Rubi Gutierrez v. General Motors LLC, et al.

Opinion

1 JS-6 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RUBI GUTIERREZ, Case No. 2:25-cv-07632-FLA (PDx)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 13 v. MOTION TO REMAND AND REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES 14 AND COSTS [DKT. 20] GENERAL MOTORS LLC, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 RULING 2 Before the court is Plaintiff Rubi Gutierrez’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion to Remand 3 (“Motion”) this action to the Los Angeles County Superior Court. Dkt. 20 (“Mot.”). 4 Plaintiff also requests attorney’s fees and costs of $2,812.50, incurred because of 5 Defendant General Motors LLC’s (“Defendant”) allegedly untimely removal. Id. at 6 11–12, 18.1 On October 29, 2025, the court found this matter appropriate for 7 resolution without oral argument and vacated the October 31, 2025 hearing on the 8 Motion. Dkt. 29; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); Local Rule 7-15. 9 For the reasons set forth herein, the court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion and 10 REMANDS this action to the Los Angeles County Superior Court. The court also 11 GRANTS Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees and costs. 12 BACKGROUND 13 Plaintiff filed her Complaint in this action on March 28, 2025, in the Los 14 Angeles County Superior Court, Case No. 25STCV09149, alleging violations of the 15 Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.2) and the Magnuson- 16 Moss Warranty Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 2301–2312), as well as breach of the implied 17 warranty of merchantability (Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1791.1, 1794), relating to her purchase 18 of a 2024 Chevrolet Silverado (the “Vehicle”) from Defendant. Dkt. 1-1 (“Compl.”)2 19 ¶¶ 6–44. Plaintiff served the Complaint on Defendant on April 2, 2025. Dkt. 20-1 ¶ 20 5, at 6–7. 21 Defendant answered Plaintiff’s Complaint on May 16, 2025. Dkt. 1-2 at 2–9; 22 Dkt. 1 at 2. Defendant removed the action to this court on August 15, 2025, over four 23 months after service was effectuated, alleging it had “conducted a preliminary 24 investigation and determined that Plaintiff’s citizenship and the reasonable, non- 25

26 1 The court cites documents by the page numbers added by the court’s CM/ECF 27 System, rather than any page numbers included natively. 28 2 Citations to the Complaint refer to pages 3 through 10 of Dkt. 1-1. 1 speculative estimation of the amount in controversy placed at issue through Plaintiff’s 2 allegations plausibly give rise to subject matter jurisdiction.” Dkt. 1 at 2. 3 Plaintiff filed the subject Motion on September 10, 2025, arguing, inter alia, 4 that Defendant failed to comply with 28 U.S.C. § 1446(1)(b)(3)’s (“Section 1446”) 5 thirty-day window to remove an action to federal court, and that the Complaint was 6 sufficient for Defendant to allege satisfaction of the amount in controversy upon 7 removal. Mot. at 10–15. Plaintiff also seeks attorney’s fees and costs associated with 8 its Motion. Id. at 17–18. Defendant filed an opposition (“Opposition”) on October 9 10, 2025. Dkt. 22 (“Opp’n”). 10 DISCUSSION 11 I. Legal Standard 12 Federal courts are courts of “limited jurisdiction,” possessing only “power 13 authorized by the Constitution and statute[.]” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of 14 Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Federal courts are 15 presumed to lack jurisdiction unless the contrary appears affirmatively from the 16 record. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 n. 3 (2006). “Article III 17 generally requires a federal court to satisfy itself of its jurisdiction over the subject 18 matter before it considers the merits of a case.” Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 19 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). 20 Most commonly, federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction where: (1) an 21 action arises under federal law (federal question jurisdiction), 28 U.S.C. § 1331; or 22 (2) the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and the 23 citizenship of each plaintiff is diverse from that of each defendant (diversity 24 jurisdiction), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Except as otherwise provided by an act of 25 Congress expressly, “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district 26 courts of the United States have original jurisdiction[] may be removed by the 27 defendant or the defendants” to the district court for the district and division where the 28 action is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 1441. 1 However, pursuant to Section 1446(b)(1), a notice of removal must be filed 2 within thirty days after a defendant receives the initial pleading or summons. Section 3 1446 is strictly construed against removal. If removability is not apparent from the 4 initial pleading, the thirty-day removal period accrues “thirty days after receipt by the 5 defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, 6 order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which 7 is or has become removable.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). “If a notice of removal is filed 8 after this thirty-day window, it is untimely and remand to state court is therefore 9 appropriate.” Babasa v. LensCrafters, Inc., 498 F.3d 972, 974 (9th Cir. 2007). 10 A defendant’s notice of removal must include “a plausible allegation that the 11 amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.” Dart Cherokee Basin 12 Operating Co. v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 89 (2014). “[W]hen the plaintiff contests, or 13 the court questions, the defendant’s allegation,” “both sides [must] submit proof,” at 14 which point “the court decides, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether the 15 amount-in-controversy requirement has been satisfied.” Id. at 88–89. Courts “strictly 16 construe the removal statute against removal jurisdiction,” and “[f]ederal jurisdiction 17 must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” 18 Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). “The ‘strong presumption’ 19 against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden of 20 establishing that removal is proper.” Id. 21 II. Analysis 22 Plaintiff argues remand is appropriate because Defendant failed to remove the 23 action timely. Mot. at 10–15. The court agrees. Plaintiff filed the action in state 24 court on March 28, 2025, and served the Complaint on Defendant on April 2, 2025. 25 Defendant did not file its Notice of Removal until more than four months later—on 26 August 15, 2025—well outside Section 1446’s thirty-day window for removal. 27 Compare Dkts. 1, 20-1 ¶ 5, with Dkts. 1-1, 1-2. Defendant argues removal was timely 28 1 because the Complaint did not establish the $50,000 amount in controversy3 2 unequivocally and clearly. Opp’n at 19–23. 3 Although the Complaint does not contain a clearly stated amount in 4 controversy, see generally, Compl., Defendant offers no explanation for the 135-day 5 delay (from April 2, 2025—when the Complaint was served on Defendant, Dkt. 20-1 6 ¶ 5—to August 15, 2025—when the action was removed, Dkt. 1) to determine the 7 value of the vehicle (for which a VIN is included in the Complaint, Compl. ¶ 6) or any 8 potential penalties or attorney’s fees and costs Defendant seeks to include in 9 calculating the amount in controversy, see generally, Dkt. 1, Opp’n.4 Plaintiff makes 10 precisely this argument in her Motion, and Defendant’s Opposition is noticeably silent 11 on any explanation for the delay in determining federal jurisdiction. Mot. at 12–13; 12 see generally, Opp’n. 13 Defendant also argues Plaintiff’s citizenship could not be determined from the 14 Complaint, thereby extending the period of removability. Opp’n at 20. The 15 Complaint, however, states Plaintiff “is, and at all times relevant herein was, a 16 resident of Anaheim, California.” Compl. ¶ 2. Defendant’s reliance on Plaintiff’s use 17 of “resident,” rather than “citizen,” to claim indeterminate citizenship is unavailing. 18 Opp’n at 20. Defendant’s Notice of Removal further states Defendant’s “preliminary 19 investigation also concluded that Plaintiff resided in California when she purchased 20 the subject vehicle, and on other occasions, establishing a plausible basis for intent to 21 22 3 See 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(3)(B), creating a private cause of action for consumers under the Magnusson-Moss Act, but permitting claims to be filed in federal courts 23 only if the amount in controversy is at least “$50,000 (exclusive of interests and costs) 24 computed on the basis of all claims to be determined in this suit[.]”). 25 4 Defendant argues the January 1, 2025 Song-Beverly Act amendments “expanded the formula for actual damages” to include “negative equity …, manufacturer’s rebate[s] 26 …,any third party sold optional equipment …, and unpaid financing.” Opp’n at 21. 27 Defendant, however, fails to identify how this new formula prevented its determination of removability within thirty days of service of the Complaint. See 28 generally, Opp’n. 1 remain in California thus providing a plausible basis for citizenship.” Dkt. 1 at 3. 2 Defendant does not explain the nature of its “investigation” or why it could not have 3 determined any earlier that Plaintiff was a citizen of California given that “Plaintiff 4 resided in California when she purchased the subject vehicle[.]” Id. 5 The evidence before the court creates clear “doubt as to the right of removal in 6 the first instance.” Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566. Defendant had sufficient information to 7 determine removability when Plaintiff served the Complaint on Defendant on April 2, 8 2025. Dkt. 20-1 ¶ 5, at 6–7. Defendant missed the May 2, 2025 removal deadline by 9 105 days. Accordingly, the court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion and REMANDS the 10 action to the Los Angeles County Superior Court. 11 III. Attorney’s Fees 12 When remanding a case, a court may, in its discretion, “require payment of just 13 costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the 14 removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); see also Jordan v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, 781 F.3d 15 1178, 1184 (9th Cir. 2015). Typically, a court may only award fees and costs when 16 “the removing party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal.” 17 Jordan, 781 F.3d at 1184 (quoting Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 18 141 (2005)). Courts in the Ninth Circuit apply “an objectively reasonable standard by 19 looking to the clarity of the law at the time of removal.” Lussier v. Dollar Tree 20 Stores, Inc., 518 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Martin, 546 U.S. at 141). 21 Attorney’s fees are warranted here. Defendant removed the action well outside 22 the removal window, the Complaint contained sufficient information for Defendant to 23 determine the removability of this action, including the car’s VIN, and Defendant fails 24 to provide any explanation for the delay in removing the action. Defendant’s 25 Opposition is silent as to Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees. See generally, Opp’n. 26 The court finds Defendant had no “objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal.” 27 Jordan, 781 F.3d at 1184. 28 Plaintiff’s Motion includes a declaration from her attorney, Michelle Yang | | (‘Yang’), attesting to her hourly rate and hours preparing and drafting the Motion. 2 | Dkt. 20-1 §§ 11-12. Yang spent 6.25 hours on the Motion, and requests a billing rate 3 | of $450 an hour. Jd. Yang, however, also billed 1.5 hours as “[a]nticipated time to 4 || review, prepare for, and attend the hearing regarding Plaintiff's Motion.” /d. 11. 5 | The court did not hold a hearing on this matter and will not award attorney’s fees for a 6 | hearing that did not take place. Dkt. 29. Accordingly, the court GRANTS Plaintiff's 7 | request for attorney’s fees and costs and AWARDS Plaintiff $2,137.50 (4.75 hours x 8 | $450) against Defendant and its counsel, jointly and severally. 9 CONCLUSION 10 The court, having considered Plaintiff's Motion and finding good cause 11 | therefor, hereby GRANTS the Motion and ORDERS as follows: 12 1. The action is REMANDED to the Los Angeles County Superior Court, 13 Case No. 25STCV09149. 14 2. All dates and deadlines in the action are VACATED. 15 3. The clerk of the court shall close the action administratively. 16 4. Plaintiff's request for attorney’s fees and costs is GRANTED and the 17 court AWARDS Plaintiff $2,137.50 in attorney’s fees and costs against 18 Defendant and its counsel, jointly and severally. Payment is due within 19 fifteen (15) days of this Order. 20 21 IT IS SO ORDERED. 22 23 | Dated: February 12, 2026 A FERNANDO L. AENLLE-ROCHA United States District Judge 25 26 27 28