Rowntree v. State

• Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
• Decided: August 17, 1998
• Docket: 03C01-9709-CR-00379
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE JUNE SESSION, 1998 FILED August 17, 1998

Cecil Crowson, Jr. CARL ROWNTREE, ) Appe llate Court C lerk ) No. 03C01-9709-CR-00379 Appellant ) ) KNOX COUNTY vs. ) ) Hon. RAY L. JENKINS, Judge STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) ) (Post-Conviction) Appellee )

For the Appellant: For the Appellee:

Carl Towntree, Pro Se John Knox Walkup N.E.C.C. #225115 Attorney General and Reporter P. O. Box 5000 Mountain City, TN 37683-5000 Ellen H. Pollack Assistant Attorney General Criminal Justice Division 450 James Robertson Parkway Nashville, TN 37243-0493

Randall E. Nichols District Attorney General City-County Building Knoxville, TN 37902

OPINION FILED:

AFFIRMED

David G. Hayes Judge OPINION

The appellant, Carl Rowntree, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s

denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court summarily

dismissed the petition finding the claims alleged were barred by the statute of

limitations.

After review, we affirm.

In April 1993, the appellant pled guilty to second degree murder and

aggravated robbery. Pursuant to these guilty pleas, the trial court imposed

concurrent sentences of forty years incarceration for second degree murder and

twenty years incarceration for aggravated robbery. On April 7, 1997, the appellant

filed a pro se petition seeking post-conviction relief. The appellant’s petition raised

the claims of (1) involuntary guilty plea and (2) ineffective assistance of counsel. On

April 17, 1997, the Knox County Criminal Court summarily dismissed the petition as

being time-barred.

At the time the appellant’s convictions became final, April 1993, the statute of

limitations applicable to post-conviction proceedings was three years. Tenn. Code

Ann. § 40-30-102 (repealed 1995). In 1995, the legislature reduced the statutory

period for filing post-conviction petitions from three years to one year. Tenn. Code

Ann. § 40-30-202(a) (1995 Supp.). As a result, the new Post-Conviction Procedure

Act governs this petition and all petitions filed after May 10, 1995. Because the

previous three-year statute of limitations had not expired at the time the new Act

went into effect, his right to petition for post-conviction relief survived under the new

Act. See Carter v. State, 952 S.W.2d 417, 420 (Tenn. 1997). Therefore, the

appellant had until May 10, 1996, one year from the effective date of the new Act, to

2 file for post-conviction relief. Compiler’s Notes, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-201 (1996

Supp.); see also Daniels v. State, No. 03C01-9606-CC-00244 (Tenn. Crim. App. at

Knoxville, Feb. 27, 1997), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. Sept. 29, 1997). Instead,

the appellant filed this petition almost 11 months after the statute had run.

Moreover, the grounds raised in this petition and on appeal do not fall within any of

the exceptions to the statute of limitations set out in Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-

202(b)(1), (2), or (3). The statute of limitations on this petition has expired, requiring

a dismissal of the appellant’s petition for post-conviction relief.

Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

____________________________________ DAVID G. HAYES, Judge

CONCUR:

_________________________________ JOHN H. PEAY, Judge

_________________________________ JOSEPH M. TIPTON, Judge