Sackman v. Liggett Group, Inc.

173 F.R.D. 358, 1997 WL 391633
District Court, E.D. New York·Decided June 27, 1997·No. No. CV 93-4166 (ADS)·Published·Cited by 12 cases

Opinion

ORDER

BOYLE, United States Magistrate Judge.

The Procedural History

By Memorandum Opinion and Order of Arthur D. Spatt, D.J., dated May 25, 1996 (“the Summary Judgment Order”), the Memorandum Opinion and Order of the undersigned dated March 19, 1996, which directed that the defendant Liggett Group Inc. (“Liggett”) disclose 123 Special Projects documents, was vacated “so that the court may reconsider the effect of this court’s summary judgment decision on the various discovery issues.” Memorandum Opinion and Order of the Honorable Arthur D. Spatt, dated May 25, 1996, at 47. The Memorandum Opinion and Order of March 19, 1996 had granted the motion by plaintiffs, Janet and Joseph Sack-man (hereinafter called “plaintiffs” or the “Sackmans”) to compel production of 123 Special Projects documents after finding that Liggett’s assertion of the attorney-client, joint defense, and work product privileges did not preclude production. [Familiarity with the Opinion and Order of March 19, 1996 is assumed herein.]

The Summary Judgment Order of Judge Spatt, D.J., dated May 25, 1996, denied Lig-gett’s motion for summary judgment with [360]*360respect to plaintiffs’ personal injury claims based on negligence and product liability (Summary Judgment Order at 8-20); dismissed plaintiffs’ claims based on breach of warranty (Summary Judgment Order at 20-24); dismissed plaintiffs’ fraud claim (Summary Judgment Order at 24-27); and denied dismissal of any derivative claims by Joseph Sackman for “punitive damages, consortium, medical monitoring and fear of cancer” (Summary Judgment Order at 27-28).

The Summary Judgment Order of May 25, 1996, also granted two motions to intervene pursuant to Rules 24(a)(2) and 24(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (summary judgment order at 35-47). The Council for Tobacco Research, U.S.A. (“CTR”) and the tobacco manufacturing companies, Philip Morris, Inc., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., R.J. Reynolds Co. and Lorillard Tobacco Co. (referred to collectively as “Inter-venors”) were granted intervention “for the limited purpose of determining whether the 123 (CTR Special Projects) documents at issue (in the opinion and order of the undersigned, dated March 19, 1996) are discoverable.” Summary Judgment Order at 47. The district court further directed that “the intervenors be permitted to participate in any further proceedings before Magistrate Judge Boyle regarding these issues.” Summary Judgment Order at 48.

By order dated May 31, 1996, the undersigned directed the parties and intervenors to initially address the affect of Judge Spatt’s Summary Judgment Order with respect to the issue of relevance. Rule 26(b)(1) Fed. R.Civ.P. Pursuant to the order dated December 5, 1996, the parties submitted supporting papers and briefs on the applicability of the privileges asserted, i.e. attorney-client work product, joint defense and the applicability of the public health and crime fraud exceptions.

1. Additional Documents

Since March 19, 1997 Liggett has uncovered 182 additional Special Projects doeu-ments that it did not turn over at the time that the privilege log was prepared for the initial 123 documents that were submitted to the Court for in camera inspection in 1995. The additional documents have been submitted to the court for in camera inspection and have been reviewed by the court, together with the privilege logs.1

2. Liggett’s and Intervenors’ Position

Liggett and the intervenors’ principal claim of a lack of relevance is based on their assertion that the civil “conspiracy” cause of action (“Eighth Count”) was dismissed in the Summary Judgment Order, dated May 25, 1996. The Eighth cause of action alleges that Liggett was a member of a conspiracy— along with other tobacco manufacturers — to suppress medical and scientific data on the health hazards of cigarette smoking and to misrepresent facts “to keep the public ignorant of the hazards of tobacco smoking.” First Amended Complaint at paras. 46 and 47. Liggett and the intervenors initially sought to substantiate the dismissal of the Eighth cause of action by a motion to clarify. They claimed that dismissal of the fraud claim encompassed the conspiracy claim. This motion was denied by the district court by order dated October 10, 1996, with leave to renew pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The latter motion was made and has been denied by Memorandum Decision and Order of Judge Spatt, dated June 9, 1997.

Liggett and the intervenors maintain that even if the conspiracy cause of action remains in the case, the Special Projects documents at issue are still not relevant evidence since (1) the documents contain no concealed scientific findings; and (2) nothing in the documents indicates any attempt to suppress or conceal research concerning the health effects of smoking, or to conceal the source of funding for Special Projects research.2

[361]*361 DISCUSSION

I. The Issue of Relevance

Rule 26(b)(1) states:

(b) Discovery Scope and Limits. Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with these rules, the scope of discovery is as follows:
(1) In General. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. The information sought need not be admissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

The purpose of discovery is to “provide both parties with information essential to proper litigation of all the facts.” Mallinckrodt Chemical Works v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 58 F.R.D. 348, 353 (S.D.N.Y.1973), (quoting Patton v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph. Co., 38 F.R.D. 428 (N.D.Ga.1965) (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947)). The discovery rules “should be interpreted broadly” to achieve the important purposes for which they have been enacted. Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 756 F.2d 230 (2d Cir.1985). However, “the parties should not be allowed to roam in shadow zones of relevancy and to explore matter which does not presently appear germane on the theory that it might conceivably become so.” In re Surety Ass’n of America, 388 F.2d 412, 414 (2d Cir.1967).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Sackman v. Liggett Group, Inc., 173 F.R.D. 358, 1997 WL 391633 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).

173 F.R.D. 358 (Sackman v. Liggett Group, Inc.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Foli v. Metro-North Railroad
S.D. New York, 2025
Lopez v. City of New York
S.D. New York, 2021
Amusement Industry, Inc. v. Stern
293 F.R.D. 420 (S.D. New York, 2013)
Thompson v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.
207 S.W.3d 76 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 2006)
United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.
449 F. Supp. 2d 1 (District of Columbia, 2006)
Costa v. AFGO Mechanical Services, Inc.
237 F.R.D. 21 (E.D. New York, 2006)
Maldonado v. New Jersey
225 F.R.D. 120 (D. New Jersey, 2004)
Madanes v. Madanes
199 F.R.D. 135 (S.D. New York, 2001)
Lawrence Arms Associates v. Shur (In re Shur)
225 B.R. 295 (E.D. New York, 1998)
Sineise v. Texaco Carribean, Inc.
38 V.I. 368 (Virgin Islands, 1998)
Compulit v. Banctec, Inc.
177 F.R.D. 410 (W.D. Michigan, 1997)
Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.
175 F.R.D. 321 (D. Kansas, 1997)