UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MICHAEL RUNNELS,
Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 25-1202 (BAH) v. Judge Beryl A. Howell FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In October 2020, plaintiff Michael Runnels, an employee with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (“FBI”), was arrested and criminally charged. Although the charges were
eventually dropped, plaintiff’s arrest triggered a year-and-a-half internal investigation by his
employers, the FBI and the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”), during which time plaintiff was
suspended without pay. Plaintiff sued the FBI for the “unreasonable delay,” asserting violations
under the Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5596(b)(1), and the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment. See Plaintiff’s Complaint (“Compl.”) ¶ 3, ECF No. 1. As the remedy, plaintiff
seeks declaratory relief and back pay of no less than $250,000. For the reasons discussed below,
plaintiff’s claims are dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
I. BACKGROUND
The facts, as plaintiff alleges and as relevant to this motion, are as follows. See Casey v.
McDonald’s Corp., 880 F.3d 564, 567 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (“On a motion to dismiss, we must
assume that the allegations of the complaint are true.”). Plaintiff is or was an employee with the
FBI. 1 On October 17, 2020, plaintiff was arrested in Nevada and criminally charged for reasons
1 The FBI is assumed to be plaintiff’s employer, though plaintiff’s complaint never explicitly says so. See Compl. at 1-2; see also Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 6 n.3, ECF No. 12 (assuming the same).
1 not specified in the complaint. See Compl. ¶ 3. Although plaintiff’s criminal charges were
eventually dropped on November 17, 2020, and his case was dismissed on February 10, 2021,
the arrest and charges triggered internal investigations by both the FBI and DOJ. Id. ¶¶ 4, 10, 15,
26. During the investigation, the FBI suspended plaintiff indefinitely without pay and suspended
his security clearance. Id. ¶¶ 5, 9. When plaintiff’s counsel sought pay for plaintiff during his
suspension, counsel was told that plaintiff could request back pay if he were reinstated. Id.
¶¶ 12, 14. Plaintiff alleges that, because of his inability to earn a living while the FBI and DOJ
investigated, he was forced to sell his home to support his family. Id. ¶ 6. On April 21, 2022,
approximately a year and a half later, the DOJ and FBI concluded their inquiries and informed
plaintiff that he would be suspended without pay for 14 calendar days. Id. ¶ 26. Plaintiff alleges
he “was informed by colleagues still working at the [FBI] that the SAC was not inclined to
restore [him] to his former position [or] . . . pay [him] the back pay that he was owed from his
suspension without pay.” Id. ¶ 27. 2
Three years later, on April 18, 2025, plaintiff brought this instant suit requesting
declaratory and compensatory relief for the “unreasonable delay” of “a year and a half” between
his arrest in October of 2020 and the internal investigation’s conclusion in the spring of 2022.
Id. ¶¶ 3, 26. Nothing in the complaint suggests that, in the intervening three years, plaintiff
availed himself of any internal DOJ procedures to request back pay. In the instant lawsuit,
plaintiff brings two counts: one under the Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5596(b)(1), “because [of] the
Government[’s] unreasonabl[e] delay[] [in] making its final decision in its adjudication of his
indefinite suspension without pay,” Compl. ¶¶ 29-30; and one under the due process clause of
the Fifth Amendment for “unreasonable delay in adjudicating his indefinite suspension, denying
2 The complaint does not define “SAC.”
2 him the ability to earn pay and/or to access back pay,” id. ¶ 34. As relief, plaintiff seeks “a
Declaratory Judgment that states [plaintiff] meets all of the criteria to be entitled to backpay
under the Back Pay [A]ct”; “a Declaratory Judgment that determines that [d]efendants violated
[p]laintiff’s Due Process Rights”; and “compensatory relief of no less than $250,000.” Id.
(Relief).
On July 24, 2025, defendant moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), and failure to state a claim, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss at 1, ECF No. 12.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), a plaintiff must establish that the
court has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims asserted. See Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d
11, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2015). “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, possessing only that
power authorized by Constitution and statute.” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, federal courts “are forbidden . . . from acting beyond
[their] authority,” NetworkIP, LLC v. FCC, 548 F.3d 116, 120 (D.C. Cir. 2008), and, therefore,
have “an affirmative obligation ‘to consider whether the constitutional and statutory authority
exist . . . to hear each dispute,’” James Madison Ltd. ex rel. Hecht v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1092
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Herbert v. Nat’l Acad. of Scis., 974 F.2d 192, 196 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).
A lack of subject matter jurisdiction over a case necessitates dismissal of the case. See Arbaugh
v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506-07 (2006); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (requiring
dismissal of the action “at any time” the court determines it lacks subject matter jurisdiction).
When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), the court must accept as true
all uncontroverted material factual allegations contained in the complaint and “‘construe the
3 complaint liberally, granting plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the
facts alleged’ and upon such facts determine jurisdictional questions.” Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v.
FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Thomas v.
Principi, 394 F.3d 970, 972 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). The court need not accept inferences drawn by
the plaintiff, however, if those inferences are unsupported by facts alleged in the complaint or
amount merely to legal conclusions. See Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir.
2002). Where, as here, a defendant files a motion to dismiss under both Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule
12(b)(6), the Rule 12(b)(1) grounds for dismissal are examined first, “as subject matter
jurisdiction presents a threshold question.” El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. United States, 750 F.3d
863, 874 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
III. DISCUSSION
As noted, plaintiff asserts two claims for violation of the Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5596,
Compl. ¶¶ 28-32 (Count I), and of the due process clause under the Fifth Amendment, Compl.
¶¶ 33-41 (Count II). For the reasons discussed below, plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction.
A. Back Pay Act Claim
Plaintiff claims he is entitled to back pay “because the Government unreasonably delayed
making its final decision in its adjudication of his indefinite suspension without pay,” when “the
adjudication . . . determined that the personnel action to suspend him was only warranted for a 14
calendar day time period.” Compl. ¶ 29. Plaintiff seeks “compensatory relief of no less than
$250,000.” Id. (Relief). This claim fails for at least two independent reasons.
First, to the extent plaintiff could bring a Back Pay Act claim in a federal district court,
the Tucker Act would require his suit to be filed in the United States Court of Federal Claims.
The Tucker Act “vests exclusive jurisdiction in the United States Court of Federal Claims over 4 claims against the United States for ‘liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in
tort’” for actions seeking more than $10,000. Smalls v. United States, 471 F.3d 186, 189 (D.C.
Cir. 2006) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1491). In Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879 (1988), the
Supreme Court “listed the Back Pay Act . . . as clearly within the purview of the Tucker Act.”
Mitchell v. United States, 930 F.2d 893, 896 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see also Bowen, 487 U.S. at 907
n.42 (noting that a claim falling under the Tucker Act must be based upon a statute that can be
“interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained,”
which include “provisions such as the Back Pay Act” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Van
Drasek v. Lehman, 762 F.2d 1065, 1071-72 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that jurisdiction was
lacking because the back pay claim based on the military’s allegedly unlawful promotion
decisions fell within the Tucker Act). Notably, plaintiff offers no response to defendant’s
argument that the Tucker Act bars his back pay claim in this Court, other than to request “that
[]his opposition be construed as a motion to transfer venue or to grant Mr. Runnels’ leave to file
a motion to transfer venue to the Court of Federal Claims.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 5; see also Wannall v.
Honeywell, Inc., 775 F.3d 425, 428 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“[I]f a party files an opposition to a motion
and therein addresses only some of the movant’s arguments, the court may treat the unaddressed
arguments as conceded.”). 3
3 Defendant protests plaintiff’s sudden request to convert his opposition into a motion to transfer his case to the Court of Federal Claims as violating Local Civil Rule 7(m), which imposes a duty to confer with the opposing party on nondispositive motions, see Def.’s Reply at 1-2, and contends that this failure alone warrants denial of plaintiff’s motion to transfer, id. at 2 (citing, e.g., Mack v. Aspen of D.C., Inc., No. 15-cv-1973, 2018 WL 564558, at *7 n.10 (D.D.C. Jan. 24, 2018) (“[Plaintiff] did not comply with Local Civil Rule 7(m)’s meet and confer requirement—a failure that warrants denial of her motion.”); United States ex rel. Pogue v. Diabetes Treatment Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 235 F.R.D. 521, 529 (D.D.C. 2006) (holding that the parties’ “motion to compel must be denied because they failed to confer with opposing counsel in an attempt to resolve the dispute before filing a non- dispositive motion”)). This basis for denial of transfer need not be addressed since, as further discussed in this section, plaintiff has not established on the merits that transfer is warranted under 28 U.S.C. § 1631, which requires, among other things, that the action “could have been brought at the time it was filed or noticed” in the transferee court. Here, plaintiff’s transfer request is puzzling, because plaintiff concedes that “[d]ue to the implication of the [Supreme Court’s] Fausto decision, [he] is barred from seeking review at the Court of Federal Claims.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 5.
5 Second, however, even a transfer of venue would not render plaintiff’s action for back
pay viable, because the Civil Service Reform Act (“CSRA”) precludes any judicial review of
plaintiff’s claim for back pay. Enacted in 1978, the CSRA created an “elaborate” framework for
reviewing adverse personnel action against federal employees, replacing the “haphazard
arrangements for administrative and judicial review of personnel action” that existed before the
statute’s enactment. United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 443-44 (1988). Under the CSRA, a
qualified employee is entitled to a review by the Merit Systems Protection Board, followed by an
appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. See Elgin v. Dep’t of Treasury, 567
U.S. 1, 6 (2012).
“The detailed protections and remedies afforded federal civil servants by the CSRA do
not apply uniformly to all covered employees.” Dotson v. Griesa, 398 F.3d 156, 163 (2d Cir.
2005). In “balanc[ing] the legitimate interests of the various categories of federal employees
with the needs of sound and efficient administration,” Fausto, 484 U.S. at 445, Congress decided
to exclude certain intelligence agencies from the CSRA’s remedial procedures, including the
right to judicial review, see 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii). As relevant here, “FBI employees are
generally excluded from CSRA provisions,” Graham v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 931, 933 (D.C. Cir.
2004), which provides FBI employees only a limited protection from employment-based
reprisals for whistleblowing, see 5 U.S.C. § 2303(a). 4 In excluding certain intelligence agencies
from the CSRA’s general remedies, Congress evinced a “desire to insulate intelligence agencies
4 The CSRA provides an exception for FBI employees who are “preference eligible,” meaning they “are entitled to specific protections under the CSRA because of prior military experience.” Graham v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 931, 933 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 2108(3)). Here, plaintiff has not alleged that he is preference eligible and entitled to the CSRA’s protections. See Compl., ECF No. 1. Regardless, even if plaintiff were preference eligible and could invoke the CSRA’s remedial procedures, plaintiff has not followed those procedures and thus dismissal for lack of jurisdiction would still be necessary. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1) (requiring administrative exhaustion before the Merit Systems Protection Board and for petitions for judicial review to be filed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit).
6 by relegating their employees to internal DOJ review procedures, thereby avoiding external
inquiry into sensitive law enforcement and intelligence matters.” McGrath v. Mukasey, No.
07-cv-11058, 2008 WL 1781243, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2008); cf. Padula v. Webster, 822
F.2d 97, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting, in a case bringing administrative and constitutional
challenges to the FBI’s hiring policies, that the FBI’s “employment practices have been
traditionally unreviewable,” as made clear by Congress’s “consistent[] exempt[ion] [of] the FBI
from statutory schemes governing the civil service”).
As both the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit have emphasized, “the CSRA is the
exclusive avenue for suit” for federal employees, “even if the plaintiff cannot prevail in a claim
under the CSRA.” Grosdidier v. Chairman, Broad. Bd. of Governors, 560 F.3d 495, 497 (D.C.
Cir. 2009); see also Elgin, 567 U.S. at 11 (“[T]he CSRA’s elaborate framework . . . demonstrates
Congress’ intent to entirely foreclose judicial review to employees to whom the CSRA denies
statutory review[.]” (emphasis omitted)); Fornaro v. James, 416 F.3d 63, 67 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(“[W]hat you get under the CSRA is what you get.”).
In United States v. Fausto, for example, a suspended federal employee with the
Department of the Interior sued under the Back Pay Act in the U.S. Claims Court (now known as
the U.S. Court of Federal Claims), contending that his suspension was in violation of department
regulations. See 484 U.S. at 441. Yet, because the plaintiff was a “nonpreference excepted
service employee”—a category of employees excluded from the CSRA’s provisions—he could
not avail himself of the CSRA’s procedures. Id. at 444. The parties disputed “whether that
withholding of remedy [under the CSRA] was meant to preclude judicial review for those
employees, or rather merely to leave them free to pursue the remedies that had been available
before enactment of the CSRA.” Id. at 443-44. Granting certiorari, the Supreme Court held that
7 even though the plaintiff had no right to administrative or judicial review under the CSRA, the
CSRA nevertheless precluded district court jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s Back Pay Act claim.
Id. at 455. The CSRA, the Court reasoned, “established a comprehensive system for reviewing
personnel action taken against federal employees.” Id. The statute’s “deliberate exclusion of
employees in [plaintiff’s] service category from the provisions establishing administrative and
judicial review for personnel action,” the Court concluded, evinced congressional intent to
“prevent[] [plaintiff] from seeking review in the Claims Court under the Back Pay Act.” Id.
Directly relevant here, many courts, including in this District, have since applied Fausto
to hold that personnel actions brought by FBI employees are subject to the CSRA’s judicial-
review restrictions, even if FBI employees generally cannot avail themselves of the CSRA’s
procedures. See Kobelia v. F.B.I., No. 24-cv-2542, 2025 WL 1444509, at *14-15 (D.D.C. May
20, 2025) (dismissing claims brought by FBI agents challenging restrictions on outside
employment, inter alia, because the “claims are precluded by the CSRA” even if the plaintiff
“cannot prevail in a claim under the CSRA”); Lamb v. Holder, 82 F. Supp. 3d 416, 422 (D.D.C.
2015) (noting that “[w]hile decisions concerning ‘pay, benefits, or awards’ are generally within
the scope of the CSRA, . . . such decisions taken at the FBI, however, are not,” and thus the
plaintiff’s challenges to his termination for gross misconduct “fall within the umbrella of the
CSRA, which provides him no avenue for judicial review”); Croddy v. F.B.I., No. 00-cv-651,
2006 WL 2844261, at *5 (D.D.C. Sept. 29, 2006) (noting, in a case challenging non-selection for
employment, that “the fact that the FBI is generally exempted from the CSRA’s scheme does not
diminish the scope of the CSRA’s preclusive effect”); Jones v. Holder, No. 11-cv-5286, 2012
WL 770849, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 7, 2012) (holding that “[t]he fact that [plaintiff] lacked a
remedy under the CSRA [to challenge his discharge] does not entitle him to review in district
8 court of the FBI’s adverse personnel action”); Chiang v. Gonzales, No. 05-cv-03273, 2006 WL
8449284, at *7 (C.D. Cal. May 9, 2006), aff’d sub nom. Chiang v. F.B.I., 278 F. App’x 728 (9th
Cir. 2008) (“Because [plaintiff’s] claims [challenging the suspension of her security clearance
and placement on administrative leave] concern personnel actions by the FBI, they fall within the
ambit of the CSRA, and the court may not review them unless the CSRA authorizes review. As
an FBI agent, [plaintiff] is excluded from the CSRA. . . . Consequently, her claims cannot be
reviewed by this court.”).
Plaintiff cites no cases to the contrary with respect to the CSRA’s preclusive effect for
FBI employees, in fact conceding that “[d]ue to the implication of the Fausto decision, [he] is
barred from seeking review at the Court of Federal Claims” over personnel actions. Pl.’s Opp’n
at 5. Plaintiff’s only real response is that his action is not personnel-related, “because his claims
arise from a violation of his constitutional rights connected to his employment” and he “is only
invoking the Back Pay Act as an auxiliary measure.” Id. at 2.
Plaintiff’s attempt to distinguish his claim from a personnel action is not persuasive.
Suspensions are quintessential personnel actions explicitly covered under the CSRA. See King v.
United States, 81 Fed. Cl. 766, 771 (2008) (explaining that “[t]he types of personnel actions
encompassed by the CSRA” include “minor adverse personnel actions such as a suspension for
14 days or less,” 5 U.S.C. § 7502,” and “major adverse personnel actions such as . . . a
suspension for more than 14 days,” 5 U.S.C. § 7512). Plaintiff claims he is not challenging his
suspension, arguing that he seeks only back pay for any suspension beyond the 14-day
suspension imposed by the adjudicatory body. Pl.’s Opp’n at 3. However, “[a]n indefinite
suspension without pay is one of the adverse personnel actions listed in the CSRA.” Kobelia,
2025 WL 1444509, at *16 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7512(2)). Further, the Fausto Court has made clear
9 that the CSRA does not exempt actions for back pay from its jurisdictional bar. Fausto, 484 U.S.
at 455 (holding that the CSRA’s “deliberate exclusion of [a category of] employees . . . from the
provisions establishing administrative and judicial review” prevents that category of employees
“from seeking review . . . under the Back Pay Act”).
As to plaintiff’s attempt to distinguish his Back Pay Act claim on constitutional grounds,
the Supreme Court has squarely held that “the CSRA precludes district court jurisdiction over
[personnel-related] claims even [when] they are constitutional claims for equitable relief.” Elgin,
567 U.S. at 8; see also id. at 13 (holding, in federal employees’ equal protection challenge to
their discharges for failure to register for the draft, that the CSRA’s “statutory review scheme is
exclusive, even for employees who bring constitutional challenges to federal statutes”). In sum,
plaintiff’s Back Pay Act claim must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
B. Due Process Claim
Plaintiff alleges “his due process rights were violated by the [FBI’s] unreasonable delay
in adjudicating his indefinite suspension, denying him the ability to earn pay and/or to access
back pay.” Compl. ¶ 34. As relief, he seeks a declaratory judgment that “states [he] meets all of
the criteria to be entitled to backpay under the Back Pay [A]ct,” a declaratory judgment “that
determines that [d]efendant[] violated [p]laintiff’s Due Process Rights,” and “compensatory
relief of no less than $250,000.” Compl. (Relief).
Sovereign immunity plainly bars plaintiff’s due process claim. See Def.’s Opp’n at 8-9.
“It is axiomatic that the United States may not be sued without its consent and that the existence
of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.” United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983).
Plaintiff brings a suit for monetary damages against the FBI, but “the United States has not
consented to be sued for damages based . . . on constitutional violations.” Cofield v. United
States, 64 F. Supp. 3d 206, 213 (D.D.C. 2014) (citing F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476-78 10 (1994)); see also Benoit v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 608 F.3d 17, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“[S]uits for
damages against the United States under . . . the Constitution are barred by sovereign
immunity.”).
Plaintiff attempts to avoid the jurisdictional bar by repackaging his request for
“compensatory relief” as one for “injunctive relief,” which plaintiff argues “has historically
included reinstatement with back pay.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 6. This argument fails. Courts
“prohibit[] . . . the creative drafting of complaints . . . to avoid the jurisdictional consequences,”
such as “by “disguising a claim for money damages as one for equitable relief.” Crowley Gov’t
Servs., Inc. v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 38 F.4th 1099, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (internal quotation
marks and alteration omitted). Indeed, in Hubbard v. Administrator, an en banc D.C. Circuit
considered a similar argument from a plaintiff who argued he “was entitled to receive back
pay . . . as part of an equitable remedy” under the Administrative Procedure Act, which waived
sovereign immunity for “relief other than money damages.” 982 F.2d 531, 532 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(en banc). The Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s argument, holding that back pay constituted
“money damages” and that “attach[ing] the ‘equitable’ label to back pay in no way contradicts
the basic conclusion that back pay is still essentially a compensatory device.” Id. at 537.
Plaintiff’s remaining arguments that declaratory relief and federal question jurisdiction
are still available also fail. Neither the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, nor federal
question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, waives the federal government’s sovereign immunity.
See Swan v. Clinton, 100 F.3d 973, 981 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that the federal question
statute does not constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity); Metz v. BAE Sys. Tech. Sols. &
Servs. Inc., 774 F.3d 18, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“[I]t is a well-established rule that the Declaratory
Judgment Act is not an independent source of federal jurisdiction.” (quoting Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649
11 F.3d 762, 778 (D.C. Cir. 2011))); Maynard v. Architect of the Capitol, 544 F. Supp. 3d 64, 77
(D.D.C. 2021) (“[T]he Declaratory Judgment Act does not provide a waiver of sovereign
immunity.” (quoting Stone v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 859 F. Supp. 2d 59, 64 (D.D.C.
2012))). Accordingly, plaintiff’s due process claim must also be dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. 5
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss the Complaint, ECF No. 12, for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, is GRANTED. An order consistent with this Memorandum
Opinion will be entered contemporaneously.
Date: November 5, 2025
__________________________ BERYL A. HOWELL United States District Judge
5 Defendant’s alternative grounds for dismissal for failure to state a claim need not be addressed.