Rubke v. ServiceNow, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedOctober 21, 2024
Docket3:24-cv-01050
StatusUnknown

This text of Rubke v. ServiceNow, Inc. (Rubke v. ServiceNow, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rubke v. ServiceNow, Inc., (N.D. Cal. 2024).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION 7 8 PAUL S. RUBKE, et al., Case No. 24-cv-01050-TLT (PHK) 9 Plaintiffs, ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' 10 v. MOTION TO STAY DISCOVERY, GRANTING-IN-PART PLAINTIFFS' 11 SERVICENOW, INC., et al., MOTION TO COMPEL, AND ISSUING A PROTECTIVE ORDER 12 Defendants. Re: Dkt. 60 13 14 Now before the Court is a discovery dispute between class action Plaintiffs and Defendants, 15 ServiceNow, Inc., and the Board of Directors of ServiceNow, Inc. (collectively “Defendants”). 16 [Dkt. 60]. Defendants seek to stay discovery and Plaintiffs seek to compel Defendants to produce 17 limited discovery. After carefully considering all the briefing, the undersigned finds this matter 18 suitable for resolution without oral argument pursuant to Civil L.R. 7-1(b). As discussed herein, the 19 undersigned DENIES Defendants’ request to stay discovery, GRANTS-IN-PART Plaintiffs’ 20 request to compel Defendants to produce limited discovery, and ISSUES a Protective Order (filed 21 concurrently herewith). 22 BACKGROUND 23 On February 21, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a class action complaint against Defendants for claims 24 under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2). [Dkt. 1]. On June 25 21, 2024, the Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. [Dkt. 28]. On August 12, 2024, Defendants 26 filed an administrative motion to stay discovery pending the resolution of the motion to dismiss. 27 [Dkt. 39]. The presiding District Judge granted the administrative motion to stay discovery. [Dkt. 1 On September 18, 2024, the presiding District Judge issued an Order granting the motion to 2 dismiss with leave for Plaintiffs to amend the complaint. [Dkt. 41]. On September 26, 2024, 3 Plaintiffs moved the Court to lift the stay on discovery, which the presiding District Judge granted. 4 See Dkt. 42 (administrative motion to lift the stay on discovery); Dkt. 51 (Order lifting the stay on 5 discovery). In the Order lifting the stay on discovery, that Order clarified that: “[t]he stay [on 6 discovery] was [] lifted on September 18, 2024, when the Court granted the Motion to Dismiss[.]” 7 [Dkt. 51]. 8 On September 30, 2024, the instant dispute was referred to the undersigned for all discovery 9 purposes. [Dkt. 50]. On October 9, 2024, the Defendants moved the Court to reconsider its Order 10 lifting the stay, or, in the alternative, certify the Order for an interlocutory appeal. [Dkt. 56]. The 11 presiding District Judge denied that reconsideration motion. [Dkt. 59]. On October 16, 2024, the 12 Parties submitted the instant dispute in a joint discovery letter brief to the undersigned, detailing 13 certain disagreements on the scope of permissible discovery. [Dkt. 60]. 14 LEGAL STANDARD 15 At this stage of this case, the scope of permissible discovery is defined by the Court’s Order 16 lifting the stay on discovery. [Dkt. 51]. As stated in that Order, “[t]he stay was therefore lifted on 17 September 18, 2024, when the Court granted the Motion to Dismiss without prejudice. ECF 41. 18 Yet the scope of permissible discovery upon the stay being lifted was only intended for Plaintiffs to 19 cure pleading defects as to process failure allegations. . . . The discovery stay is therefore lifted for 20 the limited purposes of allowing Plaintiffs to gather facts they believe will cure the pleading defects 21 that the Court pointed out in its Order granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. See ECF 41. 22 Therefore, the discovery is limited to process failure allegations . . . . The discovery is therefore 23 limited to production that relates to the fiduciaries’ conduct or methods employed in 24 determining how to invest the plan’s assets.” Id. at 1–2 (emphasis in original). 25 The Order lifting the stay further specified that “Regarding the scope of discovery, the Court 26 DENIES-IN-PART without prejudice Plaintiffs’ Motion regarding the documents that 27 Defendants must produce. The parties are ORDERED to meet and confer regarding which 1 future discovery disputes shall be addressed by the Magistrate Judge.” Id. at 2-3 (emphasis in 2 original). 3 The presiding District Judge also issued a Text Order on October 2, 2024 which further 4 clarified the scope of discovery at this stage of the proceedings. [Dkt. 52]. That Text Order of 5 October 2 states “For clarity, the Court finds that discovery is therefore limited to production that 6 relates to the fiduciaries conduct or methods employed in determining how to invest the plans 7 assets.” Id. 8 The Court has broad discretion and authority to manage discovery. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. 9 Co. v. Lee Inv. LLC, 641 F.3d 1126, 1136 n.10 (9th Cir. 2011) (“District courts have wide latitude 10 in controlling discovery, and their rulings will not be overturned in the absence of a clear abuse of 11 discretion.”); Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of Int., 342 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003). As part of its inherent 12 discretion and authority, the Court has broad discretion in determining relevancy for discovery 13 purposes. Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 635 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Hallett 14 v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002)). The Court’s discretion extends to crafting discovery 15 orders that may expand, limit, or differ from the relief requested. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 16 U.S. 574, 598 (1998) (holding trial courts have “broad discretion to tailor discovery narrowly and 17 to dictate the sequence of discovery”). For example, the Court may limit the scope of any discovery 18 method if it determines that “the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can 19 be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive.” 20 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i). Additionally, the Court can institute protective orders and certain 21 discovery completion deadlines. Jones v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., No. 22CV05954AMOPHK, 2023 22 WL 6215295 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2023) (issuing a protective order); Valentine v. Crocs, Inc., No. 23 22CV07463TLTPHK, 2023 WL 7461852 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2023) (creating certain discovery 24 deadlines to speed up discovery). 25 In general, and subject to the specific limitations on discovery set forth for this stage of the 26 case, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) provides that “[p]arties may obtain discovery 27 regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional 1 for purposes of discovery, is broadly defined to encompass “any matter that bears on, or that 2 reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” In 3 re Williams-Sonoma, Inc., 947 F.3d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. 4 Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 350–51 (1978)); see also In re Facebook, Inc. Consumer Privacy User 5 Profile Litig., No. 18-MD-2843 VC (JSC), 2021 WL 10282215, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept.

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Bluebook (online)
Rubke v. ServiceNow, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rubke-v-servicenow-inc-cand-2024.