Rzgar Qader Khorsheed v. Christopher J. Larose, Senior Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center, San Diego, California; Joseph Freden, Acting Field Office Director, San Diego Office of Detention and Removal, U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement; U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Todd M. Lyons, Acting Director, Immigration and Customs Enforcement

S.D. California

Rzgar Qader Khorsheed v. Christopher J. Larose, Senior Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center, San Diego, California; Joseph Freden, Acting Field Office Director, San Diego Office of Detention and Removal, U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement; U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Todd M. Lyons, Acting Director, Immigration and Customs Enforcement

DecidedDecember 15, 2025

Docket3:25-cv-03346

StatusUnknown

This text of Rzgar Qader Khorsheed v. Christopher J. Larose, Senior Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center, San Diego, California; Joseph Freden, Acting Field Office Director, San Diego Office of Detention and Removal, U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement; U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Todd M. Lyons, Acting Director, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (Rzgar Qader Khorsheed v. Christopher J. Larose, Senior Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center, San Diego, California; Joseph Freden, Acting Field Office Director, San Diego Office of Detention and Removal, U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement; U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Todd M. Lyons, Acting Director, Immigration and Customs Enforcement) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Rzgar Qader Khorsheed v. Christopher J. Larose, Senior Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center, San Diego, California; Joseph Freden, Acting Field Office Director, San Diego Office of Detention and Removal, U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement; U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Todd M. Lyons, Acting Director, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, (S.D. Cal. 2025).

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

11 RZGAR QADER KHORSHEED No. 25cv3346-BTM-KSC KHORSHEED, 12 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR 13 WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS v. 14 Christopher J. LAROSE, Senior Warden, 15 Otay Mesa Detention Center, San Diego, California; Joseph FREDEN, Acting Field 16 Office Director, San Diego Office of Detention and Removal, U.S. 17 Immigrations and Customs Enforcement; U.S. Department of Homeland Security; 18 Todd M. LYONS, Acting Director, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 19 U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Sirce OWEN, Acting Director for 20 Executive Office for Immigration Review; Kristi NOEM, Secretary, U.S. Department 21 of Homeland Security; and Pam BONDI, Attorney General of the United States, 22 Respondents. 23

28 1 Pending before the Court is Petitioner Rzgar Qader Khorsheed Khorsheed’s 2 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court finds that the record is sufficient to rule 3 on the papers and that oral argument would not aid in the resolution of this matter. 4 A. Background 5 Petitioner, a Kurdish native of Iraq, arrived in the United States near the San 6 Ysidro Port Of Entry on September 15, 2024. Petitioner approached border officials and 7 expressed his fear of returning to Iraq. Petitioner fears persecution and torture in Iraq due 8 to his political opinion, race, nationality, and membership in a particular social group. 9 On October 15, 2024, an immigration judge found Petitioner credible and made a 10 positive credible fear determination. On October 22, 2024, the Department of Homeland 11 Security (DHS) granted Petitioner conditional parole until his immigration status was 12 adjudicated. Petitioner was granted release on bond under 8 U.S.C. § 1226. 13 However, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents detained Petitioner 14 on January 26, 2025. He has been in ICE detention since then. Petitioner filed an asylum 15 application in April 2025. That application is still pending. 16 Petitioner now seeks habeas relief and claims that his detention runs afoul of the 17 Due Process Clause, the Administrative Procedure Act, and 8 U.S.C. § 1226. The 18 Government claims that this Court lacks jurisdiction, that Petitioner is lawfully detained 19 under 8 U.S.C. § 1225, and that ICE properly exercised its discretion to revoke 20 Petitioner’s parole. 21 B. Discussion 22 This Court has jurisdiction to review Petitioner’s challenge to his detention. 23 Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 401-02 (2019) (maintaining jurisdiction on appeal 24 following district court decisions to review legal challenge to decision to deny bond 25 hearings). This Court has jurisdiction because Petitioner is not challenging his removal, 26 the execution of a removal order, or a discretionary decision by the Attorney General. 27 See id.; see also Arce v. United States, 899 F.3d 796, 800 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[W]e have 28 limited [1252(g)]’s jurisdiction-stripping power to actions challenging the Attorney 1 General’s discretionary decisions to initiate proceedings, adjudicate cases, and execute 2 removal orders.”). 3 Instead, Petitioner has raised a legal challenge to Respondents’ decision to revoke 4 his parole, detain him for almost a year, and classify him as an applicant for admission 5 subject to mandatory detention under Section 1225. He is challenging the lawfulness of 6 his custody. Because those issues are ripe for review, Petitioner is not required to further 7 exhaust any potential administrative remedies. See, e.g., Esquivel-Ipina v. LaRose, No. 8 25-cv-2672, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210275, *9 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2025) (finding 9 exhaustion futile). The Government has also waived the issue of exhaustion by raising it 10 in a footnote. United States v. Rodriguez, 971 F.3d 1005, 1015 n.8 (9th Cir. 2020) 11 (finding an issue in a footnote insufficiently raised). In any event, exhaustion would be 12 futile based on the BIA’s decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 13 2025). 14 The Court agrees that where DHS releases a noncitizen on bond, the noncitizen 15 obtains a liberty interest in remaining released from custody. See Pinchi v. Noem, No. 16 25-cv-05632-PCP, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142213, *8 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2025) (“[E]ven 17 when ICE has the initial discretion to detain or release a noncitizen pending removal 18 proceedings, after that individual is released from custody she has a protected liberty 19 interest in remaining out of custody.”); see id. (collecting cases so holding). This liberty 20 interest, the Court rules, may not be infringed arbitrarily. Where, as here, DHS 21 determines that a petitioner is neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community, that 22 determination strongly reduces any valid interest the Government has in the petitioner’s 23 continued detention. 24 It is well established that the Government’s power to detain must be grounded in a 25 proper reason or purpose. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 590 (2001); see also 26 Pinchi, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142213, *13 (“Civil immigration detention is permissible 27 only to prevent flight or protect against danger to the community.”). The Government 28 may not detain people without a legitimate reason. Because DHS determined that the 1 Petitioner was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community, DHS has no legitimate 2 reason to re-detain Petitioner without a change in circumstances or a valid justification. 3 The Government’s Return does not identify any valid reason for the revocation of 4 Petitioner’s parole. Indeed, the Return does not even offer a single reason for the 5 revocation of Petitioner’s parole. 6 Instead, the Government contends that the discretionary revocation of Petitioner’s 7 parole is not reviewable. But “the government’s discretion to incarcerate non-citizens is 8 always constrained by the requirements of due process.” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 9 F.3d 976, 981 (9th Cir. 2017). Moreover, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) does not withdraw from 10 habeas courts review over questions of constitutional law. Id. at 987 (explaining that 11 Section 1226(e) does not bar habeas courts from reviewing constitutional claims). 12 In short, because the revocation of Petitioner’s parole lacked any purported 13 justification, that revocation failed to comport with due process. Due process for parole 14 terminations requires (1) a decision by an appropriate official on whether the purpose of 15 parole has been served; (2) written notice of the reasons for the termination; and (3) a fair 16 opportunity to rebut the reasons given for the termination. See Noori v. LaRose, No. 25- 17 cv-1824, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194953, *29 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2025) (“Petitioner was 18 entitled to due process in his parole revocation. Particularly, he was entitled to both 19 notification of revocation and the reasoning for revocation, if not also an opportunity to 20 be heard and contest the determination.”); Y-Z-L-H v. Bostock, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 21 ____ (D. Or. 2025) (“[A]s a noncitizen with connections in the United States who is no 22 longer at the threshold of initial entry, Petitioner is entitled to due process rights.” 23 (quotation marks and citation omitted)).

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

11 RZGAR QADER KHORSHEED No. 25cv3346-BTM-KSC KHORSHEED, 12 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR 13 WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS v. 14 Christopher J. LAROSE, Senior Warden, 15 Otay Mesa Detention Center, San Diego, California; Joseph FREDEN, Acting Field 16 Office Director, San Diego Office of Detention and Removal, U.S. 17 Immigrations and Customs Enforcement; U.S. Department of Homeland Security; 18 Todd M. LYONS, Acting Director, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 19 U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Sirce OWEN, Acting Director for 20 Executive Office for Immigration Review; Kristi NOEM, Secretary, U.S. Department 21 of Homeland Security; and Pam BONDI, Attorney General of the United States, 22 Respondents. 23

28 1 Pending before the Court is Petitioner Rzgar Qader Khorsheed Khorsheed’s 2 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court finds that the record is sufficient to rule 3 on the papers and that oral argument would not aid in the resolution of this matter. 4 A. Background 5 Petitioner, a Kurdish native of Iraq, arrived in the United States near the San 6 Ysidro Port Of Entry on September 15, 2024. Petitioner approached border officials and 7 expressed his fear of returning to Iraq. Petitioner fears persecution and torture in Iraq due 8 to his political opinion, race, nationality, and membership in a particular social group. 9 On October 15, 2024, an immigration judge found Petitioner credible and made a 10 positive credible fear determination. On October 22, 2024, the Department of Homeland 11 Security (DHS) granted Petitioner conditional parole until his immigration status was 12 adjudicated. Petitioner was granted release on bond under 8 U.S.C. § 1226. 13 However, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents detained Petitioner 14 on January 26, 2025. He has been in ICE detention since then. Petitioner filed an asylum 15 application in April 2025. That application is still pending. 16 Petitioner now seeks habeas relief and claims that his detention runs afoul of the 17 Due Process Clause, the Administrative Procedure Act, and 8 U.S.C. § 1226. The 18 Government claims that this Court lacks jurisdiction, that Petitioner is lawfully detained 19 under 8 U.S.C. § 1225, and that ICE properly exercised its discretion to revoke 20 Petitioner’s parole. 21 B. Discussion 22 This Court has jurisdiction to review Petitioner’s challenge to his detention. 23 Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 401-02 (2019) (maintaining jurisdiction on appeal 24 following district court decisions to review legal challenge to decision to deny bond 25 hearings). This Court has jurisdiction because Petitioner is not challenging his removal, 26 the execution of a removal order, or a discretionary decision by the Attorney General. 27 See id.; see also Arce v. United States, 899 F.3d 796, 800 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[W]e have 28 limited [1252(g)]’s jurisdiction-stripping power to actions challenging the Attorney 1 General’s discretionary decisions to initiate proceedings, adjudicate cases, and execute 2 removal orders.”). 3 Instead, Petitioner has raised a legal challenge to Respondents’ decision to revoke 4 his parole, detain him for almost a year, and classify him as an applicant for admission 5 subject to mandatory detention under Section 1225. He is challenging the lawfulness of 6 his custody. Because those issues are ripe for review, Petitioner is not required to further 7 exhaust any potential administrative remedies. See, e.g., Esquivel-Ipina v. LaRose, No. 8 25-cv-2672, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210275, *9 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2025) (finding 9 exhaustion futile). The Government has also waived the issue of exhaustion by raising it 10 in a footnote. United States v. Rodriguez, 971 F.3d 1005, 1015 n.8 (9th Cir. 2020) 11 (finding an issue in a footnote insufficiently raised). In any event, exhaustion would be 12 futile based on the BIA’s decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 13 2025). 14 The Court agrees that where DHS releases a noncitizen on bond, the noncitizen 15 obtains a liberty interest in remaining released from custody. See Pinchi v. Noem, No. 16 25-cv-05632-PCP, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142213, *8 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2025) (“[E]ven 17 when ICE has the initial discretion to detain or release a noncitizen pending removal 18 proceedings, after that individual is released from custody she has a protected liberty 19 interest in remaining out of custody.”); see id. (collecting cases so holding). This liberty 20 interest, the Court rules, may not be infringed arbitrarily. Where, as here, DHS 21 determines that a petitioner is neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community, that 22 determination strongly reduces any valid interest the Government has in the petitioner’s 23 continued detention. 24 It is well established that the Government’s power to detain must be grounded in a 25 proper reason or purpose. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 590 (2001); see also 26 Pinchi, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142213, *13 (“Civil immigration detention is permissible 27 only to prevent flight or protect against danger to the community.”). The Government 28 may not detain people without a legitimate reason. Because DHS determined that the 1 Petitioner was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community, DHS has no legitimate 2 reason to re-detain Petitioner without a change in circumstances or a valid justification. 3 The Government’s Return does not identify any valid reason for the revocation of 4 Petitioner’s parole. Indeed, the Return does not even offer a single reason for the 5 revocation of Petitioner’s parole. 6 Instead, the Government contends that the discretionary revocation of Petitioner’s 7 parole is not reviewable. But “the government’s discretion to incarcerate non-citizens is 8 always constrained by the requirements of due process.” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 9 F.3d 976, 981 (9th Cir. 2017). Moreover, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) does not withdraw from 10 habeas courts review over questions of constitutional law. Id. at 987 (explaining that 11 Section 1226(e) does not bar habeas courts from reviewing constitutional claims). 12 In short, because the revocation of Petitioner’s parole lacked any purported 13 justification, that revocation failed to comport with due process. Due process for parole 14 terminations requires (1) a decision by an appropriate official on whether the purpose of 15 parole has been served; (2) written notice of the reasons for the termination; and (3) a fair 16 opportunity to rebut the reasons given for the termination. See Noori v. LaRose, No. 25- 17 cv-1824, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194953, *29 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2025) (“Petitioner was 18 entitled to due process in his parole revocation. Particularly, he was entitled to both 19 notification of revocation and the reasoning for revocation, if not also an opportunity to 20 be heard and contest the determination.”); Y-Z-L-H v. Bostock, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 21 ____ (D. Or. 2025) (“[A]s a noncitizen with connections in the United States who is no 22 longer at the threshold of initial entry, Petitioner is entitled to due process rights.” 23 (quotation marks and citation omitted)). Respondents failed to comply with these due 24 process requirements. 25 The Court also rules that Petitioner’s continued detention—lasting more than ten 26 months—is unreasonably prolonged and violates the Due Process Clause. To assess that 27 issue, courts in this district look to the following six factors: (1) total length of detention 28 to date; (2) likely duration of future detention; (3) conditions of detention; (4) delays in 1 the removal proceedings caused by the detainee; (5) delays in the removal proceedings 2 caused by the government; and (6) the likelihood that the removal proceedings will result 3 in a final order of removal. Kydyrali v. Wolf, 499 F. Supp. 3d 768, 773-74 (S.D. Cal. 4 2020). 5 Petitioner has been detained for more than ten months, and it will be almost a year 6 by the time his case is resolved. The delays appear attributable to the Government and 7 not Petitioner. Further, the conditions of Petitioner’s confinement are causing him mental 8 health issues. Most importantly, DHS has already determined that Petitioner is neither a 9 flight risk nor a danger to the community. Moreover, given the credible fear 10 determination, its not likely that he will be removed. His continued detention is 11 unreasonably prolonged and unconstitutional. See id. (finding detention unreasonably 12 prolonged where ICE previously determined that the petitioner was neither a flight risk 13 nor a danger to the community); Hamideh Sadeqi v. Larose, No. 25-cv-2587-RSH-BJW, 14 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 222822, *11 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2025) (“[T]he Court finds that 15 Petitioner's detention for over 11 months without a bond hearing under the circumstances 16 of this case—and absent meaningful rebuttal by Respondents of Petitioner’s analysis— 17 has become unreasonable and violates due process.”). The Court agrees with those courts 18 and holds that Petitioner’s continued detention when he is not a flight risk and not a 19 danger to the community violates due process. See e.g., Hamideh Sadeqi, 2025 U.S. Dist. 20 LEXIS 222822, *11. 21 // 22 // 23 // 24 // 25 // 26 // 27 // 28 // 1 C. Conclusion 2 For the reasons stated, the Court grants the writ on counts one and two of the 3 | Petition For A Writ of Habeas Corpus. Count three is otherwise denied as moot. 4 | Respondents are ordered to immediately release Petitioner from custody under the 5 | previous conditions imposed for his parole. Respondents shall confirm compliance with 6 | this order no later than December 16, 2025. The Court retains jurisdiction to enforce the 7 | writ. 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 | Dated: December 15, 2025 Til Lusk / 10 5:24 P.M. fig Til Honoraéle Barry Ted Moskowit United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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Rzgar Qader Khorsheed v. Christopher J. Larose, Senior Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center, San Diego, California; Joseph Freden, Acting Field Office Director, San Diego Office of Detention and Removal, U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement; U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Todd M. Lyons, Acting Director, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rzgar-qader-khorsheed-v-christopher-j-larose-senior-warden-otay-mesa-casd-2025.

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