Ryan v. Brady

366 A.2d 745, 34 Md. App. 41, 1976 Md. App. LEXIS 306
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland
DecidedDecember 2, 1976
Docket136, September Term, 1976
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 366 A.2d 745 (Ryan v. Brady) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Special Appeals of Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ryan v. Brady, 366 A.2d 745, 34 Md. App. 41, 1976 Md. App. LEXIS 306 (Md. Ct. App. 1976).

Opinion

Moore, J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This controvery arose out of the purchase for $240,000 of a small estate on the waters of Peachblossom Creek, in Talbot County. It is undisputed that the selling broker mistakenly described the western boundary of the property to the appellant purchaser, William A. K. Ryan, prior to the execution of the sales contract. 1 A little more than one year after the sale, Mr. Ryan brought suit for rescission of the deed and return of the purchase price, or, in the alternative, money damages. Joined as parties defendant were the vendors, John J. Brady and his wife, Carlyle; the selling broker, Jonathan S. Wilford, Jr., and his employer, The Latham Company; and E. Holmes Hawkins, Jr., and his firm, Walsh and Benson, Inc., with whom the vendors had listed the property on an exclusive basis. The Bradys filed third party claims against the individual and corporate realtors and the latter filed cross-claims against each other.

The gravamen of appellant’s bill of complaint was that by virtue of the misrepresentation, he understood that he would receive .986 of an acre more than was actually conveyed to him, and that had he known the true location of the westerly boundary, he would not have purchased the property. 2 The chancellor, after receiving extensive testimony and numerous exhibits, filed a comprehensive written opinion in which he found that Mr. Ryan had, by his actions, waived his right to rescission. Damages were also denied, the court sustaining the defense of imputed knowledge of the actual boundaries prior to the execution by Ryan of the sales agreement which had been prepared by his *44 own counsel. As an additional ground for the denial of compensation, the court found appellant’s proof of damages wholly inadequate. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.

I

The property involved contained between four and five acres of land, improved by a ten-year-old, three and one-half bath, five-bedroom house, with approximately 350 feet of frontage on Peachblossom Creek. It was originally listed for sale at $285,000.

In late 1972, appellant contracted to sell his own home and acreage located on Leeds Creek in Talbot County for the sum of $425,000, with transfer of possession to occur on or about June 15, 1973. He then began a search for a new residence, preferably in Talbot County, and during the early part of 1973 he was shown a number of properties by appellee, Jonathan S. Wilford, Jr. The latter was a broker with The Latham Company, the agency through which the appellant had sold his property on Leeds Creek.

In early March 1973, the appellee, John J. Brady, gave an exclusive listing to the realty firm of Walsh and Benson, Inc. for the sale of approximately 50 acres owned by himself and his wife located on Plaindealing Creek. At that time, apparently upon impulse, he added to the listing the words, “Also house on Peachblossom Creek, 5 BRMS, 3-1/2 BATHS, etc. $285,000 W&B excl.” Broker Wilfordi subsequently obtained permission from E. Holmes Hawkins, Jr., a broker with Walsh and Benson and a friend of the Bradys, to show Mr. Ryan the Brady property. First, however, Wilford and Hawkins met at the property in order that Wilford could become familiar with the land and improvements. According to Wilford, Hawkins pointed out the boundaries of the property at that time. Hawkins described the western boundary as extending, in a straight line, from an iron pipe located on the northern boundary of a private road, at the north end of the property, southward to a locust post at the southwest terminus near the banks of Peachblossom Creek. When Wilford subsequently showed the property to *45 appellant Ryan, he related to Ryan the boundary information which he had received from Hawkins.

Ryan testified, however, that Wilford told him that the western boundary ran in a straight line from a stake lying somewhere between a stump and an oak tree along the southerly edge of the private road to the southwest terminus post. The stake, knowledge of the existence of which was denied by all other witnesses, including Brady’s neighbor, Charles Berry, was estimated at trial by appellant’s surveyor to be 137 feet west of the true location of the northwest corner of the Brady parcel, as shown by the 1957 recorded plat of survey.

Although Mr. Ryan was dissatisfied with the location of the kitchen in the house and also desired more acreage, he nevertheless decided to purchase the property for $240,000, $45,000 less than the asking price. Upon the acceptance by Brady of his verbal offer, communicated to Brady by Wilford, Ryan instructed his attorney, Philip E. Nuttle, Jr. of the law firm of Nuttle and Hall, to prepare the agreement of sale. As executed, on May 7, 1973, the agreement contained the following description:

“BEING the same lands or premises shown on a plat of Kastenhuber and Anderson, Surveyors, entitled ‘MAP SHOWING A PORTION OF “OAKLANDS” SURVEYED FOR DWIGHT H. LONGLEY, TALBOT COUNTY, MARYLAND, Scale 100 feet to 1 inch, March, 1957’ which plat is recorded among the Plat Records of Talbot County in Liber No. 11, folio 28.
AND being the same lands which were conveyed unto John J. Brady and Carlyle P. Brady, his wife, both of Talbot County, Maryland by deed dated December 20, 1961 and recorded among the Land Records of Talbot County in Liber 375, folio 341, and subject to the conditions and restrictions contained therein.”

Settlement under the contract took place on June 20,1973 at the offices of the attorneys, none of the principals being *46 present. The deed, executed by the Bradys on June 15, 1973, was also prepared by appellant’s attorneys and contained a metes and bounds description, and a specific reference to the plat of survey specified in the agreement of sale. The trial testimony discloses that the actual drafting of the sales agreement and the deed was handled by John F. Hall, Esq., Mr. Nuttle’s partner. Mr. Hall conceded that he must have seen a copy of the survey before the sales agreement was executed.

Shortly after Mr. Ryan took possession of the Brady property, in the latter part of July, 1973, he was mowing the grass along what he believed to be the westerly boundary of his property. His neighbor to the west, Charles H. Berry, approached him and good-naturedly thanked him for mowing the Berry property. A friendly conversation ensued concerning the location of the dividing line between the lots of the two neighbors. One or two days thereafter, Berry delivered to Ryan a copy of the plat of the Berry property and they attempted to locate the four monuments designating the eastern boundary of the Berry property (the same being the western boundary of the Ryan property), but were able to locate only the locust post marking the southeast extremity, and a concrete marker at the northeast corner. Neither Berry nor Ryan could ascertain with precision the location of their common boundary. Mr. Ryan thereafter went on vacation in South Carolina and had no further discussions on the subject with Mr. Berry. Neither, it appears, did Ryan communicate with Mr. Brady nor with his own counsel.

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Bluebook (online)
366 A.2d 745, 34 Md. App. 41, 1976 Md. App. LEXIS 306, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ryan-v-brady-mdctspecapp-1976.