McCORMICK, Justice.
This appeal presents a number of issues which arose during the trial of a hospital malpractice action. The trial resulted in judgments for plaintiff William Rudolph of $553,725.88 and for plaintiff Rosellyn Rudolph, his wife, of $30,000. Defendant Iowa Methodist Medical Center filed unsuccessful post-trial motions and then appealed. Plaintiffs moved to dismiss the appeal on jurisdictional grounds. On the merits, defendant contends the trial court erred in four principal respects. Included are issues of first impression involving the right of jurors to ask questions of witnesses and the constitutionality of § 147.136, The Code, the statute which abolished the collateral source rule in medical malpractice cases. We overrule the motion to dismiss, uphold the court’s ruling permitting a juror to submit questions for a witness, hold the trial court erred in declaring the statute unconstitutional, remit the judgment for William accordingly, reject defendant’s other assignments of error, and otherwise affirm the judgments.
William Rudolph underwent an anterior cervical fusion in defendant Iowa Methodist Medical Center on November 17, 1975. The surgery was performed by neurosurgeon Robert Hayne. Viewed in its light most favorable to the judgment, the evidence showed that hospital employees permitted William’s head to drop sharply backward while transferring him from a hospital cart to his bed after the surgery. The incident was not immediately reported to Dr. Hayne.
In the next several hours, William became partially paralyzed. When Dr. Hayne was finally notified, he obtained a myelogram in an effort to find the site of the problem. Shortly thereafter he reopened and examined the surgical site and then performed a decompression laminectomy to alleviate swelling and pressure on William’s spinal cord. William remained in intensive care for eight days and was subsequently transferred to the hospital’s rehabilitation unit where he remained for almost three months. Although he made a good recovery, he suffered some permanent disability.
The jury could find, as it did, that the hospital employees’ negligence in permitting William’s head to drop after surgery was the proximate cause of the paralysis on November 17 and the subsequent surgery, treatment, disability, and other damages. The sufficiency of evidence on the issue of liability is not challenged.
The issues which defendant has raised are whether the trial court erred in various respects in relation to the jury during trial, in allowing recovery to William for damages paid by collateral sources, in refusing to order a new trial based on excessiveness of William’s verdict, and in instructing the jury on Rosellyn’s loss of consortium claim.
Before reaching those issues, we must address plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss the appeal.
I. The motion to dismiss. After the court’s rulings on the parties’ objections to the final draft of instructions, but before the jury was instructed, defense counsel moved orally for an extension of time of thirty days after verdict within which to file post-trial motions. Plaintiffs’ counsel refused to join the motion but voiced no objection, saying, “I don’t think I’d agree to that without talking to my client but if the court wants to rule on it, that’s fine.” The court sustained the motion.
Twenty-eight days after suffering the adverse verdicts, defendant filed alternative motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdicts and for new trial. Plaintiffs moved to strike the motions on the ground [554]*554that the order extending time for them was invalid because the motion for the extension was premature and was granted without a showing of good cause.
The validity of the order extending the time for filing post-trial motions is crucial because if it was invalid the notice of appeal was untimely, having been filed more than thirty days after judgment although within thirty days of the ruling on the post-trial motions. See Iowa R.App.P. 5; Hogan v. Chesterman, 279 N.W.2d 12 (Iowa 1979). If the notice of appeal was too late, we lack subject matter jurisdiction of the appeal.
Iowa R.Civ.P. 247 provides in relevant part that post-trial motions “must be filed within ten days after the verdict . is filed, . . . unless the court, for good cause shown and not ex parte, grants an additional time not to exceed thirty days.” In overruling the motion to strike, the trial court held that the motion was not premature and that good cause existed because a local rule barred counsel from contacting jurors until the end of their four-week period of service, in this case precluding contact with them for three weeks after the verdict was rendered. The local rule would hamper investigation of claims of jury misconduct which might be made in a motion for new trial.
Nothing in rule 247 prevents the motion for extension of time from being filed before the verdict. The rule specifies that post-trial motions “must be filed within ten days after the verdict, report or decision is filed,” thus requiring that any extension of time for filing such motions be granted before the expiration of that period. However, while the rule establishes a deadline by which the motion for extension must be filed, it does not purport to prohibit an earlier filing. Cf. Bloom v. Arrowhead Area Education Agency, 270 N.W.2d 594, 597 (Iowa 1978) (reaching a similar conclusion under a statute requiring certain action “no later than sixty days” after a stated event). At least when no objection is made asserting a sufficient reason for requiring the motion to be made after the verdict is filed, we agree with the trial court that a motion to extend the time for filing a rule 247 motion may be made and ruled on before verdict.
Nor do we find merit in the contention that good cause for the extension was not shown. Although the mere existence of the local rule barring jury contact would not automatically constitute good cause for every extension, the record in this case shows defense counsel needed the additional time in order to have the opportunity to question jurors in an effort to gather evidence to support the motion for new trial. We hold that the trial court did not err in finding good cause for the extension.
Because the extension order was valid, the notice of appeal was timely, and we therefore overrule plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss.
We now turn to the merits of defendant’s appeal.
II. The trial court’s handling of the jury during trial. Defendant alleges the trial court erred during trial in deviating from the requirements of Iowa R.Civ.P. 199(a) in giving its cautionary instruction, communicating ex parte with a juror, not timely notifying defense counsel of the ex parte contact, permitting a juror to submit questions to be asked of a witness, allowing plaintiffs’ counsel to frame the questions differently than the juror, refusing to let defendant make its record on the juror questions before they were asked, and in overruling a motion for mistrial based on alleged jury misconduct. We will separately examine each assertion of error.
A. The admonition at the commencement of trial. The court admonished the jury at the beginning of the trial regarding its duty during separations. The admonition was less than absolute in its prohibition of conversations with others on the subject of the trial. Iowa R.Civ.P. 199(a) requires the court to advise the jury in part “that it is the duty of each juror not to converse with any other juror or person, nor suffer himself to be addressed on the subject of the trial.”
[555]*555We have held in criminal cases that reversal cannot be based on noncompliance with Iowa R.Crim.P. 18(7)(d), the criminal trial analogue of rule 199(a), unless timely objection is made and prejudice is shown. See State v. Pierce, 287 N.W.2d 570, 575 (Iowa 1980). Those principles apply equally under rule 199(a).
Here no objection to the court’s admonition was made at the time it was given. It was not brought up until after Dr. Hayne’s testimony on the third day of trial. It was then mentioned in connection with defense counsel’s report of an incident in which counsel said he heard juror Daniel Possin telling two other jurors about the questions Possin had given the court to be asked of Dr. Hayne and his purpose for submitting them. Nothing in this report indicated the jurors were discussing the merits of the case, and no showing was otherwise made that any discussions of the merits occurred prior to jury deliberations.
While we disapprove the trial court’s admonition to the extent it deviated from the plain terms of rule 199(a), we hold that defendant’s objection was untimely and that, in any event, no prejudice was demonstrated.
B. The ex parte communication. Juror Possin contacted Judge Denato in chambers before court convened on the third day of trial, at which time Dr. Hayne was to resume his testimony. Possin asked the judge if jurors were permitted to ask questions of witnesses. Judge Denato said that if Possin had a question at the conclusion of the doctor’s testimony he should write it out and the judge would deal with the matter at that time. Defendant does not dispute the nature of the conversation but contends the very fact it occurred is itself reversible error.
Defense counsel first learned of the conversation after the attorneys finished their examination of Dr. Hayne and the court told the jury that if jurors had questions they should be submitted to the judge in writing. However, defendant did not object to the communication until its post-verdict motion for new trial. This procedure is contrary to the general rule that parties are not permitted to delay objections until it is too late for the problem to be corrected. Thus, errors to which objection could be made at trial may not be raised for the first time as grounds for new trial. State v. Rouse, 290 N.W.2d 911, 915 (Iowa 1980); State v. LaMar, 260 Iowa 957, 967, 151 N.W.2d 496, 502 (1967). Therefore error was not preserved.
We do not reach the merits of this assignment, but we do point out that we have discussed the problem of juror-judge communications in other cases. See, e. g., State v. Hahn, 259 N.W.2d 753, 756-57 (Iowa 1977) (reversing because the record was insufficient to negate a reasonable possibility of prejudice); State v. Cowman, 212 N.W.2d 420, 424-26 (Iowa 1973) (prescribing procedures to be used in presubmission jur- or-judge communications).
C. Notice to defense counsel. The trial court notified plaintiffs’ counsel of the juror contact immediately upon entering the courtroom. However, defense counsel was not present at that time and did not learn of the conversation until after the subject of juror questions came up when counsel concluded their examination of Dr. Hayne. Defendant acknowledges the delay in notification was inadvertent and has not shown it caused any prejudice. No basis for reversal appears here.
D. Permitting the juror’s questions to he asked. We have not previously decided whether jurors may submit questions to be asked witnesses. In jurisdictions where the issue has arisen, courts have generally recognized the discretion of the trial court to allow such questions. See, e. g., United States v. Callahan, 588 F.2d 1078, 1086 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 444 U.S. 826, 100 S.Ct. 49, 62 L.Ed.2d 33 (1979); State v. Taylor, 25 Ariz.App. 497, 499-500, 544 P.2d 714, 716-17 (1976); People v. Gates, 97 Cal. App.3d Supp. 10, 13-15, 158 Cal.Rptr. 759, 761-62 (App. Dep’t Super.Ct.1979); People v. Heard, 388 Mich. 182,186-88, 200 N.W.2d 73, 74-76 (1972); Byrge v. State, 575 [556]*556S.W.2d 292, 294-95 (Tenn.Crim.App.1978); Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 872, 879-80 (1970); id. at 54 (Supp.1979).
We approve the practice in principle. As finders of fact, jurors should receive reasonable help in resolving legitimate questions which trouble them but have not been answered through the interrogation of witnesses by counsel. Of course the questions must call for admissible evidence, and trial court discretion must be exercised to prevent abuse of the practice.
When jurors manifest a desire to ask questions, the court should direct that the questions be submitted to the court in writing. The court should then conduct a hearing out of the presence of the jury in which objections may be made. When the court determines that questions are proper and may be asked, the inquiry of the witness should be conducted by the court rather than by counsel, unless counsel agrees to a different procedure. Finally, counsel should have the opportunity for additional interrogation of the witness on the subject raised by the questions after the court has asked the juror’s questions.
E. The form of the questions. The juror submitted two questions in the present case. They concerned possible causes of spinal cord swelling other than the dropping of William’s head. One question was: “Would the previously described incident involving the alleged dropping of Dr. Rudolph’s head necessarily result in visible disruption or damage to the dura or other parts of the spine?” Dr. Hayne had testified he observed no markings on the dura, the protective covering of the spinal cord, when he performed the decompression lami-nectomy. The second question was: “How is the depth of the drilling of the interver-tebral disc determined insofar as the depth varies from person to person?” This question related to the doctor’s testimony about drilling holes for the bone grafts during the anterior cervical fusion.
The trial court asked counsel if either of them wished to ask the questions. Plaintiffs’ counsel said he would ask them if defense counsel would not. When defense counsel declined to ask them, plaintiffs’ counsel did so, framing them in slightly different language and amplifying them somewhat. Defense counsel did not interrogate Dr. Hayne further.
At trial defendant objected that plaintiffs’ counsel asked the questions “almost exactly as the juror wanted them asked.” Now defendant contends reversible error occurred because the form of counsel’s questions differed from that of the juror.
Defendant cannot claim error now on a theory not urged in the trial court. We do not intimate that we would find merit in the present contention if error had been preserved.
F. Delay in making the record. Defendant alleges the trial court erred in refusing to let defense counsel make a record of objections to the asking of the juror’s questions before the questions were asked. The trial court required counsel to wait until the questioning was completed before making his record, but the court said it did not thereby intend to deprive defendant of “any appealable right.” The court also said: “It is my intention that any record he wants to make would be effective at the time he wanted to make it instead of the time I directed him to make it.”
We cannot endorse this procedure because it creates a risk that if the objections have merit the error could not be cured and a mistrial might result. However, in this case the objections were overruled, and the delay in making the record is not shown to have prejudiced defendant in any way.
G. The motion for mistrial. Defendant moved for a mistrial during the course of objecting to the asking of the juror’s questions. The grounds included that issue and several of the other complaints which we have addressed in this division. The trial court overruled the motion, and defendant contends the ruling was wrong. We find no merit in the assignments individually or cumulatively. Therefore we hold that the trial court did not err in overruling the motion for mistrial.
[557]*557III. Recovery of damages paid by collateral sources. In overruling a motion by defendant on the first day of trial to exclude any evidence of plaintiffs of “medical bills reflecting evidence of economic losses and salary . . . for which they have or will be indemnified from a third party,” the trial court held that section 147.136 violates the equal protection clauses of U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, and Iowa Const. Art. I, § 6. The court subsequently sustained a motion by plaintiffs to bar evidence of insurance payments of William’s medical bills and salary paid William while he was absent from his position as an associate professor of education and mathematics at Iowa State University.
Defendant contends the trial court erred in its rulings on these motions because it was wrong in holding that section 147.136 is unconstitutional. Section 147.136 purports to abrogate the collateral source rule at least partially in cases involving malpractice suits against designated providers of health care. See Groesbeck v. Napier, 276 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Iowa 1979). The statute provides:
In an action for damages for personal injury against a physician and surgeon, osteopath, osteopathic physician and surgeon, dentist, podiatrist, optometrist, pharmacist, chiropractor, or nurse licensed to practice that profession in this state, or against a hospital licensed for operation in this state, based on the alleged negligence of the practitioner in the practice of the profession or occupation, or upon the alleged negligence of the hospital in patient care, in which liability is admitted or established, the damages awarded shall not include actual economic losses incurred or to be incurred in the future by the claimant by reason of the personal injury, including but not limited to, the cost of reasonable and necessary medical care, rehabilitation services, and custodial care, and the loss of services and loss of earned income, to the extent that those losses are replaced or are indemnified by insurance, or by governmental, employment, or service benefit programs or from any other source except the assets of the claimant or of the members of the claimant’s immediate family.
A threshold inquiry is whether the equal protection issue is to be decided under the traditional rational basis test or more stringent tests involving “close scrutiny” or “means scrutiny.” Except when a classification is suspect or involves fundamental rights, this court applies the rational basis test. Lunday v. Vogelmann, 213 N.W.2d 904, 907 (Iowa 1973). We apply the same test under the federal and state constitutions. City of Waterloo v. Selden, 251 N.W.2d 606, 509 (Iowa 1977). We recently refused to depart from the traditional standard in deciding the constitutionality of a massage parlor ordinance in MRM, Inc. v. City of Davenport, 290 N.W.2d 338, 340-42 (Iowa 1980). Upon similar reasoning, we decline to do so in this situation also.
Although there are exceptions, most courts which have addressed the constitutionality of legislation regulating malpractice litigation have applied traditional equal protection analysis. E. g., Woods v. Holy Cross Hospital, 591 F.2d 1164,1174-75 (5th Cir. 1979); Seoane v. Ortho Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 472 F.Supp. 468, 472 (E.D.La. 1979); Hines v. Elkhart General Hospital, 465 F.Supp. 421, 430-31 (N.D.Ind.), aff’d 603 F.2d 646 (7th Cir. 1979); Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 582-83, 570 P.2d 744, 750-51 (1977); Everett v. Goldman, 359 So.2d 1256, 1266 (La.1978); Attorney General v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 309-12, 385 A.2d 57, 77-79, app. dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, 439 U.S. 805, 99 S.Ct. 60, 58 L.Ed.2d 97 (1978); Paro v. Longwood Hospital, 373 Mass. 645,—, 369 N.E.2d 985, 988-89 (1977); Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 112-13, 256 N.W.2d 657, 667-68 (1977); State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis.2d 491, 507, 261 N.W.2d 434, 441-42 (1978). See also Redish, Legislative Response to the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Constitutional Implications, 55 Tex.L.Rev. 759, 769-82 (1977).
As stated by the Supreme Court in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-[558]*55826, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 1105, 6 L.Ed.2d 393, 399 (1961), the rational basis test is as follows:
The constitutional safeguard [of equal protection] is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s objective. State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.
The classification in the present case treats victims of medical malpractice differently than victims of other torts because it denies malpractice victims the benefit of the collateral source rule which is available to other tort victims. Our task under traditional equal protection analysis is to determine whether plaintiffs met their burden to prove this classification “is wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the state’s objective.”
Our legislature stated its objective when it enacted section 147.136 as part of an act which contained several provisions relating to medical malpractice. After finding that a critical situation existed “because of the high cost and impending unavailability of medical malpractice insurance,” the legislature said the intent of its enactment was to provide “an interim solution to the impending unavailability of medical malpractice insurance.” 66th G.A., 1975 Sess., ch. 239, § I-
It thus appears that the legislature’s purpose in enacting section 147.136 was to reduce the size of malpractice verdicts by barring recovery for the portion of the loss paid for by collateral benefits. The reduction in verdicts would presumably result in a reduction in premiums for malpractice insurance, making it affordable and available, helping to assure the public of continued health care services.
Under the collateral source rule, recovery from a tortfeasor is not affected by payments of collateral benefits. Retention of the rule is supported by reasoning that its abrogation would inhibit the deterrent effect of tort actions and penalize the tort victim for foresight in purchasing insurance. See Comment, An Analysis of State Legislative Responses to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 1975 Duke L.J. 1417, 1447-48. Arguments against the viability of this reasoning have been advanced which demonstrate that the merits of the rule are fairly debatable. See 2 P. Harper and F. James, The Law of Torts § 25.22 (1956).
In an Arizona case which addressed an equal protection challenge to a statute abrogating the doctrine in medical malpractice cases, the court upheld the statute saying:
Nor is the application of the [statute] only to malpractice actions so arbitrary and unreasonable as to deny to medical malpractice claimants equal protection of the laws. The [statute] was intended by the legislature to give the jury the true extent of damages sustained by the plaintiff thereby. By scaling down the size of jury verdicts by the amount of collateral benefits the plaintiff may have received, the legislature could reasonably assume that a reduction in premiums would follow. This was one of the reasons for the Act. The legislature is entitled to proceed “one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind.” Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489, 75 S.Ct. 461, 465, 99 L.Ed. 563, 573 (1955).
Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. at 585, 570 P.2d at 753.
Using similar reasoning, other regulations affecting medical malpractice recovery rights have been upheld in the face of equal protection attack. E. g., Woods v. Holy Cross Hospital, 591 F.2d at 1174-75; Seoane v. Ortho Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 472 F.Supp. at 472; Hines v. Elkhart General Hospital, 465 F.Supp. at 430-31; Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc., Ind., 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980) (upholding statutory limitation on amount of recovery); Everett v. Goldman, 359 So.2d at 1266-67; Attorney General v. Johnson, 282 Md. at 312-13, 385 A.2d at 78-79; Paro v. Longwood Hospital, 373 [559]*559Mass, at —, 369 N.E.2d at 989; Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. at 113-15, 256 N.W.2d 667-68 (involving a statutory limitation on total recovery); State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis.2d at 508-14, 261 N.W.2d at 442-44.
Cases which have invalidated such regulations are distinguishable and unpersuasive. In two jurisdictions, Ohio and North Dakota, the courts expressly applied a heightened standard of equal protection scrutiny. See Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 133, 135-36 (N.D.1978) (using means scrutiny test); Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, Ohio Com.Pl. 3 Ohio Op.3d 164, 167, 355 N.E.2d 903, 911 (Ct.C.P. Montgomery County 1976); Graley v. Satayatham, Ohio Com.Pl., 74 Ohio Op.2d 316, 320, 343 N.E.2d 832, 837-38 (Ct.C.P. Cuyahoga County 1976) (both Ohio cases using a strict scrutiny test). In American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hospital of Los Gatos-Saratoga, Inc., 104 Cal.App.3d 219, 226-235, 163 Cal.Rptr. 513, 516-22 (1980), a three-judge panel of the California court of appeals quoted and adopted the strict scrutiny analysis of Graley, asserting but not explaining how the same reasoning would apply under the rational basis test. As other cases make clear, the method of analysis makes a critical difference. See, e. g., Woods, 591 F.2d at 1172 n.11, 1175; Hines, 465 F.Supp. at 431; Eastin, 116 Ariz. at 585, 570 P.2d at 753. An Illinois statute limiting recovery was stricken in Wright v. Central DuPage Hospital Association, 63 Ill.2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976), as special legislation in violation of a provision of the Illinois Constitution and not on equal protection grounds. The Idaho court in Jones v. State Board of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 865-67, 559 P.2d 399, 405-07 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914, 97 S.Ct. 2173, 53 L.Ed.2d 223 (1977), employed a standard of heightened equal protection scrutiny but did not decide the merits of an equal protection attack. No court has invalidated a limitation on the amount of recovery under the Federal Constitution using traditional equal protection analysis. American Bank & Trust Co. is the only case holding a malpractice regulation invalid on equal protection grounds in which the court, although applying the strict scrutiny standard, said the same reasoning would apply under the traditional test.
One who attacks a statute on equal protection grounds has a heavy burden under the traditional standard. See Franks v. Kohl, 286 N.W.2d 663, 669 (Iowa 1979). In the present case, we conclude that plaintiffs did not carry their burden to show section 147.136 lacks a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. Therefore the trial court erred in holding the statute unconstitutional.
Anticipating the possibility of this eventuality, the trial court submitted interrogatories for the jury’s use to identify the amounts of medical bills and lost salary included in the verdict for William. The jury found that the recovery for medical bills was $9810.88 and the recovery for past loss of income was $5915.00. All but $717.60 of these amounts was reimbursed from collateral sources and was required to be excluded from the verdict by section 147.136.
Defendant contends that the trial court’s error in holding section 147.136 unconstitutional cannot be cured by merely remitting the resulting total collateral source recovery of $15,008.28 from the $553,725.88 verdict for William. This contention is based on two premises. The first is that other collateral benefits should also have been excluded. The other is that allowing recovery for the items which should have been excluded may have psychologically enhanced recovery for other elements of damage. We find neither of these premises is tenable.
Defendant established through an offer of proof that William was covered by social security, which has disability income features, and TIAA-CREF, a retirement plan of his employer, but the offer of proof was wholly lacking in any showing as to the circumstances and extent of payment of benefits. Although the jury had evidence of William’s earnings, earning capacity and disability, which would permit it to make an [560]*560award for reduction in earning capacity and future disability as authorized by the court’s instructions, it would have no way to determine the conditions under which those losses might be reimbursed or the amounts which might be paid. Thus, assuming the alleged possible future benefits would otherwise constitute collateral payments under section 147.136, the record was inadequate to permit the jury to calculate them in order to exclude them from the verdict. Any finding by the jury regarding such benefits would rest on mere speculation. Therefore the trial court would not have been justified in permitting the jury to reduce the verdict by any amount based on the availability of reimbursement from collateral sources for future economic loss. Cf. Iowa-Des Moines National Bank v. Schwerman Trucking Co., 288 N.W.2d 198, 203-04 (Iowa 1980) (speculative evidence of elements of future economic loss will not support an instruction on such elements).
Nor do we believe defendant is given any right under section 147.136 to any supposed psychological benefit from having knowledge of the amounts of collateral benefits revealed to the jury. The statute only requires exclusion of those amounts from recovery.
We hold that the trial court’s error in striking section 147.136 can be cured by remitting $15,008.28 from William’s verdict. Accordingly we modify the judgment for William by reducing it to $538,717.60.
IY. The excessive verdict claim. Defendant contends the verdict for William was excessive and the result of passion, prejudice and misconduct of the jury.
The jury misconduct claim is based on a juror’s affidavit, controverted by affidavits of three other jurors, primarily concerning what was said in the jury room to influence the verdict. To the extent defendant’s affidavit purports to rely on matters which do not inhere in the verdict, we agree with the trial court that the record does not show the alleged misconduct, if it occurred, was so serious it was calculated to and probably did affect the verdict. Under principles explained in State v. Bouse, 290 N.W.2d at 916-17, and Harris v. Deere & Co., 263 N.W.2d 727, 729-30 (Iowa 1978), we reject defendant’s effort to impeach the verdict.
Nor do we find that the trial court erred in rejecting defendant’s challenge to the size of the verdict. Applicable principles have been listed in numerous cases. E. g., Starke v. Horak, 260 N.W.2d 406, 408-09 (Iowa 1977); Olsen v. Drahos, 229 N.W.2d 741, 742-43 (Iowa 1975); Turner v. Jones, 215 N.W.2d 289, 292 (Iowa 1974); Pagitt v. City of Keokuk, 206 N.W.2d 700, 704 (Iowa 1973).
The record here shows that prior to the surgery on November 17,1975, William was a busy and productive 40-year-old professor of education and mathematics at Iowa State University, holder of a doctoral degree, who maintained an athletic lifestyle and routinely engaged in tasks requiring manual strength, dexterity, and fine motor skills. After the injury, he underwent care and rehabilitative treatment over a period of many months. From a physical condition of partial paralysis and an emotional condition of fright and depression, he progressed by arduous effort and strength of will to substantial physical and total emotional recovery. However, he suffered a permanent eighty percent loss of function in his right hand, a twenty percent loss of function in his left hand, a loss of fifty percent in range of motion of his neck, weakness in the tricep wrist extensors and flexors, atrophy of hand and forearm muscles, some loss of sensation in hands and legs, and upper neuron discontinuity between brain and legs.
Although he has been able to resume teaching and many of his other prior activities, tasks which were once routine have become difficult or impossible. He tires more readily and suffers periodically from muscle spasticity and cramps.
Under the whole record, we are unable to say the amount of the verdict, as remitted, is vulnerable under the principles recognized in our cases.
[561]*561V. The loss of consortium instruction. Defendant asserts the trial court erred in overruling its objection to an instruction on Rosellyn’s loss of consortium claim. In objecting to the instruction, defendant specified a paragraph in which the court attempted to incorporate by reference principles of damage computation contained in an instruction on William’s damages. However, in specifying the grounds of its objection, defendant merely alleged “such a paragraph should not be included in the loss of consortium paragraph and has no place in that instruction and is a misstatement of the law as it concerns the claim for loss of consortium and it would be error on the part of the Court to incorporate that paragraph.”
To be sufficient, an objection must reasonably alert the trial court to the claimed error to give the court an opportunity to correct it. Andrews v. Struble, 178 N.W.2d 391, 399 (Iowa 1970). In the present situation no legal theory was articulated to point out to the court why the instruction was incorrect. The assertion that the instruction misstated the law does not preserve error. Briney v. Tri-State Mutual Grain Dealers Fire Insurance Co., 254 Iowa 673, 689, 117 N.W.2d 889, 898 (1962).
In its appellate brief, defendant had no difficulty in asserting that the challenged paragraph would permit the jury “to include in the wife’s consortium claim elements of damage, such as for disability, pain and suffering, and the loss of earning capacity, all of which were valid claims of the husband, but not valid with the wife’s consortium claim.” Assuming the instruction had this defect, defendant’s trial court objection was insufficient to alert the trial court to it. We hold that error was not preserved on this assignment.
We modify William’s judgment to reduce it to $538,717.60 and as modified, affirm it and Rosellyn’s judgment.
MODIFIED AND AFFIRMED.
All Justices concur except REYNOLD-SON, C. J., and REES and LARSON, JJ., who dissent.