In Re HOMESTORE.COM, INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION

347 F. Supp. 2d 769, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25307, 2004 WL 2792461
District Court, C.D. California·Decided May 11, 2004·No. 01-CV-11115 MJP(CWX)·Published·Cited by 25 cases

Opinion

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT WOLFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

PECHMAN, District Judge.

INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Stuart H. Wolffs Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 361). By his motion, Defendant Wolff argues that Plaintiffs cannot, as a matter of law, demonstrate that he acted with scienter under Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5,17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b), promulgated thereunder. Defendant Wolff also argues that Plaintiffs cannot, as a matter of law, demonstrate that he is a “control person” under Section 20(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a). Having considered the Motion, the responses, and exhibits, 1 filed *776 by the parties, and having heard oral argument on the issues, Defendant Wolffs Motion is hereby DENIED in its entirety. Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, Plaintiffs raise issues of material fact that Defendant Wolff acted with scienter throughout the class period. Under 20(a), Plaintiffs raise issues of material fact that Defendant Wolff had sufficient day-to-day responsibilities and control over Home-store and did not meet the burden of proving he acted in good faith.

BACKGROUND

A. General Information

Lead plaintiff CalSTRS, a pension fund for California teachers, brought this class action for damages arising from Plaintiff’s purchase of large amounts of Homestore common stock. Plaintiff originally brought this suit against Homestore.com, Inc., several of its officers, and several outside business partners and third party vendors. Plaintiff alleged in its complaint that several Homestore insiders, with the knowledge of Homestore’s auditor Price-waterhouseCoopers (“PwC”) and the active participation of various outside business entities, unlawfully “created revenue” through various types of dubious transactions in order to prop up Homestore’s stock price. Plaintiff claimed that these transactions, combined with improper accounting and the release of written and oral public statements made to the SEC, analysts, and the general public, perpetrated a fraud on Homestore’s shareholders and the investing public in violation of federal securities statutes and regulations promulgated thereunder. Eventually, Homestore was forced to restate seven quarters of revenue because of the improper transactions and accounting. By this action, Plaintiff seeks to recover damages incurred when the market price of Home-store common stock fell once the need for restatement became public.

More specifically, Plaintiff alleged in its complaint that Homestore’s management, including Defendants Peter Tafeen, former Executive Vice President of Business Development and Sales, and Stuart Wolff, former CEO and Chairman, were driven to achieve certain “revenue targets” that were set by analysts and, more generally, Wall Street. Examining a company’s revenues had become a means of measuring the value of, or predicting the potential future success of, many start-up companies that were not yet profitable. Plaintiff alleged that Homestore’s management became preoccupied, if not obsessed, with meeting or exceeding revenue goals. If those goals could not be legitimately achieved, Plaintiff alleged, management engaged in three different but related types of transactions with third party entities, all of which “created revenue” for Homestore through various ways that the transactions were constructed and “booked.” These are “barter transactions,” “buying revenues” or “revenue purchasing,” and “triangular transactions.” As time progressed, Plaintiff allege that the revenue transactions became more and more complex in order to keep PwC from questioning the accounting of the transactions.

“Barter transactions” are two-party, reciprocal (“back-and-forth”) transactions. At various times, but mostly early in the class period, Plaintiffs allege that Home- *777 store and other companies agreed to trade services, generally advertising on the Homestore.com web site in exchange for some amorphous service such as “web services” or “marketing solutions.” This would be a true barter transaction. However, instead of just trading those services, the two companies agreed to buy ■ each other’s services for an extremely exaggerated rate. For example, Homestore might pay $5 million for marketing solutions,, and the other company pays $5 million for advertising. Homestore then realizes the $5 million in revenues. In accounting for these transactions, Homestore was supposed to provide actual market value of the services, “net out” the cost of the reciprocal transaction (making the net revenue zero), and/or report the two transactions as linked. Plaintiffs allege that Homestore, with the assistance and guidance of PwC, often attempted to dissociate a pair of transactions temporally and legally by intentionally booking the transactions in two different quarters, thereby recognizing the revenue from the “sale” of its advertising:

“Buying revenues” are two-party transactions as well, and are very similar to the barter transactions. The difference is that in this instance Homestore traded stock “warrants” (a form of stock option) for some service, and received cash for some other service like advertising. The true transaction is the cash for the warrants, known as a “stock-for-revenue” transaction, which must be reported as such in accounting for the transactions.

“Triangular transactions,” or “round-tripping” transactions, were slightly more complex transactions involving three parties that were completed later in the class period. By way of example, AOL and Homestore .entered into a “revenue sharing agreement” or “advertising reseller agreement” in which AOL agreed to sell advertising for Homestore for a commission far above market value. This agreement may be valid on its own, but set the stage for allegedly improper transactions. Homestore would find some third party corporation, one that was thinly capitalized and in search of revenues in order to “go public.” Homestore then agreed to purchase shares in that company for inflated values or to purchase services or products that Homestore did not need. This transaction was contingent on the third party company “agreeing” in a “hidden leg” to buy advertising from AOL for most or all of what Homestore was paying them. The money thus flowed through the third party to AOL, which then took a commission and shared “revenue” with Homestore. This is an exceptionally expensive way to create revenue due to the cuts taken in each step along the way. This practice depleted the cash reserves of Homestore, but created “revenue” in order to meet the revenue targets, resulting in an inflated stock price.

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In Re HOMESTORE.COM, INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION, 347 F. Supp. 2d 769, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25307, 2004 WL 2792461 (C.D. Cal. 2004).

347 F. Supp. 2d 769 (In Re HOMESTORE.COM, INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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