Safeclick, LLC v. Visa International Service Association

208 F. App'x 829
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
DecidedOctober 23, 2006
Docket2006-1182
StatusUnpublished

This text of 208 F. App'x 829 (Safeclick, LLC v. Visa International Service Association) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Safeclick, LLC v. Visa International Service Association, 208 F. App'x 829 (Fed. Cir. 2006).

Opinion

CLEVENGER, Senior Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-Appellant Safeclick, LLC (“Safeclick”) filed this patent infringement suit against Defendants-Appellees Visa International Service Assoc, and Visa USA, Inc. (collectively, “Visa”) on December 30, 2003, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. Safeclick alleges that Visa’s “Verified by Visa” service infringes claims 6 and 7 of U.S. Patent No. 5,793,028 (“the '028 patent”). On July 19, 2005, Visa filed a motion for summary judgment of noninfringement. The motion was granted on December 21, 2005, and judgment was thereafter entered in Visa’s favor. Safeclick appeals that judgment. We affirm.

I

The invention of the '028 patent is an “electronic transaction security system ... designed to substantially prevent the unauthorized use of transaction identification codes such as credit card numbers for placing transaction requests electronically *831 via any suitable communication link, such as the Internet.” '028 patent col.l 11.43-48. So, for example, when a card-holding consumer (“transactionor”) wishes to make a purchase over the Internet from an online merchant (“transactionee”), the invention attempts to ensure that the parties to the transaction are who they purport to be.

In order to make a verified purchase using the invention, the transactionor sends a transaction initiation request from his or her computer to a computer operated by the transactionee. Before proceeding further with the transaction, the transactionee’s computer requests verification from a computer operated by an entity such as the bank that issued the credit card (“verifier”). The verifier’s computer does this by sending an acknowledgement request to the transactionor’s computer. In response, the verifier’s computer must receive a private identification code that uniquely identifies the transactionor’s computer. If the verifier’s computer does not receive the code it expects, the transaction will not be verified.

Because claims 6 and 7 of the '028 patent are substantially similar, only claim 6 is reproduced here (with emphasis on the relevant claim limitation):

6. A method comprising the steps of: transmitting a transaction initiation request requesting the initiation of an electronic transaction to a transactionee computer from a transactionor computer, the transaction initiation request including a public identification code uniquely identifying the transactionor computer, and a public identification code uniquely identifying a transactionee computer; receiving by the transactionee computer the transaction initiation request; transmitting a verification request requesting verification of the transaction from the transactionee computer to a verifier computer in response to the transactionee computer receiving the transaction initiation request, the verification request including one of a private identification code and a public identification code uniquely identifying the transactionee computer and the public identification code uniquely identifying the transactionor computer;
receiving the verification request by the verifier eomputer[;]
transmitting an acknowledgement request requesting acknowledgement of the electronic transaction from the verifier computer to the transactionor computer in response to the verifier computer receiving the verification request;
receiving the acknowledgement request by the transactionor computer;
transmitting an acknowledgement response indicating one of a valid electronic transaction and an invalid electronic transaction from the transactionor computer to the verifier computer in response to the transactionor computer receiving the acknowledgement request, the acknowledgement response including the private identification code uniquely identifying the transactionor computer,
receiving the acknowledgement response by the verifier computer;
transmitting a verification response indicating one of a valid electronic transaction and an invalid electronic transaction from the verifier computer to the transactionee computer in response to the verifier computer receiving the acknowledgement response; and *832 receiving the verification response by the transactionee computer and executing the electronic transaction in response to the transactionee computer receiving the verification response indicating a valid electronic transaction.

'028 patent col.23 1.60 — col.24 1.41 (emphasis added).

II

More than a decade ago, Visa began development of an internet-transaction protocol known as “3-D Secure” and marketed it under the name “Verified by Visa.” Like the invention of the '028 patent, Verified by Visa seeks to reduce fraud by verifying the identity of an online consumer who attempts to make a purchase using a registered Visa credit card. The details of Visa’s methodology are largely unimportant to the present case. Suffice it to say, a consumer who attempts to make a purchase using the Verified by Visa system must enter a password into his or her computer and send it to the card-issuing bank’s “Access Control Server” (“ACS”). Before that password is sent, however, it goes through a process called “Secure Socket Layer” (“SSL”) encryption. The SSL protocol enables the two communicating computers to generate a secret key for use during the communication session. If the transmitted information is not encrypted using this key, then the receiver will be unable to decrypt the information. Consequently, the password sent from the consumer to the ACS must be the correct password, and it must have been encrypted using the appropriate key. Upon its receipt of the encrypted password, the ACS decrypts the password and cross references it with the password on file. If the message containing the password cannot be decrypted — indicating a possibility that it may have been changed accidentally or deliberately in transit — or if the decrypted password does not match the one on file, then the transaction will not be verified.

Ill

In the proceedings below, the district court construed “private identification code uniquely identifying the transactionor computer” as “a nonpublic code that singularly identifies the computer used by the transactionor, but not only the transactionor himself or herself.” Within thirty days after the issuance of that order, Safeclick was permitted, pursuant to the Northern District of California’s Patent Local Rules, to serve Visa with its Final Infringement Contentions (to replace its Preliminary Infringement Contentions, discussed infra) in the form of “[a] chart identifying specifically where each element of each asserted claim is found within each Accused Instrumentality.” Patent Local Rules 3-l(c) and 3-6(a). Safeclick took advantage of the opportunity and timely served Visa with a chart in which it is asserted that

The private identification code uniquely identifying the cardholder computer is the authenticating information entered by the cardholder, which includes the cardholder’s password, and, in some ease[s], a personal identification statement.

(JA at A02948.)

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
208 F. App'x 829, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/safeclick-llc-v-visa-international-service-association-cafc-2006.