Sachs v. Sprague

401 F. Supp. 2d 159, 63 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 607, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29181, 2005 WL 3116592
CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedNovember 22, 2005
DocketCIV.A. 04-30032-MAP
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 401 F. Supp. 2d 159 (Sachs v. Sprague) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sachs v. Sprague, 401 F. Supp. 2d 159, 63 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 607, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29181, 2005 WL 3116592 (D. Mass. 2005).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM REGARDING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS (DM. No. 29)

PONSOR, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This is a' shareholder derivative action brought by shareholders of Wave Systems Corporation (“Wave” or the “Company”), on behalf of the Company, against certain of its officers and directors for, among other things, breaching their fiduciary duties by disseminating, or permitting the dissemination of, false and/or misleading statements regarding the Company’s condition and prospects. Citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 23.1, 12(b)(6), and 9(b), nominal Defendant Wave and the individual Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ verified consolidated amended complaint (“amended complaint”) on the grounds that Plaintiffs neither made a pre-suit demand upon Wave’s Board nor demonstrated why a demand would have been futile. The court allowed this motion to dismiss on September 26, 2005. This memorandum will set forth the reasons supporting-this ruling.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

“When presented with a motion to dismiss, the district court must take as true ‘the well-pleaded facts as they appear in the complaint, extending [the] plaintiff every reasonable inference in his favor.’ ” Medina-Claudio v. Rodriguez-Mateo, 292 F.3d 31, 34 (1st Cir.2002) (citations omitted). What follows, then, is a brief version of such facts as alleged in Plaintiffs’ amended complaint.

Wave is incorporated under the laws of the State of Delaware. (Dkt. No. 24, Am. ComplY20.) Since its inception in 1988, this" self-described “development stage company” had never managed to successfully market any of its digital security services or technologies. (Id. at ¶ 5.) By December 31, 2002, the Company found itself over $230 million dollars in debt and in need of $11 million in cash to continue operations in 2003. (Id. at ¶ 6.)

With no major revenue source in sight, the Company was forced to close a private placement of Series H Stock on April 30, 2003. (Id. at ¶ 7.) Although this private investment in the publicly held Company resulted in net proceeds of $4,465,571, the placement terms, from Wave’s perspective, were quite onerous. (Id.) Not only did they restrict the Company’s capacity to generate additional funds through future equity offerings by giving the Series H shareholders a right of first refusal, they also required Wave to pay significant dividends to these preferred shareholders. (Id.) Because the Company lacked the resources to redeem the preferred stock or pay the dividends, Wave’s status as a going concern seemed to rest on the auto *161 matic conversion of these preferred shares to Class A Common Stock. Under the terms of the placement, such a conversion could only occur if the closing bid on Wave’s stock exceeded $1.90 for fifteen of twenty consecutive trading days. (Id. at ¶ 8.) With the stock consistently trading at under $1.00 per share in the Spring of 2003, it appeared unlikely this condition would be met.

On May 15, 2003, the Company issued a press release in which Director and Chief Executive Officer, Defendant Steven Sprague (“Sprague”), stated that “key industry participants are finally beginning to recognize the value Wave can add and are evaluating ways that they can work with us to benefit from our position.” (Id. at ¶ 45.) In its Form 10-K/A filed on June 30, 2003, Wave expanded on Sprague’s optimistic assessment by forecasting $5 million in sales based upon “the anticipation that various deals we are working on will close.” (Id. at ¶ 54 (noting the Company’s continuing efforts to “solidify[] strategic alliances with the major personal computer manufacturers to force collaborative efforts to distribute its products to consumers”).)

On July 31, 2003, with the market primed to expect a substantial revenue stream, the Company issued a press release, announcing an agreement with Intel Corporation that would “enable Intel to bundle Wave’s software and services with a future Intel desktop motherboard.” (Id. at ¶ 55.) Although the terms of the deal were not disclosed (id. at ¶ 57 (citation omitted)), Wave’s stock soared and closed that day at $2.25 per share, a gain of 168% from the day before (id. at ¶ 56).

The Company’s stock was still on the rise when, on August 4, 2003, Wave announced a partnership with IBM destined to “significantly help us in our objective to deliver open and interoperable solutions to business customers.” (Id. at ¶ 61.) Once again, despite the fact that the deal’s terms were undisclosed (id. at ¶ 64 (citation omitted)), the market reacted positively, and Wave’s stock closed at $4.42 per share, up $ .77 per share from its previous closing price (id. at ¶ 63).

On August 12, 2003, Wave filed the first of four filings with the SEC in which the Company characterized its recent deals with Intel and IBM as “Material Changes.” (Id. at ¶¶75, 81-83.) Two days later, during a conference call with analysts, Sprague finally revealed that the Intel deal was a non-exclusive licensing agreement with no minimum licensing requirements. (Id. at ¶ 78.) Sprague also admitted that although the Company’s products were compatible with IBM’s, Wave -did not have a licensing agreement with the computer giant. (Id.) Despite these revelations, Wave’s CEO stood by the Company’s earlier predictions of significant revenue growth. (Id.) Pressed to indicate the source of his sanguinity, Sprague told analysts that “we’ve been much more comfortable than perhaps our shareholders can be because it’s hard to see the data that we have. But we’re very comfortable.” (Id. at ¶ 79.)

In the meantime, on August 5, 2003, Wave’s Chief Financial Officer, Defendant Gerard K. Feeney (“Feeney”), sold 100,000 shares of the Company’s stock for $500,000 (id. at ¶ 69); on August 6, 2003, Sprague himself sold 150,000 Wave shares for $533,841 (id. at ¶ 70); and, on August 19, 2003, Wave Director, Défendant Nolan Bushnell (“Bushnell”), sold 10,000 shares of Wave stock for $35,742 (id. at ¶ 71). These sales caught the spike in Wave’s stock value at $3.17-$5.00 per share, and neither Feeney, Sprague, nor Bushell filed a timely SEC Form 4 reporting them. (Id. at ¶¶ 69-71; see also id. at ¶ 72 (alleging that Sprague neglected to report the *162 sale of other Wave shares in early August 2003).)

In December 2003, the SEC commenced an investigation relating to “certain public statements made by Wave during and around August -2003, as well as certain trading in Wave’s securities during such time.” (Id. at ¶ 87.) On this news, the Company’s shares closed at $1.50 on.December 18, 2003. (Id. at ¶ 88.)

In February 2004, Plaintiffs Steve Sachs, Jeff Swanson, and Charlene Harvey each filed separate shareholder derivative complaints. (Dkt. No. 9, PI. Swanson’s Opp.

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401 F. Supp. 2d 159, 63 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 607, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29181, 2005 WL 3116592, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sachs-v-sprague-mad-2005.