Ruben Manuel Iniguez Zandia v. Ridencio M. Guzman

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: January 9, 2025
• Docket: 2:24-cv-05423
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 RUBEN MANUEL INIGUEZ ) Case No. 2:24-cv-05423-VBF-JC ZANDIA, ) 10 ) Petitioner, ) ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY 11 ) THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF v. ) HABEAS CORPUS AND THIS 12 ) ACTION SHOULD NOT BE FIDENCIO N. GUZMAN, Acting ) DISMISSED 13 Warden, ) ) 14 Respondent. 15 I. SUMMARY 16 On June 18, 2024, Petitioner Ruben Manuel Iniguez Zandia, a state prisoner 17 proceeding pro se, constructively filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a 18 Person in State Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“Petition”) that was formally 19 filed on June 24, 2024.1 (Docket No. 1; Petition at 1, 8).2 Although not a model of 20 clarity, the Petition appears to challenge Petitioner’s 2005 conviction in Los 21 Angeles County Superior Court, Case No. LA042497 (“2005 State Case”) on the 22 23 1See Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 770 n.1 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 897 24 (2011) (“When a prisoner gives prison authorities a habeas petition or other pleading to mail to court [pursuant to the mailbox rule], the court deems the petition constructively ‘filed’ on the date 25 it is signed.”). Here, as Petitioner appears to have signed the Petition on June 18, 2024, and as that 26 is the earliest date on which he could have provided it to prison authorities for mailing, the Court deems the Petition to have been constructively filed on such date. 27 2Citations to the Petition refer to the page numbers assigned by the Court’s official Case 28 Management/Electronic Case Filing (CM/ECF) system. 1 following grounds: (1) “This was a case of mistrial from the start, illegal, and very 2 criminal. My attorney didn’t argue, I did.”; and (2) “I was rushed out of the L.A. 3 County jail before I received an answer from the appeal I petitioned.” (Petition at 4 1-2, 5).3 As explained below, it appears that the Petition is time-barred and wholly 5 unexhausted and that Petitioner has otherwise failed to demonstrate his entitlement 6 to relief. Accordingly, Petitioner is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE by not later 7 than January 29, 2025, why the Petition and this action should not be dismissed on 8 the foregoing basis. 9 II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY4 10 On August 26, 2005, in the 2005 State Case, a jury convicted Petitioner of 11 one count of second degree murder and one count of attempted willful, deliberate 12 and premeditated murder and found true allegations that Petitioner personally and 13 intentionally discharged a firearm causing death and that the crimes were 14 committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang.5 See People v. Iniguez, 2007 15 WL 1532763, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. May 29, 2007); People v. Iniguez, 2024 WL 16 1083084, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2024). After strike and prior serious felony 17 allegations were proven true beyond a reasonable doubt, the trial court sentenced 18 19 20 3In light of its substance, the Court has construed the Petition to challenge Petitioner’s 21 conviction in the 2005 State Case, but notes that the Petition includes correspondence between Petitioner and his counsel in connection with resentencing petitions in the 2005 State Case and in 22 an apparently separate and unrelated state case – Los Angeles County Superior Court Case No. LA061115-01 (“2006 State Case”). (Petition at 9-13 (2005 State Case correspondence); Petition at 23 14-24 (2006 State Case correspondence)). 24 4Unless otherwise indicated, the procedural history set forth is derived from public 25 California state court records (available via https://www.lacourt.org/ and https://appellatecases. courtinfo.ca.gov/) of which this Court takes judicial notice. See Fed. R. Evid. 201; Mir v. Little 26 Co. of Mary Hosp., 844 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1988) (court may take judicial notice of court records). 27 28 5The Petition asserts that Petitioner was instead convicted of involuntary manslaughter and battery. (Petition at 2). 1 || Iniguez to a term of 80 years to life for the murder plus a consecutive term of 70 2 || years to life for the attempted murder. People v. Iniguez, 2007 WL 1532763, at *1. 3 Petitioner thereafter appealed to the California Court of Appeal, Second 4 || Appellate District “Court of Appeal”) in Case No. B186450, claiming 5 || insufficiency of the evidence and instructional, evidentiary and sentencing error. 6 People v. Iniguez, 2007 WL 1532763, at *1. On May 29, 2007, the Court of 7 || Appeal affirmed the judgment. Id. g On July 2, 2007, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the California 9 Supreme Court in Case No. $153981.° On August 15, 2007, the California 10 Supreme Court denied review. The record does not reflect and Petitioner does not

4 assert that he sought further review in the United States Supreme Court.

On or about September 22, 2022, Petitioner filed a Petition for Resentencing pursuant to California Penal Code 1172.6 (former section 1172.75) in the 2005 State Case. See People v. Iniguez, 2024 WL 1083084, at *1. On June 1, 2023, the 4 Superior Court denied such petition, ruling Petitioner was ineligible for relief as a matter of law because the jury had not been instructed on felony murder or the 16 natural and probable consequences doctrine. See People v. Iniguez, 2024 WL M7 1083084, at *1. Petitioner thereafter appealed, and on March 5, 2024, in Case No. 18 B331645, the Court of Appeal affirmed. Id. On April 5, 2024, Petitioner filed a 19 Petition for Review with the California Supreme Court in Case No. $284199, and 20 || on May 15, 2024, such court denied review. (Petition at 11). DISCUSSION 22 Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States 23 || District Courts allows a district court to dismiss a petition if it “plainly appears from 24 || the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in 25 || the district court... .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. Based 26 7 °The Petition appears incorrectly to reflect that Petitioner did not file a Petition for Review 28 || with the California Supreme Court. (Petition at 3).

1 upon the Petition, including its attachments, and for the reasons discussed below, 2 the Court orders Petitioner to show cause why the Petition and this action should 3 not be dismissed for untimeliness, failure to exhaust, and/or for failure to state a 4 claim meriting federal habeas relief. A. Petitioner’s Challenges to His Conviction in the 2005 State Case 5 Appear to Be Time-Barred 6 The Petition, as indicated above, appears to assert two claims challenging 7 Petitioner’s conviction in the 2005 State Case: (1) “This was a case of mistrial from 8 the start, illegal, and very criminal. My attorney didn’t argue, I did.”; and (2) “I was 9 rushed out of the L.A. County jail before I received an answer from the appeal I 10 petitioned.” (Petition at 1-2, 5). As explained below, the Petition appears to be 11 time-barred. 12 1. Accrual of the Statute of Limitations 13 Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), 14 a one-year statute of limitations applies to a petition for a writ of habeas corpus by a 15 person in state custody. Wall v. Kholi, 562 U.S. 545, 550 (2011); 28 U.S.C. 16 § 2244(d)(1). The one-year limitations period runs from the latest of: (1) the date 17 on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the 18 expiration of the time for seeking such review (28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)); (2) the 19 date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in 20 violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the 21 applicant was prevented from filing by such State action (28 U.S.C. 22 § 2244(d)(1)(B)); (3) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was 23 initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized 24 by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral 25 review (28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C)); or (4) the date on which the factual predicate 26 of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of 27 due diligence (28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D)). Generally, as here, state inmates are required to file their federal habeas petitions “within one year of the date on which 28 1 || his conviction becomes final on direct review, unless the petitioner qualifies for 2 || statutory or equitable tolling.” Curiel v. Miller, 830 F.3d 864, 868 (9th Cir. 2016) 3 || (en banc); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 4 Here, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s Petition for Review 5 || from the Court of Appeal’s decision affirming his conviction in the 2005 State Case 6 || on August 15, 2007, and as Petitioner did not file a Petition for Writ of Certiorari in 7 || the United States Supreme Court, his conviction became final 90 days later, on g November 13, 2007, when the time to file such a petition expired. See Bowen v. 9 Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999) (period of direct review in 28 U.S.C. 10 § 2244(d)(1)(A) includes period within which petitioner can file petition for writ of

4 certiorari in U.S. Supreme Court, whether or not petitioner actually files such

petition). Thus, the one-year statute of limitations began to run on November 14, 2007, and, absent tolling, expired on November 13, 2008. Accordingly, absent tolling, the Petition, constructively filed on June 18, 2024, was filed more than 4 fifteen years too late. See Curiel, 830 F.3d at 868 ("AEDPA requires a state prisoner to file a federal habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 within one 16 year of the date on which his conviction becomes final on direct review, unless the M7 petitioner qualifies for statutory or equitable tolling"); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 18 | 98 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 19 2. Statutory Tolling 20 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), AEDPA's limitations period is tolled while “a 21 | properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with 22 || respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” Allen v. Siebert, 552 U.S. 3, 23 || 4 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)). Petitioner “bears the 24 || burden of proving that the statute of limitations was tolled.” Banjo v. Ayers, 614 25 || F.3d 964, 967 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 564 U.S. 1019 (2011). The statute of 26 || limitations is tolled only while a petitioner is properly pursuing state 27 || post-conviction relief. See Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 219-20 (2002) 2g || (application “pending” as long as ordinary state collateral review process in

1 || continuance —7.e., until completion of that process; application remains “pending” 2 || until it has achieved final resolution through state's post-conviction procedures); 3 || Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1053 n.3 (9th Cir.) (statute of limitations tolled for 4 || all of time during which state prisoner attempting, through proper use of state court 5 || procedures, to exhaust state court remedies with regard to particular post-conviction 6 || application) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 967 (2008). The statute of 7 limitations is not tolled between the time a final decision is issued on direct state g appeal and the time the first state collateral challenge is filed because there is no g || pending during that interval. Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 10 2010) (citations omitted). 4 Here, as noted above, Petitioner’s conviction became final on November 13, 2007, and the statute of limitations expired on November 13, 2008. As no properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to judgment in the 2005 State Case was filed during that time frame, Petitioner is not 4 entitled to statutory tolling. Even assuming, for purposes of analysis, that Petitioner’s Petition for Resentencing filed in 2022 would otherwise have been an 16 appropriate predicate for statutory tolling, it cannot support statutory tolling '7 because it was filed after the statute of limitations had already expired. See 18 Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir.) (Section 2244(d) does not 19 permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that ended before a state petition is 20 |! filed), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 924 (2003). 21 Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to any statutory tolling under Section 22 || 2244(d)(2). 23 3. Equitable Tolling 24 The statute of limitations period may be subject to equitable tolling if a 25 || petitioner can demonstrate both that: (1) he has been pursuing his rights diligently; 26 || and (2) some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way. Holland v. Florida, 560 97 || U.S. 631, 649 (2010). It is a petitioner’s burden to demonstrate that he is entitled to 2g || equitable tolling. Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002), cert.

1 || denied, 537 U.S. 1003 (2002). It does not appear from the Petition or the current 2 || record that Petitioner has met his burden to demonstrate that he is entitled to any 3 || equitable tolling, let alone tolling sufficient to render the Petition timely. 4 4. Actual Innocence 5 In rare and extraordinary cases, a plea of actual innocence can serve as a 6 || gateway through which a petitioner may pass to overcome the statute of limitations 7 otherwise applicable to federal habeas petitions. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. g 383, 386 (2013); see also Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 934-37 (9th Cir. 2011) (en 9 banc). “[A] petitioner does not meet the threshold requirement unless he [or she] 10 persuades the district court that, in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting 4 reasonably, would have voted to find him [or her] guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Perkins, 569 U.S. at 386 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 329 (1995)). In order to make a credible claim of actual innocence, a petitioner must 4 “support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence — whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical 16 physical evidence — that was not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. The '7 | habeas court then “consider[s] all the evidence, old and new, incriminating and 18 exculpatory, admissible at trial or not.” Lee, 653 F.3d at 938 (internal quotations 19 | omitted; citing House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538 (2006)). On this record, the court 20 || “must make a ‘probabilistic determination about what reasonable, properly 21 } instructed jurors would do.’” House, 547 U.S. at 538 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 22 || 329). Unexplained or unjustified delay in presenting new evidence is a “factor in 23 || determining whether actual innocence has been reliably shown.” Perkins, 569 U.S. 24 || at 387, 399; Schlup, 513 U.S. at 332 (“A court may consider how the timing of the 25 || submission and the likely credibility of a [petitioner’s] affiants bear on the probable 26 || reliability of... evidence [of actual innocence].”). 27 Here, Petitioner does not raise a claim of actual innocence and has failed to 2g || identify any such “newly discovered evidence,” let alone, provide new, reliable

1 evidence to cast doubt on his conviction so as to permit the Court to consider his 2 apparently otherwise time-barred claims. 3 5. Conclusion 4 For the foregoing reasons, it appears that Petitioner’s challenges to his conviction in the 2005 State Case are time-barred. 5 B. The Petition Appears to Be Unexhausted 6 Aside from being time-barred, it appears that dismissal of the Petition and 7 this action would be appropriate because, as explained below, Petitioner’s claims 8 appear to be unexhausted. 9 A habeas petitioner “must exhaust available state remedies before presenting 10 his claim to a federal habeas court.” Davila v. Davis, 582 U.S. 521, 527 (2017); 11 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(b) and (c). “A petitioner satisfies the exhaustion requirement by 12 ‘fully and fairly presenting each claim to the highest state court.’” Greenway v. 13 Schriro, 653 F.3d 790, 801 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). 14 Here, based on the Court of Appeal decisions corresponding to the Petitions 15 for Review Petitioner filed with the California Supreme Court, it does not appear 16 that Petitioner has presented either of his current claims for relief to the California 17 Supreme Court. See People v. Iniguez, 2007 WL 1532763; People v. Iniguez, 2024 18 WL 1083084. 19 Accordingly, dismissal of the Petition and this action would also be 20 appropriate based on Petitioner’s failure to exhaust his current claims. 21 C. In Any Event, Petitioner Fails to Demonstrate His Entitlement to 22 Relief on the Claims in the Petition 23 Even if Petitioner’s claims were not time-barred and unexhausted, Petitioner 24 otherwise fails to demonstrate his entitlement to federal habeas relief. Petitioner’s 25 claims are conclusory and vague, and are unsupported by a statement of specific 26 facts. The claims do not meet even the most basic pleading requirements for federal 27 habeas petitions, and thus are insufficient to justify federal habeas relief. See Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 2(c)(1)-(2) (federal habeas petitions must 28 1 “specify all the grounds for relief,” and “state the facts supporting each ground”); 2 see also Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 655 (2005) (federal habeas petitions are 3 “expected to state facts that point to a real possibility of constitutional error”) 4 (citations omitted); Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204-05 (9th Cir. 1995) (conclusory allegations unsupported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant 5 habeas relief), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1143 (1996); Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 6 490, 491 (9th Cir. 1990) (allegations that are vague, conclusory, or unsupported by 7 a statement of specific facts, are insufficient to warrant relief and are subject to 8 summary dismissal). 9 IV. CONCLUSION 10 In light of the foregoing, Petitioner is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE by not 11 later than January 29, 2025, why this action should not be dismissed for 12 untimeliness, failure to exhaust, and/or failure to raise a claim meriting federal 13 habeas relief. 14 Alternatively, Petitioner may request a voluntary dismissal of this action 15 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a) by the foregoing deadline. If he 16 elects to proceed in that manner, he may sign and return the attached Notice of 17 Dismissal. However, Petitioner is advised that any dismissed claims may later be 18 subject to dismissal with prejudice as time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 19 /// 20 /// 21 /// 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// /// 28 1 Petitioner is further cautioned that the failure timely to respond to this 2 Order to Show Cause and/or to show good cause may result in the dismissal of 3 the Petition and this action based upon Petitioner’s claims being time-barred, 4 unexhausted, and/or without merit, Petitioner’s failure to comply with this Order, and/or Petitioner’s failure to prosecute. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED.7 6 DATED: January 9, 2025 7 ______________/s/___________________ 8 Honorable Jacqueline Chooljian 9 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 7The Court’s determinations and order herein constitute non-dispositive rulings on pretrial 25 matters. To the extent a party disagrees with such non-dispositive rulings, such party may file a motion for review by the assigned District Judge within fourteen (14) days. See Local Rule 72- 26 2.1. To the extent a party believes the rulings to be dispositive, rather than non-dispositive, such 27 party has the right to object to this Court’s determination that the rulings are non-dispositive within fourteen (14) days. A party will be foreclosed from challenging the rulings herein if such 28 party does not seek review thereof, or object thereto.