Ruben v. City of Pittsburgh

142 F. Supp. 787, 1956 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3205
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedJune 29, 1956
DocketCiv. A. No. 13714
StatusPublished

This text of 142 F. Supp. 787 (Ruben v. City of Pittsburgh) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ruben v. City of Pittsburgh, 142 F. Supp. 787, 1956 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3205 (W.D. Pa. 1956).

Opinion

GOURLEY, Chief Judge.

This is another phase of the convulsion and reverberation of the Pittsburgh renaissance, commonly described as the “Pittsburgh Story.” The circumstances which give rise to this chapter in Pittsburgh's redevelopment might be appropriately called — “Squiri'el Hill”, “a Mountain or Luxury Apartment.”

The matter comes before the court on plaintiffs’ twofold request for injunctive relief:

1. To enjoin a rezoning ordinance of the City of Pittsburgh permitting apartment house construction on a tract of 214 acres in the vicinity of Whiteman Street and Munhall Road. Ordinance 325, City Council File No. 288, File No. 1740, Series 1955.

2. To specifically enjoin the rezoning of a tract of land within the rezoned area having a frontage of 80 feet and a depth of 233 feet, owned by Public Relations Research Service, Inc., upon which it proposes to erect a luxury type eight story apartment house.

Petitioners’ property owners allege a deprivation of property without due process of law. 14th Amendment, United States Constitution.

At first impression, I had felt that since the issue posed related to the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance, the matter would require adjudication by a statutory court. Nevertheless, since the suit is not one to restrain the enforcement, operation or execution of a statute of a state within the meaning of the judicial code, it is not within the purview of such court. Ex parte Collins, 277 U.S. 565, 48 S.Ct. 585, 72 L.Ed. 990; 28 U.S.C.A. § 2284.

The general zoning ordinance of 1923, which limited the possible use of defendants’ property for 2*/2 story apartment houses, was in accord with the uses and development of the district at the time of the enactment of said ordinance. Book Vol. 34, page 556, Ordinances, City of Pittsburgh.

The ordinance to which objection is now directed amended the general ordinance of 1923. It is recognized that a previously adopted zoning plan can be changed by either amendment of the adopting ordinance or by application for a variance. No dispute exists that the pronounced change in the provisions of the general ordinance as presently enacted required amendment.

Governmental power to interfere by zoning regulations with the general rights of the land owner by restricting the character of his use is not unlimited, and other questions aside, such restriction cannot be imposed if it does not bear a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 48 S.Ct. 447, 72 L.Ed. 842.

Zoning ordinance which bears no reasonable relation to public safety, health or morals, or the general welfare constitutes taking property without due process of law either under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. American University v. Prentiss, D.C.D.C., 113 F.Supp. 389, affirmed 94 U.S.App.D.C. 204, 214 F.2d 282.

The ordinance now under review must find its justification in some aspect of the police power, asserted for the public welfare.

The line which in this field separates the legitimate from the illegitimate assumption of power is not capable of precise delineation. It varies with [789]*789circumstances and conditions. Thus the question whether the power exists to forbid the erection of a building of a particular kind or for a particular use is to be determined by considering the building or the thing, not abstractly but in connection with the circumstances and the locality. If the validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control. Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303.

Besides a most complete and exhaustive hearing held in connection with this proceeding, the court, of its own volition, personally viewed the area encompassed by the amending ordinance as well as the surrounding environs.

Upon a most thorough evaluation of the evidence, I am compelled to recognize that the comprehensive zoning ordinance as originally passed in 1923 had reference to a neighborhood which was almost entirely residential in nature, with a small number of apartment houses and substantial tract of vacant land.

Deviation from the restrictive provisions of the general ordinance occurred in 1926 when the five story Beacon Apartment was built. A wave of apartment construction took place throughout 1926, culminating in 1929 with construction of the Wendover Apartments.

The influx of population and the close proximity in construction of numerous •dwellings and apartment houses have resulted in the virtual extinction of available land, so that no room presently exists for the construction of any apartments within the three floor level unless dwellings are purchased, torn down and replaced with new apartments. Since 1923 a gradual and unrelenting process of replacing private residences with apartments transformed this broad ex- • panse of private residences into an apartment area. In spite of zoning restrictions limiting building to 2% and 3 stories, the inexorable forces of necessity and reality have resulted in a number of four and five story apartments, climaxed by the construction of the Wendover, a large luxury type apartment. I can only conclude that the overpowering and relentless surge of population growth rendered municipal authorities impotent to cope with the new apartment area even though municipal authorities were armed with the restrictive ordinance of 1923.

In this Squirrel Hill community which is now literally bursting at the seams, a drastic change has taken place in the neighborhood character since the enactment of the 1923 ordinance. The transition from the residential to the luxury apartment type construction is evidenced by the actuality of numerous apartment structures and small commercial establishments which have crept into the neighborhood in violation of existing law. The only possible means to absorb the teaming population who require accommodation in this area is to sanction an eight story luxury apartment.

The complainants in this proceeding place principal reliance on the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Wilcox v. City of Pittsburgh, 121 F.2d 835. In that decision, this Circuit enunciated the rule of law that where a municipality amends a zoning ordinance in which one block or one part of a larger area is changed to permit constructions to be made, which are different than the constructions permitted at the time of the adoption or enactment of the original zoning ordinance, even if the change is, in fact, for the benefit of the individuals who reside or desire to reside in such part of the municipality, the change in the ordinance cannot be sustained unless at the time of the enactment of the amended zoning ordinance there has been a change of neighborhood character as evaluated and compared with the neighborhood character at the time of the adoption of the original zoning ordinance.

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Related

Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.
272 U.S. 365 (Supreme Court, 1926)
Nectow v. City of Cambridge
277 U.S. 183 (Supreme Court, 1928)
Ex Parte Collins
277 U.S. 565 (Supreme Court, 1928)
American University v. Prentiss
113 F. Supp. 389 (District of Columbia, 1953)
Wilcox v. City of Pittsburgh
121 F.2d 835 (Third Circuit, 1941)

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Bluebook (online)
142 F. Supp. 787, 1956 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3205, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ruben-v-city-of-pittsburgh-pawd-1956.