Sharpe, J.
The city of Detroit enacted ordinance No. 170-C which became effective July 7, 1932. The ordinance, which is copied in the margin,
provides for the licensing of those engaged in the florist business.
S. 8. Kresge Company, of Detroit, filed a bill of complaint in the circuit court of Wayne county to have the ordinance declared invalid and void and contends that the subject matter contained in the ordinance is beyond the police power and amounts
to an unreasonable interference with the rights of citizens to carry on a legitimate business; that the ordinance by including only persons “selling cut flowers and potted plants” makes an arbitrary and unreasonable classification, constitutes class legislation, and conflicts with the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and the Michigan Constitution, art. 2, § 16; and that the ordinance is invalid because it exacts an excessive license fee.
Defendants contend that the ordinance was' adopted to curb or eliminate fraudulent practices on the part of irresponsible, itinerant merchants engaged in the business of “doping” flowers and selling them to an unsuspecting public and to prevent flower peddlers from engaging in the florist business without paying personal property tax.
The trial court held the ordinance unconstitutional and found as a fact that there was no evidence to support the claim that the vendors against whom the ordinance was aimed were irresponsible, of fly-by-night character, or that they doped flowers or sold imperfect flowers except at a reduced rate. In our opinion, the record sustains the finding of the trial court.
An examination of the ordinance discloses that it prohibits the sale of cut flowers and potted plants except when the vendor is licensed by the mayor. It does not regulate the sale of cut flowers on the streets of the city of Detroit or the sale by temporary merchants who may rent store premises for short periods during the holiday seasons, except that they must comply with the act.
Citation of authority is unnecessary to establish the proposition that the sale of cut flowers and potted plants is a legitimate business and should remain unhampered by legislative action unless restrictions are required for the protection of the public. Defendants rely upon
Saigh
v.
Common Council of City of Petoskey,
251 Mich. 77, to sustain their position that the police’power of the municipality extends to the prohibition and licensing of the business of selling flowers and potted plants if the people may be exposed to misfortunes. In that case it was held that an ordinance prohibiting auction sales of linens, laces, embroideries and other merchandise except by merchants who have been in business in the city for
one year was a legitimate subject of regulation to prevent abuses and frauds. Tbe court said:
“Granting that the business of auctioneering is a lawful and useful one, it is nevertheless a legitimate subject of regulation to prevent abuses and frauds, and the reason for this is that it is everywhere recognized that auction sales of merchandise are attended with greater risk of fraud and loss to the public than sales in the usual way by merchants.
People
v.
Gibbs,
186 Mich. 127 (Ann. Cas. 1917 B, 830); note 31 A. L. R. 299.”
In
Harrigan & Reid Co.
v.
Burton,
224 Mich. 564 (33 A. L. R. 142), we said:
“Municipal ordinances, though ostensibly enacted as public regulations, which are so framed as to control or regulate a common and useful private business or occupation in life are subject to review and investigation in the courts to determine their validity by the test of whether, under the guise of a police regulation, there is an arbitrary, unreasonable or unwarranted interference with the constitutional rights of the private citizen to pursue a lawful business or calling, and to make contracts with others in relation thereto.”
The ordinance is what the trial court said it was, an “unreasonable interference with the rights of citizens to carry on a legitimate business” and “an attempt to stifle competition rather than to enforce reasonable and necessary regulations upon a business that is in need of regulation in order to afford protection to the public. ’ ’ Both the law in this State and the record in this case justify his conclusion.
In
People
v.
Victor,
287 Mich. 506, 514, it is said:
“While there is a presumption that an act of the legislature is valid, nevertheless, the courts have the power to determine whether, as a matter of fact, the prohibition bears a reasonable relationship to
the public health, safety, morals and general welfare.”
In
Cook Coffee Co.
v. Flushing, 267 Mich. 131, 134, it is said:
“The classification must be based on natural distinguishing characteristics and must bear a reasonable relation to the object of the legislation.”
The purpose of the ordinance may. be gleaned from the testimony of defendants’ witness Brown:
“We were protecting our business by getting rid of these people who sold in the streets. * * * Mother’s Day and Easter were the principal days that they hurt me, but during the week they hurt them all on those other corners. That is why the florists association lobbied this ordinance through.
“It is true that these second-hand flowers were sold at second-hand prices. They sold roses at 25 cents a dozen. I sold them for a dollar and a dollar and a half. They were selling second-hand roses and I was selling first-hand roses. It is true that that was just a depression condition. People would not buy dollar dozen roses during the depression as much as when times were good.”
And the witness Lutey who testified:
“There is nothing wrong with selling those imperfect roses as bull-heads at reduced prices. The object of this ordinance lobbied by my florist committee was to get rid of those merchants that sold that type of flower and old flowers. They were underselling our association of florists.”
The reasoning given in the case of
Chaddock
v. Day, 75 Mich. 527 (4 L. R. A. 809, 13 Am. St. Pep. 468), again seems appropriate; we there said:
“It is quite common in these days for certain classes of citizens — those engaged in this or that business — -to appeal to the government — national,
State or municipal — to aid them by legislation against another class of citizens engaged in the same business, but in some other way.
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Sharpe, J.
The city of Detroit enacted ordinance No. 170-C which became effective July 7, 1932. The ordinance, which is copied in the margin,
provides for the licensing of those engaged in the florist business.
S. 8. Kresge Company, of Detroit, filed a bill of complaint in the circuit court of Wayne county to have the ordinance declared invalid and void and contends that the subject matter contained in the ordinance is beyond the police power and amounts
to an unreasonable interference with the rights of citizens to carry on a legitimate business; that the ordinance by including only persons “selling cut flowers and potted plants” makes an arbitrary and unreasonable classification, constitutes class legislation, and conflicts with the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and the Michigan Constitution, art. 2, § 16; and that the ordinance is invalid because it exacts an excessive license fee.
Defendants contend that the ordinance was' adopted to curb or eliminate fraudulent practices on the part of irresponsible, itinerant merchants engaged in the business of “doping” flowers and selling them to an unsuspecting public and to prevent flower peddlers from engaging in the florist business without paying personal property tax.
The trial court held the ordinance unconstitutional and found as a fact that there was no evidence to support the claim that the vendors against whom the ordinance was aimed were irresponsible, of fly-by-night character, or that they doped flowers or sold imperfect flowers except at a reduced rate. In our opinion, the record sustains the finding of the trial court.
An examination of the ordinance discloses that it prohibits the sale of cut flowers and potted plants except when the vendor is licensed by the mayor. It does not regulate the sale of cut flowers on the streets of the city of Detroit or the sale by temporary merchants who may rent store premises for short periods during the holiday seasons, except that they must comply with the act.
Citation of authority is unnecessary to establish the proposition that the sale of cut flowers and potted plants is a legitimate business and should remain unhampered by legislative action unless restrictions are required for the protection of the public. Defendants rely upon
Saigh
v.
Common Council of City of Petoskey,
251 Mich. 77, to sustain their position that the police’power of the municipality extends to the prohibition and licensing of the business of selling flowers and potted plants if the people may be exposed to misfortunes. In that case it was held that an ordinance prohibiting auction sales of linens, laces, embroideries and other merchandise except by merchants who have been in business in the city for
one year was a legitimate subject of regulation to prevent abuses and frauds. Tbe court said:
“Granting that the business of auctioneering is a lawful and useful one, it is nevertheless a legitimate subject of regulation to prevent abuses and frauds, and the reason for this is that it is everywhere recognized that auction sales of merchandise are attended with greater risk of fraud and loss to the public than sales in the usual way by merchants.
People
v.
Gibbs,
186 Mich. 127 (Ann. Cas. 1917 B, 830); note 31 A. L. R. 299.”
In
Harrigan & Reid Co.
v.
Burton,
224 Mich. 564 (33 A. L. R. 142), we said:
“Municipal ordinances, though ostensibly enacted as public regulations, which are so framed as to control or regulate a common and useful private business or occupation in life are subject to review and investigation in the courts to determine their validity by the test of whether, under the guise of a police regulation, there is an arbitrary, unreasonable or unwarranted interference with the constitutional rights of the private citizen to pursue a lawful business or calling, and to make contracts with others in relation thereto.”
The ordinance is what the trial court said it was, an “unreasonable interference with the rights of citizens to carry on a legitimate business” and “an attempt to stifle competition rather than to enforce reasonable and necessary regulations upon a business that is in need of regulation in order to afford protection to the public. ’ ’ Both the law in this State and the record in this case justify his conclusion.
In
People
v.
Victor,
287 Mich. 506, 514, it is said:
“While there is a presumption that an act of the legislature is valid, nevertheless, the courts have the power to determine whether, as a matter of fact, the prohibition bears a reasonable relationship to
the public health, safety, morals and general welfare.”
In
Cook Coffee Co.
v. Flushing, 267 Mich. 131, 134, it is said:
“The classification must be based on natural distinguishing characteristics and must bear a reasonable relation to the object of the legislation.”
The purpose of the ordinance may. be gleaned from the testimony of defendants’ witness Brown:
“We were protecting our business by getting rid of these people who sold in the streets. * * * Mother’s Day and Easter were the principal days that they hurt me, but during the week they hurt them all on those other corners. That is why the florists association lobbied this ordinance through.
“It is true that these second-hand flowers were sold at second-hand prices. They sold roses at 25 cents a dozen. I sold them for a dollar and a dollar and a half. They were selling second-hand roses and I was selling first-hand roses. It is true that that was just a depression condition. People would not buy dollar dozen roses during the depression as much as when times were good.”
And the witness Lutey who testified:
“There is nothing wrong with selling those imperfect roses as bull-heads at reduced prices. The object of this ordinance lobbied by my florist committee was to get rid of those merchants that sold that type of flower and old flowers. They were underselling our association of florists.”
The reasoning given in the case of
Chaddock
v. Day, 75 Mich. 527 (4 L. R. A. 809, 13 Am. St. Pep. 468), again seems appropriate; we there said:
“It is quite common in these days for certain classes of citizens — those engaged in this or that business — -to appeal to the government — national,
State or municipal — to aid them by legislation against another class of citizens engaged in the same business, but in some other way. This class legislation, when indulged in, seldom benefits the general public, but nearly always aids the few for whose benefit it is enacted, not only at the expense of the few against whom it is ostensibly directed, but also at the expense and to the detriment of the many, for whose benefit all legislation should be, in a republican form of government, framed and devised. This kind of legislation should receive no encouragement at the hands of the courts, and be only upheld when it is strictly within the legitimate power of Congress or the State or municipal legislatures.”
The object of the present ordinance was not to protect the citizens of Detroit in their public health, safety, morals or general welfare, but was for the financial benefit of a few. In view of the fact that the selling of flowers and potted plants is a legitimate business, and that there has been no showing made of the existence of any evil in connection with the sale of flowers and potted plants, we are constrained to hold that the ordinance involves the infringement of the right of property or business under the guise of police regulations and is therefore void.
The decree of the trial court is affirmed. No costs will be allowed as a construction of an ordinance is involved.
Btjtzel, C. J., and Wiest, Btjshnell, Potter, Chandler, and North, JJ., concurred with Sharpe, J.