[655]*655Reed, C.J.
This case arose from a disagreement over who was to pay for damage to a leased building. The principal item in dispute is the cost of a new heating system and incidentally the cost of various lighting fixtures and electrical switches either missing or nonfunctional when the lease terminated.
The leased premises consist of a downtown Aberdeen building constructed in 1948 to house a new car sales and service business. At the time of trial plaintiffs were the owners of both the building and the lessor's interest in a lease to defendant Don Johnston Ford, Inc., the term of which ended December 31, 1977. Defendant Bi-Rite, Inc., had subleased the premises from Johnston. For ease of identification both Don Johnston Ford, Inc., and Bi-Rite, Inc., will hereafter be referred to as "tenants" and plaintiffs as "landlords."
In 1977 with the lease about to expire, the landlords decided to sell the building and reached an agreement with Huffman Motors, Inc., for its purchase, with possession to be delivered at the end of the lease term. As Huffman was preparing to occupy the premises it discovered that many of the lighting fixtures were missing and the heating system did not work because of damage to the boiler. Landlords and Huffman then executed a supplemental agreement under which the parties would share the cost of repair with landlords' liability not to exceed $5,000. Additionally, landlords reserved the right to bring suit against the tenants for the cost of such repairs, applying net proceeds to its obligation under the supplemental agreement.
After trial the Superior Court awarded landlords a judgment for damages to the boiler in the amount of $9,450, plus $2,355 for repainting the building and $1,064.54 for replacing broken glass. The court rejected landlords' claim for $1,774.19 in damages to the lighting system. Tenants appealed. The landlords have cross-appealed contending that the damages awarded do not fully compensate for the loss of the boiler and that the refusal to award damages for the lighting system was erroneous. Those portions of the [656]*656judgment relating to the cost of replacing broken glass and repainting the building are not disputed in this appeal.
The tenants advance three major contentions in support of their argument that the judgment for damage to the boiler must be reversed or reduced in amount. The tenants first argue that the boiler failed as a result of "ordinary wear and tear" instead of as a result of sudden catastrophic damage. The lease provides that the tenants are not liable for ordinary wear and tear.1
The trial court found that with proper maintenance the 29-year-old boiler had a useful life of 40 years. It also found the boiler was damaged when it was "dry fired" by the tenants—that is, when it was operated without any water in the boiler. The trial court then concluded that "dry firing" did not amount to ordinary wear and tear. Accordingly, it found the tenants liable for the damage. We affirm the trial court based upon Publishers Bldg. Co. v. Miller, 25 Wn.2d 927, 172 P.2d 489 (1946), in which the court stated at pages 939-40:
The appellant makes a further contention in her brief to the effect that the damage to the boiler was due to "reasonable wear," or at least that the question was one for the jury. In our opinion, the contention is untenable.
The expressions "reasonable wear," "ordinary wear and tear" and similar phrases apply more naturally to the gradual deterioration resulting from use, lapse of time, and to a certain extent to the operation of the elements, but do not cover destruction, in whole or in part, of a structure by some sudden catastrophe. The occurrence here did not present a spectacle resulting from ordinary or reasonable wear; it evidenced a sudden casualty, more in the nature of a catastrophe. The crack in [657]*657the boiler occurred by reason of the boiler being subjected to extreme heat at a time when there was insufficient water within it. The result was a sudden occurrence, not a gradual deterioration.
Having determined that the tenants are liable for loss of the boiler, the next issue is the amount of that damage. The tenants contend that they should be required to pay only the depreciated cost of the 29-year-old boiler. However, the tenants do not point to any evidence in the record of such a cost. Moreover, the tenants overlook the long-established rule for computation of damages in cases such as this. The proper measure of damages is the cost of restoration of the building to its former condition unless the cost of restoration exceeds the diminution in value of the building caused by the failure to maintain the building as the lease required. James S. Black Co. v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 14 Wn. App. 602, 544 P.2d 112 (1975); see also Falcone v. Perry, 68 Wn.2d 909, 416 P.2d 690 (1966); DeLano v. Tennent, 138 Wash. 39, 244 P. 273, 45 A.L.R. 766 (1926). There is no evidence that repairs could have been made for less than the cost of replacing the heating plant. Thus, had there been no basis for comparison of a diminution in value with the actual cost of a new heating system, the trial court would have been correct in holding that the measure of damages was the actual cost of the new system. As we shall demonstrate, however, the supplemental agreement executed by landlords and Huffman was proof of a diminution in value that was exceeded by the cost of restoring the building to its former condition by means of a new heating plant.
Tenants' final contention in this regard is that damages should be limited to $5,000 because of the supplemental agreement between landlords and Huffman, the building's purchaser. As noted, this agreement requires landlords to contribute up to $5,000 and no more of the cost of repair or [658]*658replacement of the damaged parts of the building, including the heating system.2
Tenants' principal argument is that failure to restrict the landlords' recovery to $5,000 results in landlords receiving a windfall gain, citing 349 W. Ontario Bldg. Corp. v. Palmer Truck Leasing Co., 22 Ill. App. 3d 467, 317 N.E.2d 740 (1974), and Bowes v. Saks & Co., 397 F.2d 113 (7th Cir. 1968).
A lessee who breaches a provision of the lease requiring him to make certain repairs or to deliver up the premises at the termination of the lease in a certain condition is liable in damages for the reasonable cost of making such repairs or of putting the premises in the condition prescribed by the lease.
Crystal Concrete Corp. v. Braintree, 309 Mass. 463, 470, 35 N.E.2d 672, 675 (1941).
Cost of repairs is merely a convenient way to quantify the damage a lessor has suffered. Where the facts indicate that cost of repairs is unrelated to lessors' actual damage, the rule is not applied.
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[655]*655Reed, C.J.
This case arose from a disagreement over who was to pay for damage to a leased building. The principal item in dispute is the cost of a new heating system and incidentally the cost of various lighting fixtures and electrical switches either missing or nonfunctional when the lease terminated.
The leased premises consist of a downtown Aberdeen building constructed in 1948 to house a new car sales and service business. At the time of trial plaintiffs were the owners of both the building and the lessor's interest in a lease to defendant Don Johnston Ford, Inc., the term of which ended December 31, 1977. Defendant Bi-Rite, Inc., had subleased the premises from Johnston. For ease of identification both Don Johnston Ford, Inc., and Bi-Rite, Inc., will hereafter be referred to as "tenants" and plaintiffs as "landlords."
In 1977 with the lease about to expire, the landlords decided to sell the building and reached an agreement with Huffman Motors, Inc., for its purchase, with possession to be delivered at the end of the lease term. As Huffman was preparing to occupy the premises it discovered that many of the lighting fixtures were missing and the heating system did not work because of damage to the boiler. Landlords and Huffman then executed a supplemental agreement under which the parties would share the cost of repair with landlords' liability not to exceed $5,000. Additionally, landlords reserved the right to bring suit against the tenants for the cost of such repairs, applying net proceeds to its obligation under the supplemental agreement.
After trial the Superior Court awarded landlords a judgment for damages to the boiler in the amount of $9,450, plus $2,355 for repainting the building and $1,064.54 for replacing broken glass. The court rejected landlords' claim for $1,774.19 in damages to the lighting system. Tenants appealed. The landlords have cross-appealed contending that the damages awarded do not fully compensate for the loss of the boiler and that the refusal to award damages for the lighting system was erroneous. Those portions of the [656]*656judgment relating to the cost of replacing broken glass and repainting the building are not disputed in this appeal.
The tenants advance three major contentions in support of their argument that the judgment for damage to the boiler must be reversed or reduced in amount. The tenants first argue that the boiler failed as a result of "ordinary wear and tear" instead of as a result of sudden catastrophic damage. The lease provides that the tenants are not liable for ordinary wear and tear.1
The trial court found that with proper maintenance the 29-year-old boiler had a useful life of 40 years. It also found the boiler was damaged when it was "dry fired" by the tenants—that is, when it was operated without any water in the boiler. The trial court then concluded that "dry firing" did not amount to ordinary wear and tear. Accordingly, it found the tenants liable for the damage. We affirm the trial court based upon Publishers Bldg. Co. v. Miller, 25 Wn.2d 927, 172 P.2d 489 (1946), in which the court stated at pages 939-40:
The appellant makes a further contention in her brief to the effect that the damage to the boiler was due to "reasonable wear," or at least that the question was one for the jury. In our opinion, the contention is untenable.
The expressions "reasonable wear," "ordinary wear and tear" and similar phrases apply more naturally to the gradual deterioration resulting from use, lapse of time, and to a certain extent to the operation of the elements, but do not cover destruction, in whole or in part, of a structure by some sudden catastrophe. The occurrence here did not present a spectacle resulting from ordinary or reasonable wear; it evidenced a sudden casualty, more in the nature of a catastrophe. The crack in [657]*657the boiler occurred by reason of the boiler being subjected to extreme heat at a time when there was insufficient water within it. The result was a sudden occurrence, not a gradual deterioration.
Having determined that the tenants are liable for loss of the boiler, the next issue is the amount of that damage. The tenants contend that they should be required to pay only the depreciated cost of the 29-year-old boiler. However, the tenants do not point to any evidence in the record of such a cost. Moreover, the tenants overlook the long-established rule for computation of damages in cases such as this. The proper measure of damages is the cost of restoration of the building to its former condition unless the cost of restoration exceeds the diminution in value of the building caused by the failure to maintain the building as the lease required. James S. Black Co. v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 14 Wn. App. 602, 544 P.2d 112 (1975); see also Falcone v. Perry, 68 Wn.2d 909, 416 P.2d 690 (1966); DeLano v. Tennent, 138 Wash. 39, 244 P. 273, 45 A.L.R. 766 (1926). There is no evidence that repairs could have been made for less than the cost of replacing the heating plant. Thus, had there been no basis for comparison of a diminution in value with the actual cost of a new heating system, the trial court would have been correct in holding that the measure of damages was the actual cost of the new system. As we shall demonstrate, however, the supplemental agreement executed by landlords and Huffman was proof of a diminution in value that was exceeded by the cost of restoring the building to its former condition by means of a new heating plant.
Tenants' final contention in this regard is that damages should be limited to $5,000 because of the supplemental agreement between landlords and Huffman, the building's purchaser. As noted, this agreement requires landlords to contribute up to $5,000 and no more of the cost of repair or [658]*658replacement of the damaged parts of the building, including the heating system.2
Tenants' principal argument is that failure to restrict the landlords' recovery to $5,000 results in landlords receiving a windfall gain, citing 349 W. Ontario Bldg. Corp. v. Palmer Truck Leasing Co., 22 Ill. App. 3d 467, 317 N.E.2d 740 (1974), and Bowes v. Saks & Co., 397 F.2d 113 (7th Cir. 1968).
A lessee who breaches a provision of the lease requiring him to make certain repairs or to deliver up the premises at the termination of the lease in a certain condition is liable in damages for the reasonable cost of making such repairs or of putting the premises in the condition prescribed by the lease.
Crystal Concrete Corp. v. Braintree, 309 Mass. 463, 470, 35 N.E.2d 672, 675 (1941).
Cost of repairs is merely a convenient way to quantify the damage a lessor has suffered. Where the facts indicate that cost of repairs is unrelated to lessors' actual damage, the rule is not applied. Pennsylvania Cement Co. v. Bradley Contracting Co., 11 F.2d 687, 688 (2d Cir. 1926) (L. Hand, J.).
[659]*659"In an action for breach of contract, as opposed to a suit sounding in specific performance, the lessor is entitled only to the damages that were caused to the property by the failure to restore. Where the expense of restoration exceeds the diminution in the market value of the property caused by the lessee's nonperformance, the diminution in fair market value is the proper measure of damages." Dodge Street Building Corp. v. United States, 341 F.2d 641, 644, 169 Ct.Cl. 496 (1965). If the "cost of repair" rule will give lessors a greater benefit from the breach than could be gained from full performance, a different measure of damages must be applied to avoid injustice. Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109, 113 (Okla.1963). Accord, Giordano v. Brandywine Mushroom Corp., 32 Pa.Dist. & Co. R.2d 522, 525-26 (1963). And see Realty Associates v. United States, 138 F. Supp. 875, 134 Ct.Cl. 167 (1956).
Bowes v. Saks & Co., supra at 116-17.
On the particular facts of this case, tenants are correct. The record shows that approximately 1 year prior to the expiration of the lease, landlords decided to sell the building, placing upon it a value of $355,000. Shortly after the lease expired, landlords put the property on the market and received their asking price from Huffman without reduction.3 Had the matter rested there, the landlords [660]*660would have failed to demonstrate there had been any diminution in value because of tenants' derelictions. Under the rule which places a ceiling on damages recoverable by a landlord for breach of a tenant's agreement to repair at the diminution of value of the premises, Falcone v. Perry, supra. See also Missouri Baptist Hosp. v. United States, 555 F.2d 290 (Ct. Cl. 1977); Dodge St. Bldg. Corp. v. United States, 341 F.2d 641, 644 (Ct. Cl. 1965), landlords would receive a windfall if awarded the cost of repairs. However, after becoming apprised of the full extent of the damage, Huffman secured landlords' supplemental promise. This amounted to a reduction in market price and, by definition, a diminution in value. Although the supplemental agreement does not describe it in those terms—calling it an agreement to share the expense of repairs—the net effect of these negotiations was to lower the price by the extent to which landlords had to contribute repair costs, up to $5,000. We know now that the total cost of repair exceeded $10,000. Consequently landlords' actual loss is $5,000 and that must be the limit of their recovery. Pennsylvania Cement Co. v. Bradley Contracting Co., 11 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1926). Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed but reduced to the total sum of $5,000 plus costs.
Petrie, J., concurs.