Rottman v. Beverly

162 So. 73, 1935 La. App. LEXIS 601
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedJune 14, 1935
DocketNo. 1445.
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 162 So. 73 (Rottman v. Beverly) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rottman v. Beverly, 162 So. 73, 1935 La. App. LEXIS 601 (La. Ct. App. 1935).

Opinions

DORE, Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of plaintiff and against the defendants to the amount of $4,240, for injuries caused to the plaintiff as the result of an automobile accident.

Beverly, one of the defendants, was driving his own car, being at the time in the scope of his duties as a traveling salesman for the other defendant, Colgate-Palm Olive-Peete Company; the car was a Plymouth sedan, bought three months previous to the accident. In the automobile with Beverly was another salesman of the same company, named Holloway. Beverly and his companion salesman were traveling from New Orleans towards Hammond, with Baton Rouge as their destination. .The accident occurred about one mile south of Plammond. The highway is a paved highway, having a concrete slab of 18 feet, with shoulders on each side of about 5 feet; the highway is straight and level for at least one and one-half mile from the point of accident each way, running north and south. At the time of the accident, this highway was being used as a detour from Baton Rouge to New Orleans, the Air Line being closed; it being the best way of travel between the two cities, besides being used in its regular manner from Jackson, Miss., to New Orleans; it was therefore heavily traveled.

Mrs. Annie Rottman, the plaintiff, lives adjoining this highway some 30 or 4C feet therefrom, on the west side, about two miles from the scene of the accident, and, as testified and admitted by herself, knew that this was heavily traveled by automobiles at a fast rate of speed, and, in her language, “some times three abreast.” She was a pedestrian on the highway between Ponchatoula and Hammond in the northern direction, the same direction as defendant Beverly was traveling, and, in accordance with her own testimony, was going to Hammond, walking in accordance with the rules of roads as fixed by Act No. 21 of 1932; that is, to the left.

The plaintiff was struck by the defendant’s automobile at a point near or at a crossroad called the “Minnesota Park road,” about one mile south of Hammond, during the morning of February 20, 1933, say at about 10 a. m. The exact position on the highway at the time she'was struck is the point in dispute between the parties, and forms the vital issue in the case.

Plaintiff claims that she was on the shoulder on the east side of the pavement (traveling contrary to provisions of Act No. 21 of 1932, requiring pedestrians to travel on the left hand side), near a mail box right next to the Minnesota Park road, and which mail box was some 8 feet from the east line of the concrete slab, and it was while she was attempting to touch the mail box that she was struck by the defendant’s car from the rear.

*74 The defendant Beverly, on the other hand, contends that Mrs. Rottman was crossing- the pavement from a place on the west side of the pavement known as Bou-dier’s Filling Station, walking diagonally across the pavement, without looking for on-coming traffic; she well knowing, as heretofore stated, that the highway was heavily traveled. That despite his efforts to pass to the right .of her, after warning by blowing his horn when he saw that he could not stop her in her direction or stop his car in time, he swerved to his left with the intention of passing her to the rear, and was unable to avoid striking her; the impact taking place near the center line of the pavement, however, past the mail box.

Mrs. Rottman stated that she had crossed from the west side, on which side she resided, her legal side to be on, as provided for by rule 11 (d) of section 3 of Act No. 21 of 1932, over to the east side at a point near an Italian’s place about a quarter of a mile from the scene of the accident; she further states that she did this on account of some mud on the shoulders on the west side recently thrown by workmen; that she never heard the car coming, nor the blowing of any horn, regardless of the fact, she says, that her hearing was perfect, and that, as she reached the mail box, some 4 feet from the eastern end of the pavement, in the act of putting her hand on the mail box, she was struck from the rear, and remembers nothing thereafter.

In corroboration of her testimony, she introduced one Edward Benson and his mother, to the effect that she was struck on the east side on the pavement. At first, Edward Benson testified that he was walking on the east side of the pavement in a southerly direction coming from Hammond going south, and that Mrs. Rott-man was in plain view of him, regardless of the fact that he was some distance away, and that Mrs. Rottman was walking on the east side of the pavement, and that the accident happened as detailed by her. His testimony was shakened by the testimony of his mother, Mrs. Marie Benson, to the effect that her son Edward had already been to Hammond and had returned and was in her field talking or looking on with workmen, and particularly a friend, Ernest, at the time of the accident. The defendant was adroit in crossing the witnesses, Edward Benson and his mother. Court adjourned for recess until 1:30 p. m., and, after recess, plaintiff, realizing the contradiction, sought to have Edward Benson correct his testimony to show that he was merely in the attempt to cross over the field at the time of the accident. Mrs. Benson’s testimony does not impress us, in that she speaks of being in a certain room and saw the accident through a window, and immediately thereafter she places herself in the kitchen near her kitchen stove. However, if she did see the accident as detailed by her, she certainly acted differently from all human beings. She stated that she was called to the scene of the accident by her son Edward, and did nothing until so called. The testimony of these two witnesses is very weak, even so that the trial judge gave it no consideration, as he- based his decision on the testimony of the highway officer who reached the scene of the accident some fifteen to thirty minutes thereafter, and after Mrs. Rottman had been removed from the place she had fallen to a point on the concrete slab.

Mr. Sharp, the highway officer, offered by the plaintiff in corroboration of her testimony, does not do so; on the contrary, he is more favorable to defendant’s side of the case. He only arrived after the accident and after she had been removed from where she had fallen. His testimony is only relevant to show the skidmarks. He states that they showed that Beverly’s car had skidded some 20 to 25 steps in an angular direction to the east, and that at one point two wheels had actually left the pavement and gone to the shoulder. This is directly in line with defendant’s testimony that he tried first, after applying his brakes lightly and blowing his horn, to go to the east in front of Mrs. Rottman and did leave the pavement, and, when he saw he could not avoid striking Mrs. Rottman, then attempted to pass behind her to his left. To do this, Beverly had to come back on the pavement, and, in so doing, he applied his brakes so tightly that in skidding, the car turned around completely and was facing south when stopped. Sharp, the officer, testified that he tested the brakes of the said car immediately after the accident, and that the brakes were in perfect condition, causing the four wheels to skid as evidenced by the marks on the highway.

Beverly and Holloway both testify most positively that Mrs. Rottman was on the west side of the highway when they saw her leave from Boudier’s Filling Station to go *75 across the pavement.

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Bluebook (online)
162 So. 73, 1935 La. App. LEXIS 601, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rottman-v-beverly-lactapp-1935.