Sacket v. Mead

1 Conn. 13
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut
DecidedJune 15, 1814
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 1 Conn. 13 (Sacket v. Mead) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sacket v. Mead, 1 Conn. 13 (Colo. 1814).

Opinion

Baldwin, J.

This record presents the claim of a creditor, on an estate which had been proceeded with and settled as insolvent, who had not made out his claim with the commissioners, before the expiration of the time limited, and now rests his title to recover, on shewing further estate not before discovered or put into the inventory.

The action is against the administrator in common form, upon the debt thus barred. In bar of this action, the administrator pleads the settlement of the estate, as an insolvent estate, in the court of probate; and the neglect of the plaintiff to make out his claim with the commissioners, before the expiration of the time limited.

The plaintiff replies, that after the settlement in the court of probate, other estate not before inventoried, was shewn to the defendant, and came to his hands as administrator on said estate, and still remains in his hands as the estate of the deceased unappropriated, more than sufficient to pay all the debts against said estate; and then points out the nature of his claim, and that the administrator had notice of it.

To this replication the defendant demurs, and the plaintiff joins in demurrer.

The question of law is reserved by the superior court for our advice.

The pleadings close in a special demurrer, on the ground of duplicity ; but, as that point was abandoned in the argument, it is unnecessary to notice it.

Whether the plaintiff in such case is entitled to recover is the only subject of enquiry.

A proper decision of this question, depends on the due construction of our statutes respecting the settlement of the estates of persons deceased.

On this subject certain leading principles are admitted by all. If the estate is solvent, all debts, without preference, [18]*18are to be paid in full ; and although the administrator may, on a solvent estate, for his own safety, obtain a limitation to the exhibition of claims, he is, notwithstanding such limitation, immediately liable to the suits of creditors.

Every estate is presumed to be solvent, and will be treated as such, until the administrator, upon a fair comparison of the amount of debts, with the value of property within his knowledge, shall represent it otherwise to the court of probate. When so represented, suits at law are stayed, during its pendency. The court limits a time for the exhibition of claims, appoints commissioners to adjust them, and on their report, the estate is distributed by an equal average. When an estate is thus settled, every creditor who has neglected to make out his claim with the commissioners within the time limited is forever barred of his debt: "unless he can shew estate of the deceased, not before discovered, or put into the inventory.” If, then, the creditor can shew such estate, the bar is removed; but the statute gives no direction with respect to the extent or mode of relief. The general principles of our system for the settlement of estates must then be our guide.

As to the extent of his relief, there is now, I believe, no diversity of opinion. If the estate discovered is sufficient to pay all the debts, whether exhibited before or not, the whole must be paid. If less is discovered than will discharge the whole, the creditor barred is entitled to so much as will make his equal to former dividends, and the remainder is to be equally divided upon all the debts. This course, I understand, has been sanctioned by judicial authority.

The mode of relief has hitherto been a subject on which our courts have differed. In the case of Leavenworth v. Jones, in the year 1789, on a similar state of pleadings, the superior court adjudged the replication sufficient, and that the plaintiff recover the amount of his debt. Their judgment was reversed in the supreme court of errors, on the ground, that an administrator on an insolvent estate, which appears to have been settled in the court of probate, is not liable to any suit, except for neglect, and misconduct in the settlement, specially set forth in the plaintiff’s declaration. This construction, it appears to me, entirely defeats the saving of the statute; for it is not often contended on the discove[19]*19ry of new estate, that the administrator has been guilty of neglect or misconduct, and the settlement on record may appear fair and complete. Let the estate discovered, then, be ever so great, the administrator on the reasons given, is protected from all suits.

The case of Nelson v. Hubbel, 2 Root 421., discloses facts, which show, that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover under the saving clause; for the estate claimed, as the basis of his right, had been discovered by the administrator, and inventoried, and distributed in the settlement recorded, long before any discovery or claim by the plaintiff. He could not, therefore, recover on any principle; and so was the judgment of the court. The reporter, indeed, seems to doubt whether the mode of relief pursued in that case was proper; and suggests that after causing the administrator to inventory the new estate, the creditor ought to move the court of probate to open the commission for the examination of his claim. Others have contended, that the only remedy is by suit on the probate bond. Others again, that a new administration de bonis non is the proper course. As I know of no judicial decision which has pointed out the course proper to be taken in such case, we are at liberty to take that which is most analogous to our general system of settling estates.

The administrator, having proceeded in the court of probate to a final settlement of the estate as insolvent, and paid the dividend, the estate is no longer pending before the commissioners. Their powers have ceased. All proceedings are at an end, unless further estate is shewn to the administrator. When this is done, after such final settlement, the administrator must commence a new course of administration. He must inventory the estate, and compare its value with the amount of debts. If he finds it evidently sufficient to satisfy all the debts known to him, he may and ought to treat the estate thenceforth as solvent. But, as all the creditors who were barred, have an equal right to share in the new discoved estate, he ought to present the same to the court of probate, and, for his own safety, obtain a new limitation for the exhibition of claims. He may, also, on such comparison, if he deems it proper, represent the estate still to be insolvent, and obtain a new commission, as well as a new limitation. The creditor has no more controul of the estate thus discovered, [20]*20or of the proceedings of the administrator in this stage of the settlement, than he had at the time the administrator was at first appointed. The administrator, having the controul, may treat the estate as solvent, and if he does so, will, of course, be liable to the demands and suits of the creditors in the same manner as every administrator on a solvent estate is liable. He may, at any time, arrest their progress, whenever he finds it necessary to represent the estate insolvent.

This is a plain and safe path for the administrator. It preserves entire the analogy of our system, and secures equally the rights of all.

In the case before us, it appears by the record, that the new discovered estate has long been in the hands of the administrator, and that it is sufficient to discharge all the debts in full.

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Bluebook (online)
1 Conn. 13, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sacket-v-mead-conn-1814.