R.T. by and through his guardian ad litem, DAVID TSUKIYAMA v. SAN DIEGO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: February 4, 2026
• Docket: 3:25-cv-01624
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 R.T. by and through his guardian ad litem, Case No.: 25-cv-1624-AJB-BJW DAVID TSUKIYAMA, 12 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO Plaintiff, 13 SUPPLEMENT ADMINISTRATIVE v. RECORD 14 SAN DIEGO UNIFIED SCHOOL 15 DISTRICT, (Doc. No. 20) 16 Defendant. 17

18 SAN DIEGO UNIFIED SCHOOL 19 DISTRICT, 20 Counter Claimant, 21 v. 22 R.T. by and through his guardian ad litem, DAVID TSUKIYAMA, 23 Counter Defendant. 24 25 26 Before the Court is a motion to supplement the administrative record, filed by 27 Defendant and Counter Claimant San Diego Unified School District (the “District”). (Doc. 28 1 No. 20.) Minor Plaintiff R.T. (“Plaintiff”), by and through his guardian ad litem, David 2 Tsukiyama, opposed the motion (Doc. No. 22), and the District replied (Doc. No. 24). 3 On January 9, 2025, the Court issued an order requiring the District to file a 4 supplemental brief addressing the foundation and authenticity of the additional evidence. 5 (Doc. No. 27.) The Order permitted Plaintiff to file a response. (Id.) Pursuant to the Order, 6 the District filed its supplemental brief on January 23, 2026. (Doc. No. 28.) Plaintiff 7 declined to file a response by the January 30, 2026, deadline. (See Doc. No. 27.) The Court 8 has read and considered the papers on the Motion and deems the matter appropriate for 9 decision without oral argument. See CivLR 7.1.d.1. For the reasons discussed below, the 10 motion is GRANTED. 11 I. BACKGROUND 12 Plaintiff filed the instant action on June 25, 2025, seeking reversal of a decision from 13 the State of California’s Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH”), pursuant to the 14 Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). (Doc. No. 1.) On September 18, 15 2025, the District answered the complaint and filed a counter claim. (Doc. No. 4.) 16 On September 25, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Request for Due Process with the OAH. 17 (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 22.) The due process hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge 18 (“ALJ”) on January 28, 29, 30, and February 4, 5, 6, and 7, 2025. (Id. ¶ 24.) At the time of 19 the due process hearing, Plaintiff was 15-years-old and in the 10th grade at The Winston 20 School (“Winston”), a certified nonpublic school. (Id. ¶11; see Administrative Record 21 (“AR”) 878.) The principal dispute at the OAH hearing was placement. (AR 879.) Parents 22 preferred Plaintiff to remain at Winston. (Id.) The District argued it could serve Plaintiff at 23 a comprehensive public high school within the district. (Id.) 24 On March 28, 2025, OAH rendered its decision. (AR 882.) OAH found that the 25 District should have offered direct mental health services rather than consultation 26 beginning November 28, 2023 through the end of the 2023–24 school year. (AR 928–30.) 27 OAH also found that the District did not offer an appropriate transition plan from March 28 26, 2024, through the end of the 2023–24 school year. (Id.) OAH ordered the District to 1 reimburse Parents in the amount of $5,025 for Plaintiff’s unilateral placement at Winston 2 and to provide ten hours of individual counseling services. (AR 931.) OAH denied the 3 remainder of Plaintiff’s claims. (Id.) Subsequently, Plaintiff filed the instant action seeking 4 reversal of the March 28, 2025 OAH decision. (Doc. No. 1.) 5 On June 6, 2025, Plaintiff filed another request for a due process hearing (OAH Case 6 No. 2025060347) seeking reimbursement for Winston for the 2024–25 school year. (Doc. 7 No. 20 at 7.) Related to this new request, the District issued a subpoena duces tecum on 8 Winston requesting records relevant to Student’s attendance, enrollment, and education 9 while privately placed during the 2023–24, 2024–25, and 2025–26 school years. (Id.) 10 Winston responded and provided the District with responsive documents. By way of the 11 instant motion, the District seeks to supplement the Administrative Record with evidence 12 it obtained from the Winston subpoena. (Id.) 13 II. LEGAL STANDARD 14 When reviewing an administrative hearing decision under IDEA, statutory 15 guidelines provide that the court: 16 (i) shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings; (ii) shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party; and 17 (iii) basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall 18 grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate. 19 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C). This form or standard of “judicial review in IDEA cases differs 20 substantially from judicial review of other agency actions, in which courts generally are 21 confined to the administrative record and are held to a highly deferential standard of 22 review.” Ojai Unified Sch. Dist. v. Jackson, 4 F.3d 1467, 1471 (9th Cir. 1993). Pursuant to 23 IDEA, federal courts have “a continuing obligation to ensure that the state standards 24 themselves and as applied are not below the federal minimums . . . [which] persists despite 25 any state administrative rulings on federal law or state recodifications of federal law.” E.M. 26 ex rel. E.M. v. Pajaro Valley Unified Sch. Dist. Off. of Admin. Hearings, 652 F.3d 999, 27 1005 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Town of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 736 F.2d 773, 792 28 (1st Cir. 1984)). “The requirement that federal courts consider additional evidence when 1 evaluating state administrative rulings implements the intent that federal courts enforce the 2 minimum federal standards IDEA sets out.” Pajaro Valley, 652 F.3d at 1005. 3 In Ojai, the Ninth Circuit addressed the standard for the admission of additional 4 evidence by adopting the approach developed by the First Circuit in Town of Burlington v. 5 Dep’t of Education. See Ojai, 4 F.3d at 1472–73 (citing Town of Burlington, 736 F.2d at 6 790–91). That standard construes “additional” to mean “supplemental.” Ojai, 4 F.3d at 7 1472–73 (citing Town of Burlington, 736 F.2d at 790–91). Although the reasons for 8 supplementing the record may vary, “they might include gaps in the administrative 9 transcript owing to mechanical failure, unavailability of a witness, an improper exclusion 10 of evidence by the administrative agency, and evidence concerning relevant events 11 occurring subsequent to the administrative hearing.” Ojai, 4 F.3d at 1473 (quoting Town 12 of Burlington, 736 F.2d at 790–91). The determination of what is proper additional 13 evidence is left to the discretion of the trial court, which must be careful not to allow such 14 evidence to change the character of the hearing from one of review to a trial de novo. Ojai, 15 4 F.3d at 1473 (quoting Town of Burlington, 736 F.2d at 790–91). In considering the 16 admission of after-acquired evidence, the Ninth Circuit has instructed that “[t]he proper 17 inquiry was whether the report was relevant, non-cumulative, and otherwise admissible.” 18 Pajaro Valley, 652 F.3d at 1006. 19 III. DISCUSSION 20 The District seeks to supplement the Administrative Record with three categories 21 of evidence: (1) email correspondence between Parent and Winston, (2) Plaintiff’s 22 attendance at Winston during the 2022–23 and 2023–24 school year, and (3) Plaintiff’s 23 Enrollment Agreement for his placement at Winston for the 2024–25 school year. (Doc. 24 No. 20 at 3.) This District contends that all the evidence is relevant, non-cumulative, and 25 otherwise admissible. (Id.) Plaintiff opposes the motion to supplement arguing the evidence 26 is irrelevant, lacks foundation, and is impermissible hearsay. (Plaintiff Doc. No. 22-1.) 27 The Court first addresses Plaintiff’s concerns regarding the authenticity and 28 foundation for the supplemental evidence. The District filed a supplemental brief providing 1 additional documentation regarding the authenticity and foundation for the supplemental 2 evidence. Plaintiff did not file a supplemental brief addressing the District’s additional 3 documentation. Through its supplemental briefing, the District has reconciled the 4 authentication issue. 5 Evidence is self-authenticating when it is a certified domestic record of a regularly 6 conducted activity and meets the hearsay exception requirements of Federal Rule of 7 Evidence (“FRE”) 803(6)(A)-(C), as shown by a certification of the custodian. Fed. R. 8 Evid. 902(11). The certification of the custodian must indicate that the record was made at 9 or near the time by someone with knowledge, the record was kept in the course of a 10 regularly conducted business activity, and making the record was a regular practice of that 11 activity. Fed. R. Evid. 803(6)(A)-(C). 12 Here, the District provides a declaration from the custodian of records for Winston, 13 Kim Kanetis. (Doc. No. 28-1, Ex. A.) The declaration states that Ms. Kanetis is a “duly 14 authorized custodian of records for The Winston School of San Diego” with “authority to 15 certify records.” (Id.) The declaration certifies the evidence as “true copies of all records 16 in [her] custody or control described in the subpoena or authorization.” (Id.) Because the 17 District has provided a declaration from Winton’s custodian of records demonstrating that 18 the record was made at or near the time by someone with knowledge, the record was kept 19 in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and making the record was a 20 regular practice of that activity, the Court finds the evidence self-authenticating. See Fed. 21 R. Evid. 902; 803(6)(A)-(C). 22 The Court now turns to Plaintiff’s remaining arguments—that the evidence is 23 irrelevant and impermissible hearsay. The District argues that the email correspondence 24 between Parent and Winston (Doc. No. 20-2, Exs. A–E), as well as the attendance records 25 (Doc. No. 20-2, Ex. F), demonstrate that Plaintiff was already experiencing significant 26 mental-health distress, infrequent attendance, and school-avoidance behaviors while still 27 enrolled at Winston. (See Doc. No. 20-1 at 9.) The Court agrees this information could be 28 relevant to address the question of whether the District adequately addressed Plaintiff’s 1 |}needs. Moreover, the emails are non-hearsay as an admission of a party opponent under 2 || FRE 801(d). See In re Homestore.com, Inc. Sec. Litig., 347 F. Supp. 2d 769, 781 (C.D. Cal. 3 || 2004) (“[E]mails written by a party are admissions of a party opponent and admissible as 4 ||non-hearsay.”). The attendance records are admissible as a business record under 5 || FRE 803(6). See Clark v. City of Los Angeles, 650 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1981) (explaining 6 || the business record exception to hearsay). 7 As to the Enrollment Agreement, the District argues it provides relevant context 8 ||regarding Parents’ stated intentions and cooperation during the transition process, which 9 || lends to the feasibility and reasonableness of the District’s attempts to facilitate Plaintiffs 10 transition back to a comprehensive campus. The Court agrees. And as with the attendance 11 ||records, the agreement is admissible as a business record under FRE 803(6). 12 CONCLUSION 13 The Court finds that the proposed evidence is relevant, non-cumulative, and 14 || otherwise admissible. The Court notes, though, that while it finds the evidence relevant, 15 merits of this litigation are not currently briefed before the Court. As such, the Court 16 || makes no finding as to the weight of Plaintiff's evidence. Instead, the Court holds only that 17 relevant, non-cumulative, and otherwise admissible. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS 18 || Plaintiff's Motion to Supplement the Administrative Record with Exhibits A through G. 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. 20 || Dated: February 4, 2026 © 21 Hon, Anthony J.Battaglia 22 United States District Judge 23 24 25 26 27 28