Ruth Gammons v. John Caleb Marling and Alyssa Marling (mem. dec.)

CourtIndiana Court of Appeals
DecidedNovember 20, 2018
Docket18A-PL-145
StatusPublished

This text of Ruth Gammons v. John Caleb Marling and Alyssa Marling (mem. dec.) (Ruth Gammons v. John Caleb Marling and Alyssa Marling (mem. dec.)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ruth Gammons v. John Caleb Marling and Alyssa Marling (mem. dec.), (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before any Nov 20 2018, 9:53 am

court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK Indiana Supreme Court the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals and Tax Court estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES Ruth Gammons Anah Hewetson Gouty Westport, Indiana Pittman Law Firm Bedford, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Ruth Gammons, November 20, 2018 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-PL-145 v. Appeal from the Jefferson Circuit Court John Caleb Marling and Alyssa The Honorable Darrell M. Auxier, Marling, Judge Appellees-Plaintiffs Trial Court Cause No. 39C01-1702-PL-122

Crone, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PL-145 | November 20, 2018 Page 1 of 3 [1] Ruth Gammons appeals the trial court’s order denying her motion to set aside a

default judgment entered on April 18, 2017, in favor of John Caleb Marling and

Alyssa Marling. We note that although Gammons was represented by counsel

below, she has chosen to proceed pro se on appeal. It is well settled that pro se

litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys. Twin Lakes

Reg'l Sewer Dist. v. Teumer, 992 N.E.2d 744, 747 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). This

means that pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of

procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to

do so. Shepherd v. Truex, 819 N.E.2d 457, 463 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). These

consequences include waiver for failure to present cogent argument on appeal.

Id. While we prefer to decide issues on the merits, where the appellant’s

noncompliance with appellate rules is so substantial as to impede our

consideration of the issues, we may deem the alleged errors waived. Perry v.

Anonymous Physician 1, 25 N.E.3d 103, 105 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans.

denied (2015), cert. denied (2015). We will not become an “advocate for a party,

or address arguments that are inappropriate or too poorly developed or

expressed to be understood.” Id.

[2] Although failure to comply with the appellate rules does not necessarily result

in waiver of the issues presented, it is appropriate where, as here, such

noncompliance impedes our review. In re Moeder, 27 N.E.3d 1089, 1097 n.4

(Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. Because it would be quite cumbersome for

us to restate all the appellate rules that Gammons has violated, we will simply

say that her appellant’s brief fails to comply in numerous respects with Indiana

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PL-145 | November 20, 2018 Page 2 of 3 Appellate Rule 46. Most significantly, Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)

requires that contentions in an appellant’s brief be supported by cogent

reasoning and citations to authorities, statutes, and the appendix or parts of the

record on appeal. Failure to comply with this rule results in waiver of an

argument on appeal. Reed v. Reid, 980 N.E.2d 277, 297 (Ind. 2012).

[3] Gammons’s brief consists primarily of rambling and disorganized statements.

Gammons does not cite to a single legal authority, nor does her principal brief

contain a single accurate citation to the transcript of the trial court proceedings

or to the order being appealed. In sum, her noncompliance with the appellate

rules has resulted in the waiver of her claim. Accordingly, we affirm the trial

court’s order.1

[4] Affirmed.

Najam, J., and Pyle, J., concur.

1 In addition to denying Gammons’s motion to set aside the default judgment, the trial court’s order modified the default judgment in certain respects in Gammons’s favor. We affirm the order in its totality.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PL-145 | November 20, 2018 Page 3 of 3

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Related

Shepherd v. Truex
819 N.E.2d 457 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 2004)
Reed v. Reid
980 N.E.2d 277 (Indiana Supreme Court, 2012)

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