Ruffner's Heirs v. Hill

7 S.E. 13, 31 W. Va. 428, 1888 W. Va. LEXIS 47
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court
DecidedJune 30, 1888
StatusPublished
Cited by22 cases

This text of 7 S.E. 13 (Ruffner's Heirs v. Hill) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering West Virginia Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ruffner's Heirs v. Hill, 7 S.E. 13, 31 W. Va. 428, 1888 W. Va. LEXIS 47 (W. Va. 1888).

Opinions

Snyder, Judge;

The Commonwealth of Virginia, on March 4,1796, granted to John Barclay a tract of 50,000 acres of land lying in Ka-nawha county, between Gauley and Elk rivers, and including the heads of Campbell’s, Blue, Bell and Kelly’s creeks. The said land having become forfeited for the non-payment of taxes, that fact was, in 1840, reported to the Circuit Superior Court of said county, pursuant to statutes then in force revesting the land, or the title to said land, in the Commonwealth, and providing for the sale thereof for the use of the literary fund. By an order of said court made at the spring term, 1840, J. M. Laidley and Thomas S. A. Mathews, the commissioners of delinquent and forfeited lands for said county, made a survey of the said land, whereby they found that it contained 72,381 acres, an excess over the quantity called for in the grant of 22,381 acres; and they subdivided the survey into 11 tracts, numbered from l1 to 11, inclusive, and reported the boundary and quantity in each tract to the court. A sale was ordered by the court, and at a sale made [430]*430by said commissioners, Laidley and Mathews, on September 14,1840, Lewis Ruffner became the purchaser of lots Nos. 1 and 6, Daniel Ruffner of No. 3, and Joseph 0. Kendall of lots Nos. 2, 4, and 10, respectively. These sales were all confirmed, and afterwards the lands were conveyed by said commissioners to the respective purchasers by deeds duly executed and recorded prior to the year 1850.

In December, 1871, this action of ejectment -was brought by Joel Ruffner against George W.'Hill and others in the Circuit Court of Clay county, (a county formed subsequent to the date of grant, and in which a part of said 50,000 acres of land then lay,) and it was subsequently removed to the Circuit Court of Kanawha county, where it was prosecuted thereafter. In December, 1875, there was a trial by jury, and verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, which judgment, on a writ of error to this court, was set aside, and a new trial awarded, because the record failed to show that any issue had been joined or plea filed by the defendant. Ruffner v. Hill, 31 W. Va. 152. The plaintiff, Joel Ruffner, having died, the action was revived and thereafter prosecuted in the names of his heirs as plaintiffs. The defendants disclaimed title or claim as to a portion of the land described in the declaration, pleaded not guilty as to the residue, and in April, 1885, a second trial was had by jury, and a verdict found for the defendants, which, on the motion of the plaintiffs, the court set aside, and awarded a new trial, upon condition that the plaintiffs pay the costs of the trial at that term.

During the trial the defendants saved several bills of exceptions, in one of which all the evidence is certified, together with certain instructions given for the plaintiffs, and others refused for the defendants, and the exceptions of the defendants to the rulings of the court upon said instructions, and to the order granting a new trial. The other exceptions are to the refusal of the court to permit the defendants to read to the j ury certain papers and records. To review the action of the court in respect to the matters thus excepted to the defendants have obtained this writ of error.

The important question submitted for our .decision is whether or not the Circuit Court, erred in setting aside the [431]*431verdict of the jury and granting a new trial. Upon this question the defendants’ exceptions to the rejection of evidence, and to the rulings of the court upon the instructions given and refused, can have no possible bearing. If all the evidence offered by the defendants had been admitted, all the instructions asked by them had been given, and all those given for the plaintiffs had been refused, the jury could not have found for the defendants any more favorable verdict than they did. It is therefore clear that the defendants could in no possible manner have been prejudiced by the rulings of the court in respect to these matters. Nor would it have been different if the court had admitted improper evidence for the plaintiffs. Unless the record affirmatively shows that the plaintiff in error has been prejudiced by the action of the court below, this Court will not reverse the judgment. Shrewsbury v. Miller, 10 W. Va. 115; Miller v. Rose, 21 W. Va. 291.

The only material inquiry, then, is whether or not the evidence in the record is of such a character as to make it the duty of this Court to set aside the order of the Circuit Court granting the new trial, and to enter judgment here on the verdict for the defendants. In setting aside the verdict of a jury the Circuit Court must, to some extent, pass upon the weight of the evidence before the jury. The decisions in Virginia and this State have fully established the rule that this right of the trial-court to pass upon the weight of the evidence in such cases is so sacred that a stronger case must be made to justify the appellate court in disturbing an order granting a new trial than where one has been refused. The reason assigned is that the refusal to grant a new trial operates as a final adjudication of the rights of the parties, while the granting of a new trial simply invites investigation, and affords an opportunity for showing the Iruth, without concluding either party; the discretion exercised in granting the new trial ought not to be disturbed unless a flagrant case of injustice is made. The effect of this rule is not to stifle investigation, but to allow another inquiry into the facts and a further hearing upon the merits. However the appellate court may be inclined to find ■ from the evidence in support of the- verdict, still it must be considered [432]*432that, the trial-court having had the witnesses before it, with superior facilities for determining the true weight of the evidence, and having, in the exercise of its sound discretion, granted the new trial, the appellate court ought not to interfere with the order granting the new trial unless, upon an examination of the whole evidence, it finds a clear and manifest preponderance of evidence in favor of the verdict.

Upon these grounds, and in view of the fact that a discretion is wisely lodged in the trial-court to set aside verdicts even in cases where the evidence is conflicting, it is the constant practice of the courts to refuse to disturb an order granting a new trial even where it would have done the same thing had a new trial been denied. Patteson v. Ford, 2 Gratt. 18; Grayson's Case, 6 Gratt. 712. In Miller v. Insurance Co., 12 W. Va. 116, this Court decided as follows: “ The court below may grant a new trial where the evidence is contradictory, and the verdict is against the weight of evidence; but in such cases the power of the court to grant a new trial should be very cautiously exercised. And when, in such case, the court below grants a new trial, the opinion of that court is entitled to peculiar respect; and, generally, the appellate court will not reverse the order of the court in such case. * * * Generally, a stronger case should be made to justify an appellate court in the disturbance of an order granting a new trial than when one has been refused.”

In order to make the descriptive facts more plain and intelligible, the following diagram or map of the land in controversy is here made a part of this opinion : (See map.)

The boundary, U, A, B, C, 8, 10, R, S, 24, O, U, is a part of the original Barclay survey of 50,000 acres. There is no dispute as to the location and boundary of this survey.

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Bluebook (online)
7 S.E. 13, 31 W. Va. 428, 1888 W. Va. LEXIS 47, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ruffners-heirs-v-hill-wva-1888.