RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1799-21 A-3484-22
R.S.,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
C.V.,
Defendant-Appellant. ________________________
Submitted February 13, 2025 – Decided February 24, 2025
Before Judges Natali and Walcott-Henderson. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Union County, Docket Nos. FV-20-1113-20 and FM-20-1136-20.
C.V., appellant pro se in A-1799-21 and respondent in A-3484-22.
R.S., respondent pro se in A-1799-21 and appellant in A-3484-22.
PER CURIAM
These appeals, calendared back-to-back and consolidated for purposes of
this opinion, have their genesis in the parties' volatile relationship and
contentious divorce. In A-1799-21, C.V.1 challenges the court's January 25,
2022 order that denied his application for frivolous litigation sanctions under
Rule 1:4-8 and N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1, related to his former wife's, R.S.'s,
unsuccessful request for a final restraining order (FRO) under the Prevention of
Domestic Violence Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to - 35 (PDVA). In A-3484-22, R.S.
appeals from the court's May 24, 2023 order that denied her application to
reconsider a provision of the parties' February 2, 2023 Dual Final Judgment of
Divorce (DFJOD), in which the court directed the parties' minor child's passport
and Overseas Citizen of India (OCI) card to "remain in the custody of [C.V.'s]
attorney . . . pending further [o]rder of the [c]ourt."
1 We use initials to protect the privacy of the parties. R. 1:38-3(d)(10). A-1799-21 2 For the reasons that follow, we affirm the court's January 25 order because
we are convinced the court did not abuse its discretion in denying C.V.'s fee
application. We similarly affirm the May 24 order as we are satisfied the court
properly exercised its equitable powers by entrusting the child's travel
documents to C.V.'s counsel.
A-1799-21
R.S. filed for and was granted a temporary restraining order (TRO) against
C.V. on February 24, 2020. After a sixteen-day trial, on July 27, 2021, the court
dissolved the TRO and denied R.S.'s application for a FRO. The court explained
its decision in an oral opinion and concluded R.S. failed to establish either prong
of the two-part test detailed in Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112 (App. Div.
2006), to warrant issuance of a FRO.
Despite denying R.S.'s application, the court nevertheless noted the
parties' history was "troubling" and R.S.'s allegations "very serious." The court
also observed that R.S. "candidly, sincerely, and honestly testified that she felt
controlled by [C.V.] and his family" and expressed sympathy toward her.
Conversely, the court called C.V.'s behavior "conniving," often adding that it
was "mean" and "nasty."
A-1799-21 3 On August 16, 2021, C.V. moved for frivolous litigation sanctions in the
form of fees and costs, totaling over $120,000. The court issued an order
denying the motion and explained its reasons for denying C.V.'s application in
a twenty-three-page written opinion. In denying C.V.'s application, the court
thoroughly addressed the parties' factual allegations, correctly cited and relied
on the applicable legal principles and concluded R.S.'s applications for relief
under the PDVA were not made "for the purpose of harassment, delay, or
malicious injury," but rather were "filed in good faith." The court relied on
M.W. v. R.L., 286 N.J. Super. 408, 411 (App. Div. 1995), and explained
awarding fees was unwarranted based on trial proofs as it would facilitate
another "intimidating," "mean and conniving act" by C.V.
Before us, C.V. argues that the trial court erred in denying frivolous
litigation sanctions because the proofs from the FRO proceeding affirmatively
established R.S.'s allegations were untrue and made only to secure an advantage
in the pending divorce proceedings. He emphasizes sanctions are appropriate in
domestic violence actions, like here, that are filed "in bad faith[ and] based on
. . . perjured testimony." He further asserts this "is [a] case where [he] was found
innocent . . . because of the . . . compelling and substantial evidence . . . and the
extreme extent of the frivolous nature of the allegations in the TRO."
A-1799-21 4 We reject all of C.V.'s arguments and affirm for the reasons expressed by
the court in its comprehensive and thorough written decision. We provide the
following comments to amplify our decision.
"[A] reviewing court will disturb a trial court's award of counsel fees 'only
on the rarest of occasions, and then only because of a clear abuse of discretion.'"
Litton Indus., Inc. v. IMO Indus., Inc., 200 N.J. 372, 386 (2009) (quoting
Packard-Bamberger & Co., Inc. v. Collier, 167 N.J. 427, 444 (2001)); see also,
e.g., McDaniel v. Man Wai Lee, 419 N.J. Super. 482, 498 (App. Div. 2011)
(decision to award attorney's fees as sanction for frivolous litigation reviewed
for abuse of discretion); Wolosky v. Fredon Twp., 472 N.J. Super. 315, 327
(App. Div. 2022) (same). "An abuse of discretion 'arises when a decision is
made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established
policies, or rested on an impermissible basis,'" or "when the discretionary act
was not premised upon consideration of all relevant factors, was based upon
consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors, or amount[ed] to a clear
error in judgment." Borough of Englewood Cliffs v. Trautner, 478 N.J. Super.
426, 437 (App. Div. 2024) (alteration in original) (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cnty.
Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002), and Ferolito v. Park Hill Ass'n, 408 N.J.
Super. 401, 407 (App. Div. 2009)). Further, a family court's factual findings are
A-1799-21 5 entitled to particular deference in light of their "special jurisdiction and expertise
in family matters," and should not be overturned so long as they are "supported
by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 227
N.J. 269, 282-83 (2016) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998)).
New Jersey courts generally follow the "American Rule," requiring each
litigant to bear their own costs regardless of who prevails. Innes v. Marzano-
Lesnevich, 224 N.J. 584, 592 (2016). However, in appropriate cases fees are
permitted for frivolous litigation under Rule 1:4-8 and N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1. See
United Hearts, L.L.C. v. Zahabian, 407 N.J. Super. 379, 389 (App. Div. 2009).
Under Rule 1:4-8, "[a] claim will be deemed frivolous or groundless when no
rational argument can be advanced in its support, when it is not supported by
any credible evidence, when a reasonable person could not have expected its
success, or when it is completely untenable." Belfer v. Merling, 322 N.J. Super.
124, 144 (App. Div. 1999).
However, even "[f]alse allegations of fact will not justify a fee award
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RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1799-21 A-3484-22
R.S.,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
C.V.,
Defendant-Appellant. ________________________
Submitted February 13, 2025 – Decided February 24, 2025
Before Judges Natali and Walcott-Henderson. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Union County, Docket Nos. FV-20-1113-20 and FM-20-1136-20.
C.V., appellant pro se in A-1799-21 and respondent in A-3484-22.
R.S., respondent pro se in A-1799-21 and appellant in A-3484-22.
PER CURIAM
These appeals, calendared back-to-back and consolidated for purposes of
this opinion, have their genesis in the parties' volatile relationship and
contentious divorce. In A-1799-21, C.V.1 challenges the court's January 25,
2022 order that denied his application for frivolous litigation sanctions under
Rule 1:4-8 and N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1, related to his former wife's, R.S.'s,
unsuccessful request for a final restraining order (FRO) under the Prevention of
Domestic Violence Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to - 35 (PDVA). In A-3484-22, R.S.
appeals from the court's May 24, 2023 order that denied her application to
reconsider a provision of the parties' February 2, 2023 Dual Final Judgment of
Divorce (DFJOD), in which the court directed the parties' minor child's passport
and Overseas Citizen of India (OCI) card to "remain in the custody of [C.V.'s]
attorney . . . pending further [o]rder of the [c]ourt."
1 We use initials to protect the privacy of the parties. R. 1:38-3(d)(10). A-1799-21 2 For the reasons that follow, we affirm the court's January 25 order because
we are convinced the court did not abuse its discretion in denying C.V.'s fee
application. We similarly affirm the May 24 order as we are satisfied the court
properly exercised its equitable powers by entrusting the child's travel
documents to C.V.'s counsel.
A-1799-21
R.S. filed for and was granted a temporary restraining order (TRO) against
C.V. on February 24, 2020. After a sixteen-day trial, on July 27, 2021, the court
dissolved the TRO and denied R.S.'s application for a FRO. The court explained
its decision in an oral opinion and concluded R.S. failed to establish either prong
of the two-part test detailed in Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112 (App. Div.
2006), to warrant issuance of a FRO.
Despite denying R.S.'s application, the court nevertheless noted the
parties' history was "troubling" and R.S.'s allegations "very serious." The court
also observed that R.S. "candidly, sincerely, and honestly testified that she felt
controlled by [C.V.] and his family" and expressed sympathy toward her.
Conversely, the court called C.V.'s behavior "conniving," often adding that it
was "mean" and "nasty."
A-1799-21 3 On August 16, 2021, C.V. moved for frivolous litigation sanctions in the
form of fees and costs, totaling over $120,000. The court issued an order
denying the motion and explained its reasons for denying C.V.'s application in
a twenty-three-page written opinion. In denying C.V.'s application, the court
thoroughly addressed the parties' factual allegations, correctly cited and relied
on the applicable legal principles and concluded R.S.'s applications for relief
under the PDVA were not made "for the purpose of harassment, delay, or
malicious injury," but rather were "filed in good faith." The court relied on
M.W. v. R.L., 286 N.J. Super. 408, 411 (App. Div. 1995), and explained
awarding fees was unwarranted based on trial proofs as it would facilitate
another "intimidating," "mean and conniving act" by C.V.
Before us, C.V. argues that the trial court erred in denying frivolous
litigation sanctions because the proofs from the FRO proceeding affirmatively
established R.S.'s allegations were untrue and made only to secure an advantage
in the pending divorce proceedings. He emphasizes sanctions are appropriate in
domestic violence actions, like here, that are filed "in bad faith[ and] based on
. . . perjured testimony." He further asserts this "is [a] case where [he] was found
innocent . . . because of the . . . compelling and substantial evidence . . . and the
extreme extent of the frivolous nature of the allegations in the TRO."
A-1799-21 4 We reject all of C.V.'s arguments and affirm for the reasons expressed by
the court in its comprehensive and thorough written decision. We provide the
following comments to amplify our decision.
"[A] reviewing court will disturb a trial court's award of counsel fees 'only
on the rarest of occasions, and then only because of a clear abuse of discretion.'"
Litton Indus., Inc. v. IMO Indus., Inc., 200 N.J. 372, 386 (2009) (quoting
Packard-Bamberger & Co., Inc. v. Collier, 167 N.J. 427, 444 (2001)); see also,
e.g., McDaniel v. Man Wai Lee, 419 N.J. Super. 482, 498 (App. Div. 2011)
(decision to award attorney's fees as sanction for frivolous litigation reviewed
for abuse of discretion); Wolosky v. Fredon Twp., 472 N.J. Super. 315, 327
(App. Div. 2022) (same). "An abuse of discretion 'arises when a decision is
made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established
policies, or rested on an impermissible basis,'" or "when the discretionary act
was not premised upon consideration of all relevant factors, was based upon
consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors, or amount[ed] to a clear
error in judgment." Borough of Englewood Cliffs v. Trautner, 478 N.J. Super.
426, 437 (App. Div. 2024) (alteration in original) (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cnty.
Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002), and Ferolito v. Park Hill Ass'n, 408 N.J.
Super. 401, 407 (App. Div. 2009)). Further, a family court's factual findings are
A-1799-21 5 entitled to particular deference in light of their "special jurisdiction and expertise
in family matters," and should not be overturned so long as they are "supported
by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 227
N.J. 269, 282-83 (2016) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998)).
New Jersey courts generally follow the "American Rule," requiring each
litigant to bear their own costs regardless of who prevails. Innes v. Marzano-
Lesnevich, 224 N.J. 584, 592 (2016). However, in appropriate cases fees are
permitted for frivolous litigation under Rule 1:4-8 and N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1. See
United Hearts, L.L.C. v. Zahabian, 407 N.J. Super. 379, 389 (App. Div. 2009).
Under Rule 1:4-8, "[a] claim will be deemed frivolous or groundless when no
rational argument can be advanced in its support, when it is not supported by
any credible evidence, when a reasonable person could not have expected its
success, or when it is completely untenable." Belfer v. Merling, 322 N.J. Super.
124, 144 (App. Div. 1999).
However, even "[f]alse allegations of fact will not justify a fee award
unless they are made in bad faith, for the purpose of harassment, delay, or
malicious injury." Ibid. "When the plaintiff's conduct bespeaks an honest
attempt to press a perceived, though ill-founded and perhaps misguided, claim,
[they] should not be found to have acted in bad faith." Id. at 144-45. Put another
A-1799-21 6 way, "[s]anctions for frivolous litigation are not imposed because a party is
wrong about the law and loses [their] case." Tagayun v. AmeriChoice of N.J.,
Inc., 446 N.J. Super. 570, 580 (App. Div. 2016); see also M.W., 286 N.J. at 411
(explaining "in enacting the Domestic Violence Act, the Legislature only made
provision for counsel fees for victims, and not for prevailing parties" in order to
"avoid a chilling effect on the willingness of domestic violence victims to come
forward with their complaints"). Additionally, the burden of proof rests with
the party seeking sanctions. Ferolito, 408 N.J. Super. at 408.
Applying the aforementioned principles, we are satisfied the court did not
abuse its considerable discretion when denying C.V.'s request for frivolous
litigation sanctions. When it denied R.S.'s application for an FRO it noted her
application was not meritless. On this point, the court recounted the trial
evidence to support its finding C.V. was "'conniving' and [his] 'nasty' behavior[]
. . . closely resembled domestic violence." It likewise underscored that C.V.'s
actions were "mean" and "not model behavior," explaining that "the mere fact
that the [c]ourt did not find that [C.V.] committed domestic violence" did not
render the action frivolous. The court recalled recognizing at the time of trial
that R.S. "had reason to file" the application in the face of behavior that "closely
resembled the legal definition of domestic violence." Only the court's sensitive
A-1799-21 7 assessment of credibility over the course of the sixteen-day trial led it to
conclude that R.S. had not met her burden under Silver.
In sum, the court's conclusion that R.S. had a viable, good-faith claim was
supported by the record. Because the court applied the law properly, based its
findings on evidence in the record, and adequately explained its reasoning, we
are convinced it properly exercised its discretion in denying C.V.'s motion for
frivolous litigation sanctions.
A-3484-22
We next address R.S.'s challenge to the May 24, 2023 order in which she
contends the judge improperly ceded responsibility for retaining and distributing
the child's travel documents to C.V.'s counsel. In sum, R.S. argues a proper
review of the record establishes that C.V.'s counsel conspired with him to seize
the documents in 2019, making his counsel an unsuitable custodian. Instead,
she argues the court should have entrusted the travel documents with a neutral
party.
In July 2016, the parties entered into a marriage arranged by their families .
At the time the marriage was arranged, C.V. was living in the United States and
R.S. lived and worked in Singapore. The two met only once before the
A-1799-21 8 ceremony, which took place in India. After R.S. obtained a visa, the parties
settled in New Jersey. In September of 2017, the couple's only child was born.
On December 7, 2019, C.V. moved out of the marital home. R.S. testified
that, before he left, C.V. attempted to unilaterally take both the child's and his
travel documents. According to R.S., C.V. had left unilaterally before, departing
with their child when he was only a month old and was absent for a week. As a
result, R.S. believed C.V. was attempting to kidnap their son and called the
police.
On February 23, 2020, the day R.S. was served with the divorce
complaint, the child was at C.V.'s new apartment. R.S. reported that, based on
conversation with C.V.'s family, she was worried he would take their son and
fly to India. In response, R.S. again called the police and asserted that C.V. had
kidnapped their son.
Although the police conducted a welfare check, they took no action until
the following day. On February 24, 2020, R.S. obtained a TRO against C.V.,
the resolution of which we previously addressed in our discussion of A-1799-
21. The TRO, as later modified by the court, materially limited C.V.'s parenting
time with his son. C.V. was served with the restraining order that night, at which
point police took the child from his custody. According to C.V., he next saw
A-1799-21 9 the child around March 11, 2020, after he was "granted alternate weekends
visitation."
On March 26, 2020, the court issued a tentative disposition proposing
pendente lite relief in the divorce action. As relevant to this appeal, the court
proposed that neither party be permitted to "leave the jurisdiction with the minor
child without further [o]rder of the [c]ourt or consent of the other party."
Additionally, the court noted that it would "not be practical" for the court to hold
the child's passport during the height of the COVID-19 emergency and directed
that R.S.'s counsel hold the document in escrow.
In December 2021, in the divorce action, the court issued further interim
relief. At that point, R.S. was self-represented. Therefore, the court ordered
that the child's passport be transferred from escrow with R.S.'s previous firm, to
her successor counsel as soon as they were retained. The court also appointed a
parenting coordinator.
While the parties were able to settle the financial aspect of the divorce,
they proceeded to a three-day trial on the custody and parenting time issues.
Relevant to this appeal, C.V. claimed that in July 2019, R.S. had taken the travel
documents from their "common document bag" without telling him. He also
alleged that after R.S. and their son returned from a trip to India in December
A-1799-21 10 2019, she refused to show him their son's passport, instead hiding it in a laundry
bag instead and threatening to call the police when he found it.
R.S. told a different story, alleging that on that day, C.V. tried to take their
son and his travel documents. Additionally, R.S. noted while the court had
ordered her to surrender the son's passport to her former attorney to be kept in
trust, it failed to order the same for the OCI card. She testified that C.V. had
therefore kept the card and still had it at the time of trial. R.S. suggested that
both documents be given to the parenting coordinator as a neutral party.
On February 2, 2023, the court issued a DFJOD. Among other provisions,
the court ordered that the child "not be removed from the United States absent
written agreement between the parties or further [o]rder of this [c]ourt," but it
did not specify where his travel documents should be kept.
Later that month, R.S.'s new attorney wrote a letter to the court. It
purportedly responded to a letter from C.V.'s attorney that has not been made
part of the record on appeal. The letter apparently addressed several issues
regarding parenting time, child support, and their son's travel documents.
Regarding the travel documents issue, counsel informed the court that he had
reached out to C.V.'s counsel to propose that the newly appointed parenting
coordinator take possession of them but received no response. Counsel,
A-1799-21 11 however, urged the court not to decide the issues because there were no formal
motions pending and the court lacked the information necessary to decide the
issues presented.
R.S. subsequently filed a formal motion for reconsideration of the DFJOD,
requesting, among other relief, corrections and clarifications of certain parenting
time issues and an order requiring the son's passport and OCI card to be
deposited with the parenting coordinator. She expressed significant concerns
about either parent having access to the documents, unmediated by a neutral
party. In March of 2023, C.V. cross-moved seeking, in part, an order that the
son's travel documents be "released by [R.S.'s former counsel] to [C.V.]'s
counsel," to be "kept in escrow . . . not to be released to either party without a
court order." C.V. also proposed that he be allowed to obtain the documents for
the purpose of renewing them, and that R.S. be ordered to cooperate in such
renewal.
On May 24, 2023, the court ordered that the child's "passport shall be
released by [R.S.'s former counsel], and [C.V.]'s attorney . . . shall keep the
child's passport until further [o]rder." While the order did not mention the OCI
card, the accompanying statement of reasons clarified that both documents
would be held by C.V.'s counsel. The court also directed that the parties
A-1799-21 12 "cooperate and sign all necessary documents in order for [C.V.] to renew the
child's passport and OCI Card." As noted, R.S. argues that the court erred in
directing C.V.'s attorney to take possession of their son's travel documents. 2 We
are unconvinced.
The Family Part "is a court of equity, meaning a court of fairness."
Kakstys v. Stevens, 442 N.J. Super. 501, 506 (App. Div. 2015). As such, it is
vested with "inherent equitable authority to fashion appropriate remedies." Div.
of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. M.W., 398 N.J. Super. 266, 295 (App. Div. 2008).
We overturn an equitable remedy only in the event of an "abuse of discretion,
or where the judge's conclusions prove inconsistent with [their] own findings of
fact." Tarta Luna Props., LLC v. Harvest Rest. Grp. LLC, 466 N.J. Super. 137,
153 (App. Div. 2021).
We find no basis in the record to disturb the court's equitable decision to
entrust the travel documents to C.V.'s counsel. We are satisfied that the Family
Part judge who issued the order, and who also tried the matrimonial action, and
2 R.S.'s merits brief also raises alleged deficiencies pertaining to unrelated portions of the court's orders but specifically disclaims any desire to modify those portions. Because there is no point in controversy, nor any relief that this court may grant, we do not discuss these points further. See De Vesa v. Dorsey, 134 N.J. 420, 428 (1993) (explaining that an appellate court "normally will not entertain cases when a controversy no longer exists"). A-1799-21 13 was fully aware of the facts and acrimony between the parties, properly
exercised his equitable powers when he appointed C.V.'s attorney, an officer of
the court, as custodian of the child's travel documents, and directed those
documents to remain in counsel's custody "pending further [o]rder of the
[c]ourt."
To the extent we have not addressed any remaining arguments, it is
because they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R.
2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed in A-1799-21 and affirmed in A-3484-22.
A-1799-21 14