1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 JOSE RUIZ, Case No. 20-cv-01089-DMR 8 Plaintiff, 9 ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION v. TO DISMISS 10 Re: Dkt. No. 21 11 GREG AHERN, et al., 12 Defendants. 13 Defendants Alameda County (“the County”), Deputy Sheriff M. Solopow, and Sheriff 14 Gregory Ahern move pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss Plaintiff 15 Jose Ruiz’s amended complaint.1 [Docket No. 21 (“Motion”), 25 (“Reply”).] Ruiz filed a timely 16 opposition. [Docket No. 24 (“Opp.”).] The court held a hearing on June 25, 2020. 17 For the following reasons, the motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part. 18 I. BACKGROUND 19 A. Allegations 20 Ruiz makes the following allegations in the amended complaint, all of which are taken as 21 true for purposes of this motion.2 On October 3, 2017, Ruiz was incarcerated at the Santa Rita 22 Jail, which is owned and operated by Alameda County. [Docket No. 18 (“FAC”) ¶ 9.] While 23 Ruiz was in his cell area, Solopow ordered him to stop making noise. Id. ¶ 10. Solopow then 24
25 1 Ruiz filed an amended complaint after Defendants moved to dismiss his original complaint. See 26 Docket No. 14.
27 2 When reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must “accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) 1 pulled Ruiz from the cell, handcuffed him behind his back, and escorted him down a flight of 2 stairs. Id. ¶ 11. At the bottom of the stairs, Solopow attempted to bend Ruiz’s head forward and 3 Ruiz “informed the Defendant not to bend his head forward while being escorted handcuffed.”3 4 Id. ¶¶ 12-13. Ruiz alleges that Solopow “grew impatient” and grabbed Ruiz by the shoulder and 5 took him to the ground “with extreme force.” Id. ¶ 14. With Ruiz handcuffed and pinned on the 6 ground, Solopow placed his forearm “with force” on Ruiz’s neck and “applied more force” to 7 Ruiz’s body. Id. As a result of the force applied by Solopow, Ruiz experienced “pain in his 8 shoulder and face” and a blood clot that required surgery to treat. Id. Ruiz alleges that he 9 “submitted numerous inmate grievances regarding his abuse by Defendant Solopow.” Id. 10 Additionally, Ruiz alleges that Ahern “knew or reasonably should have known” that Ruiz 11 would be subjected to the excessive force used by Solopow because Ahern “failed to train, 12 supervise and or control” Solopow. Id. ¶¶ 23-26. While Ruiz was incarcerated, Ahern was the 13 “exclusive authority of the Alameda County jail and the Plaintiff’s health and safety.” Id. ¶ 25. 14 Ruiz alleges that Ahern’s “deficient” training policy and subordinate supervision amounted to “a 15 repudiation of the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” Id. ¶ 24. Therefore, Ahern’s inaction was the 16 “moving force” behind the constitutional violation perpetuated by Solopow against Ruiz. Id. ¶¶ 17 27-28. 18 19
20 3 Defendants note that the FAC omits facts that were present in original complaint. Motion at 4, 13-14; Reply at 12, 14. In the original complaint, Ruiz alleges that Solopow held Ruiz’s “arms up 21 past their range of motion, causing the Plaintiff to have to walk on the toes of his feet for balance,” and “while being walked in such an uncomfortable position, the Plaintiff seen [sic] a concrete 22 bench and tried to step on the bench to get some of his balance.” [Docket No. 1 ¶¶ 13-14.] Defendants cite to Azadpour v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., Case No. 06-cv-3272-MJJ, 2007 WL 23 2141079, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 23, 2007) to note that the Court may adopt facts from the original complaint if they contradict the amended complaint so as to be “false and sham.” Motion at 14. 24 Azadpour is distinguishable from the present case. In Azadpour, the pro se plaintiff’s operative complaint explicitly denied allegations made in the original complaint. Id. (“I, the above named 25 Plaintiff, allege nothing against [the defendants].”). Here, the FAC omits allegations that Ruiz made in the original complaint, but Ruiz does not expressly contradict any of the facts he 26 previously alleged against Defendants. Additionally, the amended complaint does not incorporate by reference any portions from the original complaint. See Williams v. County of Alameda, 26 F. 27 Supp. 3d 925, 936 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (“It is well-established that an amended pleading supersedes the original pleading and renders it of no legal effect, unless the amended complaint incorporates 1 B. Procedural Background 2 On February 12, 2020, Ruiz filed the original complaint for damages under 42 U.S.C § 3 1983 (“section 1983”) for excessive use of force in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights 4 against the County, Ahern, and Solopow. On April 9, 2020, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss 5 the original complaint, and Ruiz filed an amended complaint. The amended complaint alleges a 6 single section 1983 claim for damages against all Defendants for excessive force.4 7 II. LEGAL STANDARD FOR RULE 12(B)(6) MOTIONS 8 A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims alleged in 9 the complaint. See Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). 10 When reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must “accept as true all 11 of the factual allegations contained in the complaint,” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (citation omitted), 12 and may dismiss a claim “only where there is no cognizable legal theory” or there is an absence of 13 “sufficient factual matter to state a facially plausible claim to relief.” Shroyer v. New Cingular 14 Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 15 677-78; Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001)) (quotation marks omitted). A claim 16 has facial plausibility when a plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 17 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 18 678 (citation omitted). In other words, the facts alleged must demonstrate “more than labels and 19 conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. 20 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)); 21 see Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds by 22 Galbraith v. Cty. of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002). 23 As a general rule, a court may not consider “any material beyond the pleadings” when 24 ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Lee, 250 F.3d at 688 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 25 However, “a court may take judicial notice of ‘matters of public record,’” id. at 689 (citing Mack 26 v. S. Bay Beer Distrib., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986)), and may also consider “documents
27 4 The FAC is unclear as to whether Ruiz is also alleging a claim against the county under Monell v. 1 whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which 2 are not physically attached to the pleading,” without converting a motion to dismiss under Rule 3 12(b)(6) into a motion for summary judgment. Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 4 1994), overruled on other grounds by Galbraith, 307 F.3d at 1125-26. The court need not accept 5 as true allegations that contradict facts which may be judicially noticed. See Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. 6 Court, 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987). 7 III. ANALYSIS 8 Defendants move to dismiss the amended complaint on the basis that (1) Ruiz’s claims are 9 barred by the statute of limitations; (2) Solopow is entitled to qualified immunity; (3) Ruiz fails to 10 state a claim as to Ahern; (4) Ruiz fails to state a claim against the County; and (5) Ruiz fails to 11 support his claim for punitive damages. 12 A. Statute of Limitations 13 A party may raise a statute of limitations defense on a motion to dismiss “[i]f the running 14 of the statute is apparent on the face of the complaint.” Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 15 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980); see also Yamauchi v. Cotterman, 84 F. Supp. 3d 993, 1004 (N.D. Cal. 16 2015) (“A plaintiff fails to state a claim, and therefore dismissal is appropriate, where his failure to 17 comply with the applicable statute of limitations is evident from the allegations of the 18 complaint.”). Such a motion “can be granted only if the assertions of the complaint, read with the 19 required liberality, would not permit the plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled.” Jablon, 614 20 F.2d at 682. 21 Section 1983 does not contain its own limitations period. Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. 22 Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 974 (9th Cir. 2004). In actions brought under section 1983, courts “apply 23 the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions, along with the forum state’s law 24 regarding tolling, including equitable tolling, except to the extent any of these laws is inconsistent 25 with federal law.” Canatella v. Van De Kamp, 486 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting 26 Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004)); see also Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 277- 27 78 (1985) (holding that 1983 claims are best analogized to personal injury actions). In California, 1 Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) section 335.1 (“section 335.1”). Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 2 945, 954 (9th Cir. 2004). 3 Tolling for the disability of imprisonment is controlled by CCP section 352.1 (“section 4 352.1”), which is the applicable statute in section 1983 actions. Jackson v. Fong, 870 F.3d 928, 5 936 (9th Cir. 2017). Section 352.1(a) provides that the statute of limitations is tolled when a 6 plaintiff is, “at the time the cause of action accrued, imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in 7 execution under the sentence of a criminal court for a term less than for life.” The maximum 8 period for tolling under section 352.1 is two years. CCP § 352.1(a). Although state law 9 determines the length of the limitations period and tolling, federal law determines when a civil 10 rights claim under section 1983 accrues. TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999). 11 Excessive force claims brought under section 1983 accrue when the plaintiff knows, or should 12 know, of the injury that is the basis for her claims. Maldonado, 370 F.3d at 955. In sum, a claim 13 that is subject to the statute of limitations under section 335.1 and the maximum two years of 14 statutory tolling under section 352.1 is timely if it is filed within four years from the date of the 15 accrual. Trujillo v. Jacquez, Case No. 10-cv-05183-YGR, 2015 WL 428010, at *11 (N.D. Cal. 16 Jan. 30, 2015). 17 The incident at issue in this case took place on October 3, 2017. FAC ¶ 9. Ruiz filed this 18 action on February 11, 2020. If tolling does not apply in this case, then the two-year statute of 19 limitations expired in October 2019 and Ruiz’s claim is time-barred. If tolling does apply, then 20 the case is timely because the statute of limitations did not begin running until Ruiz was released 21 in May 2018, which was less than two years before he filed his complaint.5 22 Defendants argue that Ruiz’s claim is not tolled by section 352.1 because that statute does 23 not apply to individuals who are detained in county jails.6 Motion at 14, Reply at 2. They cite a
24 5 The FAC does not provide Ruiz’s release date. At the hearing, his counsel reported that Ruiz 25 was released from jail in May 2018. Ruiz must file a second amended complaint that includes the date of his release. 26 6 In their brief, Defendants also appeared to argue that the court should apply the tolling exception 27 in section 352.1(b), which “provides that there is no tolling of claims presentation requirements for state-law tort claims against public entities or employees.” Ellis v. City of San Diego, Cal., 1 recent California appellate decision, Austin v. Medicis, which held that tolling under section 352.1 2 only applies to claims brought by state prisoners and not to individuals who are in county jail 3 rather than state prison, including pretrial detainees. 21 Cal. App. 5th 577, 597 (2018), reh’g 4 denied (Apr. 11, 2018), review denied (June 13, 2018). In response, Ruiz argues that the court 5 must follow the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Elliott v. City of Union City, which held that tolling 6 under section 352.1 is merely “triggered by the individual’s arrest and incarceration” and is 7 therefore available for pretrial defendants who are held in continuous custody. See 25 F.3d 800, 8 802 (9th Cir. 1994). District courts are split on whether to apply the Ninth Circuit precedent in 9 Elliott or follow Austin. 10 The Ninth Circuit held in Elliott that tolling is available to plaintiffs held in both county 11 jails and state prisons because there is no practical distinction between the two forms of 12 confinement. 25 F.3d at 803. In Elliott, the plaintiff was arrested, charged, and held in continuous 13 pretrial custody in the county jail until he was convicted and sent to prison. Id. at 801. While in 14 prison, the plaintiff filed a section 1983 action in federal district court alleging that the defendant 15 police officers used excessive force during his arrest. Id. The Ninth Circuit considered section 16 352.1’s predecessor statute, section 352,7 and held that “actual, uninterrupted incarceration is the 17 touchstone for assessing tolling” because “[a] person held in police custody prior to arraignment is 18 faced with the same limitations as someone in custody after arraignment.” Id. at 803. Therefore, 19 the plaintiff’s arrest and continuous confinement in the county jail tolled the statute of limitations. 20 Id. 21 In Austin, the California Court of Appeal held that someone is “imprisoned on a criminal 22 charge” under section 352.1 when they are “serving a term of imprisonment in the state prison.”
23 1983 claims, which are not brought under state law and do not require a claim presentation under 24 the California Tort Claims Act. See Silva v. Crain, 169 F.3d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 1999) (“In general, state notice of claim statutes have no applicability to § 1983 actions.”). 25 7 The only difference between the two statutes is that section 352.1 sets a two-year maximum to 26 the tolling period. Section 352 did not set a maximum tolling period. The revision did not change to whom the statute applies. See Baros, Case No. 17-cv-948-SHK, 2019 WL 3849171, at *6 27 (citing Bullette v. County of Riverside, Case No. 11-cv-817-JAK (RNB), 2011 WL 4387762, at *6 (C.D. Cal. July 20, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, Case No. 11-cv-817-JAK (RNB), 1 21 Cal. App. 5th at 597. In Austin, a plaintiff brought contract and tort claims against the 2 defendant attorney who represented the plaintiff in a criminal case but abandoned him before trial. 3 Id. at 582-83. The plaintiff’s cause of action accrued while he was in county jail, where he was 4 held for about a year and a half. Id. at 537. As a matter of first impression in the state courts, 5 Austin analyzed the legislative history of section 352.1 and found that it “mention[s] only those 6 inmates” incarcerated in state prison. Id. at 596. Therefore, the court determined that section 7 352.1 did not apply to claims that accrued during the plaintiff’s pretrial detention. Id. The court 8 acknowledged the Ninth Circuit decision in Elliott but found it “unpersuasive” because it 9 “predated the enactment of section 352.1, [so] the Elliott court did not have the benefit of the 10 legislative findings on this subject.” Id. at 590 n. 4. 11 After Austin, some district courts have continued to follow Elliott in applying section 352.1 12 to claims by individuals detained in county jail. See, e.g., Baros, 2019 WL 3849171, at *2; 13 (“Elliott remains good law in the Ninth Circuit . . . unless and until the Ninth Circuit holds 14 otherwise.”) (citing to Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1170-71 (9th Cir. 2001)); Johnson v. 15 Cty. of Santa Clara, Case No. 18-cv-06264-EJD, 2020 WL 870933, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 16 2020) (“Elliot[t] remains binding on this Court.”); Wilkins v. Vancott, Case No. 17-cv-00340- 17 YGR, 2018 WL 3763316, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2018) (“Tolling under section 352.1 is 18 triggered by the plaintiff’s arrest and incarceration.” (citing Elliott, 25 F.3d at 802-03)); Kakowski 19 v. Cty. of Sacramento, Case No. 19-cv-0656-JAM (KJN), 2020 WL 1046564, at *4 (E.D. Cal. 20 Mar. 4, 2020) (“Because the Ninth Circuit has not addressed the scope of § 352.1(a)’s 21 applicability after the Austin decision was issued in 2018, Elliott remains precedent in the Ninth 22 Circuit.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 2306852 (E.D. Cal. May 8, 2020). 23 Defendants argue that the court should instead apply Austin, which has also been followed 24 by numerous federal courts. See,e.g., Sekerke v. Hoodenpyle. Case No. 19-cv-35-WQH, 2020 WL 25 914885, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2020) (declining to follow Elliott because federal courts “must 26 follow the decision of the intermediate appellate court of the state.”) (citing to Briceno v. Scribner, 27 555 F.3d 1069, 1080 (9th Cir. 2009)); Arreola v. Cty. of Fresno Pub. Def.’s Office, Case No. 12- 1 holding that “section 352.1 does not apply to an individual who is in pretrial custody in a county 2 jail at the time his claims accrued because he is not ‘imprisoned on a criminal charge’ within the 3 meaning of section 352.1”); Garcia v. Corral, Case No. 18-cv-04730-PJH, 2019 WL 931754, at 4 *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2019) (“This court finds that Elliott is distinguishable from this case, and 5 the court agrees with the state court reasoning that regardless, Elliott does not apply.”); Lockett v. 6 Cty. of Los Angeles, Case No. 18-cv-5838-PJW, 2018 WL 6842539, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 7 2018) (“This Court is bound by the state appellate court’s interpretation of state law.”). 8 This court finds that Austin does not provide the governing law. Ninth Circuit caselaw is 9 binding authority that “must be followed unless and until overruled by a body competent to do 10 so.” Hart, 266 F.3d at 1170. Elliott unambiguously provides that the tolling period of section 11 352.1 applies to claims brought by pretrial detainees in county jail. See Elliott, 25 F.3d at 802 n. 4 12 (“[P]re-trial detainees clearly are ‘imprisoned’ within the meaning of the California statute . . . .”). 13 Although Elliott analyzed section 352.1’s predecessor statute (section 352), the only difference 14 between the prior and current versions is the length of the tolling period, which does not 15 undermine Elliott’s reasoning. See Johnson, 2020 WL 870933, at *6 (“[T]he only difference 16 between the two statutes is that section 352.1 set a two-year maximum to the tolling period; the 17 revision did not change to whom the statute applies.”); see also Baros, 2019 WL 3849171, at *6 18 (“[The] addition of the phrase ‘not to exceed two years’ appears to have been the only 19 modification to the preceding . . . statute.”). 20 The court acknowledges that the Ninth Circuit recently issued a decision that follows 21 Austin. See Shaw v. Sacramento Cty. Sheriff's Dep’t, ___ Fed App’x ___, 2020 WL 3428856, at 22 *1 (9th Cir. June 23, 2020). However, that opinion is unpublished and is not binding authority. 23 See Fed. R. App. P. Rule 32.1 (U.S. Ct. of App. 9th Cir. Rule 36-3(a) (“Unpublished dispositions 24 and orders of this Court are not precedent, except when relevant under the doctrine of law of the 25 case or rules of claim preclusion or issue preclusion.”). The Ninth Circuit has made clear that 26 “[o]nce a panel resolves an issue in a precedential opinion, the matter is deemed resolved, unless 27 overruled by the court itself sitting en banc, or by the Supreme Court.” Hart, 266 F.3d at 1171. It 1 mention Elliott. Elliott is precedential authority that is directly on point in this case and has not 2 been overturned by the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc. See id. (“[C]aselaw on point is the law.”). 3 Therefore, this court must follow Elliott unless and until the Ninth Circuit revisits that case in a 4 binding opinion. 5 The outcome is the same even if the court considers whether the California Supreme Court 6 would adopt the reasoning in Austin. See Briceno, 555 F.3d at 1080. In reviewing the legislative 7 history of section 352.1, Austin explained that historically, state prisoners were not able to bring 8 civil actions while they were incarcerated because they were considered “civilly dead.” 21 Cal. 9 App. 5th at 592-93. Section 352, which provided indefinite tolling during imprisonment, was 10 enacted in 1872 to ameliorate the loss of civil rights caused by civil death. Id. at 594-95 11 (“[A]lthough prisoners were stripped of all civil rights during their incarceration—a legal 12 disability that prevented them from bringing civil actions or appearing in court—they would get 13 those rights back when they were released.”). In 1975, the California legislature passed the 14 Inmates’ Bill of Rights, which (among other things), “granted state prisoners the right to bring 15 civil actions.” Id. at 595. Austin noted that section 352’s indefinite tolling period was later 16 reduced to two years in recognition of the fact that state prisoners now had the ability to bring their 17 claims while incarcerated and should do so in a timely manner. See id. at 596. 18 Austin correctly points out that the legislative history of section 352.1 focuses on state 19 prisoners. See Austin, 21 Cal. App. 5th at 596-97. However, it does not follow that the legislature 20 therefore intended section 352.1 to apply only to claims brought by individuals held in state 21 prisons, as opposed to other forms of incarceration such as county jail. Section 352 was amended 22 solely to add a two-year cap to the tolling mechanism in order to address the large increase of civil 23 lawsuits being filed by prison inmates. See Stats. 1994, ch. 1083 § 1 (“Since 1988, the number of 24 civil lawsuits filed against the state by inmates incarcerated with the Department of Corrections 25 has outpaced the increase in California’s prison population.”). The statutory amendment 26 embodied in section 352.1 did not make any changes to the definition of individuals who were 27 entitled to tolling. It is therefore not surprising that the legislative history of section 352.1 focused 1 period. Thus, the legislative history notes that some of the lawsuits that had been tolled pursuant 2 to section 352 “concern[ed] events 10 to 15 years in the past,” which bill proponents argued were 3 “very difficult to defend since witnesses and evidence may have disappeared and memories may 4 fade.” Sen. Floor Analysis, Sen. Bill No. 1445 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 9, 1994. The lack of 5 legislative comment about individuals held in county jail might well reflect the absence of prolific 6 or old claims brought by that demographic. Therefore, contra Austin, the legislative history’s 7 silence on individuals held in county jails is not indicative of the intent to exclude them from the 8 scope of 352.1. 9 In any event, by capping rather than eliminating tolling, the legislature recognized that 10 imprisonment poses barriers to a plaintiff’s ability to file a timely action. See Assembly 11 Committee on Judiciary, Sen. Bill No. 1445 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) June 15, 1994 (noting that a 12 proposed compromise of the tolling period would preserve “some notion of tolling . . . while, 13 simultaneously, the possibility of ‘ancient’ lawsuits being filed is eliminated”). As Elliott noted 14 (and Austin significantly failed to address), “[a] person held in police custody prior to arraignment 15 is faced with the same limitations as someone in custody after arraignment” and “the purpose of 16 disability statutes would be ill-served by creating an arbitrary distinction between pre- and post- 17 arraignment incarceration.” 25 F.3d at 803. 18 Other factors also call Austin’s reasoning into doubt. First, the plain language of section 19 352.1 states that the tolling applies to anyone “imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in execution 20 under the sentence of a criminal court for a term less than life.” CCP § 352.1(a) (emphasis added). 21 Elliott explained why “charge” clearly refers to pretrial detention: 22 Although the words “imprisoned” might appear to refer to an actual prison, this reading of the statute would make it self-contradictory, since it 23 refers to being held “on a criminal charge,” i.e., prior to conviction. It is 24 the second phrase, “in execution under sentence of a criminal court,” that covers post-conviction incarceration, i.e., confinement in an actual prison. 25 25 F.3d at 802 n. 2; see also Mitchell v. Greenough, 100 F.2d 184, 197 (9th Cir. 1938) (“[T]he 26 phrase ‘imprisonment on a criminal charge’ refers to one who is imprisoned but not yet 27 convicted.”). Austin did not examine the term “charge.” Instead, it apparently interpreted 1 “imprisoned on a criminal charge” to have the same meaning as the second clause in section 352.1, 2 which applies to individuals who are “imprisoned . . . in execution under the sentence of a criminal 3 court.” Such an interpretation is unpersuasive because it is a “cardinal rule of statutory 4 interpretation that no provision should be construed to be entirely redundant.” Kungys v. United 5 States, 485 U.S. 759, 778 (1988). At oral argument in this case, Defendants were not able to offer 6 an explanation for why section 352.1 contains both phrases in the disjunctive. Therefore, the 7 statute’s plain language encompasses claims brought by pretrial detainees. 8 Moreover, as noted above, the Ninth Circuit requires courts to follow the decision of the 9 intermediate appellate court of the state, at least where the Ninth Circuit itself has not yet spoken on 10 an issue. Briceno, 555 F.3d at 1080. However, Austin is not the only California appellate court that 11 has addressed the question at issue here. Another California appellate court interpreted section 352 12 to apply to a prisoner in a federal halfway house, which contradicts Austin’s conclusion that section 13 352.1 applies only to state prisoners.8 See Bledstein v. Superior Court, 162 Cal. App. 3d 152, 169 14 (1984). Bledstein determined that “allowing tolling while prisoners are in halfway houses is apt to 15 have only a minimal impact on the values statutes of limitations are expected to serve” because 16 “concerns about faded memories, stale evidence, discomfited defendants . . . subside when we 17 consider the relatively short duration of the average stay in halfway houses.” Id. Austin does not 18 cite Bledstein or reconcile it with its conclusion that the successor section 352.1 applies solely to 19 state prisoners. Therefore, the state appellate court authority on this question is not settled. 20 In sum, the plain language of section 352 which is echoed in section 352.1, the legislative 21 history, the reasoning set forth by the Ninth Circuit in Elliott, and pre-Austin California law all 22 provide convincing evidence that the California Supreme Court would not adopt the reasoning in 23 Austin. Elliott remains good law and is not distinguishable from the facts here. Because Elliot 24 controls, the court will apply the two-year tolling of section 352.1 in addition to the two-year statute
25 8 At the hearing, Defendants distinguished Bledstein on the basis that the individual in that case 26 was not a pretrial detainee but rather was in detention following a conviction. Defendants’ argument is unconvincing. Austin explicitly extended its reasoning to deny tolling to post- 27 conviction jail inmates. See 21 Cal. App. 5th at 593 (explaining that jail—as opposed to prison— inmates never lost their civil rights and therefore did not need the tolling relief provided by section 1 of limitations under section 335.1, for a total of four years. Ruiz’s claim accrued on October 3, 2 2017. He was in continuous custody until May 2018, so the statute of limitations did not begin to 3 run until that date. He filed this action on February 11, 2020, within the two-year statute of 4 limitations period. While Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted as to the timeliness of Ruiz’s 5 complaint because Ruiz did not allege sufficient facts to support tolling, it is clear that he will be 6 able to amend the complaint to add such facts. 7 B. Qualified Immunity 8 Defendants move for summary judgment on Ruiz’s section 1983 excessive force claim as 9 to Solopow on the basis that he is entitled to qualified immunity. The doctrine of qualified 10 immunity protects government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct 11 does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person 12 would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Qualified immunity is 13 “immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 14 526 (1985). The analysis involves two inquiries. First, taken in the light most favorable to 15 plaintiff, the facts must show that the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right. Saucier v. 16 Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). If the answer is “no,” then the court need not inquire further 17 before ruling that the officer is entitled to qualified immunity. Id. If, however, “a violation could 18 be made out on a favorable view of the parties’ submissions,” the court must examine “whether 19 the [constitutional] right was clearly established.” Id. A court has the discretion to decide “which 20 of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the 21 circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). 22 For the right to be clearly established, “[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear 23 that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. 24 Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). Therefore, “the relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining 25 whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his 26 conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198-99 27 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202). To determine whether 1 existing at the time of the alleged act. Osolinski v. Kane, 92 F.3d 934, 936 (9th Cir. 1996). 2 The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a pretrial detainee from the 3 use of excessive force that amounts to excessive punishment. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 4 2466, 2473 (2015) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, n. 10 (1989)); see also Martinez 5 v. Stanford, 323 F.3d 1178, 1183 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he law regarding a prison guard’s use of 6 excessive force was clearly established by 1994[.]”). A pretrial detainee must show only “that the 7 force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.” Id. In the absence 8 of an expressed intent to punish, a pretrial detainee can prevail by showing that the officer’s 9 actions are not “rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose” or that the 10 actions “appear excessive in relation to that purpose.” Id. (citing to Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 11 561 (1979)). 12 The alleged constitutional violation for which Defendants seek qualified immunity is 13 Solopow’s use of force against Ruiz. Defendants argue that Solopow’s takedown of Ruiz did not 14 violate a clearly established constitutional right because it was not objectively unreasonable. 15 Motion at 12-13. Ruiz responds that his allegations, taken as true, show that Solopow’s use of 16 force was excessive in relation to any conceivable legitimate purpose and therefore objectively 17 unreasonable under the due process excessive punishment standard. Opp. at 4-5. Defendants 18 reply that Ruiz fails to sufficiently allege the violation of a clearly established constitutional right 19 or that Solopow’s use of force was excessive. Reply at 10-11. 20 Ruiz adequately alleges that Solopow’s use of force violated a clearly established 21 constitutional right. The alleged facts present no objective reason for the amount of force that 22 Solopow used against Ruiz because he posed little or no threat to Solopow. In the operative 23 complaint, Ruiz alleges that immediately prior to the incident Solopow attempted to bend Ruiz’s 24 head forward, which caused him pain. FAC ¶ 12. Ruiz told Solopow not to bend his head 25 forward. Id. ¶ 13. Solopow then “grew impatient” and “with extreme force” took Ruiz to the 26 ground while he was handcuffed behind his back. Id. ¶ 14. On the facts as alleged, Solopow’s 27 conduct violated Ruiz’s clearly established constitutional rights because Solopow’s use of force 1 Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 481 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that qualified immunity 2 did not apply to the officers’ tackle of plaintiff who did not pose a serious threat to the officers’ or 3 others’ safety); Acasio v. San Mateo County, Case No. 14-cv-04689-JSC, 2015 WL 5568345, at 4 *7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2015) (finding no reasonable officer could believe that it is objectively 5 reasonable to “tackle a person who is simply slow to comply with instructions”). 6 Defendants contend that Ruiz “physically resisted” Solopow by “suddenly jump[ing]” onto 7 a nearby concrete bench to get “vertical leverage.” Reply at 10; Motion at 4, 13. They claim 8 Solopow used a “takedown and control hold” to reasonably restrain Ruiz. Motion at 13. 9 Defendants’ argument fails because it relies on allegations made in the original complaint, which 10 is not the operative complaint for this motion. See supra, footnote 1. More importantly, 11 Defendants’ position disputes the factual accuracy of Ruiz’s allegations, which cannot be 12 determined on a motion to dismiss. See Grant v. City of Long Beach, 315 F.3d 1081, 1088–89 13 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that on a motion to dismiss, the court must accept allegations in the 14 complaint as true in determining whether qualified immunity applies). 15 Accordingly, the court denies Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on the basis of 16 qualified immunity. 17 C. Section 1983 Claim as to Ahern 18 Defendants move to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim as to Ahern. 19 Although not entirely clear, Ruiz appears to be bringing a claim against Ahern in his individual 20 capacity under a supervisory liability theory. See Opp. at 2. A defendant may be held liable as a 21 supervisor under section 1983 “if there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the 22 constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful 23 conduct and the constitutional violation.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) 24 (citing Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)). If a supervisory official is not 25 directly involved in the allegedly unconstitutional conduct, then “[a] supervisor can be liable in his 26 individual capacity for his own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control 27 of his subordinates; for his acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation; or for conduct that 1 Watkins v. City of Oakland, 145 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir.1998)). 2 Courts have found supervisory liability for excessive force claims where a plaintiff alleges 3 specific facts supporting a causal connection between the supervisor’s actions or failures to act and 4 the resulting constitutional violation. For example, in Truijillo v. Jacquez, the defendant prison 5 warden conducted an inquiry into the plaintiff’s allegations of excessive force by various 6 correctional officers but chose not to refer the matter to the appropriate authorities. Case No. 10- 7 cv-5183-YGR, 2013 WL 5227054, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2013). The court denied the 8 defendant’s motion to dismiss a supervisory liability claim because the defendant’s conduct in 9 “reviewing the appeal and failing to remedy the constitutional violation” was sufficiently linked to 10 the excessive force used against the plaintiff. Id. In Perez v. Cox, the supervisory defendants 11 allegedly “trained, supervised, or controlled their subordinates” pursuant to a practice of using live 12 birdshot against prison inmates, leading to the death of a prisoner. 788 Fed. App’x 438. The 13 district court found, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, that the excessive force claim brought by the 14 deceased prisoner’s estate adequately alleged supervisory liability because the supervisors 15 permitted the continued use of birdshot against prisoners despite knowing the “dangerous and 16 potentially lethal consequences.” Id. at 441. 17 In this case, the court agrees with Defendants that Ruiz’s allegations fail to state a 18 cognizable excessive force claim under supervisory liability as to Ahern. Ruiz does not allege that 19 Ahern was personally involved in the incident with Solopow. Instead, he asserts that Ahern 20 “knew or reasonably should have known that the Plaintiff would be subjected to physical abuse” 21 because Ahern “failed to train, supervise and or control” Solopow. FAC ¶¶ 24, 26. Ruiz also 22 argues that “pursuant to Cal. Gov. Code § 26605, Sheriff Ahern was required to take charge of and 23 be the sole and exclusive authority of the Alameda County jail.” FAC ¶25. Unlike in Perez, 24 where the plaintiff identified a specific practice that led directly to the alleged constitutional 25 violation, Ruiz does not identify any specific training or supervisory policy or explain what was 26 deficient about the policy. Additionally, Ruiz does not identify any actions Ahern should have 27 taken or failed to take to abate the substantial risk of serious harm caused by the unspecified 1 Although Ruiz claims to have submitted “numerous inmate grievances,” unlike the 2 plaintiff in Trujillo, Ruiz does not claim that Ahern was knew or should have known about the 3 grievances, or that Ahern was responsible for reviewing Ruiz’s submissions. Therefore, Ruiz fails 4 to allege that Ahern’s conduct played a causal role in the incident involving Solopow because 5 Ruiz has not “stated his claim with specificity, i.e., he has [not] linked Defendant[’s]. . . conduct to 6 his claim of excessive force through the aforementioned actions of reviewing the appeal.” See 7 Truijillo, 2013 WL 5227054, at *5. 8 Because Ruiz has not linked specific action or inaction by Ruiz to his claim of excessive 9 force, the court grants Defendants’ 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss in regard to Ahern. 10 D. Monell Claim 11 Ruiz does not explicitly cite the basis for his claim against the County. At the hearing, 12 Ruiz conceded that he was not bringing a claim under Monell and did not offer another reason 13 why the County is liable for the harm he suffered. His opposition brief also did not respond to any 14 of Defendants’ arguments on this point. 15 The court grants Defendants’ 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss Ruiz’s claim against the County. 16 E. Punitive Damages 17 Ruiz seeks punitive damages as to all Defendants. Compl. at 6. Defendants move to 18 dismiss punitive damages as to all Defendants on the basis that Ruiz’s allegations do not support a 19 valid punitive damages claim. Motion at 17. Additionally, Defendants move to dismiss punitive 20 damages as against the County as a matter of law. Id. at 16. 21 Ruiz’s punitive damages claims against the County and Ahern are moot because Ruiz’s 22 claim against those Defendants are dismissed.9 Punitive damages are available under section 1983 23 for claims against individuals. See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 17 (1991); Dang 24 v. Cross, 422 F.3d 800, 807 (9th Cir. 2005). While state officials sued in their official capacity are 25 immune from punitive damages, Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517, 527 (9th Cir. 1996), Solopow is 26 an employee of Alameda County and not a state official. Streit v. County of Los Angeles, 236 F.3d 27 1 552, 561 (9th Cir.2001) (holding that a sheriff acts for the county and not the state when 2 overseeing and managing a local jail). Additionally, Ruiz is suing Solopow in his individual 3 capacity. Therefore, Ruiz’s claim for punitive damages as to Solopow is not barred as a matter of 4 law. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 17. 5 To allege punitive damages, the plaintiff must plead facts showing that the defendant’s 6 conduct was driven by “evil motive or intent” or involved a reckless or callous indifference to the 7 constitutional rights of others. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983); see also Dang, 422 F.3d at 8 807–09. Ruiz alleges that Solopow, “became agitated that the Plaintiff was not fully complying 9 with his order to keep moving, and as a result of his agitation, deliberately and maliciously took 10 the Plaintiff (who was handcuffed) to the ground with extreme force.” Opp. at 10. On these facts, 11 a jury could reasonably conclude that Solopow used force to physically exercise his frustration at 12 Ruiz and was therefore motivated by evil intent or a reckless or callous indifference to Ruiz’s 13 constitutional rights. See Smith, 461 U.S. at 56. As previously stated, Defendants argument that 14 Ruiz was resisting Solopow relies on facts that are not alleged in the operative complaint and 15 cannot be determined on a motion to dismiss. See n. 4. The court finds that Ruiz has alleged 16 sufficient facts to support a reasonable jury’s finding that Solopow’s actions were “malicious, 17 wanton, or oppressive” for the purposes of punitive damages. See Dang, 422 F.3d at 807 (citing 18 Wade, 461 U.S. at 49). 19 Defendants motion to dismiss Ruiz’s claim for punitive damages as against the County and 20 Ahern is denied as moot. The court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss punitive damages as to 21 Solopow. 22 IV. LEAVE TO AMEND 23 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), leave to amend should be granted as a matter 24 of course, at least until the defendant files a responsive pleading. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). After 25 that point, Rule 15(a) provides generally that leave to amend the pleadings before trial should be 26 given “freely . . . when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “This policy is to be applied 27 with extreme liberality.” Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 1 or dilatory motive, prejudice to the opposing party, futility of the amendments, or repeated failure 2 || to cure deficiencies in the complaint by prior amendment, it is an abuse of discretion for a district 3 court to refuse to grant leave to amend a complaint. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); 4 Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Sols., Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 986 (9th Cir. 1999). These factors do 5 || not “merit equal weight,” and “it is the consideration of prejudice to the opposing party that carries 6 || the greatest weight.” Eminence Capital, 316 F.3d at 1052. “Granting leave to amend does not 7 || necessarily mean that the underlying allegations ultimately have merit.” FlatWorld Interactives 8 || LLC v. Apple Inc., 12-cv-01956-WHO, 2013 WL 6406437, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2013). 9 || “Rather, ‘[a]bsent prejudice, or a strong showing of any of the remaining [ | factors, there exists a 10 || presumption under Rule 15(a) in favor of granting leave to amend.’” Jd. (quoting Eminence 11 Capital, 316 F.3d at 1052). ag 12 If the court dismisses the complaint, it “should grant leave to amend even if no request to
2 13 amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleadings could not possibly be cured
v 14 by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). The court O 3 15 || cannot say as a matter of law that amendment would be futile as to Ruiz’s claims against Ahern and Q 16 || the County. Accordingly, Ruiz shall file an amended complaint by no later than July 29, 2020 to
17 include the date of Ruiz’s release from jail, as well as any amendments that attempt to revive claims
18 against Ahern or the County. 19 || V. CONCLUSION 20 For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in 21 part. Ruiz must file an amended complaint by no later than July 29, 2020. 22 AES DELRIOS ES OS 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. iS) & 24 || Dated: July 15, 2020 Zz \ ° < 25 4 Ly Sait 26 si tes Magist pad LINO Me A x ates eee Adge VORTRICLS 28