Rubacky v. Morgan Stanley
This text of 2003 DNH 227 (Rubacky v. Morgan Stanley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Hampshire primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Rubacky v . Morgan Stanley CV-03-328-B 12/31/03 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Tricia L . Rubacky, Plaintiff
v. Civil N o . 03-328-B Opinion N o . 2003 DNH 227 Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Credit Corporation, Defendant
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff’s “Urgent Motion for Injunction and Protection”
was filed on December 2 9 , 2003, and referred to me for a report
and recommendation. It was also served on defense counsel by
mail on December 2 9 .
Background
Plaintiff initiated this pro se suit by filing a “Motion for
Preliminary Injunction” on July 3 0 , 2003 (document n o . 4 ) . That
motion requested that defendant be enjoined from foreclosing on
plaintiff’s home. The motion was referred to me for a hearing
and recommendation. In an August 4 , 2003, Report and
Recommendation, I found that plaintiff was unlikely to succeed on
the merits on any of the five grounds advanced and recommended that the request for injunctive relief be denied (document n o .
10). The Report and Recommendation was approved after
consideration of the objection (document n o . 3 ) . A request to
reconsider that order was declined on August 1 8 , 2003.
At the August 4 hearing, plaintiff also admitted that no
mortgage payments had been made for nine (9) months as the money
was used to pay medical expenses. She also complained that the
foreclosure notice listed her prior male name. The latter, in
fact, was necessary since she granted the mortgage and took title
in that male name.
At the preliminary pretrial, defense counsel indicated that
plaintiff’s actions were impeding the consummation of the
foreclosure sale. Plaintiff, for her part, complained that the
purchasers, at foreclosure, were interfering with her peace and
enjoyment of the house. Since defense counsel had filed no
motion and the purchasers were not parties to the suit, no action
was taken by the court.
Since the date of the pretrial, the purchasers at the first
foreclosure sale have refused to complete the sale. See document
n o . 4 1 , Exhibit C . The original motion/complaint (document n o .
2 4 ) has never been amended by plaintiff so plaintiff’s claims are
the same as those existing on August 4 .
Discussion
Plaintiff’s new “Urgent Motion” is not supported by any
affidavit. It should not be considered as an ex parte request
for temporary restraining order under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b),
therefore, the time to respond to the “urgent” motion by
defendant is not until January 2 0 , 2003. Nevertheless, since
plaintiff apparently is expecting a foreclosure in the near
future1 and, since her motion is facially insufficient, I am
considering the motion without benefit of a response.
Paragraph “ 1 " of the motion is a restatement of allegations
and arguments made in her first effort at an injunction. Those
claims were considered and rejected by the prior Report and
Recommendation and prior orders. Any request to reconsider or
appeal them is time barred.
Paragraph “ 2 " related to allegations concerning Morgan
Stanley’s mutual funds actions, actions of the individuals who
1 Since January 4 , 2003, is a Sunday, it is unlikely that any foreclosure is scheduled for that date.
3 successfully bid at the first foreclosure, the friendliness of
plaintiff’s puppy, tactics of defense counsel, attempted
cancellation of her homeowner’s policy and unsubstantiated fears
of arson. These allegations bear no relevance to plaintiff’s
cause of action and four of them relate to individuals who are
not parties to the case. None of these allegations, if true,
would serve as a basis to enjoin the foreclosure.
Paragraph “3" again relates to persons who are not parties
to this suit and the allegations provide no basis for an
injunction against defendant.
The allegations in paragraph “ 4 " related to a “hold back at
closing” which has already been litigated and rejected.
(Document n o . 1 0 , ¶ C ) .
Paragraph “5" relates to the bond requirement, if an
injunction were to issue. Since I do not recommend an
injunction, nor even a hearing on one, the bond issue is not
relevant.
Plaintiff is over $20,000 in default on her mortgage. She
has not alleged any facts in her motion which would, even if
true, entitle her to enjoin the foreclosure sale under either New
Hampshire or federal law. I recommend the motion be denied.
4 Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be
filed within ten (10) days of receipt of this notice. Failure to
file objections within the specified time waives the right to
appeal the district court’s order. See Unauthorized Practice of
Law Comm. v . Gordon, 979 F.2d 1 1 , 13-14 (1st Cir. 1992); United
States v . Valencia-Copete, 792 F.2d 4 , 6 (1st Cir. 1986).
SO ORDERED.
James R. Muirhead United States Magistrate Judge
December 3 1 , 2003
cc: Tricia L . Rubacky, pro se Victor Manougian, Esq.
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