OPINION
CLINTON, Judge.
Richard Brimage, Jr. was convicted of the offense of murder in the course of committing or attempting to commit kidnapping, a capital offense under V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 19.03(a)(2). The offense occurred in Kle-berg County; trial was had on change of venue to Comal County. The jury answered the special issues affirmatively and punishment was assessed at death in accordance with former Article 37.071, V.A.C.C.P. Appeal to this Court is automatic. Id., § h. In twelve points of error, appellant challenges, inter alia, the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction and sentence, and the legality of a warrantless search of his home. We will reverse.
I. Facts
Because appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to uphold both his eonviction1 and sentence, a thorough review of the facts of the case is warranted.
Early on Monday morning, October 5, 1987, appellant placed a phone call to Mary Beth Kunkel, a 19-year-old co-ed at Texas A & I University in Kingsville. Appellant was acquainted with Kunkel through his employment at the nearby Lockheed plant; his supervisor there was Kunkel’s boyfriend. Appellant’s phone call was answered by Kunkel’s mother, to whom he misidentified himself as “George.” Appellant asked Kunkel to come to his residence on West Richard Street in Kingsville2 to pick up some drafting tools for her boyfriend. He told her not to tell her mother where she was going. Kunkel left home in her car. She was seen by a friend turning onto West Richard Street shortly before 8 a.m.
Later that day, Kunkel’s boyfriend, Michael Beagly, became alarmed when he found her car parked on the Texas A & I campus. The car was parked in a place not frequented by Kunkel and her purse was in the car. Subsequently, a missing persons investigation was begun. By Wednesday, October 7, 1987, the investigation began to focus on appellant. The police knew of his acquaintance with Kunkel; knew that appellant had quit his job without notice; and knew that Kunkel’s car had been found on the Texas A & I campus at a location near appellant’s residence. Throughout the two days of the investigation neither the police nor appellant’s former employers were able to contact him. The police had also been told that the month before appellant had attempted to sexually assault another woman.
Sometime about 11:00 a.m. that Wednesday, police officers acted on their suspicions [471]*471and went to appellant’s home on West Richard. When no one answered their knocks at the front door, the officers explored the outside of the house, peering through the windows and checking for unlocked doors. The officers found all the doors and windows locked, the garage door down and the lights out. The officers left the West Richard residence satisfied that no one was home. It was at this point that Captain George Gomez, Jr., a detective with the Kingsville Police Department, assumed supervision of the investigation.
That afternoon, Gomez contacted Roy C. Turcotte, a local attorney and a relative of appellant. Gomez told Turcotte that he suspected appellant was involved in Kunkel’s disappearance and that he wanted to talk to either appellant or his parents. Gomez also asked Turcotte for permission to search the residence on West Richard Street. Turcotte told Gomez that he would find out how to contact appellant’s parents. He also expressly told Gomez that he did not have the authority to consent to a search of the Bri-mage residence.
After his telephone conversation with Tur-cotte, Gomez was called out to the Rodeway Plaza Inn, a local motel. He was told appellant had stayed in room 119 the night before and had not been seen since. The owner of the motel provided Gomez with appellant’s room registration card and his suitcase, which had been removed from his room earlier in the day.3 Inside appellant’s suitcase, Gomez found a number of pornographic magazines, several items of men’s clothing, a piece of an ace bandage, a woman’s bra, a pair of women’s underwear, pieces of what appeared to have been women’s pajama bottoms, a jaggedly cut piece of red cloth that appeared to be blouse material, and a pair of large scissors. Gomez testified that both the red cloth and the scissors were “blood stained.” Gomez returned to the police station with the suitcase.
Gomez was met at the station by Turcotte and the Honorable Max Bennett of the 319th District Court in Corpus Christi. Bennett is appellant’s maternal uncle. Turcotte had called Bennett earlier and told him of police suspicion of appellant. Bennett had then driven to Kingsville, and the two attorneys had broken into appellant’s home. At the police station, the two men told Gomez of their break-in and that there was evidence of “violence” or a “violent act” at the residence. Gomez asked Bennett for permission to search the house, and Bennett replied, “Yes, you need to get in there.” Without securing a warrant, the police did just that. See Part III, post
Within an hour, the police entered appellant’s house and began an exhaustive search of the premises. They found the master bedroom in a state of disarray. Clothing and other items littered the floor and the bed. A jewelry box had been knocked over. A heavy blanket had been placed over a window otherwise screened by both Venetian blinds and drapes.4 Some of the clothing in [472]*472the room had been cut up, and blood had been splattered in several places. Not long after the search began, the police found Kunkel’s body in the trunk of a car in the garage. The body was unclothed from the waist down and bound at the wrists and elbows. The feet were bound to the elbows behind the body, causing an arching exposure of Kunkel’s genital area. A ligature was tightly tied around her neck, and a sock had been forced down her throat.
The police remained at the house for several hours gathering evidence. The search was suspended at approximately 2:00 o’clock that morning, and the house was secured. The police returned the following day to collect more evidence — again, without a warrant.
Based in part on the evidence obtained from the search of the West Richard residence, Kingsville police obtained an arrest warrant for appellant. On Thursday morning, October 8, that warrant was executed in Corpus Christi. While in the Corpus Christi jail awaiting transfer back to Kingsville, appellant was interviewed by an investigator from the district attorney’s office. Appellant’s written confession provides the most coherent picture of the events preceding Kurikel’s death:
“My name is Richard Lewis Brimage, Jr. I am 31 years old and I live at 1135 W. Richard, Kingsville, Texas. Last Thursday, October 1,1987,1 started trying to pick up some girls and party with. This went on through the weekend. On Monday, October 5,1987 early at about 6 am or 7 am I called Mary Beth Kunkel at home. Her mother ansewered (sic) and I asked for Mary Beth. She came to the telephone and I told her I had some engineering tools for a gift for her boyfriend Mike. I knew if I told her they were for Mike she would come over to my house. She agreed to come over. She came over and I took her to the back bedroom where the tools were. As she looked at tools I grabbed her and she said, What Richard, what.
I was standing behind her and grabbed her by the shoulders. She struggled and started screaming and I forced her into the master bedroom. She continued screaming and I kept hitting her and started chocking her. I wanted her sexually real bad and that is why I lured her to my house. We wrestled for a while and when she would not stop screaming, I finally choked her with my hands. I wasn’t sure she was dead, so I started to tie her up up (sic) so she would not struggle anymore. I got some nylons and pulled her feet behind her back. I tied her hands to her feet where she was bent out of shape. I remember seeing blood on her face and blood on my pants.
I want to say that during this time another guy was with me. His name is Leo Molina. Leo had been with me for the past three or four days. I woke him up to tell him Mary Beth was coming over. I told him to wait in the back bedroom where all the struggle took place. While she was screaming we decided to inject her with some cocaine to stop her from screaming. We managed to do so. She kept going wild, trying to escape. I kept telling her to stop screaming. Leo, I remember was trying to feel up her shorts and touch her between her legs. After I was certain she was dead, tied up, I took off her shorts, so I could admire her body. Before this I told Leo to take her car from in front of my house and park it at the college campus somewhere. While Leo was gone I picked up Mary Beth and put her in the trunk of my parents’ car.”
Appellant’s confession was admitted as evidence against him during his trial, which, because of the pervasive publicity generated by the case, was transferred from Kleberg County to Comal County.
Molina, who accepted a plea bargain, offered a significantly different, albeit self-serving, account of the events at appellant’s residence. He testified that appellant had sent him to a back room of the West Richard residence because someone was coming over to engage in sex with appellant; that he heard appellant conversing with someone at the front door of the residence; that he heard struggling and saw appellant “dragging a female into the back bedroom[;]” that he heard the female scream, “Please don’t hit me. Don’t hurt me. I’ll do anything[;]” that [473]*473responding to appellant’s call he went to the master bedroom and saw appellant striking the female; that he saw appellant inject the female with cocaine; and that he fled the back bedroom while the struggle was still going on.
Dr. Joseph Rupp,' Medical Examiner for Nueces County, preformed the autopsy on Kunkel’s body. He testified that the results of the autopsy were consistent with homicide, and that Kunkel could have died from any one of three causes: (1) manual strangulation; (2) asphyxiation by the sock obstructing her airway; and (3) ligature strangulation. Rupp based that analysis on both his autopsy results and appellant’s confession. He testified that he could not determine when, during the assault by appellant, Kunkel had died:
“Q: Would you tell us if you choke somebody with your hands, how long it takes until they — they become unconscious and dead?
A: Well, if you get a good hold and they don’t get away momentarily ... and you compress those major (blood) vessels, you have about 15 seconds of consciousness.
# ⅜ ‡ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜
Q: How long until death?
A: [I]f you compress and you lose consciousness in 15 seconds, you will die in a couple of minutes at least.
Q: Now, if I were choking someone, is it possible for me to after they reach unconsciousness become uncertain as to whether I have successfully killed them or not? A: Absolutely....
⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜
Q: [Bjased on reading [appellant’s] confession and doing your autopsy and all of the evidence in the ease ... you believe that the strangulation rendered her unconscious and then the sock was applied and then the ligature was applied?
A: Yes.
Q: Okay. Could you actually pinpoint a time of death, Dr. Rupp?
A: No....”
The medical examiner stated that the struggle that precipitated Kunkel’s death probably was brief, lasting no more than a few minutes. He said that he found no physical evidence of sexual assault, but that such did not rule out an assault, and he opined that “[t]he sexual nature of the crime [was] obvious because of the positioning of the body and the way the body [was] tied up with the legs spread and the — the—the feet tied back underneath the body with the body arched to expose the genital area.”
At the close of the case, the jury was given the statutory definitions of attempt, kidnap, restrain and abduct, and it was charged, inter alia, as follows:
“Now, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about October 5,1987, in Kleberg County, Texas, that the defendant, Richard Brimage, Jr., did then and there intentionally cause the death of an individual, Mary Beth Kunkel, by strangling her with his hands or by strangling her with a ligature, or by suffocating her with a sock, in the course of committing or attempting to commit the kidnapping of Mary Beth Kunkel, then you will find the defendant guilty of capital murder as charged in the indictment.”
The jury found appellant guilty of capital murder.
During the punishment phase of the trial, the State re-offered the evidence from the guilt/innocence phase and further called two women to testify about their encounters with appellant. The first woman was a topless dancer at a club in Kingsville. On October 8, 1987, just three days after the murder, appellant was in the club offering dancers money to come “party” with him. None of the dancers accepted appellant’s offer. Later that night, appellant called the club asking for this particular woman and again asked if she would come to his motel room; she declined his invitation and never heard from him again.
The second woman to testify was an acquaintance and school mate of appellant and one of his sisters. On September 21, 1987, two weeks before the murder, appellant invited the witness to his house on the pretense of surprising his sister, who he claimed had just returned from a trip. Once the witness [474]*474was inside the house, appellant told her his sister was in another room. As she turned toward that room, appellant hit her over the head with an object, knocked her to the ground and jumped on top of her. The witness testified that then “something snapped.” Appellant apologized for his behavior, let her up and allowed her to leave. In spite of appellant’s requests that she not tell the police, the witness reported the incident. No formal charges were filed.
Apart from the testimony of the two women, the only other evidence the State presented at punishment involved appellant’s prior criminal record. The State proved that appellant had twice been placed on probation for offenses in Washington State and Texas. On September 30, 1977, appellant entered a plea of guilty to the offense of possessing stolen property and was placed on deferred adjudication probation for two years. The offense arose out of a purse snatching incident involving an 85-year-old woman in Island County, Washington. While appellant did not commit the actual purse snatching, he was later found to be in possession of jewelry and more than $250 which had been taken from the elderly woman. Appellant successfully completed the two years of probation and was subsequently released from the disabilities of that crime.
Appellant did not fare as well on probation in Texas. On May 5,1983, appellant entered a plea of guilty to the felony offense of forgery by passing checks.5 Appellant was sentenced to five years confinement in the penitentiary, but the trial court suspended sentence and placed appellant on probation for a term of five years. Within two and one-half years, appellant’s probation was revoked for failure to report to his probation officer, as well as failure to pay a supervisory fee required after his release from Cenikor, a drug rehabilitation center in Houston. Following the revocation, appellant was sentenced to a term of two years in the penitentiary. He was released in January 1987, just ten months before the instant offense.
Neither the State nor appellant offered expert testimony during the punishment phase of the trial. Appellant called as witnesses a number of his relatives and friends, who testified that appellant would not be dangerous in the future. The two special issues of former Article 37.071(b), supra, were submitted to the jury, which answered both in the affirmative. Appellant was sentenced to death in accordance with former Article 37.071(e).
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Appellant contends that the evidence introduced at his trial was insufficient to support both the verdict of guilty and the sentence of death. Specifically, he contends that he did not kidnap or attempt to kidnap Kunkel, see V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 20.03, and that the evidence failed to show beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a probability that he will “commit criminal acts of violence that will constitute a continuing threat to society.” Former Article 37.071(b)(2), supra. In addressing both contentions, we will determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements ... beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573 (1979) (emphasis in the original).
A The Verdict
Appellant does not contend that the evidence was insufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt that he murdered Kunkel. Instead, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the kidnapping allegation that elevated the offense to capital murder.
Appellant directs our attention to Guerra v. State, 690 S.W.2d 901 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1985, no pet.), in which a court of appeals found the evidence sufficient to show capital murder committed during the course of kidnapping or attempted kidnapping. He argues that the Guerra court based its affir-mance on the fact that “the victim was re[475]*475moved by force and deadly force was used to keep her in the vehicle.” He contends that his case is distinguishable from Guerra in that “there is no evidence that the victim was removed under the use or threat of any force, or that she was held or secreted by Appellant.” Appellant’s argument assumes that secretion and the use or threatened use of deadly force are part of the actus reus of kidnapping. To the contrary, however, as the discussion post will demonstrate, they are more correctly construed as components of the mens rea requirement.
Chapter 20 of the Penal Code defines and proscribes the interrelated offenses of “false imprisonment,” “kidnapping” and “aggravated kidnapping.” “False imprisonment” is the intentional restraint of a person, which is defined as the “restrict[ion of] a person’s movements without consent, so as to interfere substantially with his liberty, by moving him from one place to another or by confining him.” V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 20.01(1). Kidnapping is the intentional or knowing “abduction” of a person. “Abduct” is defined as:
“restrain^ of] a person with intent to prevent his liberation by:
(A) secreting or holding him in a place where he is not likely to be found; or
(B) using or threatening to use deadly force.”
A problem of statutory construction lurks in the definition of “abduct,” viz: Do subcategories (A) and (B) modify “restraint” or “intent to prevent liberation?” In other words, are secretion and deadly force subsets of the act element of “restraint,” or do they modify the mens rea element of “intent to prevent liberation”? If it is the former, a kidnapping becomes a completed offense when a restraint with intent to prevent liberation is accomplished by either secretion or the use or threatened use of deadly force. If it is the latter, then a kidnapping becomes a complex ed offense when a restraint is accomplished, and there is evidence that the actor intended to prevent liberation and that he intended to do so by either secretion or the use or threatened use of deadly force.
We believe the latter construction to be correct. It is true that previous opinions by this Court have contained language indicating that the secretion/deadly force components of “abduct” encompass an act requirement. See Boyle v. State, 820 S.W.2d 122, 138 (Tex.Cr.App.1989); Huddleston v. State, 661 S.W.2d 111, 112-13 (Tex.Cr.App.1983). However, the Court in those cases was not directly addressing this question. Construing secretion/deadly force as an act requirement, rather than as a component of the specific intent to prevent liberation, ignores the plain fact that the specific intent requirement of the kidnapping statute is what distinguishes it from false imprisonment. False imprisonment is nothing more than an intentional restraint as that term is statutorily defined. A false imprisonment becomes a kidnapping when an actor evidences a specific intent to prevent liberation by either secretion or deadly force. To hold, instead, that false imprisonment is elevated to kidnapping by the manner in which a restraint is accomplished is to ignore the plainly punctuated, unadorned text of the statute. See V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 20.01 et seq.6
Thus construed, the definitions in Chapter 20 of the Penal Code, when taken together, provide that kidnapping is the intentional or knowing restriction of a person’s movements without consent, so as to interfere substantially with his liberty, by moving him from one place to another or by confining him, with intent to prevent his liberation by secreting him or holding him in a place where he is not likely to be found or by using or threatening to use deadly force. Put more simply: The State had the burden of proving [476]*4761) a restraint made 2) with a specific intent to prevent liberation by either of two particular means. Thus, secretion and the use or threatened use of deadly force are merely two alternative components of the specific intent element. It is therefore not necessary, as appellant argues, that the State prove a restraint accomplished by either secretion or deadly force. Instead, the State must prove that a restraint was completed and that the actor evidenced a specific intent to prevent liberation by either secretion or deadly force.
The State’s evidence in this cause meets that burden. The restraint is apparent from the face of appellant’s written confession. It began when appellant dragged Kunkel down the hall of his home; it ended only with her death. It cannot be gainsaid that appellant restricted Kunkel’s movements in an escalating course of force and intimidation “so as to interfere substantially with her liberty” by effectively “confining” her without her consent until he took her life.7 See and compare Earhart v. State, 823 S.W.2d 607, 618 (Tex.Cr.App.1991); Boyle, supra, at 138; Rogers v. State, 687 S.W.2d 337, 342 (Tex.Cr.App.1985); Sanders v. State, 605 S.W.2d 612, 614 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); see also Rodriguez v. State, 646 S.W.2d 524, 526 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no pet.)
The underlying “false imprisonment” having been established, the remaining issue is whether appellant harbored the specific intent to prevent liberation required by § 20.01(2).8 As noted ante, to support a kidnapping allegation, the State must prove an intent to prevent liberation by one of two statutory means: secretion or deadly force. In this cause, a rational jury could infer that appellant intended the former. The facts adduced at trial in support of this inference include the following: 1) appellant’s efforts to shield the master bedroom of his home from outside view by placing a heavy blanket over a window already screened by both drapes and blinds; 2) appellant’s misidentification of himself to Kunkel’s mother and his instruction to Kunkel to lie about where she was going; 3) appellant’s act of injecting his victim with cocaine in the express belief that this would “calm” her; 4) and the sexual nature of the assault.
From these evidentiary facts the jury could have inferred an intent by appellant to abduct and, during the course of the abduction, repeatedly sexually assault Kunkel.9 That is, a jury could have inferred that appellant intended to lure Kunkel to his home by deceit, subdue and restrain her by force, and conceal her in a bedroom of his home to prevent her liberation for the purpose of repeatedly assaulting her sexually. It is not necessary that this Court find to its own satisfaction that such was appellant’s intent. It is enough for us to find that “any” rational jury could have so found beyond a reasonable doubt. Given the evidence adduced at trial, we cannot say this jury’s verdict was irrational. Jackson v. Virginia, supra. We hold [477]*477the evidence was sufficient to support a ver-diet of guilty to the charge of capital murder.10
B. The Sentence
We bring the same standard of review to bear on appellant’s claim that the evidence is insufficient to support an affirmative finding of future dangerousness, viz: After viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we ask whether any rational factfinder could have answered the second special issue affirmatively beyond a reasonable doubt. Cantu v. State, 842 S.W.2d 667, 674 (Tex.Cr.App.1992); Huffman v. State, 746 S.W.2d 212, 224 (Tex.Cr.App.1988). Appellant finds the facts of his ease “remarkably like those of Huffman,” supra, and contends that the “evidence here is likewise insufficient to support that [affirmative] finding.” The State, without citation to supporting case law, contends that “[t]here is ample evidence in this record to support the jury’s verdict.”
We agree with the State. This offense rises above the level we were concerned with in Huffman, supra. This was not a spur-of-the-moment offense, but one that a jury could have found to be both “calculated” and “cold-blooded.” Huffman, 746 S.W.2d at 223 (quoting Roney v. State, 632 S.W.2d 698 (Tex.Cr.App.1982). Appellant lured Kunkel to his home by deception. The jury implicitly found that he intended to kidnap her. The sexual nature of the ensuing assault is obvious. Not content with simple strangulation, appellant made sure of Kunkel’s demise by tying a ligature around her neck and forcing a sock down her throat. He admitted to stripping the clothes from his victim so that he could “admire” her naked, lifeless body. In sum, his actions evidence a depravity that goes beyond that of “every murder” committed during the course of an attempted kidnapping. Id.
Nor is the record devoid of evidence of future dangerousness outside the facts of the offense. While a non-violent criminal record, by itself, is not sufficient under Huffman to support a finding of future dangerousness, it is evidence presaging a character trait of lawlessness, which in turn is a component of future dangerousness. In addition to the appellant’s extended criminal record, there also was evidence that his assault on Kunkel was by no means an isolated incident. One woman testified that appellant had assaulted her two weeks prior to the instant offense, under circumstances similar to the instant offense. Two other women gave testimony by which a jury could reasonably infer that appellant had a similar design subsequent to the instant offense. During jury argument in the punishment phase of the trial, the State characterized these incidents as appellant’s failed attempts at victimizing these women as he had Kunkel. On appeal, the State argues that these three failed attempts, coupled with the brutal murder of Kunkel, provided a basis for a rational jury to conclude that appellant would be a continuing threat to society. We agree. We hold that the evidence is at least minimally sufficient under Jackson, supra, to support the jury’s affirmative finding of future dangerousness. See Cantu, supra; Burns v. State, 761 S.W.2d 353 (Tex.Cr.App.1988).
III. The Search
In his second point of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion to suppress evidence. He argues that the warrantless search of his residence violated the Fourth Amendment.11 Therefore, he contends, the evidence obtained in that search was improperly used against him at trial in violation of Article 38.23, V.A.C.C.P.
[478]*478The lack of a search warrant for the Bri-mage residence was revealed during a pretrial hearing on the appellant’s discovery motion:
“[Appellant’s Counsel]: Your honor ... we have done some investigation and we haven’t been able to find a search warrant as to the residence on Richard Street. We would ask that the State specifically produce a — a search warrant in that respect, if they have one.
[Prosecutor]: There is no search warrant.
[Counsel]: There — There is no search warrant?
[Prosecutor]: No.
[Counsel]: Then how did you get in the house?
[Prosecutor]: Max Bennett.
[The Court]: What was that?
[Prosecutor]: The manner of entry was of consent.
[Counsel]: Is that what you’re going to rely on?
[Prosecutor]: For entering the house, yes, sir.”
Later, at a hearing on the appellant’s motion to suppress, Captain Gomez and Judge Bennett gave essentially identical testimony about the events immediately preceding the warrantless search of the Brimage residence. Gomez testified that Bennett and Tureotte met him at the police station, informed him that they had “broken in to the Brimage residence,” and that there was “evidence of a violent act in the back bedroom.” Gomez said that he then asked Bennett for permission to search the house, and that Bennett replied, “Yes, you need to get in there.” Bennett also characterized his entry into the Brimage residence as a “break in.” He testified that, after the break-in, and after discovering the house in disarray, he met with Gomez at the police station and said, “Mr. Gomez, we’re here on a matter to bring something to your attention. I have just broken into the Brimage house. There has been a disturbance there, and I think you ought to go over there.”
Gomez testified that he did not ask Bennett whether he had authority to consent to a search of the Brimage residence, nor did he ask Bennett to sign a consent-to-search form. Bennett testified that he did not have permission to enter the house himself, much less grant consent for a police search.12 He admitted that the Brimages “probably would have objected” to his breaking into the house, but that he “would have gone into the house whether they objected or not.” Neither Gomez nor Bennett characterized the police search of the Brimage home as a response to an “emergency” situation. Gomez testified that he merely “assumed that he had every right to tell me as a elder, or whatever, I assumed he was the elder brother of the family, or whatever, to give me the right to go into that house.”13
[479]*479Both Gomez and Bennett testified that they did not discuss securing a search warrant for the Brimage residence prior to the search of the house by the police. When asked whether he, as a district judge, was “concerned about entering a house on a search for evidence in a criminal case without a search warrant,” Bennett replied that he was not, explaining, “I was prepared to accept the consequences of doing something I thought was necessary_ I was not concerned about those legal aspects at all. I was not functioning as a lawyer or as a judge.”
The consequences of an illegal, warrantless search include the suppression of the evidence obtained in that search. See e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 653-55, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 1691, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 1088-90 (1961) (applying the federal exclusionary rule to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment); Odenthal v. State, 106 Tex.Crim. 1, 290 S.W. 743, 750 (1927) (state statute [now Article 38.23, supra ] requires the exclusion of evidence obtained in warrantless search without probable cause); see generally Robert R. Barton, Texas Search and Seizure § 2.015 (1992). Appellant asked the trial court to suppress the evidence obtained in the war-rantless search of his residence, but that motion was denied. The trial court’s exact reasoning in denying the motion is less than crystal clear.14 The trial court’s reasoning is irrelevant, however, so long as any theory articulated by the State supports the legality of the search. Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex.Cr.App.1990). Furthermore, we will uphold the trial court’s ruling on the admission or exclusion of evidence unless the record clearly shows that the court abused its discretion. See Maddox v. State, 682 S.W.2d 563, 564 (Tex.Cr.App.1985); Green v. State, 615 S.W.2d 700, 707 (Tex.Cr.App.1980).
The State offers three reasons the trial court did not err in failing to suppress the evidence obtained from the Brimage resi-[480]*480denee. First, the State argues that the search was valid as a “consent” search. Failing that, the State urges in the alternative that the search was justified under the “emergency doctrine.” And in any event, the State maintains, the evidence recovered in the search would have been inevitably discovered, and therefore should not be suppressed. We will address each of these arguments in turn.
A Consent
The State correctly notes that consent searches are an established exception to the warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). When the State has secured the voluntary consent to a warrant-less search, such a search violates neither the United States or Texas constitutions, nor the laws of this state. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974); Becknell v. State, 720 S.W.2d 526 (Tex.Cr.App.1986); Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611 (Tex.Cr.App.1986).
The record is clear that, in the instant case, the police did not have a warrant authorizing the search of appellant’s home. It is also clear that the police did obtain consent to search the home and that that consent was given by Judge Bennett. The issue thus becomes whether Bennett had the authority to consent to the search of appellant’s home. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993, 39 L.Ed.2d at 250. The State argues that Bennett possessed “common authority” over the Brimage’s house because he “had a relationship with the premises sufficient under the circumstances to give him capacity to give consent.” The record developed at the pretrial suppression hearings belies this assertion.
In order for a person other than the owner to validly consent to the search of property, that person must have “common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.” Id. The Supreme Court has defined “common authority” as the “mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.” Id, at n. 7. This Court, likewise, has declared that, in order for a person to validly consent to a search, that person must have equal control and equal use of the premises searched. Becknell, supra, at 528; Sharp, supra, at 617. Thus, in order for Bennett to validly consent to the officers’ search, the State must establish he had joint and equal access to or control over the Brimage home.
Bennett testified that he did not have any financial interest in the Brimage’s house, that he did not keep any personal property there, and that he had never spent the night there. Appellant’s father, the owner of the residence, testified that Bennett had neither control over nor access to the home. He further testified that, at the time of the search in question, while he and his wife were away on vacation, appellant was the only person with a key to the house and the only person who was permitted to use the house. On these undisputed facts, it certainly cannot be said that Bennett possessed any sort of “common authority” over the property. Consequently, Bennett did not have actual authority to consent to the search of the Brimage’s home.
Absent any actual authority to consent to the search, the State next argues that it should be sustained because the officers “relied in good faith” on Bennett’s consent to search the house and the circumstances reasonably indicated that he did in fact have authority to consent to such a search. In other words, the warrantless search of appellant’s home was justified because the searching officers relied on Bennett’s “apparent authority” to consent to such a search.
The so-called “apparent authority” doctrine was adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990). In Rodriguez, the defendant was arrested in his apartment and charged with possession of controlled substances. Id., at 179, 110 S.Ct. at 2796, 111 L.Ed.2d at 155. The arresting officers did not have an arrest or search warrant, but entered the defendant’s home with the consent of his former girlfriend. Id., at 180, 110 S.Ct. at 2797, 111 L.Ed.2d at 156. The girlfiiend referred to the apartment as “ours,” told officers that she had clothes and other possessions inside, [481]*481opened the door with a key, and gave consent to search. Id. In actuality, she no longer lived in the apartment, was not paying rent or authorized to have a key, and was not to enter the apartment unless the defendant was present. Id.
In evaluating whether the officers were justified in relying on the girlfriend’s apparent authority to consent to such a search, the Supreme Court concluded that “[wjhether the basis for such [apparent] authority exists is the sort of recurring factual question to which law enforcement officials must be expected to apply their judgment; and all the Fourth Amendment requires is that they answer it reasonably.” Id., at 186, 110 S.Ct. at 2800, 111 L.Ed.2d at 160. Thus, a warrant-less search pursuant to a third party consent is valid if “the facts available to the officer at the moment [would] warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting party had authority over the premises.” Id, at 188, 110 S.Ct. at 2801, 111 L.Ed.2d at 161 (internal quotation omitted).
In reaching its holding, the Supreme Court cautioned that it should not be understood as suggesting that police officers may always accept any person’s invitation to enter a residence.
“Even when the invitation is accompanied by an explicit assertion that the person lives there, the surrounding circumstances could conceivably be such that a reasonable person would doubt its truth and not act upon it without further inquiry. As with other factual determinations bearing upon search and seizure, determination of consent to enter must be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment ... warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting party had authority over the premises. If not, then warrantless entry without further inquiry is unlawful unless authority actually exists.”
Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted).
The closest this Court has come to adopting the apparent authority doctrine was in McNairy v. State, 835 S.W.2d 101 (Tex.Cr.App.1991). Without formally adopting the doctrine, we found it to be of some value in the resolution of the issues presented.15 In passing, we noted that the apparent authority doctrine was helpful in determining whether the officers were justified “in being where they were” when probable cause to conduct a warrantless search arose. McNairy, supra, at 105. Nevertheless, we opined that should “ambiguous circumstances” arise which cast doubt on the effectiveness of the consent or the extent of the consent given, the officers “must stop and make inquiries as to the continued effectiveness of the consent.” Id., citing Rodriguez, supra.
In the instant case, in order for the war-rantless search of appellant’s house to be justified under the apparent authority doctrine, the facts must show that the searching officers acted reasonably in relying on Bennett’s apparent authority to consent to its search. This was not the case. The circumstances surrounding Bennett’s alleged consent were such that no person could reasonably believe that he had the authority to give [482]*482the consent necessary for the police to enter and search the Brhnage home. At the time of the consent, the police officers were fully aware that neither Bennett nor Turcotte lived at 1135 West Richard. The officers knew that they did not have a key to the house and that they had, in fact, broken into it. Furthermore, the officers knew that Tur-cotte had earlier stated that he did not have any authority to allow the police to search the house. These facts alone are sufficient to raise “ambiguous circumstances” which should have alerted the police to the possibility that neither Bennett nor Turcotte could authorize the search of the property. At a minimum, the police should have inquired further into the alleged basis for Bennett’s authority. Rodriguez & McNairy, both supra. But as Gomez and a second officer admitted at the pre-trial hearing, no one ever questioned Bennett about his authority, or lack thereof. On these facts, it cannot be said that the police officers acted reasonably in relying on Bennett’s alleged consent as their authority to dispense with getting a search warrant in order to enter and search appellant’s home.
B. Exigent Circumstances
The State also argues that the warrantless search of appellant’s home was an “emergency search” justified by the police officers’ belief “that the missing girl might be in the house and that she might be injured and in need of assistance to save her life.” Appellant argues that the facts developed at the pre-trial hearing clearly show that “this was not a situation where immediate entry [of appellant’s residence] was necessary because [the officers reasonably believed] a person was in need of immediate aid or medical assistance.” To the contrary, appellant asserts, “it was obvious [to the officers] that no one was home.” We agree.
It is generally accepted that “the Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers from making warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid.” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2413, 57 L.Ed.2d 290, 300 (1978); Janicek v. State, 634 S.W.2d 687 (Tex.Cr.App.1982); Bray v. State, 597 S.W.2d 763 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). This exception is commonly referred to as the emergency doctrine. Bray, 597 S.W.2d at 764.
This so-called emergency doctrine is nothing more than a specific application of the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. Whether the circumstances surrounding the officers’ warrantless entry and search be characterized as exigent or that of an emergency, both may serve to exempt the officers’ actions from the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Under the emergency doctrine, the exigency which may render the warrantless entry and search reasonable is the officers’ “need to act immediately to protect or preserve life or to prevent serious injury.” Id.
As is true of every warrantless search of a residence, the burden of proof is on the State to justify the search. In order to justify the search of a residence under the emergency doctrine, the State must show 1) that the officers had probable cause to search the residence, and 2) that obtaining a search warrant was impracticable because the officers reasonably believed there was an immediate need to act in order to protect or preserve life or to prevent serious bodily injury. Id.; Brown v. State, 481 S.W.2d 106 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). This is not to say that the State must prove an actual emergency existed at the time of the officer’s warrant-less entry. The State need only show that the facts and circumstances surrounding the entry and search were such that the officers reasonably believed that an emergency existed which made obtaining a search warrant impracticable. Id. Courts must use an objective standard of reasonableness in assessing the officers’ belief that such an emergency actually existed. Bray, 597 S.W.2d at 765; Janicek, 634 S.W.2d at 691.
The State argues that the warrantless search of appellant’s home is justified because the police believed that the missing girl might be in the house and that she might be injured or in need of assistance. The facts developed at the pre-trial hearing, however, do not bear this out. Quite to the contrary, the police characterized the search as “evi-[483]*483dentiary” in nature. The decision to search the residence was arrived at almost casually, based entirely on the “consent” granted by Bennett. The police were not expecting to find a body at the house, much less an alive and injured victim in need of assistance. See n. 13, ante. We therefore reject the State’s argument.16
C. Inevitable Discovery
Having determined that the officers’ war-rantless search of appellant’s home is insupportable under either a theory of third party consent or the emergency doctrine, it follows that the search was unlawful and any evidence seized as a direct result of the search must be excluded. Weeks v. United States, [484]*484232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914); Article 38.23, supra. Nevertheless, the State cites Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984), and urges this Court to adopt the inevitable discovery doctrine.
In Nix, the Supreme Court crafted an exception to the federal exclusionary rule, one which allows the admission of evidence obtained through an illegal search when the State shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the evidence inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means. Id. The State contends such was the case below, in that either appellant’s parents or passersby would have eventually discovered the victim’s body. That contention, however, rests upon unsubstantiated assumptions which the State did not raise before the trial court, and which, consequently, the appellant did not attempt to rebut.
Even had this issue been developed below, however, its resolution would be irrelevant to our discussion today. At trial and on appeal appellant has asked that the evidence seized pursuant to the illegal search of his home be excluded under Article 38.23, supra. This Court recently held that federal inevitable discovery doctrine is inapplicable to Article 38.23. Garcia v. State, 829 S.W.2d 796, 800 (Tex.Cr.App.1992) (plurality opinion). We see no reason to revisit that holding here.
D. Harm Analysis
Having found error in the admission of the evidence taken in an unlawful search, our rules require that we “reverse the judgment under review, unless [we] determine ... beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no contribution to the conviction or punishment.” Tex.R.App.Pro., Rule 81(b)(2); see also Harris v. State, 790 S.W.2d 568 (Tex.Cr.App.1989). Rule 81(b)(2) requires that we ask “whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.” Harris, supra, at 585, quoting, Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 88, 84 S.Ct. 229, 231, 11 L.Ed.2d 171 (1963). Here, the evidence complained of includes, inter alia, the body of the victim, as well as photographs, fingerprints, clothing, and hair and blood samples the police gathered in their investigation of the crime scene. We cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that this evidence did not contribute to the conviction.
IV.
Having found that the search of appellant’s home was illegal, and that evidence obtained in that search was admitted against him at trial in violation of Article 38.23, supra, and that the error in admitting the evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we reverse appellant’s conviction and remand the cause to the trial court.