 6 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 7 || 1/saga0843.157.imm 8 9 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 13