Peters, J.
The determinative issue in this appeal is whether the Rules Committee of the Superior Court falls within the statutory purview of the Connecticut Freedom of Information Act, which defines a “public agency” subject to the act to include “any judicial office, official or body but only in respect to its or their administrative functions.” General Statutes § l-18a (a).1
This case was initiated by the defendant, Raphael Podolsky, when, by letter dated November 25, 1977, he requested notice of and access to all meetings of the plaintiff Rules Committee of the Superior Court. Upon the Rules Committee’s denial of his request, Podolsky filed a complaint with the Connecticut Freedom of [236]*236Information Commission (FOIC) on December 12,1977. On March 8,1978, after a hearing at which all the parties participated, the FOIC ordered the Rules Committee to provide Podolsky with access to its meetings pursuant to General Statutes § 1-212 and with advance notice of its meetings pursuant to General Statutes § l-21c.3 On March 17, 1978, the Rules Committee appealed the FOIC order to the Superior Court, pursuant to General Statutes § 4-183, and on August 7, 1981, the Superior Court sustained its appeal. This [237]*237court then granted Podolsky’s petition for certification. He now appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court sustaining the Rules Committee’s appeal.* **4
The trial court’s memorandum of decision and the record of the proceedings before the FOIC reveal the following facts. The Rules Committee is a body composed of judges of the Superior Court. Its function is to consider proposed changes in the rules of practice for the Superior Court, and to recommend amendments to the Practice Book, which may be adopted by vote of the Superior Court judges. Once proposed Practice Book amendments have been approved by the Rules Committee, they are published in the Connecticut Law Journal, and are subject to public comment before their adoption by the judges. The Rules Committee does not, however, permit members of the public to attend the deliberative sessions at which the committee debates suggested rule changes and formulates specific amendment proposals.
[238]*238Podolsky sought access to the meetings of the Rules Committee on the basis of his claim that the Rules Committee, although a judicial body, exercises only administrative functions, and therefore is a “public agency” within General Statutes § l-18a (a)5 and is governed by the open meeting rules of the Freedom of Information Act. General Statutes § 1-21. The Rules Committee urged, in opposition, that: (1) the Freedom of Information Act, as a matter of statutory construction, does not apply to its activities; and (2) if the Freedom of Information Act were to be held applicable, the act would unconstitutionally intrude upon the inherent rule-making powers of the judiciary, in violation of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. Conn. Const., arts. II, V.
The FOIC ordered the Rules Committee to admit Podolsky to its meetings. It concluded that the Rules Committee performed an administrative function within the Judicial Department. The FOIC disclaimed any jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of the Freedom of Information Act as applied to the Rules Committee.
The trial court sustained the appeal of the Rules Committee. Because the Rules Committee does not adjudicate individual disputes, the trial court accepted the FOIC’s ruling that the Rules Committee performed an administrative function for the purposes of § l-18a (a). Having thus found the Freedom of Information Act applicable, the court then held that the legislature had unconstitutionally intruded upon the judicial power of the constitutional courts and had thereby violated the strict separation of powers guaranteed by the Connecticut constitution.
[239]*239On this appeal, Podolsky claims that the trial court erred in holding the Freedom of Information Act to be unconstitutional when applied to the Rules Committee. The Rules Committee, while defending the trial court’s ruling, also maintains, as an alternate ground in support of the trial court’s judgment; Practice Book § 3012; that the Freedom of Information Act should be construed to exclude its activities. Because we agree with the Rules Committee’s statutory argument, we find no error without reaching the constitutional issue.
The central issue before us is the proper construction of “administrative function” for the purpose of § l-18a (a), since it is undisputed that the Freedom of Information Act itself applies, with respect to the Judicial Department, only to officials or bodies who perform administrative functions. The act itself offers no guidance as to what is “administrative.” The term “administrative” has no generally accepted plain meaning, but is commonly used to refer to a wide range of activities extending from the day to day management of an organization or an estate’s internal housekeeping functions to the conduct of the entire official business of the government. See, e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary (5th Ed. 1979); Webster, Third New International Dictionary (1961). Nor is there a sharp line of demarcation, as the trial court opined, between activities which are adjudicatory and those which are administrative. In zoning matters, for example, it is well understood that quasi-judicial functions are denominated administrative, while the enactment of regulations is considered a legislative function. See Conto v. Zoning Commission, 186 Conn. 106, 111, 439 A.2d 441 (1982); Parks v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 178 Conn. 657, 660, 425 A.2d 100 (1979). We must therefore look beyond the face of the statute to ascertain the proper meaning of “administrative functions.”
[240]*240In endeavoring to interpret the language of § l-18a (a), we must take account of our duty, when presented with a constitutional challenge to a validly enacted statute, to construe the statute, if possible, to comport with the constitution’s requirements. Beccia v. Waterbury, 192 Conn. 127, 133, 470 A.2d 1202 (1984); Patry v. Board of Trustees, 190 Conn. 460, 470, 461 A.2d 443 (1983); Moscone v. Manson, 185 Conn. 124, 128, 440 A.2d 848 (1981); Wagner v. Connecticut Personnel Appeal Board, 170 Conn. 668, 674, 368 A.2d 20 (1976); Whitfield v. Empire Mutual Ins. Co., 167 Conn. 499, 507-508, 356 A.2d 139 (1975). This general principle of construction is of particular importance in the context of the present litigation, which involves extraordinarily sensitive issues surrounding the delicate balance among the coordinate branches of our state government.
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Peters, J.
The determinative issue in this appeal is whether the Rules Committee of the Superior Court falls within the statutory purview of the Connecticut Freedom of Information Act, which defines a “public agency” subject to the act to include “any judicial office, official or body but only in respect to its or their administrative functions.” General Statutes § l-18a (a).1
This case was initiated by the defendant, Raphael Podolsky, when, by letter dated November 25, 1977, he requested notice of and access to all meetings of the plaintiff Rules Committee of the Superior Court. Upon the Rules Committee’s denial of his request, Podolsky filed a complaint with the Connecticut Freedom of [236]*236Information Commission (FOIC) on December 12,1977. On March 8,1978, after a hearing at which all the parties participated, the FOIC ordered the Rules Committee to provide Podolsky with access to its meetings pursuant to General Statutes § 1-212 and with advance notice of its meetings pursuant to General Statutes § l-21c.3 On March 17, 1978, the Rules Committee appealed the FOIC order to the Superior Court, pursuant to General Statutes § 4-183, and on August 7, 1981, the Superior Court sustained its appeal. This [237]*237court then granted Podolsky’s petition for certification. He now appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court sustaining the Rules Committee’s appeal.* **4
The trial court’s memorandum of decision and the record of the proceedings before the FOIC reveal the following facts. The Rules Committee is a body composed of judges of the Superior Court. Its function is to consider proposed changes in the rules of practice for the Superior Court, and to recommend amendments to the Practice Book, which may be adopted by vote of the Superior Court judges. Once proposed Practice Book amendments have been approved by the Rules Committee, they are published in the Connecticut Law Journal, and are subject to public comment before their adoption by the judges. The Rules Committee does not, however, permit members of the public to attend the deliberative sessions at which the committee debates suggested rule changes and formulates specific amendment proposals.
[238]*238Podolsky sought access to the meetings of the Rules Committee on the basis of his claim that the Rules Committee, although a judicial body, exercises only administrative functions, and therefore is a “public agency” within General Statutes § l-18a (a)5 and is governed by the open meeting rules of the Freedom of Information Act. General Statutes § 1-21. The Rules Committee urged, in opposition, that: (1) the Freedom of Information Act, as a matter of statutory construction, does not apply to its activities; and (2) if the Freedom of Information Act were to be held applicable, the act would unconstitutionally intrude upon the inherent rule-making powers of the judiciary, in violation of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. Conn. Const., arts. II, V.
The FOIC ordered the Rules Committee to admit Podolsky to its meetings. It concluded that the Rules Committee performed an administrative function within the Judicial Department. The FOIC disclaimed any jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of the Freedom of Information Act as applied to the Rules Committee.
The trial court sustained the appeal of the Rules Committee. Because the Rules Committee does not adjudicate individual disputes, the trial court accepted the FOIC’s ruling that the Rules Committee performed an administrative function for the purposes of § l-18a (a). Having thus found the Freedom of Information Act applicable, the court then held that the legislature had unconstitutionally intruded upon the judicial power of the constitutional courts and had thereby violated the strict separation of powers guaranteed by the Connecticut constitution.
[239]*239On this appeal, Podolsky claims that the trial court erred in holding the Freedom of Information Act to be unconstitutional when applied to the Rules Committee. The Rules Committee, while defending the trial court’s ruling, also maintains, as an alternate ground in support of the trial court’s judgment; Practice Book § 3012; that the Freedom of Information Act should be construed to exclude its activities. Because we agree with the Rules Committee’s statutory argument, we find no error without reaching the constitutional issue.
The central issue before us is the proper construction of “administrative function” for the purpose of § l-18a (a), since it is undisputed that the Freedom of Information Act itself applies, with respect to the Judicial Department, only to officials or bodies who perform administrative functions. The act itself offers no guidance as to what is “administrative.” The term “administrative” has no generally accepted plain meaning, but is commonly used to refer to a wide range of activities extending from the day to day management of an organization or an estate’s internal housekeeping functions to the conduct of the entire official business of the government. See, e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary (5th Ed. 1979); Webster, Third New International Dictionary (1961). Nor is there a sharp line of demarcation, as the trial court opined, between activities which are adjudicatory and those which are administrative. In zoning matters, for example, it is well understood that quasi-judicial functions are denominated administrative, while the enactment of regulations is considered a legislative function. See Conto v. Zoning Commission, 186 Conn. 106, 111, 439 A.2d 441 (1982); Parks v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 178 Conn. 657, 660, 425 A.2d 100 (1979). We must therefore look beyond the face of the statute to ascertain the proper meaning of “administrative functions.”
[240]*240In endeavoring to interpret the language of § l-18a (a), we must take account of our duty, when presented with a constitutional challenge to a validly enacted statute, to construe the statute, if possible, to comport with the constitution’s requirements. Beccia v. Waterbury, 192 Conn. 127, 133, 470 A.2d 1202 (1984); Patry v. Board of Trustees, 190 Conn. 460, 470, 461 A.2d 443 (1983); Moscone v. Manson, 185 Conn. 124, 128, 440 A.2d 848 (1981); Wagner v. Connecticut Personnel Appeal Board, 170 Conn. 668, 674, 368 A.2d 20 (1976); Whitfield v. Empire Mutual Ins. Co., 167 Conn. 499, 507-508, 356 A.2d 139 (1975). This general principle of construction is of particular importance in the context of the present litigation, which involves extraordinarily sensitive issues surrounding the delicate balance among the coordinate branches of our state government. We therefore turn to the legislative history, to scholarly analyses and to our own precedents to determine whether the legislature intended to apply the Freedom of Information Act to the Rules Committee.
The legislative history of the Freedom of Information Act contains almost no discussion of the act’s application to the judiciary, and hence provides little guidance for construction of the “administrative functions” of the Judicial Department. The legislative history does, nevertheless, reveal a legislative concern for the independence of the judiciary and a legislative intent to avoid a collision with the prerogatives of the constitutional courts.
When first enacted in 1975, the reach of the Freedom of Information Act within the Judicial Department was limited to the inferior courts established by the legislature; it did not apply to the constitutional courts at all.6 In describing the proposed act on the floor of the [241]*241General Assembly, Representative Burke explained: “The Freedom of Information Act covers all branches of government. Executive, Administrative, Legislative and Judicial insofar as the Judicial-Administrative functions, except the Supreme Court of Connecticut and the Superior Courts. The reason these courts were not included is that there is a grave constitutional problem in legislative rule-making for constitutional courts.” 18 H. R. Proc., Pt. 8, 1975 Sess., p. 3911. Even with respect to the nonconstitutional Probate and Common Pleas Courts, coverage was limited to their “administrative functions,” although the scope of the courts’ administrative functions was nowhere detailed.7
In 1977, at least partly in response to the merger of the Superior Court with the Court of Common Pleas,8 the legislature amended the Freedom of Information Act to include the constitutional courts with the § l-18a (a) definition of covered agencies.9 The 1977 amendment, however, like the original act, limited its applicability to the undefined “administrative functions” of the Judicial Department. Both houses of the General Assembly passed the amendment by consent, without debate or discussion. 20 S. Proc., Pt. 7, 1977 Sess., pp. 2794, 2843-44; 20 H. R. Proc. Pt. 7, 1977 [242]*242Sess., p. 2806. There is no indication in the recorded history that the legislature perceived this amendment as having any particular constitutional significance, and certainly no evidence that it was intended to stimulate a confrontation with the Judicial Department by extending the act’s open meeting provision to a significant portion of the judiciary’s business.10 The legislative history, then, supports a restrictive reading of the term “administrative.”
An interpretation of “administrative functions” that excludes the judicial rule-making power is consistent with the analytic distinctions developed by scholarly commentators. In determining the proper scope of judicial rule-making, three classes of concerns may be identified: concerns that go to substantive rules, concerns that go to procedural rules, and concerns that go to administrative rules. It is the distinction between procedural and administrative rules that is at issue in this case. That distinction turns upon whether we are dealing with matters involved in the adjudication of cases, which are procedural, or with matters involved in the internal organization of large and complex systems of courts, which are administrative. Levin & Amsterdam, “Legislative Control over Judicial Rule-Making: A Problem in Constitutional Revision,” 107 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 33-34 (1958); see also Kay, “The Rule-Making Authority and Separation of Powers in Connecticut,” 8 Conn. L. Rev. 1, 31 n.147 (1975). Following this analytic model, we believe it is appropriate to confine [243]*243“administrative functions” in § l-18a (a) to matters relating to the management of the internal institutional machinery of the court system.
We have recognized a role for “administrative functions” that relates to the internal management of the court system in our opinion in Adams v. Rubinow, 157 Conn. 150, 251 A.2d 49 (1968). There we upheld the constitutionality of a statute providing for the appointment of a judge of the Superior Court to act as administrator of the unified Probate Court system. In rejecting the plaintiff probate judges’ claim that the act encroached on their inherent judicial authority to manage the affairs of their courts, we emphasized the limited responsibilities of the administrator, which “concerned [only the] . . . efficient administrative, accounting and record-keeping procedures to be followed in the Probate Court . . . .” Adams v. Rubinow, supra, 160. We also upheld the constitutionality of General Statutes § 45-4f,11 authorizing the Probate Court administrator to propose rules of probate practice and to compile a Probate Practice Book, by narrowly construing the administrator’s rule-making [244]*244authority as “limited to rules as to efficient administrative procedures including accounting and record keeping.” Adams v. Rubinow, supra, 172.
Like the Probate Court administration statutes upheld in Adams v. Rubinow, General Statutes §§ 51-5a12 and 51-9,13 the statutes which describe the [245]*245duties of the chief court administrator and the executive secretary, respectively, provide further examples [246]*246of administrative tasks.14 Those statutes speak mainly to the accounting, personnel, scheduling and record-keeping activities of the Judicial Department. They do not purport to extend delegation of legislative authority to the rules of practice.
The Rules Committee of the Superior Court plays no role in the management of the internal institutional machinery of the court system. It is charged, instead, with the responsibility of formulating rules of practice and procedure that directly control the conduct of litigation. It sets the parameters of the adjudicative process that regulates the interactions between individual litigants and the courts. Accordingly, we hold that the Rules Committee does not perform “administrative functions” within the meaning of § l-18a (a) and is not subject to the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act.15
There is no error.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.