Filed 8/25/26 Royer v. Los Rios Community College Dist. CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
TINA ROYER, C103281 Plaintiff and Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. 34-2021-
v. 00295849-CU-OE-GDS)
LOS RIOS COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT, Defendant and Respondent.
This case comes back to us a second time, following a remand to the trial court to take further action on a special motion to strike filed pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (hereafter section 425.16 or the anti-SLAPP statute).1 Tina Royer sued her employer, the Los Rios Community College District (the District), for invasion of privacy and also asserted several causes of action alleging violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.), including harassment and discrimination on the basis of race or religion, retaliation for reporting harassment and discrimination, and failure to reasonably accommodate a disability. The District filed a special motion to strike, also known as an anti-SLAPP motion. In particular, it moved to strike the entirety of the causes of action for invasion
1 The acronym SLAPP stands for “strategic lawsuits against public participation.” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 85 & fn. 1.)
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of privacy and harassment, and portions of the causes of action for discrimination, retaliation, and failure to prevent harassment. The trial court granted the motion as to the discrimination cause of action and denied it as to the other causes of action, and the District appealed.
We reversed the trial court’s order as to the cause of action for harassment, finding Royer did not establish a probability of prevailing on that claim. We also reversed the order as to the cause of action for invasion of privacy, finding the trial court erred in finding it did not arise out of protected activity, and we remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether Royer established a probability of prevailing. In all other respects, we affirmed the order. (Royer v. Los Rios Community College Dist. (Mar. 5, 2024, C096484) [nonpub. opn.].)
On remand, the trial court found Royer did not establish a probability of prevailing on her invasion of privacy claim and thus granted the District’s motion to strike that claim. Royer appeals, and we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2 As alleged in the complaint, Royer was a tenured professor with the District who worked at Folsom Lake College and was the chair of the English department. Josh Fernandez was an English professor at Folsom Lake College. Royer is Caucasian, Christian, married to a Christian minister, and active in her church, and she alleged, “[h]er Christian background and conservative views are known to her colleagues” at Folsom Lake College. Fernandez is Hispanic and is affiliated with Antifa, which Royer characterized as a “domestic terrorist organization.” According to Royer, Fernandez had
2 We take the facts from the allegations in the complaint and the evidence filed in support of and opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion. (See § 425.16, subd. (b)(2) [when ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion, the court “shall consider the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based”].)
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a history of conducting targeted harassment campaigns against those who do not share his views, and he harassed her based on her race and her religion. She complained to the District about Fernandez’s conduct, but it failed to take steps to stop the harassment, and it retaliated against her. And when she asked to work remotely in order to avoid Fernandez and as a reasonable accommodation for a disability, the District told her, “the accommodation did not work for them,” and they removed some of her responsibilities, which resulted “in a loss of pay.”
As relevant here, Royer also alleged she submitted a “Discrimination Complaint”
or a “Claim” to the District, and the District published that claim on its website in advance of the board meeting at which it would be discussed, and it is the publication of this claim that forms the basis of her cause of action for invasion of privacy. The claim contained Royer’s home address and information about the medical diagnosis on which her failure to accommodate claim was based. She alleged that, almost immediately after the claim and her address were published, her home and church became the subject of targeted harassment by “[s]trangers” who “[met] the profile” of Antifa members. She alleged these strangers parked in her driveway; shone their lights into her house at night; drove up and down her street and parked across from her house; openly stood in front of her house for extended periods of time; and took photographs of her house and her family. She also alleged someone shot out a window of a car parked in her driveway and she found a “horror film mask” hanging in a tree on her property. Royer and her family felt so threatened that they temporarily relocated so they could install security monitoring equipment and they considered moving. She also alleged that people contacted her after the claim was published and “asked questions about her medical condition.”
Based on these allegations, Royer sued the District for invasion of privacy (among other things), and the District filed an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing the cause of action arose from protected activity and Royer could not establish a probability of prevailing. The evidence in support of and opposition to the motion showed the following.
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When she submitted her claim, Royer utilized the District’s “Discrimination Complaint Form,” which is a one-page fill-in-the-blank form that asks for the complainant’s name, address, phone number, and e-mail, as well as specific information about the complaint. Royer stated she “very specifically typed” on the form that it “was both a claim form, as well as my Discrimination Complaint, … as it was my understanding that I could do so without submitting duplicate documents.” As can be seen on the form itself, immediately beneath the words “Discrimination Complaint Form” Royer typed, “and Government Tort Claim (Gov’t Code Sections 905, et seq.).” Government Code section 905 et seq. are part of the Government Claims Act, which we will discuss in more detail below.3 On the form, Royer provided her address and checked boxes signifying she alleged discrimination based on “Physical or Mental Disability,” among other things.
Royer attached a three-page document to the form captioned, “Attachment to Discrimination Complaint Form and Government Tort Claim.” The attachment stated, “This is an attachment to the Los Rios Community College District Discrimination Complaint and is intended to provide facts concerning incidents causing damage to the Claimant. This is also submitted as and is also intended to be … Notice of a Government Tort Claim pursuant to Cal. Government Code §§800-996.6 [i.e., the Government Claims Act].” The attachment contained a narrative description of Royer’s complaints that is
3 The Government Claims Act used to be referred to as the Tort Claims Act, but in City of Stockton v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 741, our Supreme Court found “that ‘Government Claims Act’ is a more appropriate short title,” and the Legislature subsequently amended Government Code section 810 to adopt that title. Because earlier cases continue to be cited, however, it is still sometimes referred to as the Tort Claims Act or the Government Tort Claims Act (see, e.g., Tindall v. County of Nevada (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 78, 86; O.B. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 930, 933), and we note Royer and the District generally refer to Royer’s claim as a “Government Tort Claim” or a “Tort Claim.”
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similar to the allegations made in this lawsuit. The attachment also stated Royer was “a qualified individual with a disability under California law,” and it briefly described the medical diagnosis underlying her disability. We will refer to the form and the three-page attachment collectively as the “claim.”
Royer stated that when she met with District administrators concerning her complaints, she was told her “Discrimination Complaint was strictly confidential and … the information [she] provided to the District would be kept confidential.”4 (Underlining omitted.) She also stated this promise of confidentiality was “important to [her] because [she] had to reveal my disability status.”
Jacob Knapp, who was the District’s associate vice chancellor of human resources at the time of the events giving rise to this lawsuit, referred to Royer’s claim as a “Government Tort Claim” or a “Tort Claim,” and he provided the following information about such claims: “Prior to and during 2019, the District had a standard practice of placing Government Tort Claims on an agenda for consideration by the District’s Board in open session at an upcoming Board meeting. It was also the District’s standard practice to include agenda materials with the agenda. These items were generally posted online. [¶] … Consistent with its standard practice, the District placed [Royer’s] Tort Claim on the agenda for consideration by the District’s Board in open session at its November 13, 2019 Board meeting. Also consistent with the District’s standard practice, a copy of the Tort Claim was included with the agenda materials.” Royer’s claim was thus among the agenda materials that were posted on the District’s website in advance of the board meeting.
Royer stated that shortly after the claim was posted, she received a call from a professor who worked at another college and “was shocked to learn from her that my
4 Royer does not state she was told a claim submitted pursuant to the Government Claims Act would be kept confidential.
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claim had been published without redacting my medical information or my address/private contact information.” She stated she thereafter “received multiple telephone calls, both positive and negative, regarding my claims. My colleagues throughout the District asked me questions about my medical condition as well as questions about my harassment and discrimination claims against the District. I was mortified.”
Royer also stated that “within days of [the District] publishing my home address,”
she began being stalked and harassed at her home and her church by “[s]trangers” meeting the profile of Antifa protagonists. In addition to repeating the allegations in the complaint, she also provided additional details about the harassment, including that she observed individuals sitting outside her church taking photographs of the license plates of parishioners’ cars, and in January 2020, her church was broken into and ransacked.
As noted above, the trial court initially denied the motion to strike the invasion of privacy cause of action, finding it did not arise from protected activity, the District appealed, and we reversed, finding the claim did arise from protected activity. We remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether Royer established a probability of prevailing.
On remand, the trial court found Royer did not establish a probability of prevailing on her invasion of privacy cause of action for two separate reasons. First, it found that although Royer had a legally protected privacy interest in both her address and her medical diagnosis, she did not have a reasonable expectation that they would be kept private once she included them in a government tort claim filed as a precursor to
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litigation.5 Second, it found the District’s publication of the claim was absolutely privileged pursuant to Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b). The trial court thus granted the special motion to strike the invasion of privacy cause of action, and this appeal followed. (§ 425.16, subd. (i) [“An order granting or denying a special motion to strike shall be appealable”].)
DISCUSSION
I
Anti-SLAPP Principles and Standard of Review Section 425.16 is a procedural device for weeding out certain “meritless claims” at the early stages of litigation. (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384, italics omitted.) It provides, “A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution … shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) Courts frequently refer to acts in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech as “protected activity.” (See Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009; Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1062.) Protected activity includes any statement or writing made in an “official proceeding authorized by law” or in connection with an issue under consideration or review in such a proceeding. (§ 425.16, subd. (e).)
Resolution of an anti-SLAPP motion “requires the court to engage in a two-step”
process. (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67.) At the
5 The elements of a cause of action for invasion of privacy are “(1) a legally protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances; and (3) conduct by defendant constituting a serious invasion of privacy.” (Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 39-40.)
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first step, the defendant has the burden of establishing the challenged claim arises from protected activity. (Id. at p. 61.) In order to determine whether the defendant has met its burden, the court must “identify the activity” by the defendant on which the challenged claim rests and then determine whether “that activity is protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 884.) The court “must ‘consider the elements of the challenged claim and what actions by the defendant supply those elements and consequently form the basis for liability’ ” and must “evaluate whether the defendant has shown any of these actions fall within one or more of the four protected categories of ‘ “act[s]” ’ protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Ibid., italics omitted.) “If the acts alleged in support of the plaintiff’s claim are of the sort protected by the anti-SLAPP statute,” then the claim arises from protected activity, and the court proceeds to the second step. (Id. at p. 887.)
At the second step, the plaintiff has the burden of “establish[ing] that there is a probability [it] will prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) The plaintiff’s burden is not heavy, and it “need only establish that [its] claim has ‘minimal merit’ [citation] to avoid being stricken as a SLAPP.” (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 291.) In order to meet its burden, “the plaintiff must show both that the claim is legally sufficient and there is admissible evidence that, if credited, would be sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment.” (McGarry v. University of San Diego (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 97, 108.) As relevant here, however, a long line of authority holds, “ ‘A plaintiff cannot establish a probability of prevailing if [a] privilege precludes a defendant’s liability on the claims.’ ” (Bergstein v. Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 793, 814; see also Laker v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 745, 769 [“If the challenged action falls within [a] privilege, the trial court should grant an anti-SLAPP motion to strike”]; Contreras v. Dowling (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 394, 415 [plaintiff “cannot establish a probability of prevailing if [a] privilege precludes [defendant’s] liability on her claim”]; Flatley v.
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Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 323 [“The … privilege is … relevant to the second step in the anti-SLAPP analysis in that it may present a substantive defense a plaintiff must overcome to demonstrate a probability of prevailing”].)
“We review de novo the grant or denial of an anti-SLAPP motion.” (Park v.
Board of Trustees of California State University, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1067.) Although our review is de novo, “[t]he usual rules of appellate review apply: A trial court’s judgment is presumed correct, and the appellant bears the burden to demonstrate the trial court committed an error justifying reversal.” (Semaan v. Mosier (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 460, 468; see also Meridian Financial Services, Inc. v. Phan (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 657, 708 [“even on de novo review” “the trial court’s judgment is presumed correct, and the burden is on the Appellants to demonstrate reversible error”].) It is thus Royer’s burden to show the trial court erred in granting the anti-SLAPP motion.
II
Analysis
Royer’s invasion of privacy cause of action is based on the District’s publication of her claim on its website without redacting her home address and medical information and the harm that befell her as a result. In our prior decision, we found the District’s publication of her claim fell within the anti-SLAPP statute’s definition of protected activity because it was a statement or writing made in an “official proceeding authorized by law” or in connection with an issue under consideration or review in such a proceeding. (§ 425.16, subd. (e).) Despite our ruling, much of Royer’s argument concerns whether her invasion of privacy claims arises out of protected activity. We have already decided that issue and Royer gives us no reason to revisit it. As the District accurately notes, this appeal concerns a narrow issue — namely, whether Royer demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the merits of her invasion of privacy claim. As to that narrow issue, we agree with the trial court’s finding that publishing her claim
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was absolutely privileged by Civil Code section 47, and Royer thus cannot establish a probability of prevailing.6 A. Civil Code section 47 Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) (hereafter section 47(b)), provides, “A privileged publication or broadcast is one made: [¶] … [¶] (b) In any (1) legislative proceeding, (2) judicial proceeding, (3) in any other official proceeding authorized by law, or (4) in the initiation or course of any other proceeding authorized by law and reviewable” by writ of mandate. Although most cases discussing section 47(b) deal with the so-called litigation privilege for publications made in a judicial proceeding, here we are concerned with the privilege for publications made in an official proceeding authorized by law. We note, however, that case law applying the privilege “to judicial proceedings is applicable with equal force to other official proceedings authorized by law.” (Frisk v. Merrihew (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 319, 324.)
The privilege created by section 47(b) is “absolute; it applies … regardless whether the communication was made with malice or the intent to harm. [Citation.] Put another way, application of the privilege does not depend on the publisher’s ‘motives, morals, ethics or intent.’ ” (Kashian v. Harriman (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 892, 913; see also California Physicians’ Service v. Superior Court (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1321, 1330 [privilege applies even if publication is made “in bad faith” or “for inappropriate purpose”]; Rader v. Thrasher (1972) 22 Cal.App.3d 883, 887 [“ ‘Publications made in the course of a[n official] proceeding are absolutely privileged … [citations] even though they are made with actual malice’ ” (italics omitted)].) And again: “Civil Code section
6 We thus need not, and do not, discuss the trial court’s alternative finding that Royer could not establish a probability of prevailing because she did not have a reasonable expectation her address and medical diagnosis would be kept private once she included them in a government claim.
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47, subdivision (b) provides absolute immunity for publications and statements made in an ‘official proceeding authorized by law.’ ” (Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Powell (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 955, 971; see also King v. Borges (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 27, 32 [communications made in an “ ‘official proceeding authorized by law’ and thus within the ambit of Civil Code section 47 … would be absolutely privileged”].) The privilege applies to any publication that “ ‘has a reasonable relation to the [official proceeding] and is permitted by law.’ ” (Frank Pisano & Associates v. Taggart (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 1, 25.) “Although originally applied only to defamation actions, the privilege has been extended to any communication, not just a publication, having ‘some relation’ to a[n official] proceeding, and to all torts other than malicious prosecution.” (Kashian, at p. 913, italics omitted.) The privilege thus “immunize[s] defendants from tort liability based on theories of” “invasion of privacy.” (Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 215; see also Ribas v. Clark (1985) 38 Cal.3d 355, 364 [“the privilege will defeat claims of invasion of privacy”].)
The anti-SLAPP statute and section 47(b) both use the same phrase — “official proceeding authorized by law” — and we interpret the phrase analogously in both statutes. (See Doe v. San Diego-Imperial Council (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 301, 313-315 [interpreting phrase “favorable conclusion” used in two different statutes the same way]; Lee v. Fick (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 89, 96 [noting “the ‘official proceeding[s]’ provision of [the anti-SLAPP statute] has language parallel to that contained in the ‘official proceeding[s]’ provision of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b),” and by finding alleged libel was privileged under § 47, the court also “implicitly found that both prongs of the two-part analysis required by [the anti-SLAPP statute] had been satisfied”].) In our prior decision, we found the District’s publication of Royer’s claim on its website was a statement or writing made in an “official proceeding authorized by law” within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute. For the same reasons, we find it was also a
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publication in an “official proceeding authorized by law” within the meaning of section 47(b).
An “official” proceeding has been defined as a “governmental” proceeding (Eisenberg v. Alameda Newspapers, Inc. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1377), and school districts are governmental entities (see Department of Finance v. Commission on State Mandates (2003) 30 Cal.4th 727, 751, fn. 20). And as we noted in our prior decision, the phrase “official proceeding authorized by law” includes “proceedings required by statute.” (Laker v. Board of Trustees of California State University, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 764.) Here, there are two statutes that are relevant to our analysis of the privilege: the Government Claims Act and the Ralph M. Brown Act. We discuss both statutes in the next section. B. The Government Claims Act and the Ralph M. Brown Act The Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.) “require[s], as a condition precedent to bringing suit for ‘money or damages’ against a … public entity, the timely presentation to the defendant of a written claim and the rejection of that claim in whole or in part” by the public entity. (Loehr v. Ventura County Community College Dist. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 1071, 1078, italics omitted; see also Gov. Code, § 945.4 [“no suit for money or damages may be brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented … until a written claim therefor has been presented to the public entity and has been acted upon by the board, or has been deemed to have been rejected by the board”].) The purpose of this so-called claim presentation requirement “is to provide notice to the public entity that a valid claim may exist and that litigation ‘may ensue’ if it is not resolved. [Citation.] The point of the requirements is … to permit the public entity to avoid litigation by enabling it to conduct an early investigation and consider the benefits of settling a claim.” (Alliance Financial v. City and County of San Francisco (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 635, 647, italics omitted; see also City of Stockton v. Superior Court, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 744 [purpose of claim presentation requirement is
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“facilitating the investigation of disputes and their settlement without trial if appropriate”].) The Government Claims Act applies to claims against community college districts. (Oregon State University v. Superior Court (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 1180, 1186, fn. 7; Loehr, at pp. 1078-1079.) Thus, anyone who wants to sue a community college district for money or damages must comply with the act’s claim presentation requirements.7 The Government Claims Act contains detailed claim presentation procedures.
Among other things, a claim must be in writing and must include the claimant’s address and a description of “the occurrence or transaction which gave rise to the claim asserted.” (Gov. Code, § 910, subds. (a), (c).) The claim must be presented to the public entity not later than six months after its accrual. (Gov. Code, § 911.2, subd. (a).) There are procedures for seeking leave to present a late claim (Gov. Code, §§ 911.4, 911.6), and if the public entity denies an application to present a late claim, there are procedures for petitioning the court for an order relieving the petitioner from the claim presentation requirements (Gov. Code, §§ 945.4, 946.6). The public entity’s “governing body” or “board” must act on the claim within specified time limits by rejecting, allowing, or settling it in whole or in part, and if it fails to act within those time limits the claim is deemed rejected. (Gov. Code, §§ 900.2, 912.4, 912.6.) Once a claim is rejected, the claimant generally has six months to commence a lawsuit against the public entity. (Gov. Code, § 945.6, subd. (a); Cavey v. Tualla (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 310, 329-330.) Finally, the lawsuit “is subject to dismissal if it alleges a factual basis for recovery which is not
7 In her lawsuit, Royer asserted six causes of action alleging violations of FEHA. FEHA actions “are not subject to the claim-presentation requirements of the [Government] Claims Act.” (Snipes v. City of Bakersfield (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 861, 863, italics added.) Royer thus did not have to submit a government claim in order to bring suit on her FEHA causes of action.
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‘fairly reflected’ in the government claim.” (Hernandez v. City of Stockton (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1222, 1231.)
We conclude the Government Claims Act’s claim presentation procedures constitute an official proceeding authorized by law within the meaning of section 47(b). (See, e.g., Lemke v. Sutter Roseville Medical Center (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1292, 1299 [“The absolute privilege under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), encompasses communications made to instigate an official investigation and in connection with the investigation once commenced”]; Walker v. Kiousis (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1439 [filing and investigation of citizen’s complaint against peace officer is official proceeding authorized by law for purposes of § 47].) Moreover, the claim “itself is part of the official proceeding[].” (Lee v. Fick, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 97; see also Brody v. Montalbano (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 725, 732 [“communications to an official agency, which are designed to induce the agency to initiate action, are as much a part of the ‘official proceeding’ as communications made after the agency commences proceedings”].)
As noted, the Ralph M. Brown Act (the Brown Act) (Gov. Code, § 54950 et seq.)
is also relevant to our analysis. Its stated purpose is to ensure that public entities deliberate and act “openly.” (Gov. Code, § 54950.) To effectuate this purpose it provides, “All meetings of the legislative body of a local agency shall be open and public … except as otherwise provided by this chapter.” (Gov. Code, § 54953, subd. (a).) A “ ‘meeting’ ” includes “any congregation of a majority of the members of a legislative body … to hear, discuss, deliberate, or take action on any item that is within the subject matter jurisdiction of the legislative body.” (Gov. Code, § 54952.2, subd. (a).) A “ ‘local agency’ ” includes a “school district” (Gov. Code, § 54951) and a “ ‘legislative body’ ” includes the “board” of a local agency (Gov. Code, § 54952). The District’s board is thus a legislative body within the meaning of the Brown Act, and when it hears, discusses, deliberates or acts on a matter within its jurisdiction, it must generally do so in a meeting
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that is open to the public.8 And because acting on claims presented pursuant to the Government Claims Act is a matter within the subject matter jurisdiction of the board (see Gov. Code, § 912.4, subd. (a) [“The board shall act on a claim”]), that also means the board is required by the Brown Act to hear, discuss, deliberate, and act on such claims at a public meeting.
The Brown Act also provides, “At least 72 hours before a regular meeting, the legislative body … shall post an agenda” on its “internet website” that “shall contain a brief general description of each item of business to be transacted or discussed at the meeting, including items to be discussed in closed session.” (Gov. Code, § 54954.2, subd. (a)(1), (a)(1)(B), (a)(1)(A).) And it provides, “Any person may request that … a copy of all the documents constituting the agenda packet … of any meeting of a legislative body be mailed to that person,” and, “If a local agency has an internet website, the legislative body or its designee shall email a copy of, or website link to, the … copy of all the documents constituting the agenda packet if the person requests that the item or items be delivered by email.” (Gov. Code, § 54954.1, italics added.) If the legislative body is required to provide a “website link” to “all of the documents constituting the agenda packet” upon request, we find it is implicitly permitted to post those documents on the local agency’s website even absent such a request.
The Brown Act also permits (but does not require) a legislative body to hold a closed session “based on advice of its legal counsel, … to confer with, or receive advice from, its legal counsel regarding pending litigation when discussion in open session concerning those matters would prejudice the position of the local agency in the
8 We note Education Code section 72121 reiterates that “all meetings of the governing board of any community college district shall be open to the public, and all actions authorized or required by law of the governing board shall be taken at the meetings.”
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litigation.” (Gov. Code, § 54956.9, subd. (a), italics added.) Litigation is considered pending upon “receipt of a claim pursuant to the Government Claims Act.” (Gov. Code, § 54954.9, sub. (e)(3); see also id., subd. (d)(2).) Importantly, however, even if the legislative body holds a closed session to discuss a government claim, the “claim … shall be available for public inspection.” (Gov. Code, § 54956.9, subd. (e)(3), italics added.) This provision “expressly acknowledges the availability of the [Government] Claims Act claims themselves for public inspection.” (Poway Unified Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1496, 1503.)
We thus find the entire claims presentation process outlined in the Government Claims Act, and the consideration of that claim at a public meeting as required by the Brown Act and the publication of the claim in advance of that meeting, is part of an official proceeding authorized by law within the meaning of section 47(b). (See, e.g., Frisk v. Merrihew, supra, 42 Cal.App.3d at p. 324 [“school board meeting” “may be duly classified as official proceedings authorized by law within the purview of section 47”].) C. The official proceeding privilege defeats Royer’s invasion of privacy cause of action Again, section 47(b) provides, “A privileged publication … is one made: [¶] … In any … official proceeding authorized by law,” and case law teaches this privilege is “absolute” and applies regardless of “malice or the intent to harm” (Kashian v. Harriman, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 913) and “will defeat claims of invasion of privacy” (Ribas v. Clark, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 364). Applying the plain language of the statute as interpreted by case law to the facts of this case, we find the District’s publication of Royer’s claim was absolutely privileged, and she thus cannot establish a probability of prevailing on the merits of her invasion of privacy cause of action. (See Dziubla v. Piazza (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 140, 154-155 (Dziubla) [even if “plaintiffs could probably show minimal merit as to most of their claims,” “they could not overcome … the litigation privilege,” and the privilege thus “disposes of [those] claims in the second part of the anti-SLAPP analysis”].)
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Royer does not mention section 47(b) in her briefs, other than to note in passing that the trial court found it applied.9 This failure to address section 47(b) is potentially fatal to her appeal because, as noted above, even though our review is de novo, it is still Royer’s burden to show the trial court erred in finding the District’s publication of Royer’s claim was absolutely privileged. (See Niko v. Foreman (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 344, 368 [“One cannot simply say the court erred, and leave it up to the appellate court to figure out why”].) By failing to address the trial court’s finding, she fails to meet her burden of showing the trial court erred in granting the anti-SLAPP motion. (See New Plumbing Contractors, Inc. v. Edwards, Sooy & Byron (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 799, 802 [appellant “never addresses” the particular issue and thus “fails to carry the appellant’s burden of affirmatively demonstrating error”].) Nonetheless, we will briefly explain why we find the trial court did not err in concluding the publication was absolutely privileged.
The privilege applies when the publication at issue has some “logical relation” to the official proceeding and it is lost “only when the matter is so palpably irrelevant to the subject matter that no reasonable man can doubt its irrelevancy and impropriety.” (Cayley v. Nunn (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 300, 303, 304.) Put another way, “Even when a document broadly relates to [an official proceeding], it may contain unrelated parts that do not find shelter in the privilege. When communications are ‘substantially extraneous’ to the [official] proceedings, there are ‘reasonable limits’ on the application of the privilege.” (Dziubla, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 156.) We conclude the publication of Royer’s claim had a logical relation to the official proceeding and was not so
9 Royer only addresses whether the trial court erred in finding she had no reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances. As noted above, we need not address this issue, because even if we were to find Royer had a reasonable expectation of privacy and thus might have been able to establish the elements of a cause of action for invasion of privacy, the privilege would still defeat the claim.
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substantially extraneous or palpably irrelevant that no reasonable person could doubt its irrelevancy or impropriety.
As discussed above, the District’s board was required to consider Royer’s claim at a meeting that was open to the public unless it met the requirements for holding a closed session to discuss pending litigation, and even if it held a closed session to discuss the claim, the claim itself had to be made available for public inspection. (Gov. Code, § 54956.9, subds (a), (e)(3).) Moreover, the board’s standard practice was to discuss government claims in open session, and the District’s standard practice was to post on its website both the agenda and agenda materials for upcoming board meetings and to include government claims in the agenda materials. And although the District may not have been required to post (or publish) the agenda materials on its website, it was implicitly permitted to do so. (See Gov. Code, § 54954.1.) Publishing Royer’s claim was thus neither “palpably irrelevant” (Cayley v. Nunn, supra, 190 Cal.App.3d at p. 304) nor “ ‘substantially extraneous’ ” (Dziubla, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 156) to the official proceeding at which the claim would be discussed and/or decided.
In this regard, we find it appropriate to analogize Royer’s claim to a complaint in a judicial proceeding: Just as filing a government claim institutes an official proceeding authorized by law (i.e., the claim presentation process required by the Government Claims Act), filing a complaint institutes a judicial proceeding. It is well established that filing a complaint or other pleadings and papers in a judicial proceeding is absolutely privileged pursuant to section 47(b). (See Rubin v. Green (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1187, 1195 [privilege applies to “filing the complaint and subsequent pleadings in the litigation”]; Holland v. Jones (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 378, 382 [defamatory statements in a declaration filed in a marital dissolution proceeding were absolutely privileged]; Navellier v. Sletten, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 770 [“Pleadings and process in a case are generally viewed as privileged communications”]; Sacramento Brewing Co. v. Desmond, Miller & Desmond (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1086 [“ ‘a publication made
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in the course of a judicial proceeding is absolutely privileged’ ”]; California Physicians’ Service v. Superior Court, supra, 9 Cal.App.4th at p. 1330 [“Defensive pleading, including the assertion of affirmative defenses, is communication protected by the absolute litigation privilege”]; Frank Pisano & Associates v. Taggart, supra, 29 Cal.App.3d at p. 24 [privilege applies “ ‘to the pleadings, the oral or written evidence, [and] to publications in open court or in briefs or affidavits’ ”]; Baker v. Littman (1956) 138 Cal.App.2d 510, 514, fn * [“Respondent’s conduct … consisted only of the filing of a civil action. Such a publication is absolutely privileged”].) And if the filing or publication of a complaint is absolutely privileged, then, by analogy, so is the publication of a government claim.
That leaves Royer’s argument that the District should have redacted her private information before publishing the claim. Although we are not unsympathetic to this argument, it would be difficult to maintain the absolute nature of the privilege while at the same time allowing a plaintiff to go through an otherwise privileged publication lineby -line and parse out private information from public information, because allowing a plaintiff to do so risks turning an absolute privilege into a conditional privilege. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the test is not whether the publication contains private information; the test is whether the publication bears a “ ‘reasonable relation’ ” to the official proceeding or is “ ‘substantially extraneous’ ” to it. (Dziubla, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at pp. 155, 156.) We find the challenged portion of the publication bears a reasonable relation to the official proceeding.
The Government Claims Act requires a claimant to include his or her address on the claim. (Gov. Code, § 910, subd. (a).) It also requires the claimant to include a description of the “circumstances … which gave rise to the claim asserted.” (Gov. Code, § 910, subd. (c).) For a failure to accommodate claim, including a description of the circumstances giving rise to the claim could include identifying the medical condition for which an accommodation was sought. At a minimum, Royer’s medical condition was
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“directly relevant” to her claim. (Vinson v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833, 839, 842 [because “plaintiff haled defendants into court and accused them of causing her various mental and emotional ailments,” her “present mental and emotional condition is directly relevant to her claim”].) Because the Government Claims Act required Royer to provide her address and permitted her to identify her medical condition, we cannot say that publishing this information (i.e., by failing to redact it) is either palpably irrelevant or bears no logical relation to the official proceeding.10 Royer may disagree, because she states, “Much akin to having to redact social security numbers prior to submitting papers on the court docket, [the District] should have redacted [her] confidential private information” before publishing her claim. She does not cite any legal authority to support this statement, and we find the analogy is not apt for two reasons. First, although rule 1.201 of the California Rules of Court does generally require that social security numbers and financial account numbers be redacted “from all pleadings and other papers filed in the court’s public file,” it does not require
10 We note that although the Government Claims Act “does require a claimant to provide some potentially private information, generally, one who submits a tort claim has no reasonable expectation of privacy.” (Poway Unified Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at p. 1505; see also Register Div. of Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. County of Orange (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 893, 902 [by asserting personal injury claim, claimant “placed his alleged physical injuries, and medical records substantiating the same, in issue,” and “by voluntarily submitting these records to the County for the purpose of reaching a settlement on his claim, [he] tacitly waived any expectation of privacy regarding these medical records”]; Vinson v. Superior Court, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 839, 842 [plaintiff who accused defendants “of causing her various mental and emotional ailments” “waived her right to privacy in this respect”].)
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the redaction of addresses or medical information.11 And second, just because social security numbers must be redacted in court filings does not necessarily mean the failure to do so would give rise to a cause of action for invasion of privacy. Although we have found no California cases discussing this issue, there are out-of-state cases that hold the litigation privilege defeats an invasion of privacy claim based on the inclusion of a person’s social security number in court papers. In Finnerty v. State Bank & Trust Co. (2009) 301 Ga.App. 569 [687 S.E.2d 842], for example, the plaintiff bank sued the defendant for defaulting on a promissory note. The bank included the note as an exhibit to the complaint, and the note contained the defendant’s unredacted social security number. The defendant filed a counterclaim for invasion of privacy, and the bank moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion and the appellate court affirmed, holding, “such invasion of privacy claims are barred because the pleadings filed in this case, including the exhibits, are privileged.”12 (687 S.E.2d at p. 843.) It also rejected the defendant’s argument that his social security number was not pertinent or material to the relief sought and thus was not privileged, explaining, “this argument misses the mark. Clearly, the note was ‘pertinent and material’ to [the bank’s] lawsuit to collect damages after [the defendant] defaulted on the note. While the better practice would have been to redact [the defendant’s] social security number in the note, the fact
11 The rule provides, “To protect personal privacy and other legitimate interests, parties and their attorneys must not include, or must redact where inclusion is necessary, the following identifiers from all pleadings and other papers filed in the court’s public file, whether filed in paper or electronic form, unless otherwise provided by law or ordered by the court: [¶] (1) Social security numbers. … [¶] (2) Financial account numbers.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1.201(a).) 12 Georgia’s version of the litigation privilege states, “ ‘All charges, allegations, and averments contained in regular pleadings filed in a court of competent jurisdiction, which are pertinent and material to the relief sought, whether legally sufficient to obtain it or not, are privileged.’ ” (Finnerty v. State Bank & Trust Co., supra, 687 S.E.2d at p. 843, quoting GA. Code Ann. § 51-5-8.)
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remains that the note was pertinent and material to the case and was legitimately filed.” (Ibid.; see also Johnson v. Johnson & Bell, Ltd. (Ill.Ct.App. 2014) 7 N.E.3d 52, 56 [upholding dismissal of invasion of privacy claim based on allegation the defendant attached documents to final pretrial order that contained the plaintiff’s social security number because “the absolute litigation privilege applies to plaintiff’s invasion of privacy claim”]; Vanginderen v. Cornell Univ. (S.D.Cal. Jan. 6, 2009, 08cv736 BTM(JMA)) 2009 U.S.Dist. Lexis 303, *12-*14 [holding litigation privilege defeats invasion of privacy claim based on act of filing reply brief that contained previously sealed court records].) So, too, in this case.
DISPOSITION
The order granting the anti-SLAPP motion as to the invasion of privacy claim is affirmed. The District shall recover its costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).)
/s/ EARL, P. J.
We concur:
/s/ HULL, J.
/s/ KRAUSE, J.