Roy v. City of Everett

823 P.2d 1084, 118 Wash. 2d 352, 1992 Wash. LEXIS 40

• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Decided: February 6, 1992
• Docket: 56705-1
• Status: Published

Opinions

Dolliver, J.

Sheila Roy brought this action on behalf of herself and her daughter in May 1986, following a reign of terror beginning in October 1983, during which Milton Glenn relentlessly and violently pursued and abused her. Roy sought damages against Snohomish County, members of its prosecutor's office, the City of Everett and members of its police department, and Glenn's estate. (Glenn had killed himself during his final assault on Roy on October 5, 1984.) The claim against Snohomish County and its prosecutors was dismissed on the grounds of prosecutorial immunity. Petitioners here are the City of Everett, the Everett Chief of Police and certain Everett police officers.

In her complaint, plaintiff alleged defendants failed to protect her, which failure constituted negligence, gross negligence, wanton misconduct, and outrage; violated their duties under RCW 10.99.070, the domestic violence act; failed to train and supervise; violated equal protection provisions of the Washington Constitution and RCW 49.60; and violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Her complaint does not allege any misconduct by the police in the course of an arrest or other, on-the-scene action such as entering the home to break up a fight. Rather, plaintiff claims there was a yearlong pattern by the Everett Police Department of nonenforcement of the law and failure to take adequate steps to protect her from her assailant. The issue here is whether the yearlong pattern of inaction is immunized under RCW 10.99.070. We hold it is not.

Defendants moved for summary judgment asserting they were immune from suit under RCW 10.99.070. The statute provides:

A peace officer shall not be held hable in any civil action for an arrest based on probable cause, enforcement in good faith of a court order, or any other action or omission in good faith under this chapter arising from an alleged incident of domestic violence brought by any party to the incident.

The trial court denied defendants' motion for summary judgment under the claim of immunity. In its memorandum opinion, the trial court concluded:

[T]o rely on that language [RCW 10.99.070] to completely immunize the defendants . . . would undercut the purpose of the Domestic Violence Act which is to recognize the necessity of early intervention in domestic violence cases. ... If I am to give substance to the immunity provisions of the statute, I must construe it narrowly because of the wording of the intent section. When RCW 10.99.010 and 10.99.070 are read together, the latter grants immunity only for conduct in the course of an arrest or other on the scene action such as entering a home to break up a fight . . ..

Memorandum Decision on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Memorandum Decision), at 2-3. The court further ruled that:

Defendant City and police officers' immunity under RCW 10.99.070, construed in light of the entire Domestic Violence Act, is limited to conduct in the course of an arrest or other on-the-scene action such as entering a home to break up a fight. Since Plaintiff Roy's suit is not based on such conduct, it is not barred by the immunity section of the domestic violence law, and therefore defendant's motion on that issue is denied.

Order on Parties' Motion for Summary Judgment (Order), at 1. The court also rejected the defendants' claim that qualified immunity precluded their liability for Roy's claims because "[m]aterial issues of fact exist as to whether defendants' conduct was objectively reasonable . . .". Order, at 1-2.

Defendants interpret the words in RCW 10.99.070, "any other action or omission", as giving police officers — and the entities for which they work — absolute immunity from any claim based on domestic violence, unless it can be proved the officers acted in bad faith. Under this view neither negligent failure to enforce the law nor failure on the part of a police department to develop procedures to protect victims of domestic violence would suffice to abrogate this immunity RCW 10.99.070, however, was not enacted in a vacuum. As the trial court correctly noted, it is a part of, and must be read in light of, the general purpose and intent of the domestic violence act. The statement of intent in RCW 10.99.010 reads:

The purpose of this chapter is to recognize the importance of domestic violence as a serious crime against society and to assure the victim of domestic violence the maximum protection from abuse which the law and those who enforce the law can provide. The legislature finds that the existing criminal statutes are adequate to provide protection for victims of domestic violence. However, previous societal attitudes have been reflected in policies and practices of law enforcement agencies and prosecutors which have resulted in differing treatment of crimes occurring between cohabitants and of the same crimes occurring between strangers. Only recently has public perception of the serious consequences of domestic violence to society and to the victims led to the recognition of the necessity for early intervention by law enforcement agencies. It is the intent of the legislature that the official response to cases of domestic violence shall stress the enforcement of the laws to protect the victim and shall communicate the attitude that violent be/havior is not excused or tolerated. Furthermore, it is the intent of the legislature that criminal laws be enforced without regard to whether the persons involved are or were married, cohabiting, or involved in a relationship.

That statement of intent is crucial to the case before us and explains why the "any other action or omission" language must not be interpreted as broadly as the defendants suggest, so broadly that it would vitiate the rest of RCW 10.99.

Over the lengthy period of time during which Milton Glenn terrorized and abused Sheila Roy, she was unsuccessful in stopping the violence. This lack of success might be attributable to any of a number of factors — among them, lack of societal comprehension of the problems relating to domestic violence, lack of enforcement of existing laws by the police, or failure on her own part to follow up on the complaints she made. It is not for us to determine on appeal from a denial of summary judgment for defendants, however, whether Roy may have been partially responsible for the fact that the laws protecting her were not adequately enforced. That is for the jury to decide, after weighing all the evidence. What this court can and must determine is the proper interpretation of RCW 10.99.070.

As we noted in Seven Gables Corp. v. MGM/UA Entertainment Co., 106 Wn.2d 1, 6, 721 P.2d 1 (1986):

In construing statutes, the goal is to carry out the intent of the Legislature. In doing so, it is the duty of the court in interpreting a statute to make the statute purposeful and effective. Any statutory interpretation which would render an unreasonable and illogical consequence should be avoided. Thus, in attempting to effect the intent of the Legislature, an act must be construed as a whole, harmonizing all provisions to ensure proper construction.

(Citations omitted.) Similarly, a unanimous court in Anderson v. Morris, 87 Wn.2d 706, 716, 558 P.2d 155 (1976) stated:

[I]f alternative interpretations are possible, the one that best advances the overall legislative purpose should be adopted. . . . "The primary objective of statutory construction is to carry out the intent of the legislature." Anderson v. O'Brien, 84 Wn.2d 64, 67, 524 P.2d 390 (1974). Legislative intent is to be determined in the context of the entire statute, interpreted in terms of the statute's general purpose.

Indeed, in In re R., 97 Wn.2d 182, 187, 641 P.2d 704 (1982), this court went so far as to state:

In resolving a question of statutory construction, the spirit and intent of the law should prevail over the letter of the law. Furthermore, if an act is subject to two interpretations, that which best advances the legislative purpose should he adopted.

(Citations omitted.)

The language of RCW 10.99.070, particularly that portion regarding actions or omissions in good faith by peace officers, is less than a model of clarity. Nonetheless, we fully concur with the observation of the trial court that "to rely on that language to completely immunize the defendants in the instant case would undercut the purpose of the Domestic Violence Act which is to recognize the necessity of early intervention in domestic violence cases." Memorandum Decision, at 2. The trial court properly ordered that:

Defendant City and police officers' immunity under RCW 10.99.070, construed in light of the entire Domestic Violence Act, is limited to conduct in the course of an arrest or other on-the-scene action such as entering the home to break up a fight.

Order, at 1.

The trial court's decision is in keeping with our statement in PUD 1 v. Public Empl. Relations Comm'n, 110 Wn.2d 114, 120, 750 P.2d 1240 (1988) (quoting Roza Irrig. Dist. v. State, 80 Wn.2d 633, 637-38, 497 P.2d 166 (1972)) that "if [statutory] language is susceptible of two constructions, one of which will carry out and the other defeat the manifest object [of the statute], it should receive the former construction.' " See also Human Rights Comm'n v. Cheney Sch. Dist. 30, 97 Wn.2d 118, 121, 641 P.2d 163 (1982) (in order to give effect to the intent of the Legislature, an ambiguous statute "must be read as a whole; intent is not to be determined by a single . . . phrase"). Similarly, in State v. Leech, 114 Wn.2d 700, 790 P.2d 160 (1990), we unanimously and explicitly rejected a literal interpretation of the words "in furtherance of" in the statute defining first degree arson, holding that a literal interpretation would yield absurd results. Leech, at 708-09. To enact a statute with the stated intent of ensuring enforcement of laws prohibiting domestic violence, but to include within it a blanket grant of immunity for peace officers as to any action or inaction relating to a domestic violence situation, as defendants assert the Legislature did, would be absurd in every sense of the term.

The defendants' reading of RCW 10.99.070 would make a mockery of the Legislature's clearly stated intent "to assure the victim of domestic violence the maximum protection from abuse which the law and those who enforce the law can provide." RCW 10.99.010. RCW 10.99 created no new crimes but rather emphasized the need to enforce existing criminal statutes in an evenhanded manner to protect the victim regardless of whether the victim was involved in a relationship with the aggressor. As specifically stated by the Legislature, the purpose and intent of RCW 10.99 was to counteract the societal and historical tendency not to enforce laws against domestic violence, to emphasize the need for enforcement of existing laws, and to provide guidance to law enforcement agencies in how to go about enforcing them and to protect peace officers from suit when they, in good faith, attempt to enforce the law in an incident involving domestic violence.

An interpretation of RCW 10.99.070 that protects law enforcement agencies which fail to enforce the laws defeats the stated purpose of the statute as a whole. The statute is designed to protect law enforcement officers in their good faith actions involving an "incident of domestic violence" (RCW 10.99.070), not from the failure to take action, as was the case here, in a series of events occurring in the period of over a year. If the Legislature had intended to create blanket immunity for all injuries arising out of interaction between police and parties to domestic violence, the statute could have been written so explicitly. RCW 10.99.070 should be interpreted in a way which harmonizes with the intent of the rest of the domestic violence act.

In Guffey v. State, 103 Wn.2d 144, 152, 690 P.2d 1163 (1984), we stated a rule which immunized police officers from liability when they "carrie[d] out a statutory duty". The Guffey rule still stands with regard to police conduct in situations which do not involve domestic violence. In contrast, the defendants' new rule would provide for blanket immunity in domestic violence cases even when police fail to enforce the law. Thus, the defendants' interpretation of RCW 10.99.070 actually places persons seeking to enforce the laws against domestic violence in a worse situation than if RCW 10.99 had never been passed because police immunity would be broader in domestic violence cases than in cases involving the same crime (assault, burglary, kidnapping, etc.) between strangers.

The rule of ejusdem generis reinforces the contention that RCW 10.99.070 should be read narrowly:

The ejusdem generis rule requires that general terms appearing in a statute in connection with specific terms are to be given meaning and effect only to the extent that the general terms suggest items similar to those designated by the specific terms. In short, specific terms modify or restrict the application of general terms where both are used in sequence.

Dean v. McFarland, 81 Wn.2d 215, 221, 500 P.2d 1244, 74 A.L.R.3d 378 (1972), quoted in Condit v. Lewis Refrigeration Co., 101 Wn.2d 106, 111, 676 P.2d 466 (1984). RCW 10.99.070 lists two specific actions: "an arrest based on probable cause," and "enforcement in good faith of a court order," and then adds "or any other action or omission". Under ejusdem generis, the final phrase should be interpreted to read "or any other similar action or omission"; that is, the statute immunizes peace officers for injuries arising out of events like arrests and enforcement of court orders.

The ruling of the trial court is upheld.

Utter, Brachtenbach, Durham, and Smith, JJ., and Callow, J. Pro Tern., concur.