Ryan v. Smith (In Re Raymark Industries, Inc.)

228 B.R. 524, 1999 Bankr. LEXIS 36, 1999 WL 24973
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Connecticut
DecidedJanuary 15, 1999
Docket19-20158
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 228 B.R. 524 (Ryan v. Smith (In Re Raymark Industries, Inc.)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ryan v. Smith (In Re Raymark Industries, Inc.), 228 B.R. 524, 1999 Bankr. LEXIS 36, 1999 WL 24973 (Conn. 1999).

Opinion

ALAN H. W. SHIFF, Chief Judge.

SIXTH MODIFIED TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

WHEREAS, on December 8, 1998, the plaintiffs commenced this adversary proceeding to recover damages in excess of $50,000,-000 based upon, inter alia, the defendants’ alleged fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, conversion, and unjust enrichment. The 14 count complaint seeks, in addition to money damages, inter alia, the turnover of assets held by the defendants which allegedly belong to the Raymark estates. See Complaint, Count VI; and

WHEREAS, on December 8, 1998, the plaintiffs filed an ex parte application to enjoin Craig R. Smith, the former CEO of Raytech, and the other named defendants from

dissipating, transferring, assigning, conveying, encumbering, selling, or otherwise disposing of or alienating any assets whatsoever, including but not limited to, bank accounts, automobiles, stocks, bonds, and real property in which any Defendant has an interest, except to the extent that portions of such assets are necessary (i) for the support of any individual Defendant’s immediate family ... or (ii) for transactions in the ordinary course of business of defendant Friction Dynamics, Limited ... without leave of this Court....

Plaintiffs’ Proposed Temporary Restraining Order at 2-3; and

WHEREAS, the corresponding December 8, 1998 temporary restraining order specifically found that “there is a substantial likelihood that the Defendants ... will dissipate, transfer, or conceal assets presently in then-possession for the purpose of defeating the lawful claims of creditors including Plaintiffs ...” which would cause the plaintiffs irreparable injury and leave them without any adequate remedy at law, December 8, 1998 Temporary Restraining Order at 2, and corresponding orders granted the plaintiffs’ applications for a writ of attachment and prejudgment remedy; and

WHEREAS, on December 22, 1998, this court made a preliminary determination that the hearing on the application would be consolidated with a trial on the merits, see Rule 65(a)(2), F.R.Civ.P., made applicable to bankruptcy by Rule 7065, F.R.Bankr.P. Modified Temporary Restraining Order at 2-3. On December 30, defendants Craig Smith, Bradley Smith, and James Cobb objected to consolidation and filed a motion to withdraw the reference on the basis of their jury demand and unwillingness to consent to a trial before the bankruptcy judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(e). They further filed a motion requesting a stay of this adversary proceeding pending the District Court’s determination of their motion to withdraw the reference. See Rule 5011(a), F.R.Bankr.P. The plaintiffs have opposed the withdrawal motion; and

WHEREAS, the temporary restraining order entered on December 8 was modified on December 22, 1998 to permit the release of funds for personal expenses, corporate operating expenses, and the retention of counsel, subject to further modification upon application to the court; and

WHEREAS, this Court entered a Second Modified Temporary Restraining Order on December 28, 1998, in the above-captioned Adversary Proceeding to permit an increase in the budget allowance for defendant Universal Friction Composites; and

WHEREAS, the Second Modified Temporary Restraining Order was to terminate at 5:00 p.m. on January 7,1999; and

WHEREAS, a stipulated Third Modified Temporary Restraining Order entered on January 6, 1999, which permitted the assign *527 ment of property from Universal Friction Composites, Inc. to Friction Material Company, Inc.; and

WHEREAS, 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) provides: The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title. No provision of this title providing for the raising of an issue by a party in interest shall be construed to preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any action or making any determination necessary or appropriate to enforce or implement court orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of process;

and

WHEREAS, a bankruptcy court’s injunctive powers under § 105(a) allow it to enjoin activities that might “impede the reorganization process,” see MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F.2d 89, 93-94 (2nd Cir.1988) (upholding court’s use of § 105(a) against non-debtors to preserve property of the estate); In re Rubenstein, 105 B.R. 198, 203 (Bankr.D.Conn.1989), or that will “defeat or impair the jurisdiction of [the] underlying bankruptcy case.” Barney’s, Inc. v. Isetan Company Limited (In re Barney’s, Inc.), 200 B.R. 527, 533 (S.D.N.Y.1996). See also, LTV Corp. v. Miller (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 109 B.R. 613, 621 (S.D.N.Y.1990); and

WHEREAS, a Fourth Modified Temporary Restraining Order entered on January 7, 1999 which extended the Third Modified Temporary Restraining Order, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), for the purpose of maintaining the status quo until January 13,1999; and

WHEREAS, a Fifth Modified Temporary Restraining Order entered on January 13, 1999 which extended the Fourth Modified Temporary Restraining Order, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), for the purpose of maintaining the status quo until January 15,1999; and

WHEREAS, it is determined that unless an order enters preserving the status quo until further action is taken by the District Court on the motion to withdraw the reference, there is a substantial risk that this court’s jurisdiction over the administration of these eases will be impeded by the transfer and dissipation of assets in which the Ray-mark debtors’ estates assert an interest.

NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that

1. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), the Fifth Temporary Restraining Order is restated in its entirety as the Sixth Modified Temporary Restraining Order (“Sixth TRO”) except as expressly modified herein.

2. Unless otherwise ordered by the District Court, the Sixth TRO shall continue in effect until 5:00 p.m. on February 5, 1999, and the court shall conduct a hearing on January 27, 1999 at 10:00 a.m. (the “Hearing Date”) to consider any requests for modifications of the restraining provisions of this Sixth TRO and any further allowances to the defendants, including allowances for attorneys’ fees. Any such requests shall be filed and served upon all parties to the adversary proceeding no later than January 22, 1999 together with a certification of service. Two courtesy copies shall be delivered to chambers on the date served. The request shall contain a short statement of each proposed change together with the reason for the modification and any documentary support thereof.

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O'Toole v. Wrobel (In re Sledziejowski)
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238 B.R. 241 (D. Connecticut, 1999)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
228 B.R. 524, 1999 Bankr. LEXIS 36, 1999 WL 24973, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ryan-v-smith-in-re-raymark-industries-inc-ctb-1999.