ORDER DENYING MOTION PURSUANT TO § 2255 OF TITLE 28 UNITED STATES CODE
HAUK, District Judge.
The Petitioner, incarcerated at Terminal Island, brings this Motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, seeking a reduction of the sentence imposed by this Court on November 9, 1971. Because every point raised in this petition is fully answered in the official record of his conviction and in the Reporter’s Transcripts, Volumes I and II, there is no need for a hearing. Devinney v. United States of America, [Slip Opinion # 72-2510, dated February 20, 1973]; Jack v. United States, 435 F.2d 317, 319-320 (9th Cir. 1970), cert, denied, 402 U.S. 933, 91 S.Ct. 1530, 28 L.Ed.2d 867 (1971).
Petitioner makes the following contentions :
1. There was a breach of an agreement by the prosecution not to prosecute in No. 8388-Crim. a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 501.
2. Counsel refused to prepare a case or make any motions, saying that this Judge was out to “get” him, and he would not take a chance of having his license revoked because the Judge had a grudge against him.
3. The Court denied the right to subpoena witnesses.
4. The Court offered a 2-year sentence, but yielded to the Government’s insistence on a 3-year sentence.
In the light of the foregoing, he asks that the sentence be modified to two years. A brief history of the proceedings and the indictments involved is necessary to show that all of these conten[706]*706tions are frivolous and absolutely refuted by the record.
On July 8, 1971, a call of the calendar revealed that this Petitioner was a defendant in Indictment No. 7833 charging 27 counts of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341; Indictment No. 8387 also charing 27 counts of mail fraud was trailing for disposition; Indictment No. 8388, 1 count of unauthorized use of postal meter in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 501; and No. 8454 which was a transfer from the Southern District of California for a plea of guilty under Rule 20. [It is noted that No. 8387 was a superseding indictment to No. 7833, and the latter numbered ease was dismissed in proceedings on October 24, 1971 (R.T. Vol. II, 37).]
On July 8, 1971, the defendant entered his plea of guilty in No. 7833 to Counts 1, 2, 18, 19, 26 and 27 after indicating that he had read, understood and signed a statement of his constitutional rights (R.T. Vol. I, 10). He also entered a plea of guilty to the one Count in Indictment No. 8388 (R.T. Vol. I, 12), as well as to the two Counts in Indictment No. 8454 under Rule 20 (R.T. Vol. 1,13).
The Court questioned this Petitioner extensively concerning his understanding of the nature of the charges, possible penalties on each, voluntariness of the plea and the factual basis thereof (R.T. Vol. I, 15-31). It is specifically noted that Petitioner testified under oath that no promises of reward or special treatment had been made to him (R.T. Vol. I, 20) and that he pleaded guilty in No. 8388, the postage meter charge about which he now claims that there was an agreement not to prosecute (R.T. Vol. I, 25). No such statement was made at the time of the plea, and August 2, 1971, was the date set for probation hearing and sentence.
At the time of sentence, retained counsel made a plea for leniency, and this Petitioner indicated that he had nothing to add (R.T. Vol. I, 41). Petitioner had been granted probation on a previous mail fraud conviction, and the Court then proceeded to pronounce sentence. On Count 1 of Indictment 7833, he was committed to the custody of the Attorney General for a period of 5 years, to be eligible for parole under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a)(2). (R.T. Vol. I, 43). The same sentence was imposed on each of the other counts of that indictment to which Petitioner had plead guilty, namely Counts 2, 18, 19, 26 and 27, all to run concurrently with the sentence on Count 1. In No. 8388, he was sentenced to serve 3 years concurrently with the sentences previously imposed. In No. 8454 (the Rule 20 case from the Southern District of California), the Court also imposed a 5-year sentence, but recommended placement in the Los Angeles County Treatment Center Complex for a period of six months, the balance of the sentence to be suspended (R.T. Vol. I, 43-45). The same sentence was given on Count 2 of Indictment 8454, to run concurrently. (R.T. Vol. I, 45).
Counsel for this Petitioner then protested that he was told that this Court never gave more than a one-year sentence in these cases (R.T. 46). After a lengthy discussion, in which the Court stated that it was not engaging in plea bargaining and never made advance promises about sentences, the Court ordered the guilty pleas withdrawn and stricken, and not guilty pleas reinstated (R.T. Vol. I, 52-53, 58). No. 8454, the Rule 20 case, was remanded to the Southern District of California (R.T. 55). The consolidated cases Nos. 7833, 8387 and 8388, were set for jury trial on October 12, 1971. (R.T. Vol. I, 56, 59).
Pretrial discovery proceedings took place on September 27 and 28, 1971, at which time the question of subpoena of witnesses arose. The Court urged counsel for Petitioner and the Government to try to reach a stipulation, if possible, but was informed that the Petitioner refused to stipulate (R.T. Vol. II, 7, 11). Counsel contended that out of some 500 witnesses who had responded to Petitioner’s advertisements, about 117 received some merchandise, although not [707]*707exactly what they expected. Since the Government was willing to stipulate everything the witnesses could possibly testify to, the Court refused to order them subpoenaed (R.T. Vol. II, 11), especially since at one time this Petitioner had thirty thousand dollars in his bank account and was able to subpoena them himself (R.T. Vol. II, 12).
Counsel then listed 20 people for whom subpoenas by the Court were requested, all of which were denied as being too far from the jurisdiction of the Court. (R.T. Vol. II, 17-20). It was admitted that none of these witnesses had been interviewed, so there was no certainty as to the nature of their testimony. Moreover, the Court stated that testimony to the effect that certain people had not been cheated had no relevance to nor bearing on the charge that others had, in fact, been cheated. (R.T. Vol. II, 21). There is no showing that this was an abuse of discretion.
On October 14, 1971, as previously stated, Indictment No. 7833 was dismissed and superseding Indictment No. 8387 was consolidated for trial with No. 8388 and set for November 9, 1971 (R.T. Vol. II, 37).
On the date set for trial, the jury and witnesses were excused, and the Court reviewed the proceedings in the case to date (R.T. Vol. II, 46-51). During a meeting in chambers, the Court said, “I want the Defendant to understand what has been going on here and to have full knowledge of what his counsel and Government counsel have been doing so there will be no doubt about it . . .” (R.T. Vol. II, 51).
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ORDER DENYING MOTION PURSUANT TO § 2255 OF TITLE 28 UNITED STATES CODE
HAUK, District Judge.
The Petitioner, incarcerated at Terminal Island, brings this Motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, seeking a reduction of the sentence imposed by this Court on November 9, 1971. Because every point raised in this petition is fully answered in the official record of his conviction and in the Reporter’s Transcripts, Volumes I and II, there is no need for a hearing. Devinney v. United States of America, [Slip Opinion # 72-2510, dated February 20, 1973]; Jack v. United States, 435 F.2d 317, 319-320 (9th Cir. 1970), cert, denied, 402 U.S. 933, 91 S.Ct. 1530, 28 L.Ed.2d 867 (1971).
Petitioner makes the following contentions :
1. There was a breach of an agreement by the prosecution not to prosecute in No. 8388-Crim. a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 501.
2. Counsel refused to prepare a case or make any motions, saying that this Judge was out to “get” him, and he would not take a chance of having his license revoked because the Judge had a grudge against him.
3. The Court denied the right to subpoena witnesses.
4. The Court offered a 2-year sentence, but yielded to the Government’s insistence on a 3-year sentence.
In the light of the foregoing, he asks that the sentence be modified to two years. A brief history of the proceedings and the indictments involved is necessary to show that all of these conten[706]*706tions are frivolous and absolutely refuted by the record.
On July 8, 1971, a call of the calendar revealed that this Petitioner was a defendant in Indictment No. 7833 charging 27 counts of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341; Indictment No. 8387 also charing 27 counts of mail fraud was trailing for disposition; Indictment No. 8388, 1 count of unauthorized use of postal meter in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 501; and No. 8454 which was a transfer from the Southern District of California for a plea of guilty under Rule 20. [It is noted that No. 8387 was a superseding indictment to No. 7833, and the latter numbered ease was dismissed in proceedings on October 24, 1971 (R.T. Vol. II, 37).]
On July 8, 1971, the defendant entered his plea of guilty in No. 7833 to Counts 1, 2, 18, 19, 26 and 27 after indicating that he had read, understood and signed a statement of his constitutional rights (R.T. Vol. I, 10). He also entered a plea of guilty to the one Count in Indictment No. 8388 (R.T. Vol. I, 12), as well as to the two Counts in Indictment No. 8454 under Rule 20 (R.T. Vol. 1,13).
The Court questioned this Petitioner extensively concerning his understanding of the nature of the charges, possible penalties on each, voluntariness of the plea and the factual basis thereof (R.T. Vol. I, 15-31). It is specifically noted that Petitioner testified under oath that no promises of reward or special treatment had been made to him (R.T. Vol. I, 20) and that he pleaded guilty in No. 8388, the postage meter charge about which he now claims that there was an agreement not to prosecute (R.T. Vol. I, 25). No such statement was made at the time of the plea, and August 2, 1971, was the date set for probation hearing and sentence.
At the time of sentence, retained counsel made a plea for leniency, and this Petitioner indicated that he had nothing to add (R.T. Vol. I, 41). Petitioner had been granted probation on a previous mail fraud conviction, and the Court then proceeded to pronounce sentence. On Count 1 of Indictment 7833, he was committed to the custody of the Attorney General for a period of 5 years, to be eligible for parole under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a)(2). (R.T. Vol. I, 43). The same sentence was imposed on each of the other counts of that indictment to which Petitioner had plead guilty, namely Counts 2, 18, 19, 26 and 27, all to run concurrently with the sentence on Count 1. In No. 8388, he was sentenced to serve 3 years concurrently with the sentences previously imposed. In No. 8454 (the Rule 20 case from the Southern District of California), the Court also imposed a 5-year sentence, but recommended placement in the Los Angeles County Treatment Center Complex for a period of six months, the balance of the sentence to be suspended (R.T. Vol. I, 43-45). The same sentence was given on Count 2 of Indictment 8454, to run concurrently. (R.T. Vol. I, 45).
Counsel for this Petitioner then protested that he was told that this Court never gave more than a one-year sentence in these cases (R.T. 46). After a lengthy discussion, in which the Court stated that it was not engaging in plea bargaining and never made advance promises about sentences, the Court ordered the guilty pleas withdrawn and stricken, and not guilty pleas reinstated (R.T. Vol. I, 52-53, 58). No. 8454, the Rule 20 case, was remanded to the Southern District of California (R.T. 55). The consolidated cases Nos. 7833, 8387 and 8388, were set for jury trial on October 12, 1971. (R.T. Vol. I, 56, 59).
Pretrial discovery proceedings took place on September 27 and 28, 1971, at which time the question of subpoena of witnesses arose. The Court urged counsel for Petitioner and the Government to try to reach a stipulation, if possible, but was informed that the Petitioner refused to stipulate (R.T. Vol. II, 7, 11). Counsel contended that out of some 500 witnesses who had responded to Petitioner’s advertisements, about 117 received some merchandise, although not [707]*707exactly what they expected. Since the Government was willing to stipulate everything the witnesses could possibly testify to, the Court refused to order them subpoenaed (R.T. Vol. II, 11), especially since at one time this Petitioner had thirty thousand dollars in his bank account and was able to subpoena them himself (R.T. Vol. II, 12).
Counsel then listed 20 people for whom subpoenas by the Court were requested, all of which were denied as being too far from the jurisdiction of the Court. (R.T. Vol. II, 17-20). It was admitted that none of these witnesses had been interviewed, so there was no certainty as to the nature of their testimony. Moreover, the Court stated that testimony to the effect that certain people had not been cheated had no relevance to nor bearing on the charge that others had, in fact, been cheated. (R.T. Vol. II, 21). There is no showing that this was an abuse of discretion.
On October 14, 1971, as previously stated, Indictment No. 7833 was dismissed and superseding Indictment No. 8387 was consolidated for trial with No. 8388 and set for November 9, 1971 (R.T. Vol. II, 37).
On the date set for trial, the jury and witnesses were excused, and the Court reviewed the proceedings in the case to date (R.T. Vol. II, 46-51). During a meeting in chambers, the Court said, “I want the Defendant to understand what has been going on here and to have full knowledge of what his counsel and Government counsel have been doing so there will be no doubt about it . . .” (R.T. Vol. II, 51). In this Petitioner’s presence, it was stated by Petitioner’s counsel that the three-year sentence recommended by and acceptable to the Government would be acceptable to him with a provision of time for remand [suspension of execution] because of personal problems (R.T. Vol. II, 52).
The Court stated that it usually accepted Government recommendations on sentence, and would probably go along with a 3-year term, although originally the Court had imposed a 5-year sentence, since the probation report had already been considered. Petitioner indicated that he understood (R.T. Vol. II, 53-54). At no time was there ever any mention of a 2-year term or any other possible sentence.
This Petitioner then, on that date of November 9, 1971, entered a plea of guilty once again to Counts 1, 2, 18, 19, 26 and 27 of the superseding Indictment No. 8387 and guilty to the one-count Indictment No. 8388 (R.T. Vol. II, 59-60).
Once again the Petitioner was sworn and the Court interrogated him to determine the voluntariness of the pleas and the factual basis therefor.1 Petitioner [710]*710stated that his attorney was retained (R.T. Vol. II, 61), that he had discussed everything with counsel, and that he was satisfied with everything done by counsel in the case, expressing confidence in his knowledge and ability, and disclaiming any dissatisfaction (R.T. Yol. II, 70). The Court further discussed the details of the probation report with the Petitioner.2
[711]*711Finally, specifically referring to the Government’s willingness to see such a sentence imposed, the Court sentenced Petitioner to the custody of the Attorney General for three years on Count 1, with parole eligibility under 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a)(2). At this Petitioner’s request, the Court recommended that the time be served at Terminal Island, if at all possible (R.T. Vol. II, 76). The same sentence was imposed on all the other counts to which Petitioner had plead guilty, namely Counts 2, 18, 19, 26 and 27 of Indictment No. 8387, to run concurrently, and the same sentence was imposed in Indictment No. 8388, also to run concurrently with the sentences previously imposed, and concurrently with any sentence which might be imposed in the Indictment No. 8454 in the Southern District of California to which the Court had returned it, and concurrently with any State sentence which might be imposed on pending charges. Also, at Petitioner’s request that he be permitted to handle some personal affairs, the Court allowed him to remain on bail until December 1, 1971, staying execution of the sentences until that date at 10:00 a.m. when “he is to submit himself to the United States Marshal for commitment.” (R.T. Vol. II, 78-79).
At the conclusion of sentencing, Petitioner’s counsel thanked the Court, saying the sentence had been most generous and included many matters which had not been previously agreed upon (R.T. Vol. II, 79). It is quite apparent that contrary to Petitioner’s contention, there was no “grudge” nor animosity between the Court and counsel. The record shows that counsel acted diligently and made an even more advantageous sentence-arrangement than that which had earlier been imposed.
It is recognized that plea bargaining is a judicially approved procedure. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1972); North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27. L.Ed.2d 162 (1970). It is impossible to tell whether this Petitioner is having second thoughts about his pleas to agreed-upon sentences, or whether he is employing some hindsight; but it is obvious that the claims here asserted were subsequently conceived. They are completely unsubstantiated. Since his pleas were counselled by a competent attorney since the Court determined that they were voluntary and that there were factual bases for each plea, they are not subject to this attack. [712]*712Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 90 S.Ct. 1458, 25 L.Ed.2d 785 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970).
The Petition, files and records conclusively show that Petitioner is entitled to no relief, and no hearing is necessary or required. 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
It is therefore, hereby ordered that this Motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 be, and the same is, hereby denied.