NUMBER 13-14-00211-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
RUDIS ROBLES AND CLAUDIA FLORES ROBLES, Appellants,
v.
CHRISTOPHER MANN, GWENDA MANN, AND MANN’S MACHINE, INC., Appellees.
On appeal from the 284th District Court of Montgomery County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Garza, Perkes, and Longoria Memorandum Opinion by Justice Perkes1
1 Pursuant to a docket-equalization order issued by the Supreme Court of Texas, the appeal has
been transferred to this Court from the Ninth Court of Appeals in Beaumont, Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.). Christopher and Gwenda Mann (Mann) brought suit against Rudis and Claudia
Robles (Robles) seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief with respect to an
access easement. Mann and Mann’s Machine, Inc. brought various causes of action for
damages with respect to Robles’s interference with the use of the easement.2 After a
bench trial, the trial court found in favor of Mann on the declaratory judgment, granted a
permanent injunction, and awarded Mann attorney’s fees. The trial court, however,
entered a take nothing judgment in favor of Robles on Mann and Mann’s Machine, Inc.’s
damage claims. All of the parties have appealed. We reverse and remand in part and
affirm in part.
I. BACKGROUND
Robles and Mann own adjoining tracts of land deriving from a common source.
The land was originally owned by Ciendy Lawson who conveyed 25.771 acres of the
property to John Pettit (Lawson Deed) and granted an express ingress and egress
easement across her remaining 45-acre tract. Mann subsequently purchased Pettit’s
land. The conveyance from Pettit to Mann (Pettit Deed) also included a grant of an
express ingress and egress easement across the 45-acre tract. After purchasing the
land from Pettit, Mann moved the business, Mann’s Machine, Inc., onto the property.
Sometime thereafter, Robles purchased the 45-acre tract adjacent to Mann’s property
from Lawson. Mann’s easement is located on Robles’s (formerly Lawson’s) property and
2 Mann and Mann’s Machine, Inc. brought causes of action for trespass to try title, intentional interference with property rights, conversion, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, negligence, private nuisance, injury to real property, business torts, exemplary damages, and vicarious liability. Mann did not prevail on any of these causes in the trial court. On appeal, they seem to be limiting their argument to their interference claim.
2 connects Mann’s property to the county road. After purchasing the property, Robles
installed a gate across the cattle guard at the beginning of the easement, ostensibly to
keep his cattle off the county road.
Mann filed suit against Robles seeking a declaratory judgment and arguing, among
other things, that Robles’s gate prevented access to his property. The trial court found
in favor of Mann on his declaratory judgment claim and declared that “Christopher and
Gwenda Mann are the owners of and have a 60 foot wide easement for the purpose of
ingress/egress as described in the [Pettit deed].” The trial court ordered Robles to
remove the gate installed across the cattle guard and permanently enjoined Robles from
interfering with or obstructing Mann’s easement. The trial court further ordered that
Mann and Mann’s Machine, Inc. take nothing on their damage claims, but awarded Mann
$4,069.98 in attorney’s fees.
All parties appealed the trial court’s judgment. Robles brings four issues
challenging the existence and conveyance of the easement, and challenging the order
for a permanent injunction. Mann and Mann’s Machine, Inc. bring two cross-appeal
issues asserting entitlement to money damages and a higher award of attorney’s fees.
No findings of fact and conclusions of law are included in the appellate record.
Since there are no findings of fact or conclusions of law, the trial court’s judgment implies
all findings of fact necessary to support it. See Pharo v. Chambers County, 922 S.W.2d
945, 948 (Tex. 1996).
3 II. ROBLES’S ISSUES
A. Easement Creation
By his first issue, Robles argues the trial court erred as a matter of law in finding
an easement in the Lawson deed since the easement could not be located on the ground.
By his second issue, Robles argues the trial court erred as a matter of law because the
Pettit deed created an easement that did not exist in the Lawson deed.
1. Standard of Review
We apply basic principles of contract construction and interpretation when
considering an express easement’s terms. Marcus Cable Assocs., L.P. v. Krohn, 90
S.W.3d 697, 701 (Tex. 2002). In the case of an unambiguous writing, courts will give
effect to the intention of the parties as expressed by or as apparent from the writing.
Adams v. Norsworthy Ranch, Ltd., 975 S.W.2d 424, 428 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, no
writ). The proper construction of an unambiguous agreement is a question of law for the
court. Phillips Nat. Gas Co. v. Cardiff, 823 S.W.2d 314, 317 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 1991, writ denied). When an issue turns on a pure question of law, we apply a de
novo standard of review. Marsh v. Frost Nat’l Bank, 129 S.W.3d 174, 177 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi 2004, pet. denied). We are not obligated to give any deference to legal
conclusions reached by the trial court. Id.
2. Applicable Law
An easement created by an express grant must be described with such certainty
that a surveyor could go upon the land and locate the easement from the description.
Pick v. Bartel, 659 S.W.2d 636, 637 (Tex. 1983). The grant must furnish, within itself or
4 by reference to other identified writings then in existence, means or data by which the
servient estate may be identified with certainty. Compton v. Tex. S.E. Gas Co., 315
S.W.2d 345, 348 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston 1958, writ ref’d. n.r.e.). If the description is
inadequate or if there is no description, there can be no easement. Vrabel v. Donohoe
Creek Watershed Auth., 545 S.W.2d 53, 54 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1976, no writ).
However, certain un-located easements will be valid, such as where the instrument
merely permits the construction of some facility or the laying of a line on designated
property. See Armstrong v. Skelly Oil Co., 81 S.W.2d 735, 736 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo
1935, writ ref.). An express grant of a right-of-way set out in general terms without
specifying the exact place for its location can be made certain by the act of the grantee in
selecting the easement. Elliott v. Elliott, 597 S.W.2d 795, 802 (Tex. Civ. App.—Corpus
Christi 1980, no writ). Once selected, the grantee’s easement rights become fixed and
certain. Id. (citing Houston Pipe Line Co. v. Dwyer, 374 S.W.2d 662, 666 (Tex. 1964)).
3. Analysis
In his first issue, Robles argues “the trial court erred as a matter of law in finding
an easement in the Lawson Deed for the reason that the easement could not be located
on the ground.” Robles contends that since the Lawson deed did not contain a metes
and bounds description of the easement, the exact location of the easement cannot be
determined. According to Robles, without an exact location, the easement fails. In
support of his argument, Robles cites Vrabel v. Donahome Creek Watershed Authority.
In Vrabel, the easement description was as follows:
Being 111.0 acres, more or less, out of a 250.5 acre tract of land in the Basil Durbin Survey, as more fully described in a Warranty Deed dated January
5 1, 1953, from Erwin Mankins and wife, Mayna Allene Mankins, to Leslie E. Moore and wife, Lela Mae Moore as recorded in Volume 385, Page 599, of the Deed Records of Williamson County, Texas, to which reference is made for all purposes.
545 S.W.2d at 54. Our sister court held that the easement failed because it lacked a
description and references to any locating monuments. See id.
Vrabel, however, is clearly distinguishable. In the instant case, the Lawson deed
provides, in relevant part:
Also included in the conveyance is a 60’ wide easement beginning at the cattle guard on the South side of Lawson 45+ acre tract and proceeding in as nearly a straight line as practicable to the entrance of the 25.771 acre tract, GRANTOR stipulates that no other additional rights-of-way shall encroach upon or be common to this right-of-way without express written consent of GRANTEE.
(Emphasis added.) Unlike the deed in Vrabel, the Lawson deed adequately describes
where the easement begins—the cattle guard on the south side of Lawson’s 45 acre
tract—and where the easement ends—the entrance of the 25.771 acre tract—as well as
its width and general direction. The Lawson deed also adequately describes the land
encumbered by the easement—the Lawson 45-acre tract. See Jones v. Fuller, 856
S.W.2d 597, 603 (Tex. App.—Waco 1993, writ denied) (concluding the failure to describe
the exact location of the easement does not affect the validity of the easement where
encumbered land is adequately described). Therefore, we hold that the trial court did
not err as a matter of law in deciding that the Lawson deed created by an express grant
an ingress/egress easement across the 45-acre tract now owned by Robles. Robles’s
first issue is overruled.
6 In his second issue, Robles argues “the trial court erred as a matter of law for the
reason that the Pettit deed created an easement that did not exist in the Lawson deed.”
Specifically, Robles argues the Pettit deed created an easement of ingress and egress
which was not in the Lawson deed and points to differences between the two deeds: (1)
the Pettit deed creates an easement of ingress and egress different from the Lawson
deed; (2) the Pettit deed contains metes and bounds for the easement; (3) the Pettit deed
creates a different beginning and end point than the Lawson deed; (4) the Pettit deed
uses a different description for the cattle guard location; (5) the Pettit deed describes a
gate at the end of the easement on the 25.771 acre tract; and (6) the Pettit deed’s
description of the easement’s width is more specific than that of the Lawson deed.
Robles’s arguments are without merit. First, the Lawson deed specifically created
a right-of-way easement by stating “. . . no other additional rights-of-way shall encroach
upon or be common to this right-of-way.” While the Pettit deed describes the easement
as being for “ingress and egress,” both deeds grant the same right of passage. See
Greenwood v. Lee, 420 S.W.3d 106, 116–117 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2012, pet. denied)
(“easement” in conjunction with “right-of-way” is understood to mean a right to pass over
the described land).
Second, as previously discussed, the undefined boundaries of an easement
granted for a specific purpose can become fixed by the use of land for the prescribed
purpose with the consent or acquiescence of the property owner. See Dwyer, 374
S.W.2d at 666; Vinson v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 221, 227 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.);
Adams, 975 S.W.2d at 428. In Dwyer, the Texas Supreme Court reviewed a pipeline
7 easement that did not describe its dimensions by metes and bounds or even give a course
or direction for the pipe. Dwyer, 374 S.W.2d at 663. The Supreme Court held that the
pipeline company’s right to the easement nevertheless became fixed and certain when
the company constructed the pipeline with the consent and acquiescence of the
landowner. Id. at 666. Courts have found similar fixation of the boundaries of an
easement based on the use of the land for the purpose specified by the easement. See
Vinson, 80 S.W.3d at 227–28; Adams, 975 S.W.2d at 428; Elliott, 597 S.W.2d at 802.
Consequently, Robles’s arguments highlighting the variances between the Lawson and
Pettit deed fail. It is undisputed Mann uses the easement for access to his property and
Mann’s use of the easement predates Robles’s purchase of his land. Pettit was the
grantee from Lawson, and his subsequent grant to Mann coupled with Mann’s use of the
access road fixed the easement’s location. See Dwyer, 374 S.W.2d at 666; Vinson, 80
S.W.3d at 227–28. Therefore, we disagree with Robles’s assertions that the Lawson
and Pettit deeds create different easements. Accordingly, we overrule Robles’s second
issue.
B. Easement Conveyance
By his third issue, Robles argues the trial court “erred as a matter of law in entering
judgment against Robles conveying to Mann an easement for the reason that there can
be no conveyance of an easement.” Robles complains that the trial court’s judgment
language declaring that “Christopher Mann and Gwenda Mann are the owners of and
have a 60 wide easement . . . .” (emphasis added) improperly conveys a property interest.
Robles asks this Court to reform the judgment by striking the language “are the owners.”
8 1. Standard of Review
Robles’s third issue is a purely legal question. When an issue turns on a pure
question of law, we apply a de novo standard of review. Marsh, 129 S.W.3d at 177.
An easement is a nonpossessory interest in land. State v. Brownlow, 319 S.W.3d
649, 652 (Tex. 2010). Although no interest in property or other right passes by
implication as incidental to the grant of an express easement, the grantee is permitted to
do what is reasonably necessary for the fair enjoyment of the easement itself. Wall v.
Lower Colo. River Auth., 536 S.W.2d 688, 691 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1976, writ ref.
n.r.e.).
Numerous Texas courts have described easement holders as “owners.” See
Harris County Flood Control Dist., v. Shell Pipe Line Corp., 591 S.W.2d 798, 800 (Tex.
1979); Sun Pipe Line Co., v. Kirkpatrick, 514 S.W.2d 789, 792 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont
1974, writ ref. n.r.e.); San Jacinto Sand Co., v. S.W. Bell Tel. Co., 426 S.W.2d 338, 343
(Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, writ ref. n.r.e.); Baer v. Dallas Theater Ctr.,
330, S.W.2d 214, 219 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1959, writ ref. n.r.e.). We conclude the
trial court correctly referred to Christopher and Gwenda Mann as “owners” of the
easement.
More importantly, the trial court’s judgment did not grant Mann the right to use the
easement for any purpose greater than the express grant. See Marcus Cable Assocs.,
L.P., 90 S.W.3d at 700. The trial court declared that Mann “owns” a 60 foot wide
9 easement, as described in the Pettit deed, for the purpose of ingress and egress. The
trial court’s judgment is consistent with the express grant. Rather than expanding
Mann’s rights, the trial court’s order provides for what the express grant allowed. See
Johnson v. S.W. Pub. Serv. Co., 688 S.W.2d 653, 655 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1985, no
writ). Robles’s third issue is overruled.
C. Permanent Injunction
By his fourth issue, Robles argues “the trial court erred in ordering the Robleses
to remove the gate and permanently [enjoining] the Robleses from the use of their
property.” Robles’s issue concerns the scope of the easement, specifically, whether or
not Robles is permitted to use a locking gate across the easement. Robles further
challenges the trial court’s permanent injunction ordering the removal of his cattle from
the easement, which he claims defeats his right to use and enjoy his property.
We review the grant of a permanent injunction for abuse of discretion. Lagos v.
Plano Econ. Dev. Bd., Inc., 378 S.W.3d 647, 650 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.). To
determine if there is an abuse of discretion, we look to see if the trial court acted without
reference to any guiding rules and principles. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc.,
701 S.W.2d 238, 241–42 (Tex. 1985). To obtain injunctive relief, a party must generally
show: (1) the existence of a wrongful act; (2) the existence of imminent harm; (3) the
existence of irreparable injury; and (4) the absence of an adequate remedy at law. Jim
Rutherford Invs., Inc. v. Terramar Beach Cmty. Ass’n, 25 S.W.3d 845, 849 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). The purpose of injunctive relief is not to grant
10 relief for past actionable wrongs or to prevent commission of wrongs not imminently
threatened. Tex. Emp’t Comm’n v. Martinez, 545 S.W.2d 876, 877 (Tex. Civ. App.—El
Paso 1976, no writ). An injunction should be broad enough to prevent a repetition of the
“evil” sought to be corrected, but not so broad as to enjoin a defendant from lawful
activities. Lagos, 378 S.W.3d at 650. An injunction that enjoins lawful as well as
unlawful acts may constitute an abuse of discretion. Id. at 651. As we stated earlier in
this opinion and to the extent necessary to resolve this issue, we review the interpretation
of deeds granting easements de novo. Marsh, 129 S.W.3d at 177.
A servient estate cannot interfere with the right of the dominant estate to use an
easement for the purpose for which it was granted or sought. McDaniel v. Calvert, 875
S.W.2d 482, 485 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1994, no writ) (citing Bickler v. Bickler, 403
S.W.2d 354, 359 (Tex. 1966)). Likewise, the easement owner must make reasonable
use of the right and not unreasonably interfere with property rights of the owner of the
servient estate. San Jacinto Sand Co. v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 426 S.W.2d 338, 345 (Tex.
Civ. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Any use by others that interferes
with the exercise of superior easement rights must yield. Taylor Foundry Co. v. Wichita
Falls Grain Co., 51 S.W.3d 766, 770 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.); McDaniel,
875 S.W.2d at 485 (citing Pittman v. City of Amarillo, 598 S.W.2d 941, 944 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.)). Whether a party has the right to erect gates depends
upon the intent of the parties. McDaniel, 875 S.W.2d at 485. The parties’ intent can be
determined by considering the terms of the grant, its purpose, the nature and situation of
11 the property, and the manner in which it is used. Id. (citing Gerstner v. Wilhelm, 584
S.W.2d 955, 958 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1979, writ dism’d)).
a. Installation of Gate
Robles’s first argument focuses on whether his placing the gate across the
easement was a wrongful act. The Lawson and Pettit deeds do not address the matter
of gates. When an express easement is stated in general terms, the easement “implies
a grant of unlimited reasonable use such as is reasonably necessary and convenient and
as little burdensome as possible to the servient owner.” Reaves v. Lindsay, 326 S.W.3d
276, 282 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (quoting Coleman v. Forister, 514
S.W.2d 899, 903 (Tex. 1974)). We engage in this balancing test, guided by: “the terms
of the grant, its purpose, the nature and situation of the property, and the manner in which
it is used” unless the easement’s language provides direction otherwise. Gerstner, 584
S.W.2d at 958.
Robles asserts that the gate is necessary to keep his cattle off the county road.
Robles further argues that because Mann changed the use of his property after Robles
installed the gate, Mann cannot now require removal of the gate. See Greenwood v.
Lee, 420 S.W.3d 106, 120 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2012, pet. denied) (a change of use of
the land, among other factors, showed access over an easement without gates was not
reasonably necessary or convenient and the least burden on the servient estate); but see
McDaniel, 875 S.W.2d 483–85 (trial court did not err in ordering removal of gates where,
among other factors, gates had not existed for decades on easement in question).
12 In considering the nature and situation of the property, we note that the record
reflects that when the easement was granted, no gates, fences, or other obstacles were
placed across the roadway. The easement was openly used for ingress and egress until
Robles installed the gate. While we are mindful of Robles’s concern about stray cattle,
we note that the prior owners of the property shared similar concerns, hence the
installation of the cattle guard. Where, as here, an easement is granted to provide
abutting landowners access to a roadway, and no gates existed prior to the grant of the
easement, “it is evident access to the roadway was to be unobstructed.” McDaniel, 875
S.W.2d at 485 (without deed language regarding gates, dominant estate had free and
unrestricted access); see Gerstner, 584 S.W.2d at 958 (trial court did not abuse its
discretion in requiring servient estate to remove gates from easement providing access
to otherwise landlocked property); see also Hilburn v. Providian Holdings, Inc., No. 01–
06–00961–CV, 2008 WL 4836840, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 6, 2008, no
pet.) (mem. op.) (servient estate had no right to close or lock gate which existed prior to
creation of nonexclusive access easement because closed or locked gate interfered with
purpose of easement).
b. Livestock
Robles’s second argument asserts that the trial court erred by enjoining him from
having his livestock cross the easement, thereby preventing his right to the use and
enjoyment of his property. Robles did not preserve this argument for appeal.
To preserve a complaint for appellate review, a party must have presented to the
trial court a timely request, objection, or motion that states the specific grounds for the
13 desired ruling, if they are not apparent from the context of the request, objection, or
motion. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). “To preserve a point of error in a judgment, a party
must inform the trial court of its objection by a motion to amend or correct the judgment,
a motion for new trial, or some other similar method.” Homes v. Humphrey, 244 S.W.3d
570, 582 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2008, pet. denied); Dal–Chrome Co. v. Brenntag Sw.,
Inc., 183 S.W.3d 133, 144 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.); see also Holland v. Hayden,
901 S.W.2d 763, 765 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, writ denied) (motion for new
trial is appropriate method for preserving error regarding alleged defect in final judgment).
Judgment error regarding questions of law must be raised in the trial court. Solomon v.
Steitler, 312 S.W.3d 46, 61 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, no pet.).
Robles did not make any objection to the injunction’s provision requiring the
removal of cattle from the easement. Rather, Robles filed a post-judgement “Objection
to Plaintiff’s Proposed Judgment and Defendant’s Motion to Enter His Proposed
Judgment” that included Robles’s proposed judgment as an attachment. Robles’s
proposed judgment includes the very language that he now complains about on appeal.
As our sister court held in Morse v. Delgado,
Generally after verdict a party can obtain judgment by filing a motion for judgment or by tendering a proposed judgment to the court. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 301, 305. If a party files a motion for judgment on the verdict and does not indicate in some manner that it disagrees with the substance of the verdict, then that party cannot challenge on appeal the judgment it requested. First Nat’l Bank v. Fojtik, 775 S.W.2d 632, 633 (Tex. 1989); Litton Indus. Prod., Inc. v. Gammage, 668 S.W.2d 319, 321–22 (Tex. 1984). This rule is nothing more than a species of the invited error doctrine which prohibits a party from complaining on appeal about an error which he invited. See Texas Indus., Inc. v. Vaughan, 919 S.W.2d 798, 804 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied).
14 975 S.W.2d 378, 381 (Tex. App.—Waco 1998, no writ); see also In re Dept. of Fam. &
Protective Servs., 273 S.W.3d 637, 646 (Tex. 2009) (invited error doctrine applies in
situations where party requests court to make a specific ruling, then complains of that
ruling on appeal); In re Marriage of Palacios, 358 S.W.3d 662, 664 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
2009, pet. denied) (concept of invited error prevents litigant from complaining about
mistakes that he helped cause). Accordingly, Robles’s second argument is waived.
See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a).
Considering the nature and situation of Robles’s and Mann’s properties when the
easement was granted and the manner in which it was used, access to the roadway was
to remain unobstructed. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
granting the permanent injunction. See McDaniel, 875 S.W.2d at 485. Robles’s fourth
issue is overruled.
III. MANN’S CROSS-APPEAL ISSUES
A. Liability and Damages
By his first cross-appeal issue, Mann asserts the trial court’s finding of no damages
for Mann is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.3 Mann alleges
that he proved “intentional interference with property rights and damages resulting from
that interference.”
3 Mann does not explain whether the evidence was legally insufficient, factually insufficient, or both
to support a finding of liability for intentional interference with property rights. We will apply a factual sufficiency standard on the question of liability. 15 1. Standard of Review
When a party attacks the factual sufficiency of an adverse finding on an issue on
which he has the burden of proof, he must demonstrate on appeal that the adverse finding
is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Croucher v. Croucher,
660 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Tex. 1983). The reviewing court must consider and weigh all of the
evidence, and can set aside a verdict only if the evidence is so weak or if the finding is so
against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it is clearly wrong and
unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986).
Texas law is well settled that “[a]ny intentional invasion of, or interference with,
property, property rights, personal rights or personal liberties causing injury without just
cause or excuse is an actionable tort.” Suprise v. DeKock, 84 S.W.3d 378, 380 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.) (quoting King v. Acker, 725 S.W.2d 750, 754 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ)). Under this general rule, Texas courts have
recognized a cause of action for tortious interference with the peaceful use and enjoyment
of property rights, which is, “in essence, a claim for intentional invasion of, or interference
with, property rights.” See id. at 382; see also Marrs & Smith P’ship v. D.K. Boyd Oil &
Gas Co., 223 S.W.3d 1, 21 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, pet. denied). The elements of
tortious interference with property rights are: (1) an interference with one’s property or
property rights occurred; (2) such interference was intentional and caused damage; and
(3) the interference was conducted with neither just cause nor legal excuse. See
Cleveland Reg. Med. Ctr., L.P. v. Celtic Props., L.C., 323 S.W.3d 322, 349 (Tex. App.—
16 Beaumont 2010, pet. denied); Suprise, 84 S.W.3d at 380; see also Edberg v. Laurel
Canyon Ranch Architectural Review Comm., No. 04–10–00395–CV, 2011 WL 541134,
at *5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 16, 2011, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
Mann argues that Robles intentionally interfered with his property rights by placing
a gate across the easement and by placing “utility poles, trees, pipes, all kinds of debris”
on the easement, which blocked the easement’s use by large trucks. He points to Rudis
Robles’s testimony, wherein he admitted that he intentionally placed the gate and utility
poles on the easement.
Regarding the gate, Robles testified he installed the gate in 2005. He stated that
the gate was “latched” closed, but that both he and Mann had keys to the gate.4 Since
2011, he complied with a temporary injunction which required him to keep the gate closed,
but not locked. Contrary to Mann’s testimony, Robles denied that the utility poles and
other debris blocked access to the easement. Robles testified that he placed the poles
along the easement to prevent encroachment onto his land. He also testified that 18-
wheeler trucks use the easement accessing Mann’s property without issue.
Based on Robles’s testimony, the trial court could have found that the closed but
unlocked gate did not interfere with Mann’s use of the easement. Moreover, there was
no testimony that Mann was unable to access his property because of the latched gate.
See Carleton v. Dierks, 195 S.W.2d 834, 837 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1946, no writ)
(erecting locked gates interfered with the dominant estate holder’s lawful use of the
4 Larry Carter, who works with Robles, clarified that the gate was secured with a sliding latch held in place with a pin. 17 easement). The trial court could have disagreed with Mann on the alleged interference
caused by the utility poles, instead finding that Robles did not block the easement.
It is the trier of fact who judges the credibility of the witnesses and the weight given
to their testimony, and it may resolve inconsistencies in the testimony, accepting or
rejecting such portions as it sees fit. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Scholl, 990 S.W.2d 412,
419 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1999, pet. denied). We may not substitute our opinion
for that of the fact finder merely because another result is possible. Kirby v. Chapman,
917 S.W.2d 902, 914 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, no writ); Clancy v. Zale Corp., 705
S.W.2d 820, 826 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Mann asks us to reweigh
the evidence and assess the credibility of Robles’s testimony. This we cannot do.
Having reviewed the entire record, we do not find the trial court’s implicit finding—
that Mann failed to prove intentional interference with property rights—is erroneous.
Without a finding of liability, Mann may not recover money damages. Thus, the trial
court’s award of no damages is not so contrary to the great weight and preponderance of
the evidence such that it is manifestly unjust. See Croucher, 660 S.W.2d at 58.
B. Attorney’s Fees
By his second cross-appeal issue, Mann asserts the trial court’s award of
$4,069.98 is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. 5 While
Mann’s argument generally addresses the reasonableness and necessity of attorney’s
5 This award was for the work of Mann’s first attorney, who provided billing records for a portion of
her attorney’s fees. The trial court did not award any attorney’s fees for the work of Mann’s second attorney. 18 fees, he also attempts to justify his failure to segregate fees. Mann claims that his
causes of action are so interrelated that there is no need for segregation.
1. Applicable Law
In Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, the Texas Supreme Court held that parties
claiming attorney’s fees must “segregate fees between claims for which they are
recoverable and claims for which they are not” and are “required to show that attorney’s
fees were incurred while suing the defendant sought to be charged with the fees on a
claim which allows recovery of such fees.” 212 S.W.3d 299, 311 (Tex. 2006) (quoting
Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Sterling, 822 S.W.2d 1, 10 (Tex. 1991)). “Intertwined facts” do
not make fees for unrecoverable claims recoverable. Id. at 313–14. “[I]t is only when
discrete legal services advance both a recoverable and unrecoverable claim that they are
so intertwined that they need not be segregated.” Id. Thus, “[i]f any attorney’s fees
relate solely to a claim for which such fees are unrecoverable, the claimant must
segregate recoverable from unrecoverable fees.” 7979 Airport Garage, L.L.C. v. Dollar
Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 245 S.W.3d 488, 506 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet.
denied) (citing Chapa, 212 S.W.3d at 313–14).
2. Analysis
Mann’s attorney, Tom Shipp, presented the evidence regarding attorney’s fees.
Shipp testified about his qualifications, the reasonableness of his hourly rate, and the fee
amounts. He also introduced billing invoices beginning with his involvement in the case.
According to Shipp, he worked a total of 204.3 hours on the case while his legal assistant
worked 52.3 hours. He further testified that a reasonable value for his attorney’s fees,
19 costs, and expenses through trial was $90,433.92. Marcia Tillman, Mann’s previous
attorney, testified that her billing for April 2012 was $4,069.98, but did not provide billing
for any other months of her representation. Robles objected to Mann’s request for
attorney’s fees based on Mann’s failure to segregate.
Shipp did not attempt to segregate the attorney’s fees attributable to the
unsuccessful tort claims from those fees attributable to the successful declaratory
judgment claim. Shipp failed to show whether all or what portion of his attorney’s fees
were incurred for legal services involving the declaratory judgment action. A review of
the invoices submitted into evidence clearly shows that some of Mann’s attorney’s fees
related to his unrecoverable tort claims. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.009
(West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.) (“[T]he court may award costs and reasonable and
necessary attorney’s fees as are equitable and just.”); Huddleston v. Pace, 790 S.W.2d
47, 49 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1990, writ denied) (“Generally, attorney’s fees are not
recoverable in an action for tort . . . unless provided by statute.”). For example, the fees
incurred in drafting the amended petition relating to the tort claims were not recoverable,
while the portion of the fees relating to the declaratory judgment claim was recoverable.
As a result, we conclude that Mann is required to segregate his fees. See Chapa, 212
S.W.3d at 313.
The remedy for unsegregated attorney’s fees is a new trial on the issue, not
rendition of a take-nothing judgment on the claim for attorney’s fees. See id. at 314;
Stewart Title Guar. Co., 822 S.W.2d at 11. As the Texas Supreme Court stated in
Chapa, “[u]nsegregated attorney’s fees are some evidence of what the segregated
20 amount should be.” Chapa, 212 S.W.3d at 314. Mann may recover attorney’s fees for
his declaratory judgment claim and the testimony from Shipp of the unsegregated amount
constituted some evidence of his segregated attorney’s fees. Therefore, we conclude
the trial court’s nominal award of $4,069.98 in attorney’s fees is against the great weight
and preponderance of the evidence. We sustain Mann’s second issue.
IV. MANN’S MACHINE, INC.
The record contains no evidence that Mann’s Machine, Inc. has any ownership
interest in the dominant estate or any possessory interest in the easement. Rather,
Mann has generally included Mann’s Machine, Inc. in their damage claim premised on
intentional interference with property.
Mann does not provide any argument or case authority to discuss the issue of
whether a corporate entity without a property interest may recover on a cause of action
for intentional interference with a private road access easement. See TEX. R. APP. P.
38.1(i) (“The brief must contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made,
with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.”). Inasmuch as Mann’s
Machine, Inc.’s relies on the same operative facts as Mann regarding this issue, it fails
for the same evidentiary reason that Mann’s damage claim issue failed. Consequently,
we conclude that Machine, Inc. could not have prevailed on a cause of action for
intentional interference with a private access easement under the facts of this case. See
Cleveland Reg. Med. Ctr., L.P., 323 S.W.3d at 349.
21 V. CONCLUSION
We reverse the trial court’s judgment regarding attorney’s fees and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In all other respects, the trial court’s
judgment is affirmed.
GREGORY T. PERKES Justice Delivered and filed the 21st day of April, 2016.