RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 4, 2026; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2025-CA-1248-ME
RYAN GREEN APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE DEANNA WISE HENSCHEL, JUDGE ACTION NO. 13-D-00141-004
KRYSTAL ENGLISH APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CALDWELL, A. JONES, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES. CALDWELL, JUDGE: Ryan Green (“Green”) appeals from the denial of his motion for sanctions against Krystal English (“English”), who unsuccessfully sought a domestic violence order (“DVO”) against Green.1 We affirm.
1 English did not appeal from the denial of her request for a DVO. Thus, we do not determine whether the DVO was properly denied.
FACTS
Green and English were never married to one another but have a daughter together. Apparently, their relationship ended years ago.
On August 5, 2025, English filed a petition for an order of protection against Green on behalf of herself and their daughter. She alleged a history of stalking, harassment and threats dating back to 2010. She alleged she dropped wanton endangerment charges against Green in 2010 because he had men threaten her life if she did not drop the charges. English alleged that in 2013 Green threatened to kill her and tried to run her off the road. She also alleged that Green told an ex-girlfriend in 2020 that he was going to blow up English’s house and that the ex-girlfriend reported this threat to police.
She further alleged that, in 2023, Green had kidnapped their daughter and took the daughter’s phone away and that Green made threats to put English in a ditch when English retrieved the daughter. She alleged Green would not let the daughter leave his house and would not open the door to the police. English alleged the daughter was scared and had to run out of the house. English also alleged Green stalked her and the daughter afterwards and would harass them by having police come to her house.
English also alleged that she had filed petitions for protection against Green in the past, but that Green was not served. She stated she was scared
3
because Green had recently returned to the area and was trying to contact her and her daughter again.
The family court granted English an Emergency Protective Order (“EPO”) the same day that English filed her petition (August 5, 2025). The EPO restrained Green from coming within 500 feet of English and the daughter, who was also listed as a protected person on the EPO.
On August 19, 2025, the court entered docket notes from an August 13 hearing, stating that the case was continued until August 20 and that Green had not been served (at least not as of the August 13 hearing). The record also indicates, however, that law enforcement served Green with the EPO, the petition, and the summons during the afternoon of August 13, 2025 (presumably after the hearing scheduled for the morning of August 13).
On August 22, the court entered further docket notes indicating Green was present before the court and that the hearing was continued until September 3 at Green’s request. A few days later, Green’s trial counsel entered her appearance. Shortly thereafter, trial counsel filed on Green’s behalf a motion to dismiss and a motion for sanctions against English.
In his motions to dismiss and for sanctions, Green disputed the veracity of many of English’s allegations and asserted there was no threat, stalking, or danger to English or to the daughter. He alleged that English was acting
4
vindictively and trying to harass him by filing the petition. He alleged English refused to file motions regarding the daughter’s custody, and instead used domestic violence allegations to resolve custodial issues.
Green also stated that his mother had died a few days before English obtained the EPO and that he was unable to attend his mother’s funeral because English was at the funeral. He claimed English filed the petition so he could not attend his mother’s funeral and to harass him. He requested dismissal of the action and sanctions (including attorney fees) against English for allegedly filing a false accusation.
On September 3, 2025, the evidentiary hearing proceeded as scheduled. English appeared pro se and Green appeared with his trial counsel.
At the beginning of the hearing, the court acknowledged that Green had filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for sanctions. However, the court declined to immediately grant the motion to dismiss and stated that an evidentiary hearing was necessary to resolve whether entry of a DVO was merited.
The court began to read the contents of the petition into the record.
However, based on Green’s hearsay objections, the court indicated it would not be considering some allegations set forth in the petition (for example, English’s allegation that Green’s ex-girlfriend told English that Green had threatened to blow up English’s house).
5
English testified. Green’s trial counsel successfully challenged the admissibility of much of English’s testimony on hearsay grounds and much of the documentary proof English sought to present was excluded due to lack of proper certification or authentication. Although English’s testimony about what Green had said to others outside her presence and what other people told her was excluded, the court allowed English to present testimony about what Green had directly told her.
The judge asked English whether Green had threatened her in the last few years, and English admitted he had not. When asked about the last time Green threatened or hurt English, English said that happened last in 2018. However, English stated that Green’s recent return to the area made her fearful due to the parties’ past history. English also testified to having filed petitions for protection against Green several times in the past, but to none of these petitions proceeding to a hearing because Green evaded service. She said he repeated this pattern every two or three years.
In response to the court’s questioning about anything recent which made English fearful, English alluded to an upcoming court hearing (apparently about child support) and said she was afraid because Green had said in 2021 that he would gladly sit in jail rather than pay her money. On cross-examination,
6
English also admitted that Green had not threatened her in 2023, but she stated he threatened their daughter then.2 At the conclusion of English’s proof, Green’s counsel renewed the written motion to dismiss. The court orally indicated it would grant the motion to dismiss, stating it was unable to make a finding of acts or threats of domestic violence with an ongoing risk of domestic violence based on the evidence presented at the hearing. Similarly, its written order stated the Court did not find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that acts or threats of domestic violence had occurred and may occur again. The court further found that English had admitted that there had been no threatening conduct for seven years.
Although the court dismissed the action, it denied the motion for sanctions. The judge orally expressed that she wished things had been handled differently so that Green could have attended his mother’s funeral. She also acknowledged that although English testified to not initially intending to go to Green’s mother’s funeral, English admitted that she had in fact gone to the funeral with the daughter. Nonetheless, the court did not find sanctions appropriate.
2 Apparently, the allegation of a 2023 kidnapping in the petition referred to Green’s not letting the daughter leave his house—not from his allegedly snatching the daughter from another location. English testified that she had voluntarily let the daughter stay with Green in 2023, but that Green refused to let the daughter leave when English came to pick the daughter up. English did not testify to Green’s taking the daughter away without his having the authority to do so, for example. English testified to having sole custody of the daughter, but the record from the custody proceeding is not before us.
7
The judge orally stressed that she believed that English was scared due to past history, despite English’s failure to provide sufficient proof that day to entitle her to a DVO. The judge also orally expressed personal awareness of English’s history of trying to get protection against Green over the years and previously failing to get her day in court due to Green’s not being served.
The court entered an order stating it was granting Green’s request for a directed verdict because the proof was insufficient to support issuing a DVO. The court also dismissed the EPO. However, the court denied the motion for sanctions. The written order stated the court could not find that English had been vexatious, and the court incorporated its oral statements made at the hearing into its written order. The court also made a written finding that English had repeatedly filed petitions for protection, but Green had never been previously served and that English finally got her day in court this time. The court further stated it regretted that Green missed his mother’s funeral, but it was not going to make English pay sanctions.
Green timely appealed from the denial of his motion for sanctions.
On appeal, he argues that English should have been sanctioned because, in his view, English violated CR3 11 by filing the petition.
Further facts will be set forth as needed in our analysis.
3 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
8
ANALYSIS
Standard of Review
We review the denial of CR 11 sanctions for abuse of discretion.
Clark Equipment Co., Inc. v. Bowman, 762 S.W.2d 417, 420 (Ky. App. 1988).
Green contends that the family court abused its discretion in denying his motion for sanctions because, in his view, English violated CR 11.
CR 11 requires that both attorneys and unrepresented parties must sign all pleadings, motions or other papers filed in court. Moreover, CR 11 states:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certification by him that he has read the pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.
CR 11 also provides:
If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.
9
Green accurately points out that, even though English was not represented by counsel when she filed the petition and appeared at the DVO hearing, English was still bound by CR 11 and other applicable rules and procedures when she proceeded pro se in this Kentucky civil action. See, e.g., Smith v. Bear, Inc., 419 S.W.3d 49, 55 (Ky. App. 2013). Green contends that English’s petition was clearly without merit.4 Nonetheless, CR 11 does not call for sanctions every time a party files a non-meritorious claim. Instead, CR 11 sanctions are only appropriate in exceptional circumstances when a party or his/her lawyer has signed a paper in violation of CR 11’s requirements and abused the litigation process. Clark, 762 S.W.2d at 420.
Thus, a trial court considering a motion for CR 11 sanctions must determine whether the attorney (or unrepresented party) acted reasonably in
4 For example, Green contends English’s request for an EPO was not warranted by existing law. He asserts she did not allege any acts of domestic violence and abuse occurring since 2013 in her petition. He also contends that the family court abused its discretion in granting an EPO in the absence of an immediate and present danger of domestic violence, see Kentucky Revised Statutes (“KRS”) 403.730(2)(a), leading to him having to defend himself against a meritless petition. However, we need not resolve the merits of the family court’s initial decision to grant an EPO—especially given its dismissal of the EPO following the DVO hearing. In fact, a nonbinding but perhaps persuasive unpublished opinion from this Court indicates an EPO is not a final and appealable order. See Shafizadeh v. Shafizadeh, No. 2008-CA-001002-ME, 2009 WL 961130 (Ky. App. Apr. 10, 2009) (unpublished).
10
signing the allegedly improper court filing under the circumstances at the time of the signing. See generally id.
Green contends that English abused the litigation process in signing the petition for an order of protection. In his view, English’s petition for protection was in no way warranted by existing law because she failed to allege any acts of domestic violence since 2013 and sought restrictions against him just because he was back in town and trying to reconnect with their daughter. He alleges the petition was not grounded in sufficient facts because, in his view, there was no immediate and present danger of domestic violence to justify an EPO.
Green also emphasizes that despite English’s testimony about initially not intending to go to his mother’s funeral, she did attend the funeral which resulted in his not attending the funeral because of the risk of being arrested or being held in contempt for violating the EPO. See KRS 403.763.5 He contends this shows that English did file the petition for improper purposes. Green even suggests the judge’s oral remarks indicated the judge thought the petition was filed
5 English emphasizes that Green was not served with the EPO until August 13, 2025, and she alleges this service occurred after the funeral. Perhaps she is implicitly suggesting that Green might not have faced risks of being arrested or being found in contempt due to lack of service and/or lack of notice of the EPO. See KRS 403.763(1). However, there does not appear to be any proof of the date the funeral was held in the record on appeal, and the record does not clearly indicate whether Green was served or otherwise had notice of the EPO prior to the funeral.
Also, although not discussed at the hearing, the EPO restrained Green from coming within 500 feet of the parties’ daughter as well as English.
11
for an improper purpose, such as harassment or preventing Green from attending his mother’s funeral.
However, as English points out, the family court clearly stated orally and in writing that it did not find that English had filed the petition for vexatious purposes and that it concluded CR 11 sanctions were not appropriate. Certainly, the family court expressed regret that Green had not gone to his mother’s funeral because English did. Also, the court clearly took note that despite any earlier intention not to attend, English had in fact attended the funeral. Nonetheless, despite Green’s unfortunately not attending his mother’s funeral, the court concluded that English had not filed the petition for vexatious or other improper purposes. Instead, the court clearly expressed in oral findings incorporated into its written order that the court believed English’s testimony that she was scared due to her past history with Green, even though the court determined that the evidence admitted at the hearing was insufficient to support granting a DVO. The judge also clearly stated she was aware that English had been seeking protection against Green for years and that prior petitions had not been dismissed on their merits but simply because Green had not been served.
We must extend significant deference to the family court’s unique opportunity to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence. CR 52.01; Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky. 2003).
12
Moreover, based on our review of the record and applicable law, we discern no abuse of discretion by the family court in declining to impose sanctions on English.
The record does not clearly indicate that English intentionally made any false statements of fact in her petition, even if she failed to offer admissible evidence at the hearing to support all her allegations. Nor does the record clearly show that English failed to make reasonable inquiries or knew that the allegations in her petition would be insufficient to merit relief under existing law or a good- faith argument for the extension or modification of existing law.
In fact, despite the family court’s declining to find that domestic violence had occurred or may occur again considering the lack of admissible evidence of threats or injurious conduct in the last few years, the relevant statute does not explicitly require a finding that domestic violence has occurred within any particular time period. See KRS 403.740(1) (“Following a hearing ordered under KRS 403.730, if a court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that domestic violence and abuse has occurred and may again occur, the court may issue a domestic violence order[.]”).
Also, although the family court focused on when Green had last threatened or hurt English and excluded on hearsay grounds some of English’s testimony and allegations in the petition, English filed the petition on behalf of the daughter as well as herself. Moreover, English attempted to offer evidence about
13
threats Green allegedly made to the daughter in 2023 and his contacting the daughter just days before the petition was filed. (English expressed a belief that her daughter wanted no contact with Green.)
In sum, the family court essentially determined that English did not file her petition for improper purposes, and we cannot say that the record clearly compels a contrary determination—especially considering the deference we must extend to the family court’s assessment of witness credibility and the weight of the evidence. CR 52.01; Moore, 110 S.W.3d at 354. English testified as to past threatening conduct by English towards her and her ongoing fear of him, so the record does not support Green’s insistence that the DVO petition was legally unjustifiable because it was completely unsupported by the facts or applicable law. In short, the family court’s factual findings regarding English’s motivation for filing the petition are supported by substantial evidence, and we discern no abuse of discretion in its decision to not impose CR 11 sanctions on English.
CONCLUSION
Thus, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the family court’s denial of Green’s request for CR 11 sanctions against English.
ALL CONCUR.
14
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Chris Hendricks Jeffery P. Alford Murray, Kentucky Nathaniel C. Humphrey Paducah, Kentucky