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SJC-13781
DAVID M. SABATINI vs. KRISTIN A. KNOUSE & others.1
Suffolk. February 2, 2026. - May 19, 2026.
Present: Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Kafker, Wendlandt, Georges, & Wolohojian, JJ.
Employment, Sexual harassment. Anti-Discrimination Law, Unfair educational practice. Statute, Construction. Practice, Civil, Counterclaim and cross-claim, Dismissal.
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on October 20, 2021.
A motion to dismiss was heard by Hélène Kazanjian, J.
A proceeding for interlocutory review was heard in the Appeals Court by Sookyoung Shin, J.
After review by the Appeals Court, 105 Mass. App. Ct. 174 (2025), the Supreme Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review.
Ellen J. Zucker (Kimberly Crowley also present) for Kristin A. Knouse. Edward Foye (Lisa G. Arrowood & Sarah E. A. Sousa also present) for the plaintiff.
1 Ruth Lehmann and Whitehead Institute for Biomedical Research. 2
Naomi R. Shatz & Niamh S. Gibbons, for Jane Doe Inc. & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief.
WENDLANDT, J. This case presents the question whether
G. L. c. 214, § 1C (sexual harassment statute), which protects a
person's right to be free from sexual harassment in, inter alia,
the academic context, provides a sexual harassment victim with a
cause of action directly against the individual perpetrator of
the harassment. Concluding that it does, we reverse the
Superior Court judge's order dismissing Kristin A. Knouse's
counterclaim asserting that she was sexually harassed by David
M. Sabatini, her former instructor, thesis committee advisor,
and fellowship director and mentor. We remand for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.2
Background. 1. Facts. We summarize the following
allegations from the counterclaim, accepting them as true and
drawing all reasonable inferences in Knouse's favor. See
Cubberley v. Commerce Ins. Co., 495 Mass. 289, 290 (2025),
citing Buffalo-Water 1, LLC v. Fidelity Real Estate Co., 481
Mass. 13, 17 (2018) ("We summarize the allegations in the
operative complaint, accepting them as true and drawing every
reasonable inference in favor of the plaintiffs").
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by Jane Doe Inc., the Victim Rights Law Center, the Women's Bar Association of Massachusetts, and the Massachusetts Employment Lawyers Association. 3
Sabatini was a laboratory director at the Whitehead
Institute for Biomedical Research (Whitehead) and a tenured
professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in
2012 when he met Knouse, then a graduate student at Harvard
University and MIT. Sabatini was one of Knouse's instructors at
MIT and served on her dissertation committee.
During a discussion in 2016 concerning whether Sabatini
would endorse Knouse's application for an upcoming fellowship at
Whitehead, Sabatini expressed concern that Knouse took herself
too seriously and asked Knouse whether she ever had "fun,"
"fuck[ed] around," or had sex. Knouse responded that she did
have fun and quickly left the conversation. Subsequently,
Sabatini recommended Knouse for the fellowship and supported her
grant application, both of which she secured.
Knouse joined Whitehead as a fellow in 2018. That year,
Knouse and Sabatini began a sexual relationship that ended in
2019; thereafter, Sabatini continued to make sexualized comments
to her. Knouse asserts that she struggled under this dynamic.
Sabatini, whose laboratory was next to Knouse's, was the
director of the Whitehead fellows program, and he served as a
mentor and reviewer of her work. Knouse feared the potential
consequences that losing an influential mentor would have on her
career and believed she could not terminate the relationship
without professional repercussions. She "began to withdraw from 4
the scientific community" and "experience[d] debilitating
feelings of entrapment and hopelessness."
Around this period, the results of a 2020 culture survey of
Whitehead "suggested that Sabatini either personally engaged in
sexually explicit and inappropriate discussions or fostered an
environment that tolerated -- or promoted -- such inappropriate
discussions and that he threatened those who might report his
conduct." The survey results "amplified complaints" raised by
two women, who had trained in Sabatini's laboratory, and by
Knouse, who contemporaneously disclosed to the director that she
had felt harassed during her fellowship but, fearing
retaliation, did not provide any further details.
In response, Whitehead hired an independent legal team to
investigate. The investigators determined, inter alia, that
Sabatini had "engaged in and otherwise tolerated sexist and
sexualized work discussions with his lab," and that engaging in
such discussions "was an implicit part of succeeding in"
Sabatini's laboratory. They also concluded that there was a
"culture of fear and retaliation" within the laboratory. They
reported that Sabatini had "engag[ed] in sexual relations with a
Whitehead Fellow" and violated several Whitehead policies,
including its sexual harassment policy. 5
Sabatini resigned from his Whitehead position. MIT
announced that it was placing Sabatini on leave to perform its
own investigation.
2. Prior proceedings. While the MIT investigation was
ongoing, Sabatini commenced the present action against Knouse,
Whitehead, and the director of Whitehead, alleging claims for
defamation, tortious interference with contractual, prospective,
and advantageous relations, and unlawful discrimination in
violation of G. L. c. 151B. He also asserted claims against
Knouse for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional
distress and against Whitehead for breach of contract.
Knouse filed a counterclaim against Sabatini alleging,
inter alia, sexual harassment under G. L. c. 214, § 1C, which
Sabatini moved to dismiss. A Superior Court judge allowed the
motion as to that count of Knouse's counterclaim on the ground
that the sexual harassment statute did not allow claims against
individuals. An interlocutory appeal was authorized by a single
justice of the Appeals Court. The Appeals Court affirmed the
dismissal, concluding that G. L. c. 214, § 1C, does not permit
claims against individuals. Sabatini v. Knouse, 105 Mass. App.
Ct. 174, 185-186 (2025). The Appeals Court reasoned that
because the "substantive law" regarding sexual harassment in the
academic context is set forth in G. L. c. 151C, § 2 (g), and
because that statute applies only to educational institutions, 6
the sexual harassment statute also applies only to educational
institutions. Id., citing Lowery v. Klemm, 466 Mass. 572, 577
(2006), and Morrison v. Northern Essex Community College, 56
Mass. App. Ct. 784, 786 (2002).
We granted Knouse's application for further appellate
review, limited to the issue whether G. L. c. 214, § 1C, permits
claims against individuals, as opposed to educational
institutions, for sexual harassment that occurs in educational
contexts.3 496 Mass. 1103 (2025).
3. Statutory framework. First enacted in 1986 as part of
"An Act prohibiting sexual harassment," St. 1986, c. 588 (act),
the sexual harassment statute is part of a comprehensive scheme,
together with G. L. cc. 151B and 151C, to address the problem of
sexual harassment in the employment and academic contexts. See
Green v. Wyman–Gordon Co., 422 Mass. 551, 553 (1996) (discussing
enactment of St. 1986, c. 588). The act amended G. L. c. 151B,
adding a definition of "sexual harassment" in the workplace,
G. L. c. 151B, § 1 (18), see note 4, infra, and declaring it an
3 On appeal before this court, Sabatini asserts that Knouse's counterclaim fails because Whitehead is not an "educational institution" under G. L. c. 151C and Knouse was not a "student" during her term as a Whitehead fellow. He further asserts that Knouse's c. 151C claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Although Sabatini asserts that as a result, Knouse lacks "standing," these arguments concern whether she has failed to state a claim under c. 151C -- an argument we decline to address in the first instance. 7
"unlawful practice" for an employer or its agents "to sexually
harass any employee," G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (16A). It also amended
G. L. c. 151C, adding a definition of "sexual harassment" in the
academic context, G. L. c. 151C, § 1 (e), see note 5, infra, and
making it an "unfair educational practice for an educational
institution . . . [t]o sexually harass students in any program
or course of study in any educational institution," G. L.
c. 151C, § 2 (g). And, relevant here, the act created the
sexual harassment statute, which provides that "[a] person shall
have the right to be free from sexual harassment, as defined in
[G. L. cc. 151B4 and 151C5]." G. L. c. 214, § 1C. By
4 General Laws c. 151B, § 1 (18), defines "sexual harassment" in the workplace as
"sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when (a) submission to or rejection of such advances, requests or conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of employment or as a basis for employment decisions; (b) such advances, requests or conduct have the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance by creating an intimidating, hostile, humiliating or sexually offensive work environment. Discrimination on the basis of sex shall include, but not be limited to, sexual harassment."
5 General Laws c. 151C, § 1 (e), defines "sexual harassment" in the academic context as
"any sexual advances, requests for sexual favors and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when: -- (i) submission to or rejection of such advances, requests or conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of the provision of the benefits, privileges or placement services or as a basis for the evaluation of 8
incorporating the definitions of sexual harassment in G. L.
cc. 151B and 151C, the sexual harassment statute "limit[s]
statutory protection to conduct occurring in the employment and
academic contexts." Lowery, 446 Mass. at 578. See id. at 578
n.6 ("the Legislature's incorporation of the definitions of
sexual harassment in G. L. c. 151B and c. 151C strongly suggests
an intention to restrict the meaning of the term 'person' in
[the sexual harassment statute] to a 'person' either in the
employment context or a person in the educational context"
[citation and quotation omitted]).
The statute also grants to the Superior Court "jurisdiction
to enforce this right [to be free from sexual harassment in the
employment and academic contexts] and to award the damages and
other relief provided in the third paragraph of [G. L. c. 151B,
§ 9]. Any such action shall be commenced in the superior court
within the time allowed by said [G. L. c. 151B, § 9]." G. L.
c. 214, § 1C. As such, the statute provides relief to victims
of sexual harassment, including actual and punitive damages and
reasonable attorney's fees and costs, and sets the statute of
academic achievement; or (ii) such advances, requests or conduct have the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's education by creating an intimidating, hostile, humiliating or sexually offensive educational environment." 9
limitations for sexual harassment claims. See G. L. c. 151B,
§ 9, second & third pars.
Finally, the sexual harassment statute requires that "[n]o
claim under [the statute] that is also actionable under [G. L.
c. 151B or 151C] shall be brought in superior court unless a
complaint was timely filed with the Massachusetts commission
against discrimination [(MCAD)] under [G. L. c. 151B]" (anti-
duplication clause).6 G. L. c. 214, § 1C. Thus, the sexual
harassment statute does not provide a duplicate path to avoid
the administrative procedures of G. L. cc. 151B and 151C;
instead, where a person suffers sexual harassment in the
workplace or in the academic context, and where either G. L.
c. 151B or 151C provides a mechanism for that person to file an
administrative complaint with the MCAD, the person first must
6 The anti-duplication clause was added by amendment in 2002, codifying our decisions in Green, 422 Mass. at 557-558, and Guzman v. Lowinger, 422 Mass. 570, 571-572 (1996). See Green, supra ("Where, as here, c. 151B applies, its comprehensive remedial scheme is exclusive, in the absence of an explicit legislative command to the contrary. Otherwise, to permit such duplication of remedies would allow claimants to bypass the procedural prerequisites defined by the Legislature in G. L. c. 151B, crippling the effectiveness of this specific statutory remedy for discrimination in employment" [quotation, citation, and alterations omitted]); Guzman, supra at 572 ("Just as G. L. c. 151B provides an exclusive remedy for sexual harassment claims against employers with six or more employees, G. L. c. 214, § 1C, provides the exclusive remedy for such claims against employers of fewer than six employees. In neither case does an independent and duplicative right exist to pursue such claims under the civil rights act"). 10
pursue the administrative remedy. In other words, the statute
"fills a gap in the statutory scheme" by providing a remedy to
those who suffer sexual harassment in employment and academic
contexts but who are not otherwise covered by G. L. c. 151B,
§ 4 (16A), or c. 151C, § 2 (g). Lowery, 446 Mass. at 578. The
sexual harassment statute "extends to employees and students
protection that is not otherwise available under G. L. c. 151B
and c. 151C; it does not duplicate the relief provided by those
statutes." Id.
In the academic context, because the administrative
remedies under G. L. cc. 151B and 151C are available only to
applicants to educational institutions and to vocational
students, the anti-duplication clause does not preclude a
nonvocational student who claims to have been sexually harassed
from first filing suit in the Superior Court under the sexual
harassment statute. See G. L. c. 151C, § 3 (a) (describing
administrative procedures available to "[a]ny person seeking
admission as a student to any educational institution, or
enrolled as a student in a vocational training institution"
claiming to be "aggrieved by an alleged unfair educational
practice"); G. L. c. 151B, § 9 ("Any person claiming to be
aggrieved by a practice made unlawful . . . under [G. L.
c. 151C] . . . may, at the expiration of ninety days after the
filing of a complaint with the [MCAD], or sooner if a 11
commissioner assents in writing, but not later than three years
after the alleged unlawful practice occurred, bring a civil
action for damages or injunctive relief or both in the superior
[court] . . ."). See also Doe No. 99 v. Cheffi, 105 Mass. App.
Ct. 704, 708-709 (2025) (explaining that nonvocational student
who was sexually harassed does not have available administrative
remedy under G. L. c. 151C and thus may proceed directly under
sexual harassment statute).
Discussion. With this framework in mind, we consider
whether, in the academic context, the sexual harassment statute
provides a victim with a cause of action directly against an
individual abuser or whether, instead, the victim's recourse is
solely against the educational institution.
1. Standard of review. "We review the allowance of a
motion to dismiss de novo, accepting the allegations in the
complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the
plaintiff's favor" (citation omitted). Glovsky v. Roche Bros.
Supermkts., Inc., 469 Mass. 752, 754 (2014). The sole issue
before us on appeal is one of statutory construction, which we
also review de novo. Conservation Comm'n of Norton v. Pesa, 488
Mass. 325, 331 (2021).
2. Plain meaning. Statutes are interpreted "'according to
the intent of the Legislature,' which we derive 'from all [of
the statute's] words construed by the ordinary and approved 12
usage of the language, considered in connection with the cause
of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied
and the main object to be accomplished.'" Hartnett v.
Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 494 Mass. 612, 616 (2024),
quoting Matter of the Estate of Mason, 493 Mass. 148, 151
(2023). "In construing a statute, 'we begin with its plain
language.'" Hartnett, supra, quoting Matter of the Estate of
Mason, supra at 152. See Cannata v. Mashpee, 496 Mass. 188, 191
(2025) ("a statute's language must be given effect consistent
with its plain meaning"). "[W]here the language of a statute is
plain and unambiguous, it is conclusive as to legislative
intent." Hartnett, supra, quoting Six Bros., Inc. v. Brookline,
493 Mass. 616, 622 (2024).
As set forth supra, the sexual harassment statute provides
that "[a] person shall have a right to be free from sexual
harassment" and that the Superior Court "shall have . . .
jurisdiction to enforce this right and to award . . . damages."
G. L. c. 214, § 1C. The statute creates a cause of action --
the right to be free from sexual harassment in the employment
and academic contexts and a grant of judicial redress against
another who violates that right. See Black's Law Dictionary 275
(12th ed. 2024) (defining "cause of action" as "[a] group of
operative facts giving rise to one or more bases for suing; a
factual situation that entitles one person to obtain a remedy in 13
court from another person"). Nothing in the statute's plain
meaning shields individuals who perpetrate sexual harassment.
Nor does the definition of sexual harassment in the academic
context, see note 5, supra, which is incorporated into the
sexual harassment statute by reference, support such a limit on
liability.
Further, we generally construe remedial statutes
"liberally, giving effect to every provision to produce a
consistent body of law." Thurdin v. SEI Boston, LLC, 452 Mass.
436, 444 (2008), citing 3 C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory
Construction § 72.05, at 392 (4th ed. 1974) (civil rights
statutes are remedial and entitled to liberal construction).
See Thurdin, supra ("The rule for the construction of remedial
statutes is that cases within the reason, though not within the
letter, of a statute shall be embraced by its provisions . . ."
[citation omitted]). Reading into the sexual harassment statute
a limit to shield individual perpetrators of the harassment, as
pressed by Sabatini, would run counter to the statute's broad
remedial purpose. See Lowery, 446 Mass. at 581 (noting that
sexual harassment statute "provide[s] greater protections and
grant[s] a broader array of remedies and tools for enforcement
than are available at common law" [citation omitted]).
Notably, the sexual harassment statute mirrors the language
of G. L. c. 214, § 1B (right to privacy statute), which provides 14
that "[a] person shall have a right against unreasonable,
substantial or serious interference with his privacy" and that
the Superior Court has "jurisdiction . . . to enforce such
right" and "to award damages." G. L. c. 214, § 1B.
Significantly, we have allowed, under the right to privacy
statute, claims against both individuals and institutions. See,
e.g., Polay v. McMahon, 468 Mass. 379, 385 (2014) (holding that
plaintiffs "made out a plausible claim" against their neighbor
for invasion of privacy under G. L. c. 214, § 1B); Bratt v.
International Business Machs. Corp., 392 Mass. 508, 519 (1984)
(concluding that corporation may be held liable for
intracorporate disclosure of private facts giving rise to
invasion of privacy claim under G. L. c. 214, § 1B). We see no
reason to adopt a narrower construction of the sexual harassment
statute.
3. Unfair educational practices. Sabatini's contention
that the sexual harassment statute is limited to claims against
an educational institution rests on the "unfair educational
practice[s]" provision set forth in G. L. c. 151C, § 2 (g),
which provides:
"It shall be an unfair educational practice for an educational institution . . . [t]o sexually harass students in any program or course of study in any educational institution" (emphasis added). 15
Sabatini asserts that because G. L. c. 151C, § 2 (g), enumerates
sexual harassment as an unfair educational practice, and because
liability for engaging in those practices extends only to the
educational institution under G. L. c. 151C, liability under the
sexual harassment statute should also be limited to claims
against educational institutions. We disagree.
As discussed supra, the sexual harassment statute
incorporates G. L. c. 151C's definition of the term "sexual
harassment." G. L. c. 214, § 1C ("A person shall have the right
to be free from sexual harassment, as defined in chapter . . .
one hundred and fifty-one C" [emphasis added]). Sexual
harassment in the academic context is defined in G. L. c. 151C,
§ 1 (e). See note 5, supra.
Significantly, the statute does not reference G. L.
c. 151C's unfair educational practices provision, G. L. c. 151C,
§ 2 (g), which in turn limits liability under G. L. c. 151C to
the "educational institution" itself. In essence, Sabatini
would have us rewrite the statute to state that "[a] person
shall have the right to be free from [unfair educational
practices], as defined in chapter 151C" or that "[a] person
shall have the right to be free from sexual harassment [by an
educational institution], as defined in chapter 151C." This we
cannot do. See City Elec. Supply Co. v. Arch Ins. Co., 481
Mass. 784, 789 (2019) ("We do not read into the statute a 16
provision which the Legislature did not see fit to put there,
whether the omission came from inadvertence or of set purpose"
[citation omitted]). "Indeed, we have long recognized that
statutes must be interpreted as enacted and statutory omissions
cannot be supplied by the court" (quotation and citation
omitted). Id.
Moreover, the omission of any reference to G. L. c. 151C's
unfair educational practices provision stands in stark contrast
to other language in the sexual harassment statute that
expressly incorporates by reference specific provisions of G. L.
cc. 151B and 151C. See, e.g., G. L. c. 214, § 1C (expressly
adopting definition of "sexual harassment" from G. L. cc. 151B
and 151C); id. ("The superior court shall have the jurisdiction
to . . . award the damages and other relief provided in the
third paragraph of section 9 of chapter 151B. Any such action
shall be commenced . . . within the time allowed by said section
9 of said chapter 151B" [emphases added]). The Legislature's
express inclusion of these provisions of G. L. cc. 151B and 151C
strongly supports the conclusion that its intent was to exclude
other provisions. See Attorney Gen. v. Mystic Valley Regional
Charter Sch., 497 Mass. 251, 259 (2026) ("the maxim 'expressio
unius est exclusio alterius' [holds that] the express inclusion
of one thing in a statute is an implied exclusion of other 17
things not included in the statute" [quotation and citation
omitted]).
For this same reason, we disagree with Sabatini's argument
that the sexual harassment statute incorporates wholesale the
"substantive law" of G. L. c. 151C, including the provision of
G. L. c. 151C, § 2, which provides that educational institutions
are liable for a list of unfair educational practices but does
not provide that individuals are liable. Had the Legislature
intended that the sexual harassment statute function solely as a
mechanism to enforce the prohibitions set forth in G. L. c. 151,
§ 2 (g), it would have said so expressly.
Our decision in Lowery is not to the contrary. There, we
determined that the incorporation of the definitions of "sexual
harassment" in G. L. cc. 151B and 151C in the sexual harassment
statute demonstrated that the statute's protection applied only
in the employment and academic contexts, because those
definitions are limited to those contexts. See Lowery, 446
Mass. at 578. We did not suggest that the "substantive law" of
G. L. c. 151C, which sets forth a list of unfair educational
practices by educational institutions, limited those liable for
violations of the sexual harassment statute.
Sabatini's position also garners no support from the
comprehensive statutory scheme comprising G. L. cc. 151B 18
and 151C and the sexual harassment statute.7 See Malloy v.
Department of Correction, 487 Mass. 482, 496 (2021), quoting
Pentucket Manor Chronic Hosp., Inc. v. Rate Setting Comm'n, 394
Mass. 233, 240 (1985) ("In interpreting a statute, we look not
only to the specific words at issue but also to other sections,
and 'construe them together . . . so as to constitute an
harmonious whole consistent with the legislative purpose'").
Here, permitting a claim under the sexual harassment statute
against the individual perpetrator of the sexual harassment does
not run counter to the comprehensive scheme. In fact, where the
Legislature sought to cabin a claim under the sexual harassment
statute to specific provisions set forth in G. L. cc. 151B
and 151C, it did so expressly. See G. L. c. 214, § 1C
(applicants to educational institutions and vocational students
must pursue administrative remedies because "[n]o claim under
this section that is also actionable under chapter 151B or
chapter 151C shall be brought in superior court unless a
complaint was timely filed with the [MCAD] under said chapter
151B" [emphases added]); G. L. c. 151C, § 3 (a) (providing
administrative remedies for applicants and vocational students
7 Cf. Green, 422 Mass. at 555, 557 (relying on G. L. c. 151B's "comprehensive remedial scheme" to impose limitations on sexual harassment statute's availability in workplace context). 19
only).8 See also Doe No. 99, 105 Mass. App. Ct. at 708-709
("Although the new language [added by the 2002 amendment to the
sexual harassment statute] imposes an administrative filing
requirement on vocational students and applicants, it does not
alter the remedies available to all other students"); Morrison,
56 Mass. App. Ct. at 786 n.6 (examining prior version of sexual
harassment statute and noting that "c. 151C, in contrast to
c. 151B, [does not] state that the provisions for the filing of
sexual harassment claims with the [MCAD] are exclusive").9 In
8 Because of the comprehensiveness of the administrative remedies for sexual harassment in the workplace under G. L. c. 151B, as well as the exclusivity provision in G. L. c. 151B, § 9, the anti-duplication clause has a different effect in the employment context, where an employee generally must pursue remedies under G. L. c. 151B first. See G. L. c. 151B, § 5 (detailing administrative process before MCAD, including filing, investigation, hearing, and adjudication procedures); G. L. c. 151B, § 9 ("Any person claiming to be aggrieved by a practice made unlawful under this chapter . . . may . . . bring a civil action for damages or injunctive relief or both in the superior or probate court for the county in which the alleged unlawful practice occurred . . ."). As discussed supra, no comparable administrative scheme exists under c. 151C for nonvocational students.
9 The Appeals Court's decision in Morrison does not support Sabatini's argument that the sexual harassment statute is limited to claims against educational institutions. In Morrison, the Appeals Court acknowledged that G. L. c. 151C does not provide an administrative remedy to students at educational institutions; thus, the Appeals Court determined that a student who was the victim of sexual harassment could bring a claim under the prior version of the sexual harassment statute without first filing an administrative complaint with the MCAD. See Morrison, 56 Mass. App. Ct. at 786 n.6. The court did not suggest that G. L. c. 151C's unfair educational practices provision cabined the remedies available to students. 20
view of the limited reach of the anti-duplication clause's
prohibition in the academic context, and in light of the
remedial nature of the statute, we decline to construe the
sexual harassment statute narrowly to provide relief only
against educational institutions.
Conclusion. We conclude that, in the academic context, the
sexual harassment statute permits claims against individual
perpetrators of sexual harassment. The judge's order allowing
Sabatini's motion to dismiss count I of Knouse's counterclaim on
this ground is reversed. The judge did not reach Sabatini's
alternative grounds for dismissal, and we decline to do so in
the first instance. Accordingly, the matter is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
The sexual harassment statute was subsequently amended, see note 6, supra. But the amendment did nothing to address the lack of administrative remedies available to students under G. L. c. 151C. See Doe No. 99, 105 Mass. App. Ct. at 708-709 (examining current version of sexual harassment statute and noting that administrative procedures under G. L. c. 151C did not bar student, who had no such administrative procedures available to her, from filing suit under sexual harassment statute directly). The amendment lends no support to Sabatini's assertion that the limitation in G. L. c. 151C's unfair educational practices provision to claims against educational institutions also limits the remedies available under the sexual harassment statute.