Safas Corp. v. Etura Premier, L.L.C.

293 F. Supp. 2d 436, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21193, 2003 WL 22596371
CourtDistrict Court, D. Delaware
DecidedNovember 5, 2003
DocketCIV.A.01-833-KAJ
StatusPublished

This text of 293 F. Supp. 2d 436 (Safas Corp. v. Etura Premier, L.L.C.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Safas Corp. v. Etura Premier, L.L.C., 293 F. Supp. 2d 436, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21193, 2003 WL 22596371 (D. Del. 2003).

Opinion

OPINION

JORDAN, District Judge.

I.INTRODUCTION

This is a patent infringement case. Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1338. Presently before me are the parties’ requests for construction of the claims of United States Patent No. 5,476,895 (issued April 22, 1993) (the “’895 patent”), pursuant to Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed.Cir.1995) (en banc), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996). The plaintiff in this case is Safas Corporation (“Safas”) and the defendant is Etura Premier, L.L.C. (“Etura”). The following three disputed claim terms in claims 1-3 of the ’895 patent are at issue and are construed herein: (1) “the granules comprising a thermoplastic and thermoset plastic,” (2) “substantially immiscible,” and (3) “substantially isopycnic.”

II. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

On December 14, 2001, Safas filed a complaint alleging that Etura was willfully infringing the ’895 patent. (Docket Item [“D.I.”] 1 ¶ 9.) Etura answered Safas’ complaint on January 2, 2002, denying all allegations of infringement and asserting several affirmative defenses, including invalidity of the ’895 patent. (D.I.5.) The parties submitted a joint claim construction chart and filed claim construction briefing in September of 2003; they presented oral argument on their positions on October 22, 2003. (See D.I. 59, 78, 80, 93.)

B. The Disclosed Technology

Safas is in the business of developing and manufacturing simulated granite and stone. (D.I. 1 ¶ 3.) Safas is the owner by assignment of the ’895 patent, entitled “Granite-Like Coating” (issued April 22, 1993). (D.I.79, Exh. 1.) The named inventor is Akbar Ghahary. (Id.) The ’895 patent discloses an invention that relates generally to a method of forming a synthetic surface material simulating various natural substances. See ’895 patent, Col. 1, Ins. 11-14. Specifically, the invention provides a coating, comprised of a gel coat and granules, which mimics the appearance of granite. Id., Col. 2, Ins. 63-67. The coating may be sprayed onto a surface or applied by brush, roller, or curtain wall. Id., Col. 2, Ins. 22-24.

III. APPLICABLE LAW

Patent claims are construed as a matter of law. Markman, 52 F.3d at 979. A court’s objective is to determine the plain meaning, if any, that those of ordinary skill in the art would apply to the language used in the patent claims. Waner v. Ford Motor Co., 331 F.3d 851, 854 (Fed.Cir.2003) (citing Rexnord v. Laitram *438 Corp., 274 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed.Cir.2001)). In this regard, pertinent art dictionaries, treatises, and encyclopedias may assist a court. Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202-03 (Fed.Cir.2002). The intrinsic record, however, is the best source of the meaning of claim language. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1996). Therefore, patent claims are properly construed only after an examination of the claims, the specification, and, if in evidence, the prosecution history of the patent. Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1324 (Fed.Cir.2003) (citing Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582).

The intrinsic record is also of prime importance when claim language has no ordinary meaning in the pertinent art, see Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Communications Group, Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1269-70 (determining that claim language could only be construed with reference to the written deseription)(citing Comark Communications, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1187 (Fed.Cir.1998)), and where claim language has multiple potentially applicable meanings. Texas Digital, 308 F.3d at 1203.

If patent claim language has an ordinary and accustomed meaning in the art, there is a heavy presumption that the inventor intended that meaning to apply. Bell Atl., 262 F.3d at 1268 (citing Johnson Worldwide Assocs., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 989 (Fed.Cir.1999)). Thus, unless the inventor has manifested an express intent to depart from that meaning, the ordinary meaning applies. Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed.Cir.2002) (en banc) (citing York Prods., Inc. v. Cent. Tractor Farm & Family Ctr., 99 F.3d 1568, 1572 (Fed.Cir.1996))..

To overcome that presumption, an accused infringer may demonstrate that “a different meaning is clearly set forth in the specification... or the accustomed meaning would deprive the claim of clarity.” N. Telecom Ltd. v. Samsung Elec. Co., Ltd., 215 F.3d 1281, 1287 (Fed.Cir.2000). However, the presumption may not be rebutted “simply by pointing to the preferred embodiment. ...” Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1327. It may be rebutted, though, where “the patentee... deviate[d] from the ordinary and accustomed meaning... by redefining the term or by characterizing the invention in the intrinsic record using words or expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction, representing a clear disavowal of claim scope.” Id.

If claim language remains unclear after review of the intrinsic record, a court “may look to extrinsic evidence to help resolve the lack of clarity.” Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve Incorp., 256 F.3d 1323, 1332 (Fed.Cir.2001). The use of extrinsic evidence in the claim construction process, however, is “proper only when the claim language remains genuinely ambiguous after consideration of the intrinsic evidence.” Id. A court may not use extrinsic evidence to contradict the import of the intrinsic record, and if the intrinsic record is unambiguous, extrinsic evidence is entitled to no weight.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Vitronics Corporation v. Conceptronic, Inc.
90 F.3d 1576 (Federal Circuit, 1996)
Comark Communications, Inc. v. Harris Corporation
156 F.3d 1182 (Federal Circuit, 1998)
Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc.
308 F.3d 1193 (Federal Circuit, 2002)
Alan Waner, Plaintiff-Cross v. Ford Motor Company
331 F.3d 851 (Federal Circuit, 2003)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
293 F. Supp. 2d 436, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21193, 2003 WL 22596371, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/safas-corp-v-etura-premier-llc-ded-2003.