Roy Garcia Carrillo v. Tony Eugene Berry

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedMay 18, 2000
Docket03-99-00657-CV
StatusPublished

This text of Roy Garcia Carrillo v. Tony Eugene Berry (Roy Garcia Carrillo v. Tony Eugene Berry) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Roy Garcia Carrillo v. Tony Eugene Berry, (Tex. Ct. App. 2000).

Opinion

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN




NO. 03-99-00657-CV

Roy Garcia Carrillo, Appellant


v.



Tony Eugene Berry, Appellee



FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 53RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. 98-12977, HONORABLE JOHN K. DIETZ, JUDGE PRESIDING

Roy Garcia Carrillo appeals from the final judgment rendered against him in appellee Tony Eugene Berry's negligence suit. After a jury trial, the judgment awarded to Berry $3506.37 in actual damages and pre-judgment interest and $8000.00 in punitive damages. In one issue presented, Carrillo challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the award of punitive damages. We will affirm the trial-court judgment.

Factual Background


This suit arises out of events occurring in the parking lot of the Warehouse Saloon. Carrillo testified that he had been feeling ill for several days and had been taking Nyquil, a cough medication. After work, he took a dose of the "drowsy" form of Nyquil. He went out to buy more Nyquil. Then he stopped at the Warehouse Saloon for a tequila shot to "soothe his throat." While at the bar, he consumed at least one shot of tequila, six or seven rum-and-Cokes, and two beers. He said he did not remember when he left the bar. He admitted taking a tip jar but said he did not notice it had money in it; he took it because he liked the way it looked and his son had a collection of glasses. After leaving the bar, he got into the van he was driving. He noticed a "group of guys" coming toward him as he drove off; he said he panicked and kept going. He testified that he was aware of the dangers of drinking and driving, such as problems with reaction time, losing coordination, and an increased possibility of having an accident that could kill or injure someone. He also testified that he usually drank a "quart a day" of alcohol, depending on how stressful the day had been, and was familiar with the effects of alcohol on himself.

Joseph Salazar, a security guard at the Warehouse, testified that his responsibilities included patron control, both inside the bar and in the parking lot. On the night in question, he saw Carrillo grab and break a tip jar, take the money, go outside, jump in the van and "take off." Carrillo drove the wrong way in attempting to leave the parking lot, ended up at a dead end, reversed the van's direction, skidded, and continued to attempt to leave. He saw the van hit Berry.

Tony Berry, also a security guard, similarly testified that he was responsible for problems inside the club and in the parking lot. On the night in question, he was told that two tip jars had been stolen and he went toward an exit. He heard the sound of breaking glass and saw Carrillo leaving. He attempted to stop Carrillo by moving toward the van, but there was still enough room in the lot for the van to pass him. The van ran over his foot. The impact threw him into the side of the van, forcing his elbow violently into his ribs. He hit the mirror and was knocked backward, "landing on my rear end." The van failed to make a necessary turn and ended up at a dead end in the parking lot. The van then backed up rapidly, and if Berry had not scrambled out of the way, Carrillo would have "hit me again."

Scott Solomon, the investigating officer from the Austin Police Department, testified that he administered an intoxilyzer test to Carrillo. The test registered a .14 blood alcohol reading. Solomon described Carrillo at the scene as having bloodshot eyes, an intolerable odor of alcohol on his person, slurred speech, staggering walk, and a "cocky attitude."



Discussion


Standard of Review



In one issue, appellant contends the trial court erred in awarding punitive damages. He challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the punitive damages award. In deciding a no-evidence point, we consider only the evidence and inferences tending to support the finding of the trier of fact and disregard all evidence and inferences to the contrary. See Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Crye, 907 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex. 1995); Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. 1965). We will uphold the finding if more than a scintilla of evidence supports it. See Crye, 907 S.W.2d at 499; In re King's Estate, 244 S.W.2d 660, 661 (Tex. 1951). The evidence supporting a finding amounts to more than a scintilla if reasonable minds could differ in their conclusions. See Crye, 907 S.W.2d at 499; Transportation Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 25 (Tex. 1994); see generally William Powers, Jr. & Jack Ratliff, Another Look at "No Evidence" and "Insufficient Evidence," 69 Tex. L. Rev. 515 (1991).

When deciding an insufficient evidence point, we must consider and weigh all of the evidence and should set aside the judgment only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. See Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); In re King's Estate, 244 S.W.2d 660, 661 (Tex. 1951); see also Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1986); see generally William Powers, Jr. & Jack Ratliff, Another Look at "No Evidence" and "Insufficient Evidence," 69 Tex. L. Rev. 515 (1991).



Punitive Damages



To receive punitive damages, a claimant must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the harm suffered resulted from malice. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 41.003(a)(2) (West 1997). The relevant definition of malice is:



(B) an act or omission:



(i) which viewed objectively from the standpoint of the actor at the time of its occurrence involves an extreme degree of risk, considering the probability and magnitude of the potential harm to others; and



(ii) of which the actor has actual, subjective awareness of the risk involved but nevertheless proceeds with conscious indifference to the rights, safety or welfare of others.



Id. at § 41.001(7)(B).



The definition of malice in section 41.001(7)(B) mirrors the court's definition of gross negligence in Transportation Insurance Company v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 23 (Tex. 1994). See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Ellender, 968 S.W.2d 917, 921 n.2 (Tex. 1998). Therefore, Moriel

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Roy Garcia Carrillo v. Tony Eugene Berry, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/roy-garcia-carrillo-v-tony-eugene-berry-texapp-2000.