Rutherford v. United States

542 F.2d 1137
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
DecidedOctober 12, 1976
Docket75-1725
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 542 F.2d 1137 (Rutherford v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rutherford v. United States, 542 F.2d 1137 (10th Cir. 1976).

Opinion

542 F.2d 1137

Glen L. RUTHERFORD, Plaintiff Intervenor-Appellee,
and
Jimmie Stowe and Gene Schneider, Individually and on behalf
of a class composed of cancer victims and their
spouses, who are responsible for the
cost of treatment, Original
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
UNITED STATES of America and David Mathews, Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 75-1725.

United States Court of Appeals,
Tenth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted July 30, 1976.
Decided Oct. 12, 1976.

Burton J. Johnson, Watts, Looney, Nichols, Johnson & Hayes, Oklahoma City, Okl. (Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma College of Law, Norman, Okl., on the brief), for plaintiffs-appellees.

Barry Grossman, Atty., Dept. of Justice (Richard A. Merrill, Chief Counsel, Rockville, Md., and J. H. Geller, Associate Chief Counsel, Food and Drug Div., Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare, Washington, D. C., of counsel; John E. Green, Acting U. S. Atty., and William S. Price, Asst. U. S. Atty., Oklahoma City, Okl., Thomas E. Kauper, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Carl D. Lawson and Catherine G. O'Sullivan, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., on the brief), for defendants-appellants.

Before HOLLOWAY, McWILLIAMS and DOYLE, Circuit Judges.

WILLIAM E. DOYLE, Circuit Judge.

The Department of Health, Education and Welfare here seeks review and reversal of a judgment of the District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma which temporarily enjoined the Department, and particularly the Food and Drug Administration, from preventing appellee Rutherford from obtaining a supply of a controversial cancer drug called Laetrile for his own use. An order was issued on behalf of Rutherford which allowed him to purchase and transport in commerce a six months' supply of Laetrile and accompanying drugs. In the course of this order the trial court found that Laetrile was not toxic and further found that if properly administered it would "effect relief from cancer disease to the satisfaction of many who are privileged to use the same." The court also ruled that the FDA was required under the law to approve or disapprove Laetrile as a cancer treatment and that it had neglected its duty in this regard. The judge also held that the new drug application requirements contained in the Food and Drug Act, Section 505(b), 21 U.S.C. Section 355(b), violated the Fifth Amendment due process clause in that they prescribed expensive procedures which could not be carried out by persons in the position of Rutherford.1

The government seeks reversal on statutory grounds:

First, that it (FDA) has no duty to approve a new drug unless a so-called new drug application is submitted to it.

Second, that it is not empowered to determine the safety and efficiency of Laetrile.

Third, that the court exceeded its authority in issuing the injunction, the effect of which was to block the enforcement of an Act of Congress without convening a three-judge court, 28 U.S.C. Sections 2282 and 2284.

We need not review the judge's ruling that Laetrile is an effective treatment for cancer or that Laetrile is not toxic or that the new drug application provision is unconstitutional. We confine ourselves to the issue whether the so-called new drug procedure constitutes, as H.E.W. contends, the only legal route that is available for testing the drug for harmfulness or harmlessness. So considered, we are of the opinion that the question whether this is a new drug presents a mixed question of fact and law which should be fully tried. As it is, the FDA's record is grossly inadequate and consists merely of a conclusory affidavit of an official of the FDA which in effect declares that it is a new drug because the FDA says it is and thus is subject to all of the statutory vagaries of such a designation.

I.

As we view it, the reason that the Food and Drug Administration is anxious to classify Laetrile as a new drug is so as to bring it within the new drug certification procedures of the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act. Section 505(a) of the Act, 21 U.S.C. Section 355(a). This provision bars the introduction into interstate commerce of a new drug without an approved new drug application having been filed pursuant to the Act just cited. The Secretary is required to review the application within a specified period on the criteria of safety and effectiveness as demonstrated by "adequate and well-controlled investigations." Such an application is reviewable directly in the court of appeals. The plaintiff-appellee's position on this is that Laetrile escapes the clutches of this Act by being a food rather than a drug, or even if it is a drug it is not a new drug.

A.

It is unnecessary to linger and dwell on the subject whether it is a food or a drug inasmuch as this is not determinative. Appellee argues that it is in the nature of a diet supplement or a vitamin, but the cases recognize that even if a substance is also a food it may be subjected to the requirements of the Act if it is used in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention of disease in man or other animals.2 Intended use is an important aspect in the determination whether it is a drug. See Hanson v. United States, 417 F.Supp. 30 (D.Minn.1976).

Unquestionably Laetrile is intended at least as a treatment for cancer, so the likelihood that Rutherford can demonstrate that it is not a drug at all appears slim. Hence if this were the only issue to sustain the injunction it would be unnecessary to proceed further.

B.

THE QUESTION WHETHER LAETRILE IS A NEW DRUG

Rutherford vigorously argues that even if it is a drug it is not a new one, and therefore, it is exempt from the thicket which results from seeking to comply with Section 505(a) of the Act. A new drug is defined in Section 201(p) of the Act, 21 U.S.C. Section 321(p) as follows:

(p) The term "new drug" means

(1) Any drug (except a new animal drug or an animal feed bearing or containing a new animal drug) the composition of which is such that such drug is not generally recognized, among experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of drugs, as safe and effective for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof, except that such a drug not so recognized shall not be deemed to be a "new drug" if at any time prior to the enactment of this chapter it was subject to the Food and Drugs Act of June 30, 1906, as amended, and if at such time its labeling contained the same representations concerning the conditions of its use; or

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