Rxeed LLC v. Caremark LLC

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: February 3, 2026
• Docket: 25-1638
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT No. 25-1638

RXEED, LLC, Appellant

v.

CAREMARK LLC _____________________________ Appeal from the U.S. District Court, D.N.J. Judge Michael E. Farbiarz, No. 2:24-cv-01111

Before: BIBAS, PORTER, and BOVE, Circuit Judges Submitted Jan. 26, 2026; Decided Feb. 3, 2026 _____________________________

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION*

BIBAS, Circuit Judge. You cannot sue someone for violating your federal rights unless

you have federal rights to violate. Rxeed sued Caremark for violating a law that it claims

gave it rights. But because nothing in that law even hints at such rights, we will affirm the

District Court’s dismissal.

The Drug Supply Chain Security Act regulates producers and distributors of prescrip-

tion drugs. Under one provision, a drug “dispenser” (like a retail drugstore) that “transfers

ownership of a” drug must “provide the subsequent owner with [the] transaction history”

for that drug. 21 U.S.C. § 360eee-1(d)(1)(A)(ii). But the transaction-history requirement

* This is not an opinion of the full Court and, under 3d Cir. IOP 5.7, is not binding precedent. does not apply when one dispenser sells a drug “to another dispenser to fulfill a specific

patient need.” Id.

Rxeed runs a third-party online marketplace that lets retail drugstores buy and sell

drugs, including for specific patient needs. As part of its service, Rxeed makes sellers pro-

vide transaction histories as required by federal law. Caremark manages New Jersey’s

Medicaid prescription-benefits program. In that role, Caremark processes drugstores’ re-

imbursement claims for serving Medicaid patients.

To get reimbursement from Caremark, retail drugstores must provide drug-purchase

histories. Rxeed alleges that Caremark has started refusing to accept Rxeed’s purchase his-

tories for reimbursement. Rxeed alleges that Caremark has even clawed back reimburse-

ments that it had already made. So Rxeed sued Caremark, claiming that its conduct violated

§ 360eee-1(d)(1)(A)(ii) and various state laws.

The District Court dismissed that federal claim for failure to state a claim and declined

supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. We review de novo and may affirm on

any basis in the record. Host Int’l, Inc. v. MarketPlace, PHL, LLC, 32 F.4th 242, 247 n.3

(3d Cir. 2022).

Rxeed sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which authorizes lawsuits for violating “any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the [U.S.] Constitution and laws.” To sue under

§ 1983, a plaintiff must show a violation of his federal right, not just a federal law. Gonzaga

Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002). Not only must the underlying statute “clearly and

unambiguously use rights-creating terms,” but it “must [also] display an unmistakable focus

on individuals like the plaintiff.” Medina v. Planned Parenthood S. Atl., 606 U.S. 357, 368

2 (2025) (cleaned up). It is not enough to show that the law “provide[s] a benefit or protect[s]

an interest.” Id.

Rxeed cannot clear this hurdle. The only federal law that it invokes focuses on dispens-

ers and buyers, not third-party platforms like Rxeed. Section 360eee-1(d)(1)(A)(ii) has no

language about third-party platforms, let alone rights-creating language or an unmistakable

focus on entities like Rxeed. Because “[no]thing short of an unambiguously conferred

right” is enough for a § 1983 cause of action, Rxeed’s claim fails. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at

283. We need not decide whether this provision of the DSCSA grants enforceable rights to

dispensers, buyers, or any other entities.

*****

Because Rxeed has no enforceable right, amending its complaint would be futile. And

Rxeed does not argue that the District Court, after dismissing its federal claim, should have

exercised supplemental jurisdiction over its state-law claims. So we will AFFIRM the Dis-

trict Court’s dismissal with prejudice.