NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________
No. 25-1356 ___________
RP WYNSTONE LP; REAL PRO ENTERPRISES LP; PROVIDENT TRUST GROUP LLC; GENERAL HANCOCK PARTNERSHIP ENTERPRISES LP; TROLLYLINE ENTERPRISES LP; AT REALTY LP; AKM PROPERTIES LP; PROVIDENT TRUST GROUP LLC FBO BENJAMIN GOLDTHORP ROTH IRA; PROVIDENT TRUST GROUP LLC FBO CLAYTON HECKLER IRA
v.
TOWNSHIP OF NEW HANOVER; NEW HANOVER TOWNSHIP AUTHORITY; BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF NEW HANOVER TOWNSHIP; JAMIE GWYNN; WILLIAM ROSS SNOOK; KURT ZEBROWSKI; MARIE LIVELSBERGER; BOONE FLINT; THOMAS MISKIEWICZ; CHARLES GARNER; RUSSEL OISTER; SUSAN SMITH; WILLIAM MOYER; KNIGHT ENGINEERING INC; DANIEL GRAY; CEDARVILLE ENGINEERING GROUP LLC; ROBERT FLINCHBAUGH
RP Wynstone LP; Real Pro Enterprises LP; General Hancock Partnership Enterprises LP; Trollyline Enterprises LP; AT Realty LP; AKM Properties LP FBO Benjamin Goldthorp Roth IRA; Provident Trust Group LLC FBO Clayton Heckler IRA, Appellants __________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 2:24-cv-00959) District Judge: Hon. Joel H. Slomsky ____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) February 2, 2026 Before: HARDIMAN, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and ROTH, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: March 3, 2026) ____________
OPINION * ____________
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
This appeal arises from a longstanding land-use dispute in New Hanover,
Pennsylvania. Plaintiffs are real estate companies and investors (the Developers). They
sought to develop about 230 acres of property as “a mixed-used development” with
single-family homes, multi-family homes, and commercial space. App. 95. Though the
Developers received preliminary approval for one of their plans in 2007, the projects
stalled, and several state lawsuits followed.
In this federal court action, filed on March 5, 2024, the Developers sued New
Hanover Township and related parties (collectively, the Township) under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. They alleged constitutional violations and conspiracy. They claimed that the
Township, in an effort to limit its racial diversity, undertook a lengthy campaign to
obstruct their projects by, inter alia, passing onerous ordinances, refusing to grant
extensions, and arbitrarily denying their plans.
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.
2 The District Court dismissed the Developers’ claims for a variety of reasons. We
will affirm, essentially for the reasons the District Court articulated in its thorough and
careful opinion.
I1
We start with the two-year statute of limitations, which precludes most of the
Developers’ claims. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(2); Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634
(3d Cir. 2009); Ammlung v. City of Chester, 494 F.2d 811, 814–15 (3d Cir. 1974). The
Developers acknowledge that all acts alleged in the complaint occurred outside that
period, except for two: (1) the Township Manager’s June 2022 settlement offer; and
(2) Knight Engineering’s October 2023 letter to the Township reviewing the Developers’
August 2023 revised plan (and referencing one of the ordinances the Developers say was
enacted to obstruct their plans). Invoking the continuing violation doctrine, the
Developers argue that these two acts were part of an ongoing course of conduct that tolls
the statute of limitations. See Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 165 (3d
Cir. 2013). We disagree.
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of an order granting a motion to dismiss is plenary. Huertas v. Bayer US LLC, 120 F.4th 1169, 1174 (3d Cir. 2024). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation modified). At the motion to dismiss stage, “we are required to accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 350 (3d Cir. 2005).
3 For starters, “the continuing violation doctrine does not apply when the plaintiff is
aware of the injury at the time it occurred.” Montanez v. Sec’y of Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 773
F.3d 472, 481 (3d Cir. 2014) (citation modified). With allegations dating as far back as
2018, and related state litigation beginning in 2020, the Developers were well aware of
each injury when it occurred and could have sued back then. See id.
Moreover, as the District Court determined, neither the settlement offer nor the
routine issuance of an engineer’s review letter were obstructive conduct constituting
“continual unlawful acts.” Weis-Buy Servs., Inc. v. Paglia, 411 F.3d 415, 423 (3d Cir.
2005) (citation modified). Instead, they were discrete acts that cannot revive untimely
causes of action. See O’Connor v. City of Newark, 440 F.3d 125, 127 (3d Cir. 2006). In
short, because the Developers “failed to assert [their] rights in a timely fashion,” all their
claims are untimely as they relate to any factual allegations predating March 5, 2022.
Montanez, 773 F.3d at 481.
II
We now consider whether either the June 2022 settlement offer or the October
2023 letter support a claim upon which relief can be granted.
First, take the Developers’ substantive due process claims. “Land-use decisions,”
in particular, “are matters of local concern, and such disputes should not be transformed
into substantive due process claims based only on allegations that government officials
acted with ‘improper’ motives.” United Artists Theatre Cir., Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington,
PA, 316 F.3d 392, 402 (3d Cir. 2003). Instead, those actions must “shock[] the
conscience.” Id. at 400.
4 The complaint states that Knight Engineering’s October 2023 review of the latest
development plan resulted in a letter to New Hanover Township which “noted [the]
requirements” of one of the Township’s ordinances. App. 120. Such anodyne facts about
Knight Engineering’s work, which merely referenced a disfavored ordinance, do not
constitute conscience-shocking behavior, as the District Court rightly held.
The June 2022 settlement offer likewise fails to support an allegation of
conscience-shocking behavior. The complaint alleges only that the Township Manager
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________
No. 25-1356 ___________
RP WYNSTONE LP; REAL PRO ENTERPRISES LP; PROVIDENT TRUST GROUP LLC; GENERAL HANCOCK PARTNERSHIP ENTERPRISES LP; TROLLYLINE ENTERPRISES LP; AT REALTY LP; AKM PROPERTIES LP; PROVIDENT TRUST GROUP LLC FBO BENJAMIN GOLDTHORP ROTH IRA; PROVIDENT TRUST GROUP LLC FBO CLAYTON HECKLER IRA
v.
TOWNSHIP OF NEW HANOVER; NEW HANOVER TOWNSHIP AUTHORITY; BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF NEW HANOVER TOWNSHIP; JAMIE GWYNN; WILLIAM ROSS SNOOK; KURT ZEBROWSKI; MARIE LIVELSBERGER; BOONE FLINT; THOMAS MISKIEWICZ; CHARLES GARNER; RUSSEL OISTER; SUSAN SMITH; WILLIAM MOYER; KNIGHT ENGINEERING INC; DANIEL GRAY; CEDARVILLE ENGINEERING GROUP LLC; ROBERT FLINCHBAUGH
RP Wynstone LP; Real Pro Enterprises LP; General Hancock Partnership Enterprises LP; Trollyline Enterprises LP; AT Realty LP; AKM Properties LP FBO Benjamin Goldthorp Roth IRA; Provident Trust Group LLC FBO Clayton Heckler IRA, Appellants __________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 2:24-cv-00959) District Judge: Hon. Joel H. Slomsky ____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) February 2, 2026 Before: HARDIMAN, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and ROTH, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: March 3, 2026) ____________
OPINION * ____________
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
This appeal arises from a longstanding land-use dispute in New Hanover,
Pennsylvania. Plaintiffs are real estate companies and investors (the Developers). They
sought to develop about 230 acres of property as “a mixed-used development” with
single-family homes, multi-family homes, and commercial space. App. 95. Though the
Developers received preliminary approval for one of their plans in 2007, the projects
stalled, and several state lawsuits followed.
In this federal court action, filed on March 5, 2024, the Developers sued New
Hanover Township and related parties (collectively, the Township) under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. They alleged constitutional violations and conspiracy. They claimed that the
Township, in an effort to limit its racial diversity, undertook a lengthy campaign to
obstruct their projects by, inter alia, passing onerous ordinances, refusing to grant
extensions, and arbitrarily denying their plans.
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.
2 The District Court dismissed the Developers’ claims for a variety of reasons. We
will affirm, essentially for the reasons the District Court articulated in its thorough and
careful opinion.
I1
We start with the two-year statute of limitations, which precludes most of the
Developers’ claims. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(2); Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634
(3d Cir. 2009); Ammlung v. City of Chester, 494 F.2d 811, 814–15 (3d Cir. 1974). The
Developers acknowledge that all acts alleged in the complaint occurred outside that
period, except for two: (1) the Township Manager’s June 2022 settlement offer; and
(2) Knight Engineering’s October 2023 letter to the Township reviewing the Developers’
August 2023 revised plan (and referencing one of the ordinances the Developers say was
enacted to obstruct their plans). Invoking the continuing violation doctrine, the
Developers argue that these two acts were part of an ongoing course of conduct that tolls
the statute of limitations. See Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 165 (3d
Cir. 2013). We disagree.
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of an order granting a motion to dismiss is plenary. Huertas v. Bayer US LLC, 120 F.4th 1169, 1174 (3d Cir. 2024). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation modified). At the motion to dismiss stage, “we are required to accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 350 (3d Cir. 2005).
3 For starters, “the continuing violation doctrine does not apply when the plaintiff is
aware of the injury at the time it occurred.” Montanez v. Sec’y of Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 773
F.3d 472, 481 (3d Cir. 2014) (citation modified). With allegations dating as far back as
2018, and related state litigation beginning in 2020, the Developers were well aware of
each injury when it occurred and could have sued back then. See id.
Moreover, as the District Court determined, neither the settlement offer nor the
routine issuance of an engineer’s review letter were obstructive conduct constituting
“continual unlawful acts.” Weis-Buy Servs., Inc. v. Paglia, 411 F.3d 415, 423 (3d Cir.
2005) (citation modified). Instead, they were discrete acts that cannot revive untimely
causes of action. See O’Connor v. City of Newark, 440 F.3d 125, 127 (3d Cir. 2006). In
short, because the Developers “failed to assert [their] rights in a timely fashion,” all their
claims are untimely as they relate to any factual allegations predating March 5, 2022.
Montanez, 773 F.3d at 481.
II
We now consider whether either the June 2022 settlement offer or the October
2023 letter support a claim upon which relief can be granted.
First, take the Developers’ substantive due process claims. “Land-use decisions,”
in particular, “are matters of local concern, and such disputes should not be transformed
into substantive due process claims based only on allegations that government officials
acted with ‘improper’ motives.” United Artists Theatre Cir., Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington,
PA, 316 F.3d 392, 402 (3d Cir. 2003). Instead, those actions must “shock[] the
conscience.” Id. at 400.
4 The complaint states that Knight Engineering’s October 2023 review of the latest
development plan resulted in a letter to New Hanover Township which “noted [the]
requirements” of one of the Township’s ordinances. App. 120. Such anodyne facts about
Knight Engineering’s work, which merely referenced a disfavored ordinance, do not
constitute conscience-shocking behavior, as the District Court rightly held.
The June 2022 settlement offer likewise fails to support an allegation of
conscience-shocking behavior. The complaint alleges only that the Township Manager
offered to settle related state litigation if the Developers agreed to modify their
development plans. A standard settlement offer does not rise to the level of “the most
egregious official conduct” that “shocks the conscience.” Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Indiana,
385 F.3d 274, 285 (3d Cir. 2004) (emphasis added). See id. at 286 (no substantive due
process violation where the plaintiffs had alleged local officials “delayed certain permits
and approvals” and “maligned and muzzled” the plaintiffs). The Developers therefore
failed to state a substantive due process claim.
So too with the Developers’ equal protection claim. To succeed, the Developers
would have to show that: (1) they were treated differently from similarly situated
individuals; and (2) the differential treatment was based on an unjustifiable standard.
Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 184 n.5 (3d Cir. 2010). We agree with the
District Court that the Developers have failed to allege that similarly situated land
developers were treated differently.
As alleged, the Township did not treat these Developers differently from any other
land developers. The complaint itself acknowledges that “the Township has effectively
5 stopped all building and land development,” and that it “has not approved any major
subdivision and land development plans” in the last several years. App. 94 (emphasis
added). So the Developers failed to state an equal protection claim. And because they
failed to state a claim for either of the underlying offenses, the civil conspiracy
allegations fail as well. See Boyanowski v. Cap. Area Intermediate Unit, 215 F.3d 396,
405 (3d Cir. 2000).
***
For the reasons stated, we will affirm the order granting the motion to dismiss.