Ruiz Pineda v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: March 4, 2026
• Docket: 25-2363
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 4 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

AMERICA RUIZ PINEDA, No. 25-2363

Petitioner, Agency No. A209–838–310 v.

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General, MEMORANDUM*

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted March 2, 2026 ** San Francisco, California

Before: S.R. THOMAS and GOULD, Circuit Judges, and MORRIS, Chief District Judge. ***

America Ruiz Pineda, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for

review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing Ruiz

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Brian Morris, United States Chief District Judge for the District of Montana, sitting by designation. 1 Pineda’s appeal of an order by an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying asylum,

withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture

(“CAT”). The parties are familiar with the relevant underlying facts and procedural

history, so we do not recount them here. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252 and deny the petition for review.

We apply a highly deferential “substantial evidence” standard to the agency’s

findings of fact. See Ruiz-Colmenares v. Garland, 25 F.4th 742, 748 (9th Cir. 2022).

The agency’s findings of fact are considered “conclusive unless any reasonable

adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. §

1252(b)(4)(B). When ‘“the BIA issues its own decision but relies in part on the

immigration judge’s reasoning, we review both decisions.”’ Tzompantzi-Salazar v.

Garland, 32 F.4th 696, 702 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Flores-Lopez v. Holder, 685

F.3d 857, 861 (9th Cir. 2012)).

1. To establish eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal, Ruiz

Pineda must show a nexus between past or feared future persecution and a

statutorily protected ground of race, religion, nationality, membership in a

particular social group, or political opinion. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A),

1158(b)(1)(B)(i), 1231(b)(3)(A); Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1015 (9th Cir.

2010). The nexus requirement for eligibility of asylum requires Ruiz Pineda to

establish that her protected ground was or would be “one central reason” for the

2 harm. Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 358-60 (9th Cir. 2017). The nexus

requirement for eligibility of withholding of removal requires Ruiz Pineda to

establish that her protected ground was or would be at least “a reason” for the

harm. Id.

Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Ruiz Pineda failed

to establish a nexus between any past or future harm and her proposed particular

social group. The record does not compel the conclusion that Ruiz Pineda was

targeted “on account of” her proposed particular social group of “individuals who

have taken concrete steps to resist gang activities” or that her social group was “a

reason” for the harm she experienced. Ruiz Pineda testified that she was threatened

by gang members at her home and place of business and that the gang members’

threats always concerned the collection of money. Ruiz Pineda testified that she

was also threatened by gang members at her mother’s home in San Salvador

because they saw that she had come from a rival gang’s territory. Asylum and

withholding of removal are “not available to those who have simply had the

misfortune of becoming a victim of criminal misconduct abroad, motivated by the

sorts of things (money, generally) that motivate criminals.” Rodriguez-Zuniga v.

Garland, 69 F.4th 1012, 1024 (9th Cir. 2023).

The record demonstrates that gang members targeted Ruiz Pineda for

ordinary criminal motives such as financial gain and maintaining territorial control.

3 Ruiz Pineda did not meet her burden to establish eligibility either for asylum or

withholding of removal because Ruiz Pineda’s proposed particular social group

was not a reason, Barajas-Romero, 846 F.3d at 360, let alone “one central reason”

for her persecution. Khudaverdyan v. Holder, 778 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2015)

(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i)).

2. An issue may be forfeited when a petitioner only addresses an issue “in a

single sentence, and without coherently develop[ing] the argument.” Hernandez v.

Garland, 47 F. 4th 908, 916 (9th Cir. 2022). Ruiz Pineda forfeited her asylum and

withholding of removal claims based on her political opinion and membership in

the proposed social group defined as “members of the Ruiz Pineda family.” Ruiz

Pineda’s opening brief failed to make any asylum claim on the basis of a political

opinion. Ruiz Pineda’s opening brief merely mentioned that she was a member of

the Ruiz Pineda family. Ruiz Pineda failed to develop an argument on how she has

established a nexus between the gang members’ threats and her being a “member

of the Ruiz Pineda family.”

3. “To prevail on a claim under CAT, a petitioner must prove that it is more

likely than not that he or she will be tortured if removed to the designated

country.” Eneh v. Holder, 601 F.3d 943, 946 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing 8 C.F.R. §

208.16(c)(2)). To establish a likelihood of torture, Ruiz Pineda must show a

4 “particularized risk of torture” that is “higher than that faced by all [El Salvadoran]

citizens.” Ruiz-Colmenares v. Garland, 25 F. 4th at 751.

Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of CAT protection. The IJ

properly considered the country conditions of El Salvador in denying Ruiz

Pineda’s application for protection under CAT. The IJ acknowledged that gang

violence “remain[ed] a serious and widespread problem in El Salvador.” The IJ

properly determined that this country condition evidence did not demonstrate that

Ruiz Pineda faced a particularized risk greater than others who live in El Salvador.

Generalized country conditions alone do not establish a particularized risk of

torture. Tzompantzi-Salazar, 32 F.4th at 706-07; Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600

F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2010). The record also does not compel the conclusion

that it is more likely than not that Ruiz Pineda will be subjected to torture if

returned to El Salvador. The IJ and BIA properly determined that Ruiz Pineda

failed to establish a likelihood of torture upon return to El Salvador given the

substantial lapse of time and lack of threats since Ruiz Pineda’s departure in 2016.

PETITION DENIED.

The motion for a stay of removal (Dkt. No. 2) is DENIED. The temporary

stay of removal is lifted.