Ryan v. Kaplan

213 A.D. 131, 209 N.Y.S. 446, 1925 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 8449
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedMay 1, 1925
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 213 A.D. 131 (Ryan v. Kaplan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ryan v. Kaplan, 213 A.D. 131, 209 N.Y.S. 446, 1925 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 8449 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1925).

Opinion

McAvoy, J.:

The petitioners were appointed to clerical positions in the department of education on or prior to July 16, 1900, from eligible lists established by the municipal civil service commission as the result of open competitive examinations conducted by said commission, Ryan as a junior clerk and Sullivan as an office boy. Thereafter, from time to time petitioners were promoted to positions of higher grade in the clerical group of the competitive class of the classified civil service in said department, and their salaries were increased subject to, and always in form and manner required by the Civil Service Law of the State of New York until January 1, 1922.

On and since January 1, 1920, all positions in the clerical service of the city of New York have been graded, based upon the amount of annual compensation or the equivalent attaching to each grade.

Petitioners were in. grade 4 of the Civil Service Commission’s rules at a salary of $2,160 prior to the enactment of the Legislature, hereinafter described.

Pursuant to chapter 680 of the Laws of 1920 — the so-termed Lockwood-Donohue Bill — the board of education of the city of New York adopted on June 16, 1920, certain salary schedules and schedule conditions to become effective on and after August 1, 1920, fixing the compensation of all members of the teaching, supervising and clerical staffs of the -board of education. In the clerical service provision was made for six schedules or grades with conditionally automatic salary increases within each grade (except the highest) for each year of service therein.

By reason of the adoption of these schedules the petitioner Ryan was classified under a schedule known as 2-d at a salary for the first year in such schedule of $2,470 per annum and the petitioner Sullivan under Schedule 2-c at a salary for the third year in said schedule of $1,950 per annum, but by readjustment of his salary the petitioner Sullivan’s position was classified on July 30, 1920, in Schedule 2-d at a salary for the first year in said schedule of $2,470 per annum. Thereafter both petitioners received the yearly increase in salary within such schedule or grade upon receipt of a certificate of the personnel board that their work was “ above standard.”

Upon the increase of the salaries of the petitioners to $2,820 per annum, commencing January 1,1922, and other similar increases, conferences were had between the department of education and [133]*133the municipal civil service commission, as a result of which, pending the decision of the commission as to the holding of promotion examinations where such increases in salary carried the employees receiving the same from a lower to a higher salary grade as fixed by the commission, the municipal civil service commission temporarily approved of the petitioners’ increases in salary on what is known as a special certificate, which was concededly provisional only.

Thereafter and on January 23, 1924, the municipal civil service commission decided that it would no longer certify the payrolls of employees of the board of education situated as were the petitioners, among others, as having complied with the requirements of the Civil Service Law and the rules of the commission and instructed its chief examiner to proceed with the holding of promotion examinations for all such employees of the board of education. On or about January 28, 1924, the board of education was notified of this determination of the civil service commission and of their intention with respect to the further certification of payrolls of employees of the board of education situated similarly to petitioners.

It appears that appropriations have been made in the annual budget of the city of New York for the year" 1924 for salaries of the petitioners at the rate of $2,820 per annum each and that their duties in their respective positions have not changed since the year 1913 in the case of Ryan, and since 1916 in the case of Sullivan, except in respect to an increase in the extent of their respective duties.

In April, 1924, the petitioners commenced an injunction proceeding to compel the respondents to certify their salaries at the rate of $2,820 each. This proceeding was dismissed by the court upon the ground that the plaintiffs therein (now petitioners) had a statutory remedy by mandamus.

Thereafter, and on July 1, 1924, petitioners commenced this proceeding by means of an order to show cause and a petition, wherein a court order was prayed for requiring the said respondents as Civil Service Commissioners and members of the Municipal Civil Service in the city of New York to certify salaries of these petitioners and each of them and of the other employees of the Board of Education similarly situated upon the payrolls of the Board of Education at the rates fixed in the Schedule" and Schedule Conditions adopted by the Board of Education June 16, 1920, as amended July 30, 1920, to wit, at the rate of $2,820 per annum, and for such other and further relief as to the Court may seem proper.” The order now here granted the prayer of the petition.

[134]*134It would appear axiomatic that the municipal civil service commission cannot be compelled to affix its certificate to payrolls containing the names of the petitioners if they have not been promoted in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Law and rules of said commission. If some other statute clearly exempts them from such provisions, they do not need the certificate of the commission in order to receive their salaries.

It is admitted that the salaries of the petitioners have been fixed by the board of education at ah amount in excess of the maximum salary for the grade of position under the civil service rules of the municipal civil service commission. The civil service commission has refused to certify payrolls of such employees because such increases beyond grade constituted a promotion, and to pay them such increased salary would be in violation of the Civil Service Law. The salaries of the' respondents have been fixed by the board of education at $2,820. The maximum salary for the fourth grade (the position held by respondents) under the civil service commission’s rules, is $2,160. The fixing of the salary by the board of education at $2,820 constituted a promotion to the fifth grade under the municipal civil service commission’s rules. The commission’s contention is that in order that the employees may receive the salary in excess of the maximum for the fourth grade they must successfully pass a competitive promotion examination.

The respondents’ claim is that the Lockwood-Donohue Law (Laws of 1920, chap. 680) took away from the civil service commission the power to establish grades for the employees of the board of education, and that the fixing of respondents’ salaries in excess of the civil service commission’s grade by the board of education was not a promotion over which the municipal commission had jurisdiction. We cannot agree that the legislative direction in the act accomplishes this change of authority over promotions in the administrative staff.

Chapter 680 of the Laws of 1920 vested in the board of education the power to fix salaries of employees of the teaching and administrative staffs of the board of education and took such power out of the hands of the board of aldermen upon the recommendation of the board of estimate and apportionment under section 56 of the Greater New York charter (Laws of 1901, chap. 466, as amd. by Laws of 1902, chap. 435), which board had such power prior to the adoption of the Lockwood-Donohue Law.

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Bluebook (online)
213 A.D. 131, 209 N.Y.S. 446, 1925 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 8449, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ryan-v-kaplan-nyappdiv-1925.