Ruz-Zurita v. Wu's Dynasty, 07ap-616 (1-29-2008)

2008 Ohio 300
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedJanuary 29, 2008
DocketNo. 07AP-616.
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 2008 Ohio 300 (Ruz-Zurita v. Wu's Dynasty, 07ap-616 (1-29-2008)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ruz-Zurita v. Wu's Dynasty, 07ap-616 (1-29-2008), 2008 Ohio 300 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008).

Opinion

OPINION
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Gladys Ruz-Zurita ("appellant"), appeals from a decision of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas granting summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees, Wu's Dynasty, Inc., Jack Wu, and Super Dynasty Buffet (collectively "appellees"). For the following reasons, we reverse.

{¶ 2} The facts of this case are simple and virtually undisputed. On February 9, 2004, appellant and her friend, Anthony Heller ("Heller") went to appellees' restaurant to have lunch. Appellant and Heller went up to the buffet, got their food, and sat down at a booth. Appellant then went back to the buffet to retrieve a pair of *Page 2 chopsticks with which to eat her lunch. As appellant was walking back to the booth, a waitress took her by the elbow and began to escort her, presumably to the location where the waitress thought appellant was sitting. Realizing that the waitress was not leading her in the direction of the booth, appellant pointed to its location and stated to the waitress, "I'm going there. Where are you taking me? I'm there." (Ruz-Zurita depo. at 18, 22.) The waitress did not respond to appellant's questioning due to a lingual disconnect. Appellant noticed Heller waving her over, as it was clear she was not headed back towards the booth. Within moments, appellant, whose focus was on Heller and still being escorted by the waitress, fell down a set of stairs comprised of two steps.

{¶ 3} As a result of her fall and injuries, appellant filed a personal injury action against appellees, which, in turn, moved for summary judgment. On June 22, 2007, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of appellees. Upon reviewing photographs of the situs of the accident, which, we note, were taken after appellant's fall and did not depict the area as it existed at that time, the trial court found that the unobstructed steps were an open-and-obvious condition. It further found that appellant failed to introduce evidence demonstrating that the waitress's actions constituted unusual or unexpected attendant circumstances that obviated application of the open-and-obvious doctrine. Appellant filed a timely appeal and asserts the following single assignment of error:

THE COMMON PLEAS COURT OF FRANKLIN COUNTY, OHIO ERRED TO THE SUBSTANTIAL PREJUDICE OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT GLADYS RUZ-ZURITA BY GRANTING DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES WU'S DYNASTY INC., ET AL. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

*Page 3

{¶ 4} An appellate court's review of summary judgment is conducted de novo. Koos v. Cent. Ohio Cellular, Inc. (1994), 94 Ohio App.3d 579, 588, citing Brown v. Scioto Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1993), 87 Ohio App.3d 704,711. We apply the same standard as the trial court and conduct an independent review without deference to the trial court's determination.Maust v. Bank One Columbus, N.A. (1992), 83 Ohio App.3d 103, 107;Brown, at 711. We must affirm the trial court's judgment if any of the grounds the movant raised in the trial court support the judgment.Coventry Twp. v. Ecker(1995), 101 Ohio App.3d 38, 41-42.

{¶ 5} Summary judgment is appropriate only where (1) no genuine issue of material fact remains to be litigated, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, that conclusion being adverse to the nonmoving party. Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 64,66. A party seeking summary judgment "bears the initial responsibility of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion, and identifying those portions of the record * * * which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of fact on a material element of the nonmoving party's claim." Dresher v. Burt (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 280,292.

{¶ 6} To establish a cause of action for negligence, a plaintiff must show the existence of a duty, breach of that duty, and an injury proximately caused by the breach. Texler v. D.O. Summers Cleaners Shirt Laundry Co., 81 Ohio St.3d 677, 680, 1998-Ohio-602. An owner or occupier of premises owes a business invitee, such as appellant here, a duty of ordinary care in maintaining the premises in a reasonably safe condition so that the invitee is not unnecessarily and unreasonably exposed to *Page 4 danger. Paschal v. Rite Aid Pharmacy, Inc. (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 203. However, the owner or occupier is not an insurer of an invitee's safety and owes no duty to protect an invitee from open-and-obvious dangers on the property. Id. at 203-204, citing Sidle v. Humphrey (1968),13 Ohio St.2d 45, paragraph one of the syllabus. Courts reason that, because of the open-and-obvious nature of the hazard, business owners may reasonably expect their invitees to discover the hazard and take appropriate measures to protect themselves. Simmers v. Bentley Constr.Co., 64 Ohio St.3d 642, 644, 1992-Ohio-42. The open-and-obvious doctrine is determinative of the threshold issue, the landowner's duty.Armstrong v. Best Buy Co., Inc., 99 Ohio St.3d 79, 2003-Ohio-2573, at ¶ 13. When applicable, "the open-and-obvious doctrine obviates the duty to warn and acts as a complete bar to any negligence claims." Id. at ¶ 5.

{¶ 7} Open-and-obvious hazards are those hazards that are neither hidden nor concealed from view and are discoverable by ordinary inspection. Parsons v. Lawson Co. (1989), 57 Ohio App.3d 49, 50-51. "[T]he dangerous condition at issue does not actually have to be observed by the plaintiff in order for it to be an `open and obvious' condition under the law. Rather, the determinative issue is whether the condition is observable." Lydic v. Lowe's Cos., Inc., Franklin App. No. 01AP-1432, 2002-Ohio-5001, at ¶ 10. Put another way, the crucial inquiry is whether an invitee exercising ordinary care under the circumstances would have seen and been able to guard himself against the condition.Kidder v. Kroger Co., Montgomery App. No. 20405, 2004-Ohio-4261, ¶ 11, citing Youngerman v. Meijer, Inc. (Sept. 20, 1996), Montgomery App. No. 15732. Thus, this court has found no duty in cases where the plaintiff could have seen the condition if he or she had looked even where the plaintiff *Page 5 did not actually notice the condition before falling. Early v. Damon'sRestaurant, Franklin App. No. 05AP-1342, 2006-Ohio-3311, at ¶ 8.

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Bluebook (online)
2008 Ohio 300, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ruz-zurita-v-wus-dynasty-07ap-616-1-29-2008-ohioctapp-2008.