Ruben Lujano v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: April 24, 2008
• Docket: 01-07-00350-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Opinion issued April 24, 2008 

In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

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NO. 01-07-00350-CR

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RUBEN LUJANO, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

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On Appeal from County Criminal Court at Law No. 15

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1444072

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MEMORANDUM OPINION

          After a plea of nolo contendere, the trial court found appellant, Ruben Lujano, guilty of possession of marihuana and assessed punishment at confinement for 50 days in county jail. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.121(a) (Vernon 2003). We determine whether the trial court erred in overruling appellant’s motion to suppress the evidence that he contends was obtained over his objection to the warrantless search of his bedroom. We affirm.

Facts

          Deputy Price responded to a family disturbance call at the house that appellant shared with his mother. Upon Price’s arrival, appellant’s mother explained that she had just had a heated argument with appellant, that he was under the influence of marihuana, and that he was belligerent, aggressive, and locked in his bedroom. Appellant’s mother could hear no movement in the bedroom and was worried about his welfare. Price entered the house with consent from appellant’s mother and knocked on the bedroom door, but did not get a response. Concerned for appellant’s safety, Price tried to open the bedroom door, but discovered that it was locked. Appellant’s mother then opened the door with a tool from the kitchen counter.

          Price entered the bedroom, where appellant was lying on his bed awake. Price immediately smelled a strong odor of marihuana. Price asked appellant what was going on, but appellant did not respond. Price then removed the blanket covering appellant and performed a pat-down search for everyone’s safety. Appellant had difficulty standing and required help to do so. He did not, however, refuse to comply. During the pat-down search, Price felt a bulge in appellant’s left, front pocket and, based on experience, believed the bulge was marihuana. Price removed the object creating the bulge and discovered a cellophane bag containing a green, leafy substance, which he knew to be marihuana. Appellant never asked Price to leave or otherwise protested the confrontation. It was apparent that appellant was under the influence of marihuana.

          Price testified that he believed that his entry into appellant’s bedroom was justified because he received consent from appellant’s mother, he was responding to a family disturbance, and he was concerned for appellant’s safety. Furthermore, at the time of Price’s entry, appellant did not object to the consent given by his mother, nor did he otherwise object to Price’s entry into the bedroom. Price considered the circumstances exigent based on the need to check appellant’s physical welfare.

Discussion

A.      Standard of Review

          The trial court is the sole trier of fact at a suppression hearing and thus evaluates the witnesses’ testimony and credibility. Torres v. State, 182 S.W.3d 899, 902 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The denial of a motion to suppress is reviewed for abuse of discretion, and we give great deference to the trial court’s determination of historical facts while reviewing de novo the trial court’s application of the law to those facts. Balentine v. State, 71 S.W.3d 763, 768 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). We look at the “totality of the circumstances” in determining whether probable cause existed. Torres, 182 S.W.3d at 902.

B.      Applicable Law

          The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution guarantee the right to be secure against unreasonable searches. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Tex. Const. art. I, § 9. In addition, article 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure forbids any evidence obtained in violation thereof to be admitted against an accused. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.23(a) (Vernon 2005). To suppress evidence because of an unreasonable search, the defendant bears the initial burden of producing evidence that rebuts the presumption of proper police conduct. Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). A defendant satisfies this burden by establishing that a search or seizure occurred without a warrant. Id. Once the defendant has made this showing, the burden of proof shifts to the State, which is then required to establish that the search or seizure was conducted pursuant to a warrant or was otherwise reasonable. Id.

          A peace officer may arrest an individual without a warrant only if probable cause exists with respect to the individual in question and the arrest falls within a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. Kelly v. State, 669 S.W.2d 720, 725 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356, 88 S. Ct. 507, 514 (1967)). One such exception is the emergency doctrine. Under the emergency doctrine, police officers are not barred from making warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 2412 (1978); Rauscher v. State, 129 S.W.3d 714, 719 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. ref’d). The emergency doctrine applies when the police are acting in their limited community caretaking role to “protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury,” not in their “crime-fighting” role. Laney v. State, 117 S.W.3d 854, 861 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). If the emergency doctrine applies, the police may seize any evidence that is in plain view during the course of their legitimate emergency activities. Laney, 117 S.W.3d at 862; Rauscher, 129 S.W.3d at 719.

          In order to justify the search of a residence under the emergency doctrine, the State must show (1) that the officers had probable cause to search the residence and (2) that obtaining a search warrant was impracticable because the officers reasonably believed that there was an immediate need to act in order to protect or to preserve life or to prevent serious bodily injury. Brimage v. State, 918 S.W.2d 466, 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); Bray v. State, 597 S.W.2d 763, 765 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). The State is not required to prove that an actual emergency existed at the time of the officer’s warrantless entry. Id. Rather, the State need only show that the facts and circumstances surrounding the entry and search were such that the officers reasonably believed an emergency existed that made obtaining a search warrant impracticable. Id.
C.Application of the Law to the Facts

          In one issue, appellant contends that his mother’s consent to enter his bedroom was insufficient to overcome the lack of a warrant. At the hearing, the State argued both that appellant’s mother’s consent was sufficient and that Price’s entry was legal pursuant to the emergency doctrine. We will sustain the trial court’s decision on the motion to suppress if it is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case. See State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855–56 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
          The emergency doctrine has been formulated to allow warrantless searches when there is reasonable cause to believe that, absent an immediate search, serious bodily harm or death may result. White v. State, 201 S.W.3d 233, 240 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. ref’d) (citing Brimage, 918 S.W.2d at 500–01 and Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 118, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1525 (2006) (noting that “no question has been raised, or reasonably could be, about the authority of the police to enter a dwelling to protect a resident from domestic violence; so long as they have good reason to believe such a threat exists, it would be silly to suggest that the police would commit a tort by entering . . . to determine whether violence (or threat of violence) has just occurred or is about to (or soon will) occur.”)).

          Courts should carefully apply the objective standard of reasonableness when determining whether an officer’s warrantless entry and search is justified. Id. This objective standard looks at the police officer’s conduct and “takes into account the facts and circumstances known to the police at the time of the search.” Id. (citing Colburn v. State, 966 S.W.2d 511, 519 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998), Brimage, 918 S.W.2d at 501, and Janicek v. State, 634 S.W.2d 687, 691 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982)).

          The motivation for an entry pursuant to the emergency doctrine must be “totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.” Id. The scope of the search must also be strictly circumscribed by the emergency that justified its initiation. Id. at 241(citing Mincey, 437 U.S. at 390, 98 S. Ct. at 2412 (1978) and Laney, 117 S.W.3d at 862).

          At the time of the search, Price was responding to a family disturbance. Appellant’s mother was nervous; she indicated that appellant was under the influence of drugs and that she was concerned for appellant’s safety as well as her own. Appellant’s mother had more intimate knowledge of appellant’s mental state, and Price could have reasonably believed that the concern was genuine and the likelihood of injury was founded. See Janicek v. State, 634 S.W.2d 687, 691 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982). Appellant was silent, and Price was concerned that appellant needed medical attention. Price testified that these were “[e]xigent circumstances, we wanted to go in that room and see if he was okay.” Thus, according to the facts and circumstances known to Price at the time he entered appellant’s bedroom, we hold that the trial court did not err if it concluded that Price had an objectively reasonable belief that, absent an immediate search, serious bodily harm or death could result. See White, 201 S.W.3d at 243.

          The trial court may have reasonably concluded that Deputy Price’s entry into appellant’s bedroom was justified under the emergency doctrine. Thus, we need not address appellant’s co-tenancy argument that his mother’s consent was insufficient to allow the entry under Georgia v. Randolph. Looking at the officers’ conduct and taking into account the facts and circumstances known to the officers at the time of the entry, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying appellant’s motion to suppress.

Conclusion

          We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Tim Taft

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Taft, Keyes, and Alcala.

Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).