Ruby C. Jacobo v. Ford Motor Company

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 RUBY C. JACOBO, an individual, Case No.: 25-CV-868 JLS (LR)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING FORD MOTOR v. 13 COMPANY’S MOTION TO DISMISS FORD MOTOR COMPANY, a Delaware PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED 14 Corporation, and DOES 1 through 10, COMPLAINT inclusive, 15 Defendants. (ECF No. 15) 16

17 18 Presently before the Court is Defendant Ford Motor Company’s (“Ford”) Motion 19 to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (“Mot.,” ECF No. 15). 20 Also before the Court are Plaintiff Ruby C. Jacobo’s Opposition thereto (“Opp’n,” ECF 21 No. 17) and Defendant’s Reply in support thereof (“Reply,” ECF No. 18). Upon full 22 consideration of all the papers and evidence submitted, and good cause appearing, Ford’s 23 Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC,” ECF 24 No. 13) is DISMISSED in its entirety WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 26 This litigation stems from a used 2021 Ford Bronco (“Subject Vehicle”) 27 manufactured and distributed by Defendant that Plaintiff alleges is defective. See FAC 28 ¶ 15. Plaintiff purchased the Subject Vehicle on or around July 29, 2023. Id. ¶ 9. When 1 Plaintiff purchased the Subject Vehicle, Plaintiff asserts she received express written 2 warranties affirming that the material or workmanship was defect free or would meet 3 specified levels of performance over a specified level of time. Id. ¶ 11; see ECF No. 15-2, 4 Ex. B (“Warranty”). Plaintiff alleges that the Subject Vehicle manifested defects, and 5 when Plaintiff delivered it to an authorized repair facility, Defendant failed to service or 6 repair in compliance with the express warranty despite a reasonable number of 7 opportunities to do so. FAC ¶¶ 20–23. 8 On April 11, 2025, Defendant filed a Notice of Removal, asserting that Plaintiff’s 9 allegation of a violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (“MMWA” or “Act”), 15 10 U.S.C. § 2301, et seq., is a federal question for which this Court has original jurisdiction 11 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ECF No. 1 (“Notice of Removal”). Defendant then filed a 12 Motion to Dismiss on April 18, 2025, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 13 ECF No. 5. Plaintiff’s deadline for filing an opposition to the Motion to Dismiss was May 14 22, 2025. See ECF No. 11. On May 23, 2025, Defendant filed a Notice of Non-Opposition 15 to its own Motion to Dismiss, requesting that the Court grant said Motion to Dismiss 16 because Plaintiff missed her deadline. ECF No. 6. Later, on May 23, 2025, Plaintiff filed 17 an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 9. In Plaintiff’s Opposition, she 18 voluntarily dismissed the first four claims, leaving only her cause of action under the 19 Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. See ECF No. 9 at 2.1 20 The Court granted Defendant’s first Motion to Dismiss on July 28, 2025. See ECF 21 No. 11. The Court found that Plaintiff had not sufficiently pled that the Warranty was a 22 “full” warranty and, since Plaintiff had voluntarily dismissed all state law claims, there was 23 no plausible way for her to be entitled to relief. Id. at 9. The Court noted that Plaintiff 24 would need to allege that the Warranty was “full,” comports with the requirements of 15 25 U.S.C. § 2304, and that Defendant breached those requirements, to state a claim under the 26 27 28 1 Unless otherwise indicated, the page number citations refer to the electronically generated page numbers 1 Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. Id. On August 19, 2025, Plaintiff filed her First Amended 2 Complaint, realleging and expanding on her claim under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty 3 Act. See generally FAC. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the Subject Vehicle was 4 covered by a “full warranty,” suffered from substantial defects covered by the Warranty, 5 and continued to have substantially impaired use after multiple repair attempts. Id. 6 Plaintiff also contends that Defendant refused to provide a refund for the vehicle pursuant 7 to the standards for full warranties in 15 U.S.C. § 2304. Id. Defendant filed the present 8 Motion on September 3, 2025. See generally Mot. 10 I. Legal Standards 11 A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 12 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a party to raise by motion the 13 defense that the complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” To 14 survive a 12(b)(6) motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as 15 true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 16 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is 17 facially plausible when the facts pled “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference 18 that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. That is not to say that the claim 19 must be probable, but there must be “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has 20 acted unlawfully.” Id. Facts “‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” fall short of 21 a plausible entitlement to relief. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Though this 22 plausibility standard “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . it [does] demand[] 23 more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. (quoting 24 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In other words, a complaint will not suffice “if it tenders 25 ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (alteration in original) 26 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Put differently, “a formulaic recitation of the 27 elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 28 / / / 1 Review under Rule 12(b)(6) requires a context-specific analysis involving the 2 Court’s “judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. In performing 3 that analysis, “a district court must accept as true all facts alleged in the complaint, and 4 draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Wi-LAN Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 5 382 F. Supp. 3d 1012, 1020 (S.D. Cal. 2019). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not 6 permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has 7 alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 8 at 679 (second alternation in original). If a complaint does not survive Rule 12(b)(6), a 9 court grants leave to amend unless it determines that no modified contention “consistent 10 with the challenged pleading could . . . possibly cure the deficiency.” Schreiber Distrib. 11 Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986). 12 B. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act 13 The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act creates a private right of action for any 14 “consumer who is damaged by the failure of a supplier, warrantor, or service contractor to 15 comply with any obligation under [the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act], or under a written 16 warranty, implied warranty, or service contract.” 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1). The MMWA 17 provides this right of action for consumers damaged by a warrantor’s failure to comply, 18 regardless of whether the warranty is full or limited. Milicevic v. Fletcher Jones Imps., 19 Ltd., 402 F.3d 912, 918 (9th Cir. 2005). Consumers may bring federal causes of action for 20 breaches of express or implied warranty claims under state law. In re Sony Grand Wega, 21 758 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1101 (S.D. Cal. 2010). The MMWA does not expand the rights 22 under state warranty claims. Clemens v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 534 F.3d 1017, 1022 & 23 n.3 (9th Cir. 2008); Stearns v. Select Comfort Retail Corp., No. 08-2746 JF, 2009 WL 24 1635931, at *9 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2009). 25 The MMWA distinguishes between the remedies available for full and limited 26 warranties and provides federal standards and an explicit set of remedies for a breach of a 27 full warranty. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2303(a), 2304(a), 2310(d). Should a plaintiff prevail in an 28 action against a warrantor who has breached the terms of a full warranty, the plaintiff is 1 entitled to a judgment equal to the value of the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, 2 reasonable attorneys’ fees, and the choice of a full refund or a replacement without charge. 3 15 U.S.C. §§ 2304(a)(4), 2310(d)(2). 5 I. Request for Judicial Notice 6 “Generally, district courts may not consider material outside the pleadings when 7 assessing the sufficiency of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 8 Procedure.” Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 998 (9th Cir. 2018) 9 (citing Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled on other 10 grounds by Galbraith v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002)). “There are 11 two exceptions to this rule: the incorporation-by-reference doctrine, and judicial notice 12 under Federal Rule of Evidence 201.” Id. Both exceptions “permit district courts to 13 consider materials outside a complaint.” Id. “[T]he court may judicially notice a fact that 14 is not subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court’s 15 territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose 16 accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). 17 Under the incorporation by reference doctrine, a court may “take into account 18 documents ‘whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party 19 questions, but which are not physically attached to the [plaintiff’s] pleading.’” Knievel v. 20 ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005) (alteration in original) (quoting In re Silicon 21 Graphics Inc. Secs. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 986 (9th Cir. 1999)). A defendant may seek to 22 incorporate a document into the complaint in two ways. First, “if the plaintiff refers 23 extensively to the document,” it may be incorporated by reference. United States v. Ritchie, 24 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). Second, a document may be incorporated by reference 25 if “the document forms the basis of the plaintiff’s claim.” Id. A document forms the basis 26 of the plaintiff’s claim when “the claim necessarily depend[s]” on the document. Khoja, 27 899 F.3d at 1002 (quoting Knievel, 393 F.3d at 1076). “The defendant may offer such a 28 document, and the district court may treat such a document as part of the complaint and 1 thus may assume that its contents are true for purposes of a motion to dismiss under Rule 2 12(b)(6).” Ritchie, 342 F.3d at 908. However, “[t]he incorporation-by-reference doctrine 3 does not override the fundamental rule that courts must interpret the allegations and factual 4 disputes in favor of the plaintiff at the pleading stage.” Khoja, 899 F.3d at 1014. 5 A. Sales Contract 6 Defendant filed a Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN,” ECF No. 15-2), which 7 requests the Court to take judicial notice of the Retail Installment Sale Contract. See RJN, 8 Ex. A (“Sales Contract”). The Sales Contract is the relevant purchase agreement for the 9 Subject Vehicle. Id. at 12. Plaintiff raises no objection. See generally Opp’n. The Court 10 may take judicial notice of the Sales Contract because it is “not subject to reasonable 11 dispute.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Furthermore, the document satisfies the incorporation by 12 reference doctrine because Plaintiff relies on it to form the basis for her claim that she 13 possesses valid warranties that Defendant breached. Khoja, 899 F.3d at 1002 (quoting 14 United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907–09 (9th Cir. 2003)). Thus, the Court GRANTS 15 Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice as to the Sales Contract. 16 B. Warranty 17 Defendant also seeks judicial notice of the warranty guide for the Subject Vehicle. 18 See Warranty. Defendant argues incorporation is appropriate here because the Warranty 19 is the basis of Plaintiff’s claim. Mot. at 11–12. Plaintiff does not directly dispute the 20 incorporation by reference of the Warranty but argues that no matters outside of the 21 pleadings can be considered without converting the Motion into a motion for summary 22 judgment. Opp’n at 3. 23 The Court finds that the Warranty can be considered under either standard. Plaintiff 24 refers to the Warranty twenty-one times in her thirty-two-paragraph complaint. See 25 generally FAC. More importantly, the Warranty forms the basis of Plaintiff’s claim. The 26 contract she alleges Defendant has breached is the Warranty. Id. Thus, the Warranty is 27 correctly incorporated by reference and Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice as to the 28 Warranty is GRANTED. 1 II. Whether the Warranty is “Full” or “Limited” 2 As the Court noted in the first Order granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, 3 Plaintiff needs to show that the Warranty was “full” to have a claim under the MMWA. 4 ECF No. 11 at 9. Plaintiff contends that she has sufficiently alleged that the Warranty 5 should be treated as a “full” warranty. Opp’n at 2. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that her 6 allegations regarding the Warranty are matters of interpretation, and as such, Plaintiff’s 7 version must be accepted as true. Id.; FAC ¶¶ 14(a-e); see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Further, 8 Plaintiff argues that the “mere use” of the “limited” label is insufficient to characterize the 9 Warranty as limited, and instead the Court should compare the Warranty to the minimum 10 standards set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 2304. Opp’n at 3–4. Plaintiff concludes that the 11 Warranty meets or exceeds the minimum standards and that her view of the Warranty must 12 be accepted. Id. at 2–4. Defendant argues that the allegations are questions of fact rather 13 than matters of interpretation and that the Court can resolve these disputes in fact by 14 comparing the incorporated by reference Warranty to the statutory requirements in § 2304. 15 Mot. at 5. The Court agrees with Defendant. 16 The Federal Trade Commission has spoken on how to interpret warranties as “full” 17 or “limited:” 18 If each of the following five statements is true about your warranty's terms and conditions, it is a full warranty: 19 1. You do not limit the duration of implied warranties. 20 2. You provide warranty service to anyone who owns the product during the warranty period. 21 3. You provide warranty service free of charge. 22 4. You provide, at the consumer's choice, either a replacement or a full refund if, after a reasonable number of tries, you are 23 unable to repair the product. 24 5. You do not require consumers to perform any duty as a precondition for receiving service, except notifying you that 25 service is needed, unless you can demonstrate that the duty is 26 reasonable. If any of these statements is not true, then your warranty is limited. 27 28 / / / 1 Fed. Trade Comm’n, Businessperson’s Guide to Federal Warranty Law 2 (2018), https://www.ftc.gov/business-guidance/resources/businesspersons-guide-federal- 3 warranty-law; see also 15 U.S.C. § 2304. The purpose of the title “full” or “limited” is to 4 provide customers with a quick understanding of what key terms may or may not be 5 included in the warranty. Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra. Here, the Warranty is titled “The 6 New Vehicle Limited Warranty for your 2021-model vehicle,” creating an initial 7 assumption to the customer that the Warranty is limited. See Warranty at 20; see also Fed. 8 Trade Comm’n, supra. (“The title is intended to provide consumers, at a glance, with a key 9 to some of the important terms and conditions of a warranty. The title ‘full warranty’ is a 10 shorthand message to consumers that the coverage meets the Act’s standards for 11 comprehensive warranty coverage. Similarly, the title ‘limited warranty’ alerts consumers 12 that the coverage does not meet at least one of the Act’s standards, and that the coverage 13 is less than ‘full’ under the Act.”). 14 In theory, it may be possible for a warranty to be “full,” but incorrectly designated 15 as “limited.” However, a single defect in a warranty designated as “limited” from the 16 minimum standards set forth by the MMWA would defeat this claim. See Fed. Trade 17 Comm’n, supra. In other words, all the minimum standards established in the MMWA 18 must be present in the warranty for it to be designated as “full,” regardless of the warranty’s 19 title. 20 The Court considers each of Plaintiff’s arguments that the Warranty here is “full,” 21 and finds that it is not. See FAC ¶¶ 14(a–e). First, Plaintiff claims the Warranty “did not 22 disclaim, modify, or limit the duration of any implied warranty . . . including implied 23 warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose.” Id. ¶ 14(a). This 24 allegation, if true, would have the Warranty meet or exceed the Act’s minimums. See 15 25 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(2). However, contrary to Plaintiff’s allegations, the Warranty expressly 26 limits implied warranties: “These implied warranties are limited, to the extent allowed by 27 law, to the time period covered by the written warranties, or to the applicable time period 28 provided by state law, whichever period is shorter.” Warranty at 21. In addition, the 1 Warranty disclaims all implied warranties when the vehicle is used for business or 2 commercial purposes and disclaims the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose 3 for racing. Id. Therefore, the Warranty does not meet the minimum standards of the Act. 4 Second, Plaintiff claims the Warranty did not impose any “unreasonable” duties on 5 her as a condition of obtaining remedies for defects, malfunctions, or failures. FAC ¶ 14(c). 6 This allegation, if true, would have the Warranty meet or exceed the Act’s minimums. See 7 15 U.S.C. § 2304(b)(1). The Warranty imposes some duties, namely requiring the owner 8 to contact the BBB AUTO LINE and proper ownership and maintenance of the vehicle. 9 Warranty at 20, 22. As these duties could be plausibly interpretated as reasonable, 10 Plaintiff’s allegation in this regard meets the Act’s minimums. 11 Third, Plaintiff claims the Warranty permitted owners to choose either a refund or 12 replacement without charge as a remedy. FAC ¶ 14(d). This allegation, if true, would have 13 the Warranty meet or exceed the Act’s minimums. See 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(4). However, 14 the Court finds that this allegation is not supported. The Warranty provides only for 15 “repair, replacement, or adjustment of defective parts” as a remedy, and does not provide 16 at all for a refund. Warranty at 24. Since the Warranty explicitly limits refunds, it does 17 not meet the minimum standards provided by the Act. 18 Fourth, Plaintiff claims that there was no limitation on consequential damages that 19 did not conspicuously appear on the face of the Warranty. FAC ¶ 14(e). To comply with 20 the statutory minimums, full warranties must either not limit consequential damages or 21 have the limitations “conspicuously appears on the face of the warranty.” See 15 U.S.C. 22 § 2304(a)(3). For a limitation to be considered as “conspicuously appearing on the face of 23 the warranty,” the limitation must be placed in “close proximity to the location where the 24 text of the warranty terms begins.” 16 C.F.R. § 701.1(j)(3). The Warranty does limit 25 consequential damages by disclaiming that “Ford and your dealer are not responsible for 26 any time or income that you lose, any inconvenience you might be caused . . . , or for any 27 other incidental or consequential damages you may have.” Warranty at 21. Since these 28 limitations appear within the first few pages, it is plausible that this would be considered 1 as “close proximity” to where the text begins. See id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(3). 2 Therefore, this portion of the Warranty likely does meet the Act’s minimums for a full 3 warranty. 4 For Plaintiff to overcome the Warranty’s explicit designation as “limited,” all the 5 minimums of § 2304 would have to have been met. Since two of the minimums of § 2304 6 are not met by the Warranty—that the implied warranties are limited and there is no option 7 of a refund if repair fails—the Warranty is correctly understood as limited. See Fed. Trade 8 Comm’n, supra; see also 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a). The MMWA provides for remedies when 9 there is a violation of a full warranty or when there is a corresponding state law cause of 10 action. See Reynolds v. Mclaren Automotive, Inc., No. 23-CV-01928-W-MMP, 2024 WL 11 2000644, at *9 (S.D. Cal. May 6, 2024). Here, Plaintiff has no accompanying state claims, 12 and the Warranty is not a full warranty. See generally FAC. Accordingly, there is no way 13 for the Court to reasonably infer that the Defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged, 14 and the FAC should be dismissed. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 15 544 at 570). 16 III. Leave to Amend 17 Defendant argues that Plaintiff should not be granted leave to amend because 18 alleging different facts could not demonstrate the existence of a full warranty. Reply at 7– 19 8. Leave to amend should be freely given “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20 15(a)(2). Although this rule should be interpreted liberally, leave should not be granted 21 automatically. Jackson v. Bank of Haw., 902 F.2d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1990). In 22 determining whether to grant leave to amend, trial courts consider various factors, 23 including bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing party, futility of amendment, 24 and whether the party has previously amended. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). 25 Applying the Foman factors, the Court declines to grant Plaintiff leave to amend. Here, 26 Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate grounds for a successful claim. The MMWA provides 27 for claims borrowed from state law and from violations of the minimum requirements from 28 full warranties under 15 U.S.C. § 2304. See Daniel v. Ford Motor Co., 806 F.3d 1217, 1 || 1227 (9th Cir. 2015). Plaintiff has no accompanying state claims, and the Warranty 1s not 2 full warranty. See generally FAC. As a result, Plaintiff has no valid causes of action 3 |}under the MMWA. Therefore, the Court finds that “it is clear that granting leave to amend 4 || would [be] futile.” Thinket Ink Info. Res., Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 368 F.3d 1053, 5 (9th Cir. 2004). 7 In light of the foregoing, the court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF 8 ||No. 15). Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 13) is DISMISSED WITHOUT 9 || LEAVE TO AMEND. As this concludes the litigation in this matter, the Clerk SHALL 10 || CLOSE the file. 1] IT IS SO ORDERED. !2 Dated: June 16, 2026 kt

14 United States District Judge 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28