Rucker v. Severson

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedJanuary 2, 2024
Docket2:23-cv-01575
StatusUnknown

This text of Rucker v. Severson (Rucker v. Severson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rucker v. Severson, (E.D. Wis. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

ERIC T. RUCKER,

Plaintiff, v. Case No. 23-CV-1575-JPS

ERIC J. SEVERSON, LT. SHALLOW, STEFONEK, C.O. MUELLER, ORDER WALKOWSKI, SCARDINO, LANDRESS, MILLER, D. JOHNSON, MATTHEWS, and NEUMAN,

Defendants.

Plaintiff Eric T. Rucker, a former inmate filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the defendants violated his constitutional rights. ECF No. 1. This Order resolves Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee and screens his complaint. 1. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING THE FILING FEE Plaintiff was not incarcerated at the time of filing and Plaintiff filed a motion to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee. ECF No. 2. On the question of indigence, although Plaintiff need not show that he is totally destitute, Zaun v. Dobbin, 628 F.2d 990, 992 (7th Cir. 1980), the privilege of proceeding without prepayment of the filing fee “is reserved to the many truly impoverished litigants who, within the District Court’s sound discretion, would remain without legal remedy if such privilege were not afforded to them.” Brewster v. N. Am. Van Lines, Inc., 461 F.2d 649, 651 (7th Cir. 1972). In. his motion, Plaintiff avers that he is unemployed and unmarried. ECF No. 2 at 1. The source of his monthly income is Social Security Insurance and totals $846.00 with allegedly no monthly expenses. Id. at 2– 3. He does not own a car or a home; has nothing in checking or savings accounts; and does not own any other property of value. Id. at 3–4. Given these facts, the Court accepts that Plaintiff is indigent and will grant his motion to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee. However, the inquiry does not end there; the Court must also screen the action. 2. SCREENING THE COMPLAINT 2.1 Federal Screening Standard Notwithstanding the payment of any filing fee, when a plaintiff requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court must screen the complaint and dismiss it or any portion thereof if it raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992); Hutchinson ex rel. Baker v. Spink, 126 F.3d 895, 900 (7th Cir. 1997). The Court may dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). To state a claim, a complaint must provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). In other words, the complaint must give “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The allegations must “plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibility above a speculative level.” Kubiak v. City of Chicago, 810 F.3d 476, 480 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal citation omitted). Plausibility requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In reviewing the complaint, the Court is required to “accept as true all of the well-pleaded facts in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Kubiak, 810 F.3d at 480–81. However, the Court “need not accept as true ‘legal conclusions, or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.’” Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (internal bracketing omitted). 2.2 Plaintiff’s Allegations Plaintiff’s allegations are difficult to discern. On September 23, 2019 or 2020, his rights were violated in part by being partially disabled because he was refused a lower cell. ECF No. 1 at 3. Plaintiff’s requests for a lower cell went ignored. Id. With medical staff present on February 8, 2022, Plaintiff fell down a metal staircase in the Waukesha County Jail. Id. Defendant Johnson witnessed this incident. Id. at 2. According to the Social Security Administration, Plaintiff is permanently disabled and has nerve damage in his knee. Id. Someone violated his rights by refusing to view medical records from Milwaukee County Jail. Id. Plaintiff was housed in various units that required stair usage and the fall caused permanent nerve damage. Id. 2.3 Analysis A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment where he is deliberately indifferent “to serious medical needs of prisoners.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To state a claim, a plaintiff must allege facts from which the Court can infer that: (1) he had an objectively serious medical need; and (2) the defendants were deliberately indifferent towards that medical need. Est. of Miller by Chassie v. Marberry, 847 F.3d 425, 427–28 (7th Cir. 2017); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722 (7th Cir. 2016)). “A medical need is sufficiently serious if the plaintiff's condition ‘has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or ... is so obvious that even a lay person would perceive the need for a doctor's attention.’” Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843 857 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005)). The condition does not need to be life-threatening to be serious; it needs only to be “a condition that would result in further significant injury or unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” if not addressed. Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 620 (7th Cir. 2010). Here, Plaintiff’s complaint may state a claim for an Eighth Amendment violation for denying him a medically necessary lower bunk. However, the Court is obliged to dismiss his complaint, with leave to amend, because Plaintiff has failed to identify any facts showing the named defendants’ personal involvement. For a prison official to be personally liable, he or she must have participated in some way with the alleged constitutional violation. Vance v.

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Related

Estelle v. Gamble
429 U.S. 97 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Neitzke v. Williams
490 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Denton v. Hernandez
504 U.S. 25 (Supreme Court, 1992)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Roe v. Elyea
631 F.3d 843 (Seventh Circuit, 2011)
Robert L. Brewster v. North American Van Lines, Inc.
461 F.2d 649 (Seventh Circuit, 1972)
Richard A. Zaun and Lois Jean Zaun v. James Dobbin
628 F.2d 990 (Seventh Circuit, 1980)
Donald F. Greeno v. George Daley
414 F.3d 645 (Seventh Circuit, 2005)
Farmer v. Brennan
511 U.S. 825 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Gayton v. McCoy
593 F.3d 610 (Seventh Circuit, 2010)
Brooks v. Ross
578 F.3d 574 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
Laura Kubiak v. City of Chicago
810 F.3d 476 (Seventh Circuit, 2016)
Tyrone Petties v. Imhotep Carter
836 F.3d 722 (Seventh Circuit, 2016)
Estate of William A. Miller v. Helen Marberry
847 F.3d 425 (Seventh Circuit, 2017)
Hutchinson ex rel. Baker v. Spink
126 F.3d 895 (Seventh Circuit, 1997)

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Bluebook (online)
Rucker v. Severson, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rucker-v-severson-wied-2024.