Saffon v. Wells Fargo & Co.

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedJanuary 9, 2008
Docket05-56824
StatusPublished

This text of Saffon v. Wells Fargo & Co. (Saffon v. Wells Fargo & Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Saffon v. Wells Fargo & Co., (9th Cir. 2008).

Opinion

FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GRACIELA SAFFON,  Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 05-56824 v. WELLS FARGO & COMPANY LONG  D.C. No. CV-04-01237-GPS TERM DISABILITY PLAN, an ERISA OPINION plan, Defendant-Appellee.  Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California George P. Schiavelli, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted August 10, 2007—Pasadena, California

Filed January 9, 2008

Before: Alex Kozinski, Chief Judge, Johnnie B. Rawlinson, Circuit Judge and Miriam Goldman Cedarbaum,* Senior District Judge.

Opinion by Chief Judge Kozinski

*The Honorable Miriam Goldman Cedarbaum, Senior District Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.

269 272 SAFFON v. WELLS FARGO

COUNSEL

Cassie Springer-Sullivan and Charles J. Fleishman, Beverly Hills, California, for the plaintiff-appellant.

Yuliya I. LaRoe and Eric R. McDonough, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Los Angeles, California, for the defendant-appellee.

OPINION

KOZINSKI, Chief Judge:

We consider whether an ERISA plan administrator prop- erly terminated benefits because of its beneficiary’s failure to produce evidence of her disability.

Facts

Graciela Saffon has long suffered from degeneration of her cervical spine, a condition confirmed by repeated MRI scans and X-rays. After a car crash aggravated her condition in December 2001, Saffon quit her desk job at Wells Fargo Bank and applied for disability benefits from defendant, the Wells SAFFON v. WELLS FARGO 273 Fargo & Co. Long Term Disability Plan. The Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (MetLife), which served both as the Plan’s insurer and as its claims administrator, promptly began to pay her short-term disability benefits. Saffon eventually applied for long-term disability benefits, which MetLife granted. After paying long-term benefits for a year, MetLife informed Saffon that she “no longer m[et] the definition of disability” and terminated her long-term benefits. Saffon then unsuccessfully availed herself of MetLife’s administrative appeals process.

Saffon sued the Plan under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a), seeking payment of withheld benefits, attorney’s fees and a declara- tion that she is disabled. After a bench trial on the administra- tive record, the district court concluded that the Plan hadn’t abused its discretion and denied Saffon any relief.

Standard of Review

[1] 1. We review benefits denials de novo “unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits;” if the plan does grant such discretionary authority, we review the administra- tor’s decision for abuse of discretion. Firestone Tire & Rub- ber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989).

Here, the Plan’s Summary Plan Description states:

In carrying out their respective responsibilities under the Plan, the Plan administrator and other Plan fidu- ciaries shall have discretionary authority to interpret the terms of the Plan and to determine eligibility for and entitlement to Plan benefits in accordance with the terms of the Plan.

Saffon argues that we must review MetLife’s decision de novo because it is unclear whether the Summary Plan Description’s discretionary clause refers to MetLife. Kearney 274 SAFFON v. WELLS FARGO v. Standard Ins. Co., 175 F.3d 1084, 1090 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (we defer only if the grant of discretionary authority is “unambiguous[ ]”). Saffon sees an ambiguity in the fact that the Summary Plan Description doesn’t refer to MetLife by name; instead, it grants discretionary authority to “the Plan administrator [Wells Fargo] and other Plan fiduciaries.” But it’s perfectly clear that MetLife is included in this grant of discretionary authority because it is one of the “other Plan fiduciaries” mentioned there.

[2] A “fiduciary” is an entity with “any discretionary authority” in the “administration of” an ERISA plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A). See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 220 (2004) (“When administering employee benefit plans, HMOs must make discretionary decisions regarding eligibility for plan benefits, and, in this regard, must be treated as plan fiduciaries.”). MetLife’s Certificate of Insur- ance provides that “MetLife in its discretion has authority to interpret the terms, conditions, and provisions of the entire contract.” The Summary Plan Description explains that the Plan “is . . . administered by [MetLife].” “To qualify for LTD benefits,” beneficiaries must “[r]eceive approval for LTD benefits by MetLife.” Those “benefits will begin” one month after “MetLife determines you are disabled,” and will end on “[t]he date MetLife determines that you are no longer dis- abled.”

[3] These provisions leave no doubt that MetLife is an entity with discretionary authority to administer the Plan. MetLife is therefore one of the “other Plan fiduciaries” to which the Summary Plan Description grants “discretionary authority to . . . determine eligibility for . . . Plan benefits.” While the path to this conclusion is somewhat tortuous, it is also perfectly clear. See Wilson Arlington Co. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 912 F.2d 366, 371 (9th Cir. 1990) (complex- ity is not the same thing as ambiguity). The Plan unambigu- ously confers discretionary authority on MetLife to administer benefits claims. SAFFON v. WELLS FARGO 275 [4] 2. Saffon also argues that we must disregard the dis- cretionary authority granted to MetLife because the California Insurance Commissioner has revoked the Certificate of Insur- ance in Saffon’s policy, and “any related Summary Plan Descriptions.”1 At least 6 other states have done the same; the National Association of Insurance Commissioners encourages the remaining 43 to follow suit. See Henry Quillen, State Pro- hibition of Discretionary Clauses in ERISA-Covered Benefit Plans, J. Pension Planning & Compliance, Summer 2006, at 67.

This nationwide vote of no confidence seems to have been precipitated by the cupidity of one particular insurer, Unum- Provident Corp., which boosted its profits by repeatedly deny- ing benefits claims it knew to be valid. UnumProvident’s internal memos revealed that the company’s senior officers relied on ERISA’s deferential standard of review to avoid detection and liability. See John H. Langbein, Trust Law As Regulatory Law: The UNUM/Provident Scandal and Judicial Review of Benefit Denials Under ERISA, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1315, 1317-21 (2007) (describing UnumProvident’s behav- ior). It is an open question whether the states’ efforts are pre- empted by ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), or (as is more likely) they are saved from preemption because they “regulate[ ] insurance,” id. § 1144(b)(2)(A). See Quillen, supra, at 77-79 (arguing against preemption). The parties haven’t briefed the preemption question in depth, and we do not consider it.

[5] Even if federal law permitted states to nullify an ERISA plan’s grant of discretionary authority, California law doesn’t authorize the Commissioner to do so retroactively. Cal. Ins. 1 Order from John Garamendi, Cal. Ins.

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